



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

CAPTAIN SHIPLEY THOMAS

— 2 —



THE SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATIONS

THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

BY

SHIPLEY THOMAS


CAPTAIN 26TH U. S. INFANTRY

FIRST DIVISION, A. E. F.


**WITH MAPS, DIAGRAMS
AND ILLUSTRATIONS**



NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY



**COPYRIGHT, 1920,
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY**



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

**TO
MY WIFE**

100. 100. 100.

**HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Old Land Office Building,
Washington, D.C.**

September 29, 1919.

**Captain Shipley Thomas,
Yale Club,
New York, N.Y.**

My dear Captain Thomas:

I am sending you today by express the manuscript of the History of the A.E.F. I have read the parts pertaining to the operations in which I was concerned and you have given a faithful and impartial account of the occurrences. From what I have learned of other operations, I believe that the narrative is equally just. I regard the book as a valuable and timely contribution to the history of the American Expeditionary Forces.


I have taken the liberty of suggesting a few changes; however, and hope that you will find it agreeable to make them.

I congratulate you upon the great labor and the intense interest that you have shown in preparing the book, and I hope that it will meet with the success that it deserves.

I regret that I could not return it to you earlier, but my time has been intensely occupied and I have only this moment been able to comply with your request.

With assurances of my warm regards, I am

Cordially yours,


C. P. SUMMERALL,
Major General, U.S.A.

FOREWORD

By **BRIGADIER GENERAL U. G. McALEXANDER, U.S.A.**

(General McAlexander, as a colonel, commanded the 38th U. S. Infantry Regiment of Third U. S. Division on the Marne, and it was there, on July 15, 1918, by his heroic defence of the Surmelin Valley, that he won the name "the Rock of the Marne." When promoted to Brigadier General, he commanded the 180th Infantry Brigade of the 90th Division in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, and then in the Army of Occupation.)

An opportunity is here presented to the public to obtain an excellent account, from official and other reliable sources, of the great events in which the American Army participated in Europe during the war just ended.

The author has taken great pains to present historical facts in an attractive, readable form and to show to the mind a realistic picture of the whole scene of operations.

It may be noted that the Germans made five major drives against the Allies. The last was the only one directed against Americans. The first drive was in August and September, 1914, through Belgium and northern France down to and including the Marne east of Paris.

The second was against Verdun in 1916.

The third against the British Army and Amiens in March, 1918.

The fourth between Rheims and Soissons down to the Marne including Château-Thierry, the latter part of May, 1918—thus making what was known as the Marne Salient.

The fifth offensive was against the French and Americans on July 15th, and was made to deepen and widen the Marne Salient, and, if possible, to capture Paris.

At the end of the third and fourth drives the morale of the British and French reached their lowest levels. The attack by the 1st Division at Cantigny in May, 1918, the actions of the

2nd Division northwest of Château-Thierry in June, and the now famous defense made by the 3rd Division on the Marne July 15th, by which latter the tide of the war was turned, so reacted on the morale of the British and the French Armies as to restore great confidence. Perfect assurance of ultimate success followed the counter-attack near Soissons on July 18th. The Allied offensive was then continuous until the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

I have been over the whole of Captain Thomas's history and I am delighted with it. His account, I believe, will be approved by those who saw actual service and who are thus in a position to test his statements by personal knowledge. This certainly is the kind of history of America's work overseas that we would wish the public, and the soldier as well, to have.

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

SHIPLEY THOMAS

CAPTAIN 26TH U. S. INFANTRY, FIRST DIVISION, A. E. F.

Born in Philadelphia December 18, 1892, Shipley Thomas was educated at the Chestnut Hill Academy, from which he was graduated in 1911. During this time, he spent a year (1908-1909) in Germany, attending the Giesela Kreis Real-Schule in Munich. He graduated from Yale in 1915, and following this studied architecture in the office of Tracy and Swartwout in New York City for two years. During the summer of 1916, he attended the Plattsburg Military Training Camp; and, during the following winter (1916-1917), attended the course of instruction held under the supervision of Major General Leonard Wood, in New York City. On March 15, 1917, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Infantry Section of the Officers Reserve Corps. Immediately upon the declaration of war, he was called to active duty and ordered to Plattsburg Barracks, New York, where he assisted in the preparations for the First Officers Training Camp, May 15-August 15, 1917. At the close of this camp, he was commissioned a First Lieutenant of Infantry, U.S.R., and was one of the 1,000 officers chosen from all the training camps, to be sent immediately overseas, to fill vacancies in the First Expedition. Landing in France September 21, 1917, he attended the British Fourth Army Scouting, Observation, and Sniping School. On the completion of this course, on October 21, 1917, Lieutenant Thomas was assigned to Company I, 26th U. S. Infantry, in the 1st Division (Regulars) of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The 1st Division was then ordered to the Front to occupy the Sommerville Sector. This was the first appearance of

American troops in the front line. Commanding the second platoon of Company I, 26th Infantry, Lieutenant Thomas entered the line on November 15, 1917. After the 1st Division was withdrawn from the line for further training, Lieutenant Thomas was appointed Regimental Intelligence Officer of the 26th U. S. Infantry, which position he held until the signing of the Armistice. He served continuously with this regiment throughout every engagement in which the 1st Division took part, and was never wounded or evacuated from the Front for any cause. (Captain Thomas is the only combat officer of this regiment holding this record.) Following the Allied counter-offensive towards Soissons on July 18, 1918, he was promoted to a Captaincy by the Corps Commander. He received the following citation in Division Orders:

"Captain SHIPLEY THOMAS, 26th Infantry, served with gallantry and devotion to duty in all engagements of the regiment. As regimental Intelligence Officer he repeatedly accomplished missions of vital importance to his regimental commander. Frequently called upon to direct the movement of assaulting units and other important missions in the forward areas, he traversed ground swept by machine gun and artillery fire. At Soissons, July 18-22, 1918, he kept his regimental commander informed at all times of the progress of the advance units, exposing himself fearlessly to do so. In the Argonne Forest, Oct. 1-11, and November 6-8, 1918, his efficient and devoted work was invaluable to his commanding officer."

As First Lieutenant and Captain, he took part with the 26th Infantry, in the following engagements:

Sommerville Sector, November, 1917.

Toul Sector, March, 1918.

Cantigny Sector, April, May, June, July, 1918.

Montdidier-Noyon Defensive, June, 1918.

Aisne-Marne Offensive, July 18-22, 1918.

Sazerais Sector, August, 1918.

St. Mihiel Offensive, September 12, 1918.

Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 30-October 11, 1918.

Meuse-Argonne Offensive, November 1-November 9, 1918.
Forced march on Sedan, November 7, 1918.
Army of Occupation.

Immediately after the Armistice, Captain Shipley Thomas was ordered to attend the last course of the Army Intelligence School at Langres, France. (One combat officer from each combat division was chosen for this course, the purpose of which was to review the tactics and experiences of the American Troops on every front.) It was at this school that Captain Thomas began the compilation of his material for a history of the American fighting forces in France.

During these two months he became familiar with the history of each division. At the close of this school, on January 14, 1919, he was graduated second in the class, and ordered for duty with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. He was attached to the Committee on Roumania, and made preparations to visit that country, when the plans of the Commission were changed and the Army officers were withdrawn. Captain Thomas was then ordered to the Ninetieth Division, in the Army of Occupation, and became Adjutant of the 180th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General U. G. McAlexander. It was from General McAlexander ("The Rock of the Marne") that the accurate and impartial history of the events at Château-Thierry and on the Marne was obtained.

In April, 1919, Captain Thomas was ordered back to the United States and was demobilized, and became once more a reserve officer. He then obtained permission from the Secretary of War to write a history of the A.E.F., and the archives, records and maps of the Army War College at Washington were placed at his disposal. He was assisted in the preparation of this history by officers of the Historical Branch of the General Staff.

The manuscript of Captain Thomas's "History of the A.E.F." upon completion was submitted to the Secretary of War, and, at his direction, it was gone over by the Historical Branch of the General Staff of the United States Army.

INTRODUCTION

True to their name and calling, the Camouflage Section transformed a dull, bleak gallery in the Carteret Trecourt Barracks at Langres, France, into a most luxurious club room for the Army Intelligence School. A huge, brick fireplace, with a plentiful supply of wood, a piano, and three excellent musicians in the school; big, comfortable chairs, an abundance of magazines and card tables sufficed to draw thither every evening practically all the officers who were taking the course. Immediately after the Armistice we assembled, one captain of Infantry from each American combat division, and few of us were pleased to be there. The sole comfort we could find was the huge fireplace, so there we gathered. We were not interested in the lectures at the school, but we were intensely interested in that part of the fighting in which each had participated. And never again, do I think, will there be a more well-selected gathering of authorities on the American part in the War, for practically each officer present had fought continuously with his division. Each officer knew all about his own division, and about the divisions which had been on the right and left in various actions; and, as there was one officer from each division, the sum total of our knowledge was, could it be put together, the complete history of the American Actions of the War.

But of course this information was stored in thirty-odd different minds, and it was only by a story here, an eager question there, that the full, ungarnished tale was brought forth. At the same time, the *Stars and Stripes* (the official newspaper of the A. E. F.) was publishing in each issue, either a history of one of the combat divisions, or of a major engagement. These were eagerly read by us, and taken to the officer from that division for confirmation. On the whole they were found

to be accurate to a marked degree, and added much to our knowledge of what had actually taken place.

The history of the fighting, as I heard it there, made a lasting impression on my mind. On my return to this country, I was much surprised at the distorted accounts of the achievements of the various units. The errors had crept in as a result of the very stringent censorship. These seemed very noticeable to me, in view of the fact that, but a few months before, I had heard pieced together, bit by bit, the actual history of each division. I realized that an accurate and complete history of the American Expeditionary Forces would be welcomed.

Thus, with the note book habit (which I had acquired while studying all the history I could take at Yale), a complete file of *The Stars and Stripes*, and, best of all, my diary, I felt that I had the complete history within my grasp, and was eager to write it out.

My usual good luck was with me. I had written to Mr. Herbert Corey shortly after my return to this country, for some photographs he had taken while attached to my regiment as a correspondent. And, in a few days, scarcely a month after I had been demobilized, I received a request from Harper and Brothers to write a history of the A. E. F. This was to be a part of their twelve volume history of the War, and speed, accuracy and impartiality were the three great requirements.

I accepted, and immediately went to Washington and obtained permission from Secretary of War Baker to use the War College files in preparing the data. Here I found an immense wealth of data, and I was greatly assisted in assembling this by Major Robert Cotton, G.S., who was in charge of the Historical Branch of the General Staff. While in Washington, I visited the various Staff Corps and Departments, such as the Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Department, etc., and with few exceptions I was referred to the Historical Officer of each organization, and from them received a brief history of each service. In particular, I am most indebted to Colonel Sanford H. Wadhams (Medical Corps), and to Colonel Arnold D. Tuttle (Medical Corps), who jointly wrote that part

of this volume which deals with the Medical Corps. None are better qualified to write on this subject, for the organization of the Hospitalization of the A. E. F. was outlined and developed by these two officers.

In preparing the history of the other Arms and Services, I was greatly assisted by, and desire to express my indebtedness to General Amos T. Fries (Chemical Warfare Service), Colonel Edward Canfield, Jr. (Coast Artillery Corps), Lt.-Colonel Thomas Miller (Ordnance Corps), Lt.-Colonel Ernest K. Coulter (Quartermaster Corps), and to Colonel G. S. Patten, Jr. (Tank Corps). Without the kindly coöperation of these officers and assistance rendered by them in outlining, writing and supplying me with all the available information, this book could not pretend to be adequate.

With this array of material I began in July, 1919, to write a one-volume history of the American Expeditionary Forces, and, at the end of August, I turned the manuscript in to Harper and Brothers.

In view of the pressure under which the work was done and the obscurity of many of the American records of the war, it was far from my ideal, both in point of accuracy and in polish. I hoped to do more with this subject, should another opportunity arise. This came when George H. Doran Company offered to publish it as a separate volume. In the year that has elapsed I have not only verified everything myself, but sent the copy to many of the officers I knew in several divisions, and incorporated the changes suggested by them. Indeed, the original draft of this history has been completely rewritten in the light of more complete records, and there have been numerous substantial additions to the text. Among those who have lent me valuable assistance, I wish in particular to thank Major General Charles P. Summerall (under whose command I participated in five major engagements), for his kindly interest and criticism; also Brigadier General U. G. McAlexander, "The Rock of the Marne" (under whom I served as Brigade Adjutant in the Army of Occupation), for his assistance in making clear the complicated series of actions on the Marne and for his kindness in writing the introduction

to this volume; and Colonel George C. Marshall, Jr. (who as G-3 of the 1st Division and then of the First Army, and finally, after the Armistice, as Aide-de-Camp to General Pershing, is the one man most familiar with the history of the A. E. F.), for his interest, corrections and suggestions. Each of these officers read the manuscript and corrected errors as he read.

And yet, with it all, I fear it is inevitable that there should be some inaccuracies. My greatest effort throughout has been to give full credit to the two million Americans who so gallantly conducted themselves in France as to help bring victory to the Allied Arms. Sins of omission and commission are bound to appear in a history written so soon after the fighting closed, and as the years go on new details will come to light. My aim throughout has been to give a true account and an accurate picture of the events as they occurred. I have availed myself of all the information obtainable at this time. And I have felt, ever since those days when I sat before the huge fireplace in the French Barracks at Langres, and heard the history of the actions told by the men who had actually seen each engagement, that the American people should have the true history of the glorious record made by their armies in the World War. The A. E. F. is now history. By General Order of the War Department the American Expeditionary Forces passed out of existence on August 31, 1920.

SHIPLEY THOMAS.

New York,
September 1, 1920.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	PERSHING ARRIVES IN FRANCE Official Reception. Organization of General Staff. Training Problems. Schools.	27
II	IN TRAINING SECTORS 1st Division Arrives in France. Billets. Changes in Uniform and Equipment. The American Zone. First Americans in the Battle Line. Pershing's Tactics in Training Sectors	41
III	AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH German Spring Offensive Threatens Amiens. 1st Divi- sion Sent to Picardy. Seicheprey. Cantigny.	67
IV	THE AISNE DEFENSIVE 3rd Division at Chateau-Thierry. 2nd Division in Belleau Wood.	82
V	THE MONTDIDIER-NOYON DEFENSIVE 1st Division in Line.	97
VI	A MONTH OF WAITING Allied Forces Shifted About. Nine New Divisions Arrive. Celebration in Paris on Eve of Last German Drive.	102
VII	THE CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE 3rd, 28th, and 42nd Divisions, in Line with the French, Halt the Last German Drive. McAlexander Holds the Surmelin Valley.	114
VIII	THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE First and Second Divisions Attack Toward Soissons. German Line Broken, and Their Army Forced to Retreat from the Marne. Capture of Berzy le Sec.	132
IX	THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE MARNE 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, 42nd and 77th Divisions Fol- low the German Retreat from the Marne to the Vesle.	171

CHAPTER		PAGE
X	THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY	185
	Foch Releases American Divisions from Allied Armies, and Pershing forms the first American Army.	
XI	ST. MIHIEL	204
	With Army Three Times as Large as Grant's Army of Potomac, Pershing Reduces the Salient and Captures 16,000 Germans.	
XII	MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE	227
	September 26—October 3rd. German Retreat had Reached Hindenburg Line. Foch Decides to Force the Fighting by Combined Attack. Nine American Divi- sions Used. Hindenburg Line Pierced.	
XIII	WITH THE ALLIES	264
	27th and 30th Divisions with British in Flanders. 2nd and 36th Divisions with French in Champagne. 2nd Division Seizes Blanc Monte, which Breaks German Line.	
XIV	MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE	288
	October 4—30. Main Line Resistance Broken. American Casualties Reach Peak of the War. 1st Division's Signal Honor.	
XV	MEUSE-ARGONNE—THIRD PHASE	334
	November 1—11. Allies Smash Through on Every Front. 2nd Division Breaks the Line. 1st Division Goes Through to Sedan. Second Army Attacks on Eve of Armistice.	
XVI	AUXILIARY ARMS	378
	Heavy Artillery. Air Service. Tank Corps. Signal Corps. Chemical Warfare Service.	
XVII	THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY	411
	Quartermaster Corps. Medical Department. Engineer Corps. Ordnance Department.	
XVIII	DIVISION HISTORIES	448
	29 Combat and 13 Depot and Replacement Divisions. Pershing's Message to His Victorious Army.	
XIX	A VISITOR'S GUIDE	497
	Places of Historical Interest on Western Front. Brief Résumé of Great War, Paris, the Battlefields, and American Military Centers. Outline of Tours.	
	INDEX	527

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

ILLUSTRATIONS

General John J. Pershing, U. S. A.	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	PAGE
General Pershing and the Staff of General Headquarters	32
The French Barracks at Chaumont—Building "B"	32
Typical French Villages Behind the Front in Lorraine	33
Full Field Equipment	64
American 3-inch Field Gun	64
French 75-millimeter Field Gun	64
German Prisoners of War	65
Typical Battlefield in Northern France	65
The Allied Commanders at Metz	65
General Pershing Bids Farewell	65
340-millimeter Railway Gun Firing	384
155-millimeter G. P. F. Gun	384
155-millimeter G. P. F. Gun, Camouflaged	384
Camouflaged Railway Gun	384
"Old Dutch Cleanser"	384
75-millimeter Anti-aircraft Gun	384
240-millimeter Trench Mortar	384
8-inch Howitzer	384
6-inch Trench Mortar	384
320-millimeter Railway Gun Firing	384
British Tank Wiped Out	384
French Tanks, Manned by Americans	385
French "Baby" Renault Tank	385
Mustard Gas Protection	385
Horse and Rider Fully Protected	385
Firing through Gas	385
Romagne, the American Military Cemetery	385
"Any Port in a Storm"	432
From Firing Line to Field Hospital	432

xxii MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
An Ambulance Receiving Wounded Just Behind the Line	432
American Hospital Train	432
Interior of Hospital Train, Hauebille, France	432
Mobile Hospital (Tents) at the Front	432
Interior of Ward Tent of a Mobile Hospital	432
An American Hospital Municipality	433
Base Hospital No. 53 and No. 88 at Langres, Hante, Marne, France	433
Interior of Ward in Base Hospitals Constructed by Americans . .	433
"Homeward Bound"	433
A Field Hospital	433

MAPS

Western Front—September, 1917—American Headquarters . .	35
The American Zone—S. O. S.	49
Americans Enter Battle Line	52
The Toul Sector	58
The Chemin des Dames	61
Vosges Mountain Sector	63
Americans on Western Front, March 21, 1918	65
German Spring Drive, 1918	68
The Cantigny Sector	71
American Divisions in France, May, 1918	80
Western Front, May 27, 1918	85
The Marne Salient, June 2, 1918	88
Château-Thierry	90
Belleau Wood	93
Western Front, July 9, 1918	98
American Divisions in Marne Salient, June, 1918.	107
Western Front, July 15, 1918	115
Marne Salient, June 2, 1918	117
German Attack, July 15, 1918	120
Marne Salient, July 15, 1918	123
Champagne Front, July 15, 1918	128
Western Front, July 18, 1918	133
The Drive Towards Soissons	147
Capture of Missy-aux-Bois and Vierzy	159
Advance of July 19, 1918	163
Capture of Ploisy	165
Capture of Berzy-le-Sec	167

	PAGE
Battle Line on the Marne, July 20, 1918	172
Chateau-Thierry Evacuated	174
Line on the Ourcq River	177
Line on the Vesle River	181
The American Sector	189
Western Front, September, 1918	192
American Divisions in Allied Armies (August, 1918)	197
Western Front, September, 1918	205
The St. Mihiel Salient	207
Divisions in Line for St. Mihiel Offensive	211
Advance Reaches Thiacourt	215
The Juncture at Vigneulles	221
The New Line, St. Mihiel Salient Reduced, September 15, 1918	225
Complete Western Front	229
Assault on Hindenburg Line	231
German Lines of Defense on Western Front	233
Meuse-Argonne Battlefield (September 20, 1918)	235
Divisions in Line for Jump-off, September 26, 1918	239
First American Army Sector, September 26, 1918	242
Jump-off Meuse-Argonne	245
First Day's Advance (Meuse-Argonne)	247
Capture of Montfaucon (September 27, 1918)	250
Advance of September 28, 1918	254
Close of First Phase, Meuse-Argonne	257
The Allies Attack, September, 1918	265
The Somme Offensive (Hindenburg Line and Canal)	270
Advance of the Second Corps	275
The Champagne Front, October 1, 1918	278
Capture of Blanc Mont	281
Advance to the Aisne	285
The Allied Attack, October, 1918	289
Western Front, October 4, 1918	290
Jump-off of Second Phase, Meuse-Argonne, October 4, 1918	293
Advance of October 4, 1918	299
Advance of October 5, 1918	301
Advance of October 6, 1918	304
Rescue of the Lost Battalion	307
Front of American First Army, October 8, 1918	309

	PAGE
Attack Extended East of the Meuse	311
Advance of October 9, 1918	315
Lower Half of Argonne Cleared	316
Advance of October 11, 1918	318
Second American Army	321
Closing Actions of Second Phase, Meuse-Argonne	328
Meuse-Argonne Front, November 1, 1918	331
Jump-off of Last Phase, Meuse-Argonne	337
Advance of November 1, 1918	340
Advance of November 2, 1918	343
Advance of November 3, 1918	345
Advance of November 4, 1918	347
Advance of November 5, 1918	349
Advance of November 6, 1918	351
Sedan	355
November 10, 1918	359
Second Army Attack	363
The Armistice on the Meuse-Argonne Front	368
Advance on Brussels.	371
Casualties per Hundred	373
Weekly Casualty	374
Casualties for Divisions	375
American Lines of Communication (the S. O. S.) in France	414
Main Battlefields on Western Front	503

THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

CHAPTER I

PERSHING ARRIVES IN FRANCE

Official reception—Organization of General Staff—Training Problems—Schools

On the 6th of April, 1917, the United States of America declared war upon Germany. Late in May of the same year, Major General John J. Pershing, with a Staff of 53 officers and 146 enlisted men, boarded the S. S. *Baltic* and sailed for Europe where he, as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, was to prepare for the arrival of these forces.

On June 8, on the *Baltic's* arrival at Liverpool, General Pershing was received on the dock by a British general with a regiment as guard of honor. As General Pershing stepped down the gangplank, the regimental band played *The Star-Spangled Banner*. There also to greet the American commander were the British Admiral who commanded the port and the Lord Mayor of Liverpool. General Pershing reviewed the guard of honor, and after the formal ceremonies were over the train for London was boarded, the State car being placed at General Pershing's disposal.

In London he was received by Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War, General Lord French; the Ambassador of the United States, and Admiral Sims of the United States Navy. The following day General Pershing and his Staff were received by King George at Buckingham Palace, where General

28 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

Lord Brooke, commander of the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, presented the American commander to the King. It was upon this occasion that King George made a speech in which, among other things, he said:

"It has been the dream of my life to see the two great English-speaking nations more closely united. My dreams have been realized. It is with the utmost pleasure that I welcome you at the head of the American contingent to our shores."

The following days were spent in receptions and official calls, while the Staff spent most of the time with the corresponding staff members of the British War Office, and General Pershing also spent much of his time with the heads of the departments. The entire British military system was placed at his disposal, and many of the developments of American Staff training were learned in those few days in the British War Office.

On June 12 General Pershing was taken to the training camp near London to observe the British Army methods, and the reception in England closed with a formal dinner at Lancaster House.

But an even greater welcome awaited General Pershing on French soil.

It was at Boulogne on the morning of June 13, 1917, that General Pershing landed in France. As he came off the ship, General Dumas, commanding the northern region, greeted him and said: "I welcome the United States of America who have now become united to the United States of Europe." This was the first time that a soldier of the United States in uniform had landed on the European continent to conduct war. On the dock was a French regiment in their horizon-blue battle uniforms. They were, for the most part, middle-aged men who had seen three years of war. Among the other officers who met General Pershing at the pier was Brigadier General Pelletier, who became chief of the French mission to the American Expeditionary Forces; General Dupont represented General Petain, and General George Fowke represented Sir Douglas Haig.

PERSHING ARRIVES IN FRANCE 29

The reception given to General Pershing in Paris was marked by scenes of rejoicing such as that city had not seen since the outbreak of the war. At the Gare du Nord the platforms and streets were lined for blocks with soldiers. The entire route from the station to the Hotel Crillon in the Place de-la-Concorde, where the General was to make his temporary headquarters, was lined with soldiers. At the station the band of the guard of honor played *The Star-Spangled Banner* and the *Marsellaise*; and there were there to greet him Marshal Joffre, M. Viviani, M. Painlevé, Minister of War, Generals Foch and Dutail, and Ambassador Sharp. The tens of thousands who had turned out to see the first Americans arriving in France cheered as though the whole American Army were marching down the street.

On June 14 General Pershing visited the tomb of Napoleon. Marshal Joffre took General Pershing down into the crypt where, for the first time in a century, the case containing the sword of Napoleon was opened and the sword was handed to the American General. It was the first time this signal honor has ever been bestowed upon any one.

That afternoon General Pershing received a remarkable ovation at the Chamber of Deputies. On the afternoon of June 15, he paid the last of his official calls, which had been occupying nearly all of his time, and also a visit to Picpus Cemetery, where he placed a wreath of American Beauty roses on the tomb of Lafayette.

From that day, General Pershing devoted his entire time while in Paris to organizing the headquarters of the A.E.F., a small office in the rue de Constantine. There were, as yet, no troops in France, the 1st Division of regulars being still upon the seas. Plans were made at this time for an American Army of two million men, which was to be the strength of the A.E.F. This would necessitate the expansion of every branch of the service, and in giving shape to this expansion the experience of the British and French was carefully studied.

Experience has shown that a military commander in the field can deal directly with but few men; the maximum number of subordinates that one commander can personally direct

is from four to six. There had as yet been no General Staff system of any consequence in the American Army, for in an army that has but five kinds of troops, infantry, cavalry, artillery, signal corps, and engineers, the bureau system is capable of handling all the staff work, but as the conduct of the war became more and more complex and more and more auxiliary services were brought in, the need of the modern system of the General Staff became more and more apparent.

If all the activities of modern war were each controlled by a bureau chief, it would be beyond the power of any commanding officer, no matter how able, to control the whole. For this reason, the activities were grouped under responsible subordinates, so that the number of groups would not be excessive.

Theoretically, the action taken at the headquarters of any commander is his personal action. In practice the commander has certain staff officers in whom he has confidence, who have good judgment and who are kept constantly informed of the commander's general plans and policies. Knowing the General's plan, these staff officers give orders as to the details in carrying out the plan, in the name of the commander. This is practically as well as theoretically the action of the commander himself.

In organizing the General Staff of the A.E.F., while the experience of the British and French was taken into consideration, the organization was made on different lines; and it has worked, on the whole, very satisfactorily. None of the Allied Staffs could have been copied exactly, because they were based upon the laws of the different countries involved, as well as upon the psychology of its people, and had they been merely copied, they would not have worked well in the A.E.F.

A command is complete for doing all of the work assigned to it without a staff; but in the larger units, the capacity of a single individual to perform all the duties is not large enough, hence there is a staff whose sole duty is to assist the commander in performing the functions of his command. It performs such functions of a command as the commander

may direct and keeps the commander constantly informed from the detailed technical knowledge which each staff officer possesses.

Early in the organization of the American Expeditionary Forces, the Staff of General Headquarters was divided into three parts: the General Staff, the Technical Staff, and the Administrative Staff. The General Staff at first consisted of three branches, through which the commander dealt with all subordinate units. This was however found to be inadequate, and the number of subdivisions was soon increased to five. These were:

First Section, commonly known as "G-1," *Administration*. This section had charge of the procurement of supplies, transportation, storage and replacements of men and animals.

Second Section, commonly known as "G-2," *Intelligence*. This section collects and collates information regarding the enemy, makes and distributes maps, and propaganda.

Third Section, commonly known as "G-3," *Operations*. This section has charge of all steps pertaining to strategy, tactics, and tactical employment of all troops.

Fourth Section, commonly known as "G-4," *Coördination*. This section has charge of the distribution of supplies, replacements, and ammunition, throughout the command.

Fifth Section, commonly known as "G-5," *Training*. This section has charge of the training, schools and inspection.

In the cases of an army corps or smaller unit only three branches of the General Staff exists: G-1 combines the procurement of supplies with the distribution of supplies; G-2 deals with intelligence; G-3 combines with G-5.

To coördinate the work of the branches of the General Staff and the Administrative and Technical Staffs, there is a Chief of Staff who directs the work of the entire staff, and transmits to them the will of the commanding officer.

The smallest unit which has a staff is the battalion. Here three staff officers—the Adjutant, the Intelligence Officer and the Supply Officer—perform all the functions of the General Staff, the Technical Staff, and the Administrative Staff.

The Technical Staff consists of a group of officers each of

whom represents one group of combat or supply troops; and these officers exercise direct technical supervision over the various units in the name of the commanding officer. The Technical Staff is made up of such officers as the Chief Quartermaster, Chief Ordnance Officer, Chief of the Motor Transport Service, etc., and these form what is known as the supply group. The other group of Technical Staff officers is the combat group. This consists of the Machine Gun Officer; the Chief of Artillery; the Chief Engineer Officer; the Chief Signal Officer; in other words, these are the heads of the technical troops assigned to the command. The functions of the officers of the Technical Staff are to advise the Commander-in-Chief or the General Staff as to the necessities, possibilities, and limitations of their own particular arms or services, and to supervise the function of the technical troops of the command in subordinate units.

The Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces was early divided into three main heads; the General Staff, the Technical Staff, and the Administrative Staff. The Administrative Staff concerns itself with the routine duties of the command, in accordance with established laws, regulations, orders and customs. It conveys to the command the general instructions of the commander, arranges and preserves the records of the administrative business, and is, for this purpose, divided into six groups, namely, the Adjutant General, whose duty is routine orders and personal records; the Inspector General (general efficiency); Judge Advocate (general law and discipline); the Chaplain (moral and spiritual welfare); the Headquarters Commandant (commands the personnel of the headquarters); the heads of the Attached Services (Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., etc.). The Administrative Staff plans its own work under the general direction of the General Staff, and in so doing exercises direct and indirect supervision over corresponding parts of the staff of subordinate commanders.

In military forces the command is made up of a number of included commands. These may be organized alike or may have different organizations and equipment, and per-

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

form different functions, for example in an Army Corps, the Corps Commander has five division commanders, five to perform the major tasks allotted to the corps, and in addition there is a group of ten or twelve commanders of the corps troops such as Corps Artillery, Engineers, Tanks, Air Service, etc., whose tasks are incidental to the activities of the divisions. These ten or twelve commanders of the corps troops are the Technical Staff of the commanding officer, but in the majority of cases they deal directly with the General Staff and keep the General Staff informed of the use and requirements of their special troops.

There is also in every organization commanded by a general, his personal staff consisting of the Aides whose duty is to render personal assistance to the Commander, and to keep the Chief of Staff informed of the movements of the Commander. The subordinate commander, such as a Division or Regimental Commander exercises command within his own unit, and is personally and directly responsible to the superior Commander, but in the majority of cases the commanders of subordinate units deal with the General Staff of the superior command.

In this way the command of the entire organization or group of organizations comes through this one channel, the General Staff, where it is coördinated. The chiefs of the various sections of the General Staff are the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for their section, and deal directly with the Chief of Staff who commands them. These chiefs of sections are his immediate assistants and handle the five subdivisions into which every phase of military life is readily divided.

The most important function of the staff is to assist troops in combat and in preparation for combat. The General Staff officer has no command and is the servant of every soldier in the entire command, and the efficiency of the organization depends upon the efficiency of its staff, and by the selection and choice of staff officers is the making or breaking of a unit determined.

For this purpose, in the A. E. F., there was immediately established the General Staff College, which was the highest

school in the A.E.F. The graduates of this school became members of the General Staff and were sent out to fill the General Staff positions in the various Divisions, Corps, and Armies in the A.E.F. The policy was early maintained that General Staff vacancies could only be filled by General Staff Officers sent out by G.H.Q., and it was the wisdom of this which resulted in having in each Division, Corps, and Army, a uniformly trained General Staff, to whom the workings of the superior and inferior and adjacent staffs were well known. In the Argonne battle the success of new divisions going for the first time into battle was largely due to the fact that many trained General Staff officers were sent to these divisions during the training period.

On September 1, the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces moved from Paris to Chaumont, Haute Marne. Paris was the center of the French supply lines and this change placed the American G.H.Q. on the American lines of communication, about midway between the great base depots of Bourges and Tours and the front. The town itself is a pretty little French garrison city on the headwaters of the Marne; and the huge French stone barracks offered an ideal place for the housing of the enormous staff which eventually would be created to handle two million men. Here in the now famous room 51 of building "B," in the French barracks at Chaumont, General Pershing on September 3 established his own headquarters. About him were grouped the Chief of Staff and the heads of the sections of the General Staff. In the preliminary organization the General Staff was divided into but three sections, as follows:

Chief of Staff—Brigadier General Harbord.

G-1—Colonel James A. Logan.

G-2—Brigadier General D. E. Nolan.

G-3—Colonel J. McA. Palmer.

It soon became apparent, however, that G-3, Operations and Training Sub-section, was so important that it could be best handled by separate sections; and early in August, 1917,

ization of the
of Staff, as



American Expeditionary
of Communication.

Avery D. An-

E. Nolan.
Conner.

(G-4) *Coördination*—Brigadier General G. Van H. Mosley.

(G-5) *Training*—Brigadier General H. B. Fiske.

General McAndrew succeeded General Harbord as Chief of Staff, and the permanent organization of the General Staff as thus constituted was continued throughout the military operations.

From the landing of the first units until September, 1918, a period of over a year, the American G.H.Q. did not have command of a sector of the front; but, instead, American divisions were fighting as parts of British or French Armies. This put but very light duties on the 2nd and 3rd Sections of the General Staff. But this period was an extremely busy time for G-5. However, G-2 and particularly G-3 had very heavy tasks during this period in formulating the basic plans and working the preliminary studies. Training was the one great requisite of the American Army in France, and for this a huge educational system was organized whereby newly arrived divisions received instruction in the very latest developments of the art of war.

Training divides itself into two parts; the training of officers and the training of men. In expanding a small army into an enormous army the greatest difficulty was found in developing a corps of officers. For this competent instructors were needed—both line and staff officers—for the ever increasing need of trained staff officers was clearly felt. The first big problem therefore was to train officers so that they could train the men. Some slight instruction had been given in the training camps in the United States, but this was found to be entirely inadequate for the more advanced requirements of a European war.

Accordingly, following the precedents of the British and French, a great system of schools was inaugurated. The old saying that the best training for war is war, had proven an utter fallacy. Service in battle hardens officers and men but it does not school them. It was found that by sending officers to the school from the line the best results were obtained.

Then there was another point; the losses in officers were heavy, and this meant a constant and urgent demand for new officers and trained officers. Therefore the schools were organized to give the newly arrived officer from the United States a more rigorous course of instruction, to give the officer just back from the line a refreshing course, and to ground the newly created officer in the fundamentals.

Part of this training system was incorporated in the replacement system. The original idea of replacement for the Army was worked out so as to give to each corps six divisions; four combat and two replacement divisions. One of these replacement divisions was to remain in a training area and train replacements in both men and officers—from privates to generals. The sixth division of the Corps was to be the Depot Division, situated somewhere near the seacoast where it would receive and organize drafts from the United States. This scheme, however, was never fully developed, but it formed the basis of the training system of the A.E.F.

The corps were to be kept mobile, whereas the schools worked best when stationary; and as the Replacement Division of the corps was stationary, it was decided that the Corps Schools should be situated with this division, and thereby the labor and demonstration troops would be available to the school.

The need for coördination in these Corps Schools led to the establishment of a group of Army Schools, to furnish instructors for the Corps Schools, so that the Corps Schools could train officers rapidly, and send them back to their commands. Students graduating with distinction from Corps Schools were sent to Army Schools. These two school groups provided the great bulk of the training of line officers, but it did not cover two great requirements. New officers were constantly demanded to fill the places of those fallen, and trained staff officers were needed on the many new staffs which were being developed daily. Therefore a Staff College and a Candidates' School were established. The city of Langres was chosen for this work and here the Army Schools, the Candidates' School, and the Staff College were established.

38 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

The town was not far from Chaumont and this fact made possible constant touch with G.H.Q.

The Staff College opened for its first class on November 28, 1917, with Brigadier General Bjornstad as its first director. With him were four French and four experienced British General Staff officers. Four classes in all, 534 officers, were graduated; and many of these replaced the British and French officers as instructors. The course was of three months' duration, but the number graduated was so limited that a more simplified course at the School of the Line was begun for officers of less military training.

The Army Candidates' School was organized to meet the serious shortage in officers. In addition to those coming over with replacement troops, the War Department sent over 6,000 casual officers in the junior grades; but the lines of communication, the requirements of the S.O.S., and the battle wastage were so enormous that in the early fall of 1918, the A.E.F. was faced with a big shortage of officers. The Army Candidates' Schools were enlarged to cover every arm of the service, and the number of men sent to them was steadily increased. The courses were for three months and there were graduated 6,895 infantrymen, 3,393 artillerymen, 1,332 engineers, and 365 signalmen, which made a total of 11,985 officers graduated from these schools from the ranks of the A.E.F.

Besides the task of training officers, was the equally vital one of training the troops. When the 1st Division arrived in France it was split up with a French division and trained under its control. This was not found to be altogether satisfactory. Accordingly, when the training section of the General Staff was organized, a schedule was made out for the 1st Division, and it was carefully supervised. The same system was applied to each division on arriving in France; and thus a uniformity of training, rather than the whim of the division commanders, was the final result in the training. The original plan was to give each division three months' training in France; but the German spring drive in 1918 made it necessary to reduce this to but four weeks before the division went into the line, and a heavy schedule of work for those four weeks

was ordered. This only gave time for small units—companies and battalions—to practice together. Meanwhile to get the training of the regimental, brigade and division commanders and their staffs, to accustom them to functioning together, terrain exercises were held with assumed conditions of actual warfare and with experienced instructors which developed this side of the training. During the second period of training, the American higher commands worked with the French staffs in the line as observers, while the battalions of the division were in the line under French command, and both line and staff learned the actual workings of the corresponding French unit without having the responsibility. Then came the third period of training, when for four weeks behind the lines, maneuvers were held for the benefit and instruction of higher commanders and staffs in their functions in battle. This was in brief the A.E.F. training program. Scarcely any divisions had the full four weeks for the last stage; the time averaged between six days and three weeks.

It was found impossible to train artillery units with their divisions during the first stage. To make use of the existing French ranges, the artillery brigades were therefore sent to so-called organization and training centers for about six weeks and usually rejoined their divisions while the latter were in the line for the first time with the French.

The German drive in the spring of 1918 forced the speeding up of the transportation of troops, and ten American divisions, less their artillery, were trained with the British. Here again the training was done according to a plan drawn up by the training sections of the British and American G.H.Q., and for the same three periods; but the exigencies of the situation resulted in the shortening of most of these periods.

A studied policy underlying all this training which was constantly emphasized was the education of the troops for the offensive. There was never the slightest doubt that the German line could be broken. An aggressive self-reliant infantry was the basis of this doctrine. This was shown in every document of instruction. In connection with this, great emphasis was laid on the importance of rifle fire, and the jus-

tification of this came on the Marne in July, 1918, when the accurate rifle fire of American Infantry was tested in actual warfare, and with complete success.

After the Armistice, a comprehensive school system was ordered, which included Post Schools, Divisional Schools, and the American University at Beaune. University courses were also offered at a large number of British and French universities, and roughly 200,000 officers and men were at one time enrolled in the various schools of this valuable educational program.

CHAPTER II

IN TRAINING SECTORS

First Division Arrives in France—Billets—Changes in Uniform and Equipment—The American Zone—First Americans in the Battle Line—Pershing's Tactics in Training Sectors

Early in the morning of the 26th of June, 1917, the first great American troop convoy steamed into the harbor of St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the River Loire. Admiral Gleaves had accomplished his mission, and with such secrecy was the move completed that scarcely a soul either in the United States or in France knew it had taken place. As the transports moved slowly towards the dock, a crowd of townspeople gathered along the quay. In utter silence from those on the shore, the ships were docked. Never has there been such a gloomy landing of troops on friendly soil. All France was suffering from a general depression following the failure of their attack along the Chemin des Dames of April 17. The losses there had been very heavy, and at the landing of the first American troops, there seemed but little hope of victory.

The troops were debarked and marched to the flat plain overlooking the harbor, on the outskirts of the city, and the first camp was pitched. Major General William L. Sibert was in command of this force, which consisted of four regiments of the old Regular Army—the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th Regiments of United States Infantry, and the 5th Regiment of the United States Marine Corps. But a few weeks before the four Infantry regiments were guarding the Mexican border; but so swiftly and so secretly had the move been made, that not even the families of these men knew that they had been sent overseas. They had embarked from New York June 14th. The voyage over was not without incident. Ad-

miral Gleaves reported to the Navy Department that German submarines had twice attacked the convoy. The first attack was on the night of June 22nd when a torpedo missed by twenty feet the bow of one of the transports. All the ships immediately changed their courses and every gun was put into action. Apparently the submarine fled. The second attack came next morning. The unmistakable evidences of a submarine appeared directly ahead. An American destroyer darted between a couple of transports, and going at full speed, dropped a depth bomb over the spot. There could be no doubt as to the result, for with the explosion, a column of smoke and water rose high in the air, and as the transports passed the spot, the water was covered with floating oil and strewn with wreckage.

General Pershing, accompanied by General Pelletier, representing French General Headquarters, visited the camp on June 28, and inspected the troops. The last units of the first expedition arrived on July 2, and on July 4 a battalion of the 16th Infantry paraded in Paris. The Fourth of July was enthusiastically celebrated throughout France. In Paris the chief feature was the parade of Americans, for all France was eager to see the new Allies, and everywhere the Stars and Stripes were flying. Public buildings, hotels, private residences, even taxicabs flew the colors, and it seemed that every pedestrian was wearing a miniature flag. The enthusiasm of the vast crowd reached its highest pitch when General Pershing, escorted by Marshal Joffre and President Poincaré, reviewed the American troops, and the American band playing the *Marseillaise*, while the French band played the *Star-Spangled Banner*. This was the last of a long series of welcome demonstrations, and on July 6, it was announced that the American Army would immediately begin its training for the line.

General Sibert moved his command by rail from St. Nazaire to the Gondrecourt Area, with headquarters in Gondrecourt, Meuse. This town lies near the head of the Ornain Valley between Neufchâteau and Bar-le-Duc, and the five regiments were billeted in the small towns in the valley. General Pershing says in his report: "After a thorough considera-

tion of allied organizations it was decided that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of 3,000 men each, with three battalions to a regiment, and four companies of 250 men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments, a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench mortar battery, a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staff and military police." This gave each combat division a rifle strength of 12,000, and the total strength of the division was 28,000. The four infantry regiments were then formed into the 1st Division and began their training. To each battalion of this 1st Division, the French sent a battalion of "Chasseurs Alpins" and all during July and August they lived and drilled together until the Americans had picked up from their French instructors all the little points of trench warfare which it is possible to learn outside of actual combat.

Here in this first training area, the gradual process of transformation of the army began. Until that time, the American Army had devoted almost its entire time in preparation for tropical and semi-tropical campaigns against semi-civilized tribes in wild unbroken country. Here however they found themselves behind an established front. As they arrived, each battalion was conducted to a French village, and billeted. This was a novel experience to both officers and men. Always before they had gone outside the town and pitched their tents in an open field. Every man had his tent with him, and the novelty of being billeted among the families of the village seemed very strange at first. This was necessary however for several reasons. In the first place, Europe is so intensively cultivated that there are no available fields which can be spared to encamp a thousand troops outside of each village. Then too, the climate is such that a tent camp would bring untold hardships as was later evidenced when one was attempted by the 1st Division in its early maneuvers. But most important of all was the fact that a tent camp would be an open target to enemy airmen, while billeting troops in a village gave little indication from the air, that troops were in the vicinity.

These little French farming villages were ideal for billeting troops. The French farmers do not live on their little farms, but instead all live together in small villages, around which the farms are located. This meant that adjoining almost every house in the villages stood a stone barn, and in the hay mows of these the soldiers were billeted, while the officers were assigned to the various families according to the number of unused bed rooms available. All was done with customary European thoroughness. In each town was stationed a "Town Major," either an officer or non-commissioned officer, depending upon the size of the town. He had an office on the main street, and the billeting officer of the battalion would go ahead and make arrangements with this Town Major for the reception of the troops. The Town Major had a list which gave the capacity of every building in the town, and in addition each building had painted over the door, the number of officers, men, and horses to be billeted therein. The house owners were paid by the government at the rate established by law of twenty cents per day for each officer, two cents per day for each soldier, etc., and they had no choice; if the room was vacant, the military authorities took it over by requisition. It did not take the Americans long however to accustom themselves to these new conditions, and they soon made friends with the inhabitants. So much so in fact, that, after a month when they packed up to go out on a practice march of two or three days, all the inhabitants in the villages, not knowing that they were going to return, with tears in their eyes lined the streets to bid them farewell.

But if the methods of living had to be changed, how much more did the uniform and equipment. The 1st Division came to France just as they had left the Mexican Border. The khaki uniform had been changed at Hoboken for one of wool, but this was only a slight change, for no one wore the coats, and all day long, much to the surprise of the French, the American soldiers drilled in their olive drab shirts. This was soon changed, however, by orders from G.H.Q., prescribing that the coat be worn at all times. The wisdom of this was later seen, for it seldom is hot in France, and the nights are

invariably cold. Then came the gas-mask, the first addition to the burden of the soldier. At first these were little French masks, then was added the British box respirator, and finally the trench helmet of British make was issued to the troops. But the final blow came late in the autumn of 1917 when, by General Order from G.H.Q., the distinctive and typically American "Campaign Hat" was ordered to be turned in, and in its place was issued the little French trench cap. The transformation of the American soldier was now complete, and the 1st Division, which had all this time been working on a tremendous training schedule, was now ready for its second phase of training, and the time was drawing near when it would go into the line. Meanwhile more troops were landing in France, who went through much the same experiences.

In September, 1917, came the second great movement of American troops to France. The increase in the Regular Army had brought with it automatic promotion for the officers of the 1st Division, which meant that by this time almost every lieutenant who had sailed with the 1st Division, was now a captain, and there were practically no lieutenants of infantry in the division. Accordingly, when the first series of Officers Training Camps closed on August 15, about one thousand lieutenants were selected and ordered immediately to France, for there was a crying need of officers. Staffs were forming, schools were organizing and a long line of communications all combined to draw officers from the 1st Division. About the first of September these officers from the training camps in the United States began arriving, and were immediately sent to the various British and French Army Schools for a course of instruction, where the details of modern minor tactics were very carefully taught. In October, when these officers joined the 1st Division, each one was an expert in his own line, whether trench mortars, 37 millimeter cannon, bayonet, wiring, telephone, sniping, grenades, or the thousand and one technical requirements which three years of trench warfare had developed. They brought this knowledge, and with it they brought assurance, for almost all of them had spent a

week in the trenches with some British battalion after the close of the school, and had seen the theory in operation.

On September 21, 1917, another convoy arrived at St. Nazaire, bringing with it the first elements of the 26th Division. This division was composed of National Guard units from New England, and was commanded by Major General Clarence R. Edwards. The Division went to its training area, with headquarters at Neufchâteau, for about four months, which time the troops spent partly in training, but for the most part as lines of communication troops, taking over the work the 5th Marines had been doing in making preparations for the army which was to arrive. This division was organized and trained in the United States, and was the first to come to France as a division, the 1st and 2nd Divisions having been organized in France.

Meanwhile another regiment of the United States Marine Corps (the 6th) had arrived in France and had a similar experience to its predecessor's, the 5th Marine Regiment, which had been detailed as Military Police, and Lines of Communication Troops. The arrival of two Regular Army infantry regiments (the 9th and the 23rd Regiments, United States Infantry) on September 21, permitted the forming of the 2nd Division with one brigade (3rd) of infantry soldiers and one brigade (4th) of Marines. This division was organized during the last three months of 1917, with headquarters at Bourmont (Haute Marne). Meanwhile the four regiments continued their duties along the lines of communication while the 2nd Artillery Brigade was in training. Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, United States Marine Corps, commanded the division until November 7, when Major General Omar Bundy was assigned to the command.

The 42nd or Rainbow Division, composed of national guard units from almost every State in the Union, was assembled at Camp Mills, N. Y., in the fall of 1917, and on October 18 the division sailed for France. The first elements of the division arrived at St. Nazaire on October 29, while others arrived at Brest, and some came through Liverpool. The division was assembled in the Vaucoulers Area, where it re-

mained until December 11. On that date began the memorable march of the Rainbow Division, south,—55 kilometers (35 miles) in two and a half days to the La Fauche Area. Major General Charles T. Menoher relieved Major General William A. Mann in command of the division. Then on Christmas Day, accompanied by a heavy snowstorm, orders came to march 75 kilometers (47 miles) to the area south of Langres. This march was part of the training and despite the blizzard, the order was carried out. For three days the division marched over ice covered roads. There were men without overcoats, and gloves were the exception, while many a foot left its red trail of blood in the snow; but the spirit of the men was never broken. Chilled to the bone, the Rainbow Division made that memorable march, and through it developed a spirit and courage which were to mark it throughout its entire course, the unbeatable spirit of the Rainbow.

Late in the fall of 1917 there arrived, also from the United States, a replacement battalion for each of the four infantry regiments of the 1st Division. When this division sailed in June, the regiments were not filled to the prescribed full war strength, and immediate steps were taken in the forming of replacement battalions to fill these up to strength. When these battalions arrived they were amalgamated into the various regiments, but even then there were still some vacancies, and there were also gaps in the ranks of the other three combat divisions, for, while they had not yet suffered casualties from action, accident and disease had reduced slightly the numbers, and there was at that time no replacement system for the combat organizations.

The 41st Division, National Guard of Washington, Oregon, Montana, North Dakota, Idaho, and Wyoming, was organized at Camp Green, N. C., under the command of Major General Hunter Liggett. The last units of this division arrived in France on December 7, 1917, and the division was assembled in the St. Aignan Training Area, near Tours, and was designated as the First Depot Division. The 41st Division was then broken up into training cadres for the instruction of replacements for combat divisions on the front. The 66th Artillery

Brigade was left intact, however, and after its period of training, became, on July 1, the corps artillery of the First American Army Corps. As such it served throughout the three big American campaigns of the war.


This gave the United States, at the close of the year 1917, four combat divisions in France: the 1st (Regular), 2nd (Regular and Marine), 26th (New England National Guard), and 42nd (Rainbow); two Regular Divisions, and two National Guard, as was the plan. Then, in addition, there was the 41st Division which was now known as the First Depot Division. These were all made a part of the First American Army Corps, and in the middle of January, 1918, General Liggett was placed in command of the Corps, with headquarters at Neufchâteau.

A corps differs from a division in that it has no divisions which regularly belong to it, but at different times certain portions of the line are assigned to it. Divisions are assigned to the corps, fight, are then relieved, and new divisions are assigned to it. Divisions in action may start as part of one corps, only to find in the midst of the action that they have been shifted to an adjacent corps.

It was planned to have the 1st Corps take over a sector using two divisions in the front line, with other two in reserve. This plan, however, was never put into effect, because on March 21 the Germans began their great drive, and Allied troops had to be rushed to fill in the gaps. The first assignments of divisions to the First Corps came on July 4, 1918, when the 2nd, 26th, and 167th French Divisions were ordered under General Liggett's command, on the Marne Salient. From then on until the armistice, this corps was almost constantly in the thick of the fighting and had, at different times, assigned to its command, sixteen American and three French divisions.

That the four American combat divisions were all in one large area, centering in the triangle formed by Chaumont, Bar-le-Duc, and Neufchâteau, seemed to indicate where the American zone of operations would be, for these divisions were all

th St. Mihiel,
Why the Amer-
st be explained



der not to cross the

Report of the

ould take on the
the vital ques-

tions of communication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British Armies' shipping and supplies, while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us as lines of supply, and those leading from the southern ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots, and regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.

"With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover, broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage depots.

"All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war, we must utilize the southern ports of France—Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire, and Brest—and the comparatively unused railway systems leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so that our Armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serving on the Western front."

The Artillery brigades for each of these divisions had now reached France and were being trained by the French in the use of the French 75 (3-inch) millimeter gun, and 155 (6-inch) millimeter howitzer. The decision to avail ourselves of the French and British offer to supply us with artillery was

made by the mission in Paris, headed by Colonel House and including General Tasker H. Bliss of the Army, and Admiral Benson of the Navy. As a result, this cablegram was sent in the fall of 1917:

"The representatives of Great Britain and France state that their production of artillery—field, medium, and heavy—is now established on so large a scale that they are able to equip completely all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918 with the best make of British and French guns and howitzers. With a view, therefore, to expedite and facilitating the equipment of the American Armies in France, and second, *securing the maximum ultimate development of the munitions' supply with the minimum strain upon available tonnage*, the representative of Great Britain and France propose that the field, medium and heavy artillery be supplied during 1918, and as long after as may be found convenient, from British and French gun factories."

The 1st (Regular) Division had by October completed its preliminary training and was ready to go to the front. The sector selected was that of Sommerville, ten kilometers southeast of Nancy. This was, at that time, a very quiet sector, well fitted for instructional purposes. On the night of October 20, 1917, one battalion of each of the four regiments, 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th Infantry relieved alternate French battalions holding their allotted sectors of the line; and American troops were occupying the front line for the first time when dawn broke on the 21st of October, 1917. The battalions were under the command of the French regiments holding the sector, and French and American battalions alternated along the line. Each American battalion stayed in ten days, with one company in the front line, and the others in support and reserve, and these companies alternated so as to give each an equal amount of front-line experience. The divisional artillery—5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments of United States Field Artillery—had come up from the artillery school, their training finished, and had gone into position in support of the infantry along with the French artillery. There was great rivalry as to who should fire the first shot, and on October 23, 1917,

Battery C. of the 6th Field Artillery won this honor, and fired the first hostile artillery shot of American troops in the war. The gun was later sent to West Point where it now forms part



AMERICANS ENTER BATTLE LINE

October 21, 1917.

of the collection of trophies of the Military Academy, while the brass shell case was sent to President Wilson.

The sector was very quiet, the front lines were almost a mile apart, and the intervening space was well filled with belts of barbed wire, for this front had seen practically no fighting

since 1914, and was used as a rest sector by both French and Germans for divisions worn out through fighting elsewhere. The German Intelligence Service was not long in finding out that there were Americans in the sector, despite all the care our French preceptors took to keep the fact hidden. On November 3, the Germans raided the front held by the 16th Infantry. Without warning their artillery laid a barrage which isolated an advanced post; the raiding party blew a gap in the wire, and captured the few men in the outposts. The company rallied to drive out the attackers, but they had not remained. While this was the only raid the Germans attempted, the other battalions of the 1st Division all shared equally the other experiences of trench warfare, suffered casualties, were shelled, went out on patrols, and lost their first fear, which new troops always have.

On November 20, the last battalion of each regiment had completed its ten days' trench duty, and the division was once more collected in the Gondrecourt Area, this time with the 1st Artillery Brigade, engineers and all the component parts of a combat division, and began training as a division. The thirty days of trench service was marked by 56 casualties—3 killed, 43 wounded, and 10 captured,—while one German prisoner was captured by the Americans—the first prisoner of war to be captured by the American Army.

During the summer and fall of 1917 victory on land seemed within easy grasp of the Allies. In April, 1917, the British began their succession of advances in Flanders at Vimy Ridge. On May 4 the French took Craonne. On May 14 the Italians started their great drive towards Trieste. General Petain was made Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies. On June 2 the British took Messines Ridge, and on July 1, the Russian Army, which the world had been watching with much concern since the revolution, commenced its great offensive, under Kerensky. The Germans apparently were in trouble, with Austria crumbling (for Bethmann-Hollweg was dismissed), and on July 19 the Reichstag sent out its terms of peace. Apparently Germany had lost the diplomatic battle in Russia,

that of fighting with diplomacy rather than force of arms, and a new Russia in the field, with all the elements of treachery removed, presented a new problem. The military situation was very delicate. On the West front, the Hindenburg line was under attack, and weakening of any portion just at that time might mean a break which would put the Allies on the German border. Then the Italian Campaign on the Carso had reached such proportions that aid must be sent to Austria, as well as to France; the submarine campaign had failed, so that by the next summer American troops would give preponderance on the West front to the Allies, and the only apparent path left open to Germany was to negotiate some sort of a peace.

For a time things seemed to drag, then in the latter part of July the Russians suffered a defeat in Galicia principally through mutiny of their own troops. But this was offset by the great British victory in Flanders. The salient at Ypres, to which the British had clung for three years, was no more, and Flanders was free from its constant menace. The Russians continued in retreat, and again the Allies in Flanders made another big attack. Then France on November 1 delivered a smashing blow, and drove the Germans off the commanding ground of the Chemin des Dames, northeast of Soissons. Italy was apparently in rout, and French and British troops were rushed there to hold that front. Meanwhile the British stormed Passchendaele Ridge on November 6. The Italians made their stand on the Piave on November 9; and on November 20 the British astonished the world by the attack on Cambrai. Apparently the war could be won by the Allies whenever they decided to win it, and America's contribution to the war was to be chiefly in money, food and raw materials, with only a few troops sent for the moral effect.

November, 1917, will go down as one of the big months of the war. The chief occurrences were: the disastrous retreat of the Italian Armies, the mutiny of the Bolshevists and the establishment of their Republic in Russia, the British victory in Palestine, the British and French gains on the Western front, the first Americans in the trenches, the coming into

power of Georges Clemenceau as Premier of France, and finally the decision to form a Supreme Allied Council of War.

The Russian mutiny, retreat, and Republic, which culminated in the armistice of December 6, released the entire German Army of more than 63 divisions on the Eastern front, and gave the Germans again the preponderance in guns and men on the Western front—a maneuvering army, which changed the Allies' plans immediately from offense to defense. The German counter attack at Cambrai, which was so disastrous to the British, proved that Germany was far from beaten.

That winter of 1917-18 in Lorraine will ever be remembered by those four divisions for the intense suffering it entailed. The training of the American Army was immediately put on a slightly different basis, and while trench warfare was studied, all the practice marches, all the maneuvers in the snow and rainstorms of that excessively cold winter were in preparation for open warfare.

To practically every one in the American Army this appeared to be folly. Officers returning from British schools were full of the new British plan of defense,—the policy of “let them come on” (which was to prove so costly to the British in the spring drive)—the great British machine-gun defense in trench warfare. The French also were practicing the niceties of trench warfare, and the plan of the “yielding defense” was put forth in mid-winter, and at once, throughout the French sectors, work was begun on second and third lines of defense with belts of barbed wire ten miles behind the front.

Meanwhile, in the sleet and bitter cold, through snow, and over the frozen hills of Lorraine, during that awful winter, the Americans were practising open warfare. Each evening the junior officers would gather in one room, each bringing with him his precious small armload of wood, and while they vainly tried to get warm, they would pour out their troubles which almost amounted to mutiny. They talked—as junior officers always do, in a cock-sure way born of youthful enthusiasm—of the uselessness of “chasing the Indians,” of Generals who “had learned nothing since Custer and apparently couldn't

learn," and who did not know that every German artillery shot was plotted days in advance. Night after night in the miserable, frozen billets, the junior officers of the 1st Division (for it was the 1st on whom experiments were always tried) poured forth their woes over the incompetence of Generals who taught open warfare and attack, "when any fool could see that it was the Germans, and not us, who were going to attack." And still American G.H.Q. insisted upon open warfare; and now those officers of the 1st Division who are still alive, who suffered those horrors of open warfare that winter of 1917-18 in Lorraine, realize that General Pershing, who insisted upon it, was the wisest of them all, for every moment of this training proved later that it was justified. The actual tactics may have been antiquated; but the confidence and ability it gave to those officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 1st, and of all succeeding divisions, in the use of unfamiliar ground, in fighting in the open, in establishing and maintaining contact, and in ever pushing onward, was what enabled the American divisions, green and unused as they were to the tactics of this war, to fill the breach in defense, and then on July 18, to take up that most glorious unrelenting offensive which never stopped until the Germans asked for peace.

Too much credit cannot be given to General Pershing and to the General Staff for clinging to their American creed of open warfare, not of defense, but of offense, in the face of utter discouragement.

Those four divisions will never forget that winter of maneuvers, which developed the toughest army, physically and mentally, in the world.

Of food there was plenty, but of all other supplies there was the greatest scarcity. Shoes, for example, were almost impossible to obtain, for many reasons. The chief among these was that in order to keep warm, each soldier was wearing two pairs of heavy knitted socks, and this added to the cold and wet and the exceptionally heavy packs, which increased the average foot two and three sizes, made the call for shoes much bigger than those sent over according to old standards.


There were plenty of small shoes, but the order for the larger sizes had to go back over such a long line of communications that it was late in the spring before the divisions were fully supplied. And still the training went on, for every head among the Allies' armies had to be counted now.

On January 15, 1918, the 1st Brigade of the 1st (Regular) Division, 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments, under the command of Brigadier General George B. Duncan, relieved the French in the sector northwest of Toul, and that became the American Sector, better known as the "Toul Sector." Here was to be the final training. At first the sector remained under the command of the French, but when the organization of the division headquarters and their training was completed the sector passed to the command of Major General Robert Lee Bullard, who had succeeded General Sibert in command of the 1st Division in the late fall. This too was a quiet sector when the French held it, but the Americans decided to liven it up, and General Summerall, who commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, began to increase the firing schedules. The Germans were not long in replying.

This sector in which so many American divisions received their final instruction before being put into battle, held none of the charm of the sectors in the Vosges Mountains (those sectors between Nancy and the Swiss Border). Instead, while quite safe from general attack, the infantry was given every opportunity to realize to the full the worst of sector warfare. The front lines lay in a low, marshy valley, so that the trenches were always awash with mud, and each night the demand for working parties required almost the entire garrison to repair and drain these trenches. The main line of resistance, about 2,000 yards in the rear, was on the crest of the rise which was just high enough to be a watershed, and on this, parallel to the front, ran the great national highway which connected the towns of Bouconville, Rambucourt, Beaumont, Flirey, Limey, to Pont-a-Mousson. These towns were for the most part Regimental Headquarters, and, being on the skyline, outlined with the regular double row of trees which marked the highway. This road was the sole way for transport. Just behind the

58 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

road lay all the divisional artillery, so with these three targets together the whole ridge was constantly shelled. But the one great feature of the landscape was the German position. The German front lines were also in the marsh, and their support lines on the rising ground beyond, somewhere in the edge of the woods, but above all was Mont Sec. Immediately in front



THE TOUL SECTOR

On the south side of the St. Mihiel Salient, taken over from the French on January 15, 1918, and held by Americans continuously until the Armistice.

of the Toul sector stood this hill—solitary, conical like a sugar loaf, 457 feet above the valley bottom—and from it the Germans saw every move that was made in the sector and were able to adjust their artillery fire with the greatest nicety. Mont Sec was just 2,000 yards behind the front line, and with its concrete dugouts and tunnels and observation posts, it commanded the entire country for miles around—a fortress unassailable by any force at our command.

The front lines of both sides were a snarl of old trenches,

which, when the 1st Division first took them over, were fairly well held. A new plan of defense was worked out, however, which moved the majority of the garrison back to the Beaumont-Rambucourt road. But this did not lessen the discomforts of the platoons which held the front line in and around Seicheprey, Xivray, Marvosin. These towns, which were Battalion Headquarters, received their full share of attention from the Germans. It was no uncommon occurrence to look from the observation post in Rambucourt towards Xivray, the town in the hollow just inside our lines shrouded in the low hanging fog of early morning, shells bursting in and around the town, and vainly speculate as to what was going on. All means of communication were very soon put out of action when any shelling started, so well did the Germans know the sector.


It was between the front lines, in the maze of old abandoned trenches, and in the marshy No Man's Land between these, that the American Army in France had its first taste of real patrolling. Each night, every battalion in the line would send out a patrol on some mission or other; and every now and then the Germans would send one out, and occasionally these two would mix in the pitch black night and fight it out. The Americans were very brave, while the Germans were very skillful, so the honors at first went mostly to the enemy until it was learned by sad experience that it does not pay to send a patrol of ten men out every night at precisely the same hour, through the same gap in the wire, on the same sort of mission. The capture of one such patrol of the 16th Infantry Regiment taught the whole American Army a lesson. Then the 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Regiments) of the 1st Division, having finished its term in the line, was relieved by the Second Brigade (26th and 28th Infantry Regiments) and the 1st Brigade went to practice for the first American raid, in retaliation for the many such compliments the Germans had lavished upon them; but especially in retaliation for the big raid on the 18th Infantry, when that regiment, with the immediate support of the 1st Artillery Brigade had prevented the Germans from entering Seicheprey. General Pershing

came up from G.H.Q. to witness this first raid, which, in reality, was to be a dual affair—simultaneously one raid by each regiment. The artillery preparation was perfect. The infantry went over; and then—where were the engineers who were to blow up the barbed wire? The plan called for the divisional engineers just before the attack to carry across No Man's Land, and push under the German barbed wire long pipes filled with high-explosive and then, at the appointed time, to explode these, thus opening the way for the infantry. The infantry, through frequent patrols, knew the ground well, but no one thought to provide infantrymen as guides for the engineers and, consequently, the engineers were lost. That taught the American Army something about the necessity for "guides"; and a week later, when the raid was tried again, everything went smoothly and it was a reassuring success.

The second of the four combat divisions to go to the line for its final training was the 26th Division (New England National Guard). For this purpose it was assigned to the Eleventh French Army Corps, and ordered to the Chemin des Dames. This was the famous sector between Soissons and Reims where Nivelle, in the Spring of 1917 and again in the early fall, had thrown the Germans off the commanding position. The sector was now quiet; but as there was no certainty of its remaining so, the French exercised the greatest care with the new troops from America. The plan was to send two battalions at a time into the line with French battalions; and for this purpose the 26th Division was attached to the 4th French Division. This was the first of the National Guard Divisions to go into the line, and much greater care had to be taken with them than with the Regulars who had gone in the line preceding October, and were now holding the Toul Sector. The artillery of the 26th Division also went in with the French and on February 5th went into action; and on that night units of the 101st Infantry Regiment went into the forward position with the French. The 26th Division was scattered over a front of 40 kilometers (25 miles) for this course of instruction under the French. While there they helped the French beat off a German raid; and then, for the benefit of the Amer-

icans, the French raided the German trenches. Some Americans were taken along, and the raid was a complete success. No Americans were killed or wounded; two German officers and twenty men were captured; and the 26th Divisional Artillery helped cover the attack.

The division had completed its training by March 20 and left the Chemin des Dames under orders to proceed to the Bar-sur-Aube area, near Chaumont. Many of the officers and



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES

Heavy black line indicates the Battle Line on this front when the 26th Division entered the sector.


men had been decorated with the Croix de Guerre by the French, while others had been recommended for the American D.S.C. The division was once more concentrated in a rest area and three new General Staff officers took over the work of the Division Staff.

The 42nd Division (Rainbow—National Guard) was also ready for the line; and was accordingly assigned to the Seventh French Army Corps and ordered to the Vosges Mountains—"Baccarat Sector"—near Lunéville. On February 16, the first elements went into the line. This time the plan was different. Four famous French divisions (41st, 164th, 14th and 128th) were at that time in the line, and the various units of the Rainbow Division were split up among these for train-

ing. This sector as well as the Toul Sector, was to become famous in the American Army as the training school of many a new division; and those who have left there to go elsewhere still speak of the happy days in the Vosges, for, when not in the front line, it was one of the pleasantest spots in France. Being very quiet, the civilians lived close to the lines, and battalions at rest were billeted in towns where eggs were to be had and other things that go to make life pleasant in the war zone.

The Baccarat Sector in the Vosges Mountain extended for a distance of 15 kilometers from the forest of Elieux north of the village of Badonviller, through the Bois Communal de la Woevre, Bois des Haies, the villages of Merviller and Ancerviller, along the edge of the Bois Banal, to the southern edge of the Bois des Pretes. This sector in the beautiful wooded hills and mountains of the Vosges was quiet in that it was practically free from danger of a great German offensive, as there was nothing to gain, while enormous losses were certain in trying to march armies over the mountains. The French and Germans had used the sector as a position where divisions worn out with fighting elsewhere in the line could break in their recruits or "replacements." The shell fire was consequently held down to a minimum by both sides so that the much needed rest could be obtained before the call came for the division to go to an active front. American troops—a division at a time—were brought into this sector with a French division. The latter had command until, after a couple of weeks the Americans had become accustomed to the working of the sector, when the French withdrew, and left the command of the whole sector to the American major general commanding the division. The division then did a lot of patrolling and raided into the German trenches, to true up the fighting edge of its men; after this had been done two or three times, the Germans could be counted upon to return the compliment and to do it in finished style. Such was the quiet sector experience which no amount of training behind the lines could give.

While the 42nd Division was occupying the four sectors in



VOSGES MOUNTAINS

From Lunéville to Belfort the Battle Line in the mountains remained stationary from 1914 until the Armistice. Between these two cities lay the "Quiet Sectors" where new divisions received their first battle experience.

this fashion, the division had the benefit of a large scale raid by the French, which netted over a thousand prisoners, and later the 168th Infantry, 166th Infantry and 165th Infantry in order named, took part in three special raids, while to the 167th Infantry goes the credit for the first prisoner captured by this division. The American artillery did their part to liven up this sector, and the Germans retaliated with a severe raid.


The 2nd Division (Regular Army and Marines) was the last of the four combat divisions to go into the line for its final training. The place selected for this division by the French was the western side of the St. Mihiel Salient, near Verdun. With its units scattered under French command, the 2nd did not have to look for trouble in this sector. The French always said that there were two kinds of Germans: *Verdun Boche* and *Boche*, for they seemed to inherit the aggressive spirit of the locality. The 2nd Division suffered the steady toll of casualties from the heavy shell fire every day, and their stay was also punctuated by several very clever German raids.


The largest of these raids was directed against the line held by "I" and "L" Companies of the Ninth Infantry. Led by a selected force of over one hundred "Sturm Truppen," the German raiders, nearly five hundred strong, advanced behind an intense barrage. Small groups of the enemy dressed in French uniforms filtered into the American lines and shouted gas alarms just before their main force leaped into the American trenches. Confused, attacked from every side, the Ninth men stood their ground gallantly and finally drove the Boche back in complete disorder. Sixty-five enemy dead were left in the Ninth trenches and eighteen prisoners were captured. Eight prisoners from the Ninth, including a battalion surgeon, were captured by the Boche but the victory was none the less a decisive one for the Americans.

On March 21, the German offensive began. Every available man was needed for the battlefield and thus the period of tutelage under the French for these first four divisions was brought to a close. The 42nd Division (Rainbow)


overalls, full pack, overcoat, and gas-mask do not weigh more than 100 lbs., by the infantryman.







was withdrawn from the front, and assembled for its march back to the training area, when it received orders to relieve the 128th French Division in the Baccarat Sector,



MARCH 21, 1918

Showing location of American Divisions when the German Spring Drive started towards Amiens.

which it did on April 1. On April 4 the 26th Division (New England National Guard) relieved the 1st Division in the Toul Sector, and the 1st was assembled behind Toul. This gave the American Army three sectors, each held by veteran di-

visions, and the 1st Division available to be sent wherever the need should arise.

One more division was now added to the lists of those in France. On February 24, 1918, the headquarters of the 32nd Division, made up from the National Guard of Michigan and Wisconsin, with Major General W. G. Haan in command, were established at Prauthory, Haute-Marne, near Langres. This was designated as the 10th Training Area, and the division was designated as the Replacement Division of the First Corps.

For about four weeks it continued to function as such, until the enemy offensive of March 21 made it imperative that all available troops be utilized for combat duty. Accordingly the division was inspected by the Training Section of the General Staff and was made a temporary combat division.

The training of these divisions was now over, and, while the primary object of occupying trenches on different parts of the line had been for the instruction of officers and men in that side of modern warfare which can only be learned under fire, the beginnings of the nation's sacrifice was shown in the War Department Casualty List of March 15, 1918, which included the figures from the arrival of the first contingent to date:

Killed in action.....	136
Killed by accident.....	134
Died of disease.....	641
Lost at sea.....	237
Died of wounds.....	26
Died, various reasons.....	38

TOTAL DEATHS1,212

Wounded	475
Captured	21
<i>Missing</i>	14

TOTAL CASUALTIES 1,722

CHAPTER III


AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH

German Spring Offensive Threatens Amiens—1st Division Sent to Picardy—Seicheprey—Cantigny

The long expected spring drive of the German Army began March 21, 1918, crashing upon the junction of the British and French Armies between Cambrai and St. Quentin. In three days Bapaume and Peronne were captured, and the drive was pushing at full speed towards Amiens and the Channel ports. Those were the darkest days of the war, the crucial time when as Field-Marshal Haig's report said, the British were fighting with "their backs to the wall." Four million men were engaged in this battle on a front of 150 miles. The Allies had known that this attack was imminent, for during the previous two months they had observed the withdrawal of first class German divisions from the front and their places being taken by the 63 divisions transferred from Russia; which made a total of 206 German Divisions on the Western front. The Allies had watched the growth of the three great concentrations of German Divisions behind the lines, and yet, lacking unity of command, the British and French were powerless to stop this powerful drive.

The crisis of the war had been reached. A decisive Allied step was imperative. On March 28, Marshal Foch, by agreement of the Allies, was made Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. General Pershing on that day unreservedly placed at Marshal Foch's command all the American forces, to dispose as his judgment dictated. In his report General Pershing said: "We had four divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was

such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed. At his (Marshal Foch's) request, the 1st Division was transferred from the Toul Sector to a position in reserve at



GERMAN SPRING DRIVE OF 1918

Chaumont-en-Vixen" (about thirty miles northwest of Paris just south of Beauvais).

From this time until the St. Mihiel offensive, when the First American Army was formed in September, General Pershing exercised no tactical command. As fast as American

AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH 69

Divisions were trained, they were placed at the disposal of the Allies, and entered the line as units of the British or French Armies.

On the 4th of April the 26th Division (New England National Guard) relieved the 1st Division (Regulars) in the Toul Sector, and the 1st was assembled in the big camp at Bois l'Eveque, in the wooded plateau between the two branches of the Moselle river southeast of Toul. The division was given a few days' rest after the long march back from the trenches, and then, clean, refreshed and ready once more, it entrained and moved towards the scene of the great battle. Twenty-four hours in troop trains brought the division to the Chaumont-en-Vixen area. As this was the first real test of the administrative ability of the staff, it is interesting to know that the movement was a reassuring success. Moving 28,000 men, 1,700 animals, and 1,000 vehicles three hundred miles, at the same time turning over a sector to another division, giving the men a chance to rest and bathe, all in twelve days, proved the efficiency of the staff. How it was done no one knows, for the railways were choked with ammunition, reinforcements, supplies, etc., while the cross-country roads were jammed with ambulances, motors, trucks, fugitives and troops. Surmounting these obstacles without disorganization of the forward movement was not the least of American feats in the war.

At Chaumont-en-Vixen the 1st Division spent a week in open warfare maneuvers preparing for an attack under the close supervision of French and American Generals, and finally General Pershing came up from G.H.Q. to witness the largest of these maneuvers and later had all the officers of the division assembled on the lawn behind the château and made a short speech to them. He told them that they had been selected to make a name and reputation for the American Army, fighting with the best units of the British and French Armies in Picardy. His speech on this memorable occasion will never be forgotten by those officers, and it is generally referred to as "Pershing's Farewell to the First," for in this


speech he told them that the command had passed to the French.

On April 25, the 1st Division relieved the French before Cantigny, five kilometers west of and facing Montdidier on the Montdidier-Noyon front. The French officers said at the time, "We are not turning over to you a sector, but a good place to make a sector." It was then the hottest position on the Western front, for it was here that the French, coming up in trucks from reserve, had stopped the fierce German thrust towards the Channel ports but two days before. The front lines had finally been stabilized in a wheat field lying in a shallow valley. There were no trenches, there was no barbed wire; only a line of occupied shell holes marked the front lines. It was daylight from three in the morning until nine at night and the enemy artillery fire was so intense that to show oneself was to court sudden death, so the troops holding the front line had to lie for eighteen consecutive hours each day in those shell holes, baked by the hot sun of late spring, and wait till darkness came before they could send carrying parties back for food and water. During the short night they dug furiously into the chalky soil, to make the holes deeper and finally connect them into a trench. The support lines were back about a mile along the crest of the slope on the edge of a long fringe of woods and villages, where in the deep wine cellars of the buildings the majority of the garrison was housed. The cellars had of necessity to be deep, for the enemy threw over on an average 3,450 shells a day on a front of 5,000 yards. Contrary to popular impression, the bulk of this shell fire was not directed at the front line, for at that time it was impossible to plot exactly where the front lines of either side were, so close were they together in the wheat field; but instead, the full brunt of the shelling was upon the support positions and especially upon the batteries which were among these positions. At night every road was swept with a fire of murderous accuracy, and yet through it all the troops never missed a single meal. The food was cooked far in rear, and, as soon as it was dark, the Regimental (and Battalion) Supply officers started out with their train of sixteen one-mule

AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH 71

ration carts and drove them up to each company headquarters, bringing the one hot meal of the day, and enough cold rations to last until the next night. The men who drove those carts over those roads night in and night out in this and other American sectors are the unsung heroes of the war.

No description can picture the terrific shell fire in that sector. Every moment day and night, shells screeching overhead made a hell of that otherwise lovely country. Official reports



THE CANTIGNY SECTOR

On May 28, 1918, the 1st American Division assaulted and took Cantigny. This was the first ground gained by the A.E.F.

credit the Germans with an average of 3,450 rounds per day, and in one single gas attack, 15,000 rounds were used. The American artillery averaged almost five to the enemy's one, and it was amid such conditions that the 1st Division had been called upon to establish the name and reputation of the American Army—and did so in the taking of Cantigny on May 28. Until that time, no American combat division had taken part in any big action, and while the conduct of the Americans in the quiet sectors had come up to all expectations in most cases, the Allies were very anxious to know of what mettle our troops were made, and as to how the command would function alone in a real battle. Upon this test of American

courage, organization, leadership and skill in modern warfare, the Allies and also the Germans waited with ever increasing anxiety, the latter with the determination to smother this first attempt and thereby break the morale of the American and Allied armies. Captured orders show this very clearly, and it was for this reason that in front of the Americans in the Cantigny Sector the Germans placed such a heavy concentration of artillery.

May 20, 1917, closed the seventh month since the Americans had first gone into the line. There were by this time six combat divisions in France. The last to arrive was the Seventy-seventh, the first of the National Army Divisions made up chiefly of men and officers from New York City under the command of Major General Geo. B. Duncan. This Division was in training back of the British front near St. Omer, with the 39th British Division. The 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) Division on May 18, had gone into the line in Haut-Alsace for its initial training with the French, where they remained, patrolling and with constant skirmishes with the enemy in this quiet sector, until July 19. The 42nd (Rainbow) Division was still in the Baccarat Sector where by a succession of raids and patrols they were establishing an enviable reputation in the quiet sector. The 2nd (Regular and Marine) Division had left their training sector, and after a rest, had moved to the Chaumont-en-Vixen Area, where they were in reserve for the battle front in Picardy, and the 1st (Regular) Division was in the line before Cantigny. None of these divisions had fought any action of any consequence other than to themselves.

But the 26th (New England National Guard) Division, soon after they had taken over the Toul Sector from the 1st Division, suffered a most unfortunate raid on April 20, at Seicheprey, in which the Germans captured almost the entire garrison of the forward position, about 179 men and twenty-four machine-guns, and remained in the town for about twelve hours, until the Americans assisted by the French Infantry from the right forced them to withdraw.

Coming at this time, just when the Allies were beginning

to count on American aid to help to stem the German tide, the success of this raid was particularly regrettable. The Germans, who knew the sector like a book, and watched every move from the top of Mont Sec, had timed their raid to a nicety. A relief had just taken place, and the relievers did not know the sector as they should have known it, for the division had had very scant training. Troops and officers of fourteen days' experience were surprised by veteran troops and officers, because the mechanical niceties of trench raiding were new to them.

The taking of these prisoners had put the American Army in a rather unfavorable light at the time, and the Germans, who had planned the raid for just this purpose, made the most of it. Through neutral countries, dropped by airplane, went long accounts with pictures of this affair; and the wireless station near Berlin told all the world about it in boastful terms. The only thing the American Army had done to offset this was the gallant action of 300 men of a Railroad Engineer Regiment who had been caught in the opening of the German offensive on March 21. They were among the forces hastily gathered just behind the British front by Major General Sanderson Carey, which stopped the gap in the line when General Gough's army was driven back. They were in the very thick of the thirteen days' fighting. They were armed with machine guns found in a machine-gun school, but although only a few knew how to work them, still the detachment held a mile and a half gap for six days with great gallantry.

It was very evident that the American Army would have to do something which would forever vindicate its name both among friends and foes. During the month following Seicheprey, many plans were laid by the staff to accomplish this purpose. One very elaborate plan was for the whole 1st Division to attack and take Montdidier; but for this a division on the right and left would have to advance also, and as this was to be purely an American show of strength, another plan was finally agreed upon. One regiment of the 1st Division was to take Cantigny, which lay in very much the same relative position inside the German lines that Seicheprey occupied within

the American lines. Having taken it, they were to hold it. The latter was the hardest thing to do, for the advance was not to penetrate deep enough to capture any artillery, and was to be on such a small front that the entire artillery of the defenders could be concentrated on that one spot, and all the reserve used in counter-attack. It was, as a matter of fact, a Staff battle, with the Allied General Staffs as well as the German General Staff as spectators, while the 1st Division proved itself in the ring for the American Army.

The 28th Regiment of Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hansen E. Ely, was chosen to make the attack. The 26th Infantry was to fill in the right flank as soon as the town was taken, and the other regiments of the divisions were to act as reserves and carrying parties, to bring forward ammunition, wire, etc.

Great secrecy was maintained, for, if the Germans had known of the proposed attack, they could have wiped out the attacking force just before the jump-off. Additional jumping-off trenches had to be constructed, and the engineers laid these out so well that even the regiments who were digging them considered them only a doubling of the front line trenches. Outside of the 28th Infantry, which was back of the lines in training, only four officers in each regiment, the Colonel and his Staff, knew that the attack was in prospect. This was particularly fortunate, for the Germans, observing the excessive activity in the sector, determined to find out what was going on. Accordingly, just twenty-four hours before the attack, they delivered a series of raids along the entire front held by the division. At midnight they began a very heavy bombardment with gas shells on the batteries and support positions, which lasted until six in the morning. Some 15,000 gas shells were used, which drenched the entire belt in a poisonous cloud and cut every means of communication with the front. In addition a dense fog made it impossible for the infantry or artillery observation posts to discover what was happening in front. The first news came by a runner, almost exhausted, who had found his way through the barrage, the gas and the fog to regimental headquarters, with a note from the battalion

commander, which said that at 6:30 a. m., under cover of a rolling barrage, the enemy had attacked, that the front lines had shot up all their S.O.S. rockets, calling for a protective barrage, but as these had been lost in the fog, no artillery support was given, and the infantry were fighting off the attacking waves with volley fires. Another message came a few minutes later, just as the fog cleared and all had quieted down, which said that the raids had been completely repulsed, the enemy reaching the American trenches only at two points, that we had captured two prisoners, but that they had captured one of our men. This was most serious. The question was, Did this man know of the impending attack on Cantigny, and if he did, would the German Intelligence officers be able to get it out of him?

Cantigny was on the point of a little salient which projected into the Allied line five kilometers west of Montdidier. The town itself was situated on rising ground, backed by groups of woods which gave ample protection for the reserves. The front lines lay about 700 yards in front of and circling the town, and the whole was fortified and garrisoned as a "Strong-Point." A battalion normally held the town, and with machine guns cross-firing at every angle, each approach was swept, so that to take it, not only courage of the highest order would be needed, but also great skill in following the barrage and keeping in liaison with the tanks. Keeping in liaison, or, as the British call it, "keeping touch," was to be the great test of that day. The attack was to be on a front of little over a mile, and ten French tanks and a platoon of French flame throwers, assisted by 150 men of the 1st Engineers, had to be worked into the plan, and liaison maintained most carefully in order to have the operation work correctly.

That night everything seemed quiet, yet on the roads and on every path leading down to the front went constant files of infantry, machine gunners, engineers, and carrying parties. New telephone wires were laid, big supplies of ammunition were brought up to each battery, new batteries which had come in late in the afternoon were connecting in on the much over-

crowded telephone system, and every one was tense, waiting for that long anticipated moment to come when we should strike back in retaliation for the long months we had sat, taking our daily toll of casualties which in this last sector had averaged almost fifty a day. The moment was at hand when the Americans, acting as part of a French Army, would make their first attack.

At 6:45 a. m., on the morning of May 28, after an hour's artillery preparation by both lights and heavies, which tore the town of Cantigny to shreds and nullified by counter-battery every German battery which it had been possible to locate by aviator, sound ranging or any other device, the 28th Infantry, under Colonel Hansen Ely, following closely their rolling barrage, jumped off for the capture of Cantigny. It was perfectly done. The artillery barrage moved forward at a rate which averaged twenty-five yards each minute, and the infantry followed so closely that eighty-eight minutes after H hour, just as the artillery barrage reached its final line where it was to stand, the infantry had captured the town and passed on to the final objective, 2,186 yards from the jumping-off line, having captured or killed all the defenders of the salient, and then started to dig in. The commander of the 5th French Tank Battalion said in his report of his own operations: "Aside from the evidence of spirit and courage which aroused all admiration on the part of all members of Tank Battalion No. 5, the American Infantry showed a remarkable knowledge of how to use tank assistance, following them closely without allowing themselves to be held up by them and sticking close to their own barrage."

Two hundred and fifty prisoners came in the first batch, a much larger number than had been expected, and it was learned from these prisoners that a relief was just in progress in the salient, so that instead of capturing the salient with one battalion as its garrison, at the time of the attack there were two German battalions in the salient. These prisoners paid a high tribute to the fighting qualities of the Americans, which was far more than the perfunctory answering of the questions of the intelligence officer at the division prisoners' enclosure.

AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH 77

Five minutes later came the first of the counter attacks which were to attempt to dislodge the Americans before they had time to dig in and consolidate the position, and while the first reaction after the strain of the attack was upon them. This was a small attack launched against the extreme right, and was easily beaten off. Except for constant pounding of our new lines the day passed quietly, but at 4:26 p. m. the first of the big counter attacks came, preceded by a heavy bombardment of the whole front line as it now stood. This fire was directed by the German aeroplane which circled over the lines. At 5:10 p. m. the enemy infantry moved forward to attack, preceded by a rolling barrage. The enemy was caught by the American barrage and counter preparation fire before reaching the lines. At one point only was the American line weak and seeing this Major Theodore Roosevelt took the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry across the field and filled the gap. The system was working perfectly. Every means of communication stood up under the test. At 6:40 p. m. the second big counter attack met the same fate, and those of the enemy who were missed by the barrage were mowed down by the infantry from the front lines. At 6 a. m. next morning came the most determined counter attack in two waves. The Germans were a third time repulsed, without winning back one foot of the ground. The 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry, which had moved out to connect with the right flank of the 28th Infantry, repelled two other counter attacks coming up the draw from the south. Then the German efforts to dislodge the Americans from the first town and scrap of ground they had captured ceased. Although of practically no tactical importance, other than of relieving a very touchy spot in the line, the capture and holding of Cantigny showed, and at exactly the right time—for just the day before the Germans had commenced their drive on Paris—that American troops were worthy of being placed in the line with the best of the Allied divisions and fully capable of doing their share of the fighting. Had it not been for Cantigny, the French would certainly not have entrusted a portion of the defense of the Marne to two other American divisions a week later.

78 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

In the capture of Cantigny the 1st Division suffered 1,067 casualties, of whom 199 were killed.

The situation on the Western front by this time had become acute, and with the Germans ever threatening either to cut the British and French in two or else take Paris, the great cry was for men. General Pershing says in his report:

"As German superiority in numbers required prompt action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville Conference of the Allied Premiers and Commanders and myself on May 2 by which British shipping was to transport ten American Divisions to the British Army area, where they were to be trained and equipped, and additional British shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for us elsewhere."

This conference on May 2 resulted in the great midsummer troop movement from the United States. During the months of May and June over half a million men were embarked from the United States for France, and the troop movement continued at this rate or better to the armistice. (When the armistice was signed 2,045,000 troops, and 30,000 Marines had embarked for France.) The man-power question was now solved, and the next question was, could these new divisions be trained in time to stop the present drive, and be used in the counter drive which would follow as soon as the Allies had gained the numerical superiority.

During the month of May, 1918, five combat divisions arrived from the United States, and two of these, without any previous trench experience, saw action in the Second Battle of the Marne (July 15-18). These divisions were, in order of their arrival in France:

The 5th Division, made up from units of the old Regular Army, organized and trained at Camp Logan, Texas. On arrival in France, under the command of Major General James E. McMahan, the division went to the Bar-sur-Aube Area, between Chaumont and Troyes, for training, and remained there until June 1st, when it left by rail for the Vosges, and relieved the 21st French Division in the Colmar sector.

The next division to arrive was the 35th (Missouri and

AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH 79

Kansas National Guard). This division landed at Liverpool under the command of Major General H. M. Wright, and reached France on May 11, where it trained with the British in the area of Eu until June 11, then until June 30, in the Arches Area. From this training sector it went to the Vosges for training under the French in the De Galbert and Gerardmer sectors.


The 28th, or Keystone, Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), landed at Calais on May 18, under the command of Major General Charles H. Muir and trained with the British in the vicinity of Neilles les Blequin for about two weeks. It then was moved to the Connesse area, 10 miles north of Paris.

The 3rd Division was organized from units of the Regular Army at Camp Greene, Charlotte, N. C., and arrived in France at the end of May under the command of Major General Joseph T. Dickman. The division was concentrated in the Château Villain Training Area, 15 miles southwest of Chaumont.

The 4th Division, composed of units of the Regular Army, was trained at Camp Greene. It arrived in France in the latter part of May, via England and Calais and went to the Sammer training area under the command of Major General Geo. H. Cameron for training with the British. The Artillery Brigade went to train at Camp de Souge. On June 9, the Division moved to Meaux, on the River Marne, midway between Château-Thierry and Paris.

By the end of May, 1918, there were eleven American combat divisions in France, approximately 300,000 men. Two of these divisions, the 1st and 2nd Regulars, had completed their training; two, the 26th New England National Guard and the 42nd, were just finishing their training; the 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) was in the line for the first time; the 77th (New York National Army) was not yet into line, and the five divisions which had arrived in the month of May were, according to custom, becoming acclimated and taking up intensive training prior to entry into a quiet sector. The exigency of meeting the German drive had

disrupted temporarily all plans for an American sector, under command of General Pershing, and necessitated making the American divisions integral parts of the British and French



POSITION OF DIVISIONS IN MAY, 1918

Armies, being distributed to all parts of France, the American headquarters having no tactical control over them. The Americans fought under these conditions until September, including their participation in the great action in the Marne Salient, which is so often referred to as the drive on Château-

AMERICAN FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH 81

Thierry because that was its designation in the first dispatches reporting the fighting.

The location of these eleven combat divisions at the end of May was as follows:

- 1st. Cantigny Sector, between Amiens and Beauvais.
- 2nd. In general reserve at Chaumont-en-Vixen.
- 3rd. Château Villain Training Area 15 miles southwest of Chaumont.
- 4th. Sammer Training Area, near Bologne sur Mere.
- 5th. Bar-sur-Aube Training Area, between Chaumont and Troyes.
- 26th. Toul Sector.
- 28th. Conesse Area, ten miles northeast of Paris.
- 32nd. Alsace Sector, near Belfort.
- 35th. Eu Training Area in Flanders.
- 42nd. Baccarat Sector, Vosges Mountains between Nancy and Epinal.
- 77th. Eperlecques Training Area, near St. Omer.

CHAPTER IV

THE AISNE DEFENSIVE

3rd Division at Château-Thierry—2nd Division in Belleau Wood

BATTLES IN THE MARNE SALIENT

The fighting in the Marne Salient, comprising as it did 72 days of combat of varied intensity (from May 27 to August 6, 1918) was not one battle. "The Second Battle of the Marne," as it is so frequently and erroneously called, was divided into four separate and distinct battles. General Pershing, in the General Order which awards campaign badges, so divided the fighting during this time. These four major operations were as follows:

1. "*Aisne Defensive*—On the Chemin des Dames and northeast of Reims, between May 27 and June 5." This was the first phase of the German drive towards Paris, which on June 1 reached the River Marne near Château-Thierry. The 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines), 3rd Division (Regulars) took part in this defensive.

2. "*Montdidier-Noyon Defensive*—Between June 9 and 15." In this operation the Germans attempted to widen the Marne Salient to the west, and the 1st Division (Regulars) was in the line of defense.

Between the close of the first operation on June 5, and the beginning of the third on July 15, the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) made a small local advance and took the town of Vaux and Belleau Wood.

3. "*Champagne-Marne Defensive*—Between July 15 and 18." This was the first phase of the Second Battle of the Marne. The Germans attacked to cross the Marne and drive towards Paris, and were checked by the French and two American divisions, the 3rd Division (Regulars) and the 28th

Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), which were in the same line with the French and helped to stop this attack. At the same time the Germans drove southward in the Champagne, east of Reims, and here the 42nd Division ("Rainbow" National Guard) fought as a part of Gouraud's Fourth French Army, and helped to stop the attack. The Germans were stopped on all sides, and a vulnerable flank was left open.

4. *Aisne-Marne Offensive*—Between July 18 and August 6." Foch now took the initiative and drove a swift counter attack into the German's exposed right flank, southwest of Soissons. For this operation (July 18-22) he used the 1st Division (Regulars) and the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) along with the French 1st Moroccan Division. The attack was such a success that the Germans were forced to retreat from the Marne, and in further driving the Germans from the Marne, the following American Divisions took part in the action from day to day. 3rd (Regulars), 4th (Regulars), 26th (New England National Guard), 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard), 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), 42nd ("Rainbow" National Guard), and the 77th (New York City, National Army).


In this chapter, the first of this series of major operations, the Aisne-Defensive, is described. The second, third, and fourth operations follow in the succeeding chapters.

[The greatest secrecy was maintained during these actions to prevent the Germans from learning how many American troops were being used against them at this point. But even more important than this was the necessity of keeping concealed the identity of the American divisions in the area, for the German Intelligence knew well that three or four American divisions were experienced, first class troops; they also knew however that there were many American divisions in France which had never been in the line. If they had been able to distinguish the one from the other, serious trouble might have arisen. This was foreseen, and the most strict censorship was ordered. Even in the press accounts to the United States no mention could be made of units participating

in this fighting. On one occasion, however, the censor did permit the word "Marines" to be used. This was during the first days of the fighting, and the Press of the United States interpreted all the actions in the Marne Salient as being fought solely by Marines. The publicity bureau of the Marine Corps, in the United States, fostered this idea to increase recruiting, and in this way, a single slip of the censorship gave for the time being the credit for all these battles, to the United States Marine Corps. The 6,000 Marines, who formed a part of the 2nd Division, did fight a very gallant action in Belleau Wood, but it seems unfortunate that they were given the credit for what was really accomplished by the 250,000 American Infantry, and the million of French Infantry who fought through the 72 days, from May 27 to August 6, 1918. The general impression in the United States was that the Marines were rushed up to fill a gap in the line at Château-Thierry and saved Paris. The facts were briefly these: The Marine Brigade did not fight in Château-Thierry. The 2nd Division, in which there were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps, was put in behind a French Division in support on June 1. There were small gaps in the French lines, and some units of the Division went into the front line to fill these, and helped the French repel the attack of June 2. Then, on June 4, the French, under orders, fell back through them, and this put the Americans in the front line, facing Belleau Wood. Here the Division remained for two days, and then, acting independently, they attacked the Germans who were entrenched in Belleau Wood. This was merely a local attack and its result had an importance in lifting the morale of the Allies far beyond the actual importance of the attack of itself. The Marines fought gallantly, and in 20 days' continuous fighting cleared the wood of Germans.]

It is worth while to try to picture the succession of events that led up to the situation at the end of May, 1918. On March 21, the Germans began their great offensive towards the junction of the British and French, at St. Quentin, with the intention of dividing these two Allies before America could throw enough men into the fight to make herself felt,

and by seizing the Channel ports, to menace England with invasion. How close they came to success can be seen in the fall of Bapaume and Peronne on March 24, the fall of Ar-



BATTLE LINE OF MAY 27, 1918

The Germans attacked, between Soissons and Reims, and pushed the advance south as far as Château-Thierry.

mentières on April 11, and the bloody battle for Amiens on April 24, by which the offensive was stopped. Then came a month of inactivity on the front while both sides reorganized and replaced their combat divisions. The month of May,

1918, was one of anxious waiting, to see where the Germans would strike next. Marshal Foch had a formidable problem to face, for with approximately the same reserve force, he was on the outside of a right angle, with the apex at Amiens, while the Germans were on the interior lines. Roughly speaking this put all the German forces, eighty-two divisions of maneuver, together in one great central group able and ready to strike in any direction, while the Allied reserves had to be scattered in three great groupings, one behind the British front, one behind the apex at Amiens, and one behind the French front. These three groups of Allied reserves were, of necessity, but one-third the size of the great German group. Watching every slightest move of the enemy and keeping the reserves in just the right place and always mobile involved an enormous task.

The Germans had been preparing for over a month for the resumption of the offensive. Marshal Foch decided that they would strike toward Compeigne and so disposed of his reserves between Montdidier and Compeigne. To do this he had weakened his reserves along the Chemin des Dames (between Soissons and Reims), for this position was naturally very strong. On May 27 the Germans launched their attack, not where Foch had expected it, but along the Chemin des Dames. On the front of forty kilometers (25 miles) were three French and three British divisions, exhausted from severe fighting, and sent to this hilly sector to rest, so impregnable were the four successive lines of hills considered. Along the entire front of the Chemin des Dames ten Allied divisions with four in support, faced eight German divisions with one in support. During the night of May 26-27, the Germans skillfully brought fifteen rested, assault divisions up to the Chemin des Dames and, attacking at dawn, the Allied forces were overwhelmed. So complete was this success that in twenty-four hours the Germans had penetrated nineteen kilometers (almost 12 miles). By May 30 the Allied resistance was practically gone, and the Germans pressed southward to the Marne as fast as they could march. The success had been greater than the Germans had anticipated and, with Paris in


mind, their plans were suddenly changed. The surrounding of Reims had been their object, but on May 30 the route was directed toward Château-Thierry. Until this moment, Marshal Foch had allowed the Germans to advance their fifteen divisions into the long salient, without moving any of his thirteen reserve French divisions.

By the taking of Cantigny on May 28, the 1st Division had demonstrated the fighting quality of the American troops, and this was one of the big factors in deciding Marshal Foch to use the Americans along the Marne. Accordingly he ordered the 2nd (Regular and Marine) and the 3rd (Regular) American divisions to the Marne. They were not sent there to fill a gap, but merely to be distributed along the French lines. There were two purposes in this action. Primarily it was a political move to encourage the French nation, and secondarily its purpose was to strengthen the French lines in weak spots without withdrawing any units from his thirteen French divisions of maneuver, which he held ready to strike back when the time came.

These two American divisions, the 2nd and 3rd, reached the Marne early in June and were put in immediately to fill small gaps in the line which were made as the ten original Allied divisions lengthened their line with each withdrawal. The 3rd Division, being untried, was split up and spread along the line from Château-Thierry eastward, while the 2nd Division, at General Bundy's insistent request, was put in reserve as a unit, immediately behind the French, about fifteen kilometers (ten miles) west of Château-Thierry, facing Belleau Wood and Vaux. The Germans had not reached the line held by the Americans, either at Château-Thierry or Belleau (the two highways towards Paris), and no real contact was gained until June 2.

On May 30 the order to move to the Marne came to the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. It was a complete surprise, for the 2nd Division, which was in reserve for the Picardy front, at Chaumont en Vixen, was under orders to leave next day to relieve the 1st Division in the Cantigny Sector. The 3rd Division (Regulars) in the Château Villaine area (15 miles

southwest of Chaumont) was preparing to leave its training area and go into a quiet sector for its first experiences in the line. Major General Bundy received a French staff officer at five in the morning at 2nd Division Headquarters, who handed him orders to put the whole division aboard trucks and send them with all speed to Meaux. General Dickman, then com-



THE MARNE SALIENT

Showing Battle Line of June 2, 1918, when the 2nd and 3rd American Divisions entered the line.

manding the 3rd Division, was making a tour of inspection of the quiet sector to which this division was to be sent very shortly for its first trench training, when he was overtaken by the order to move the division to Château-Thierry. He returned at once and issued the movement order, and the division started on its long journey, preceded by the 7th Machine-gun Battalion, which, being motorized, went ahead.

The Marne river flows in a westerly direction between high banks which come down to the water's edge, on the north


side from Essomes-sur-Marne ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Château-Thierry), east as far as Vincelles. The bottom lands or flats are on the south side of the river in this vicinity. A small tributary enters at Essomes from the northwest, and in the angle thus created is a commanding elevation, Hill 204. Ten miles to the north the Ourcq river flows west, then bends sharply south and empties into the Marne twenty miles west of Château-Thierry. Flowing west parallel to the Marne, a tributary of the Ourcq has its headwaters about a mile from the headwaters of the Marne tributary which enters at Essomes. Along the Ourcq tributary to the northwest of Château-Thierry are the towns of Bouresches, Belleau, Torcy, and Bussiares distant three, five, six, and eight miles, respectively, and connected with Essomes and Château-Thierry by a narrow-gauge railway. Along the Marne tributary are the towns of Monneaux and Vaux. Château-Thierry is a town of considerable importance due to its being a communication center, both by highway and rail. It is built on both the north and south banks of the Marne, just where the river takes a sharp bend to the south, and is only about fifty miles from Paris. Scattered along the Marne and at average distances of less than a mile apart are numerous small towns, the most important of which are Mont St. Pére-Charteves (five miles distant), Jaulgonne (one mile further east), and Dormans (ten miles from Château-Thierry). The importance of these towns is due to the bridges across the Marne at these points. All the surrounding country is broken and covered at intervals with forests and woods. This made the German position on the heights north of the Marne almost impregnable from frontal attack.

The first American unit to arrive in the Marne sector was the 7th Motorized Machine-gun Battalion of the 3rd Division. While the remainder of the division was speeding along in French railroad trains, the machine-gun battalion had come overland 110 miles and arrived in the sector at 4 p. m. May 31. They detrucked and, carrying their guns and ammunition, that night marched into the town of Château-Thierry. A battalion of French Colonial Infantry was holding the place while the

90 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

German advance guards were trying to force their way into it, so as to gain possession of the two bridges across the Marne.

The 7th Machine-gun Battalion held the Germans at bay, and gradually the attack died down. Meanwhile the 4th Infantry regiment relieved the French in the town of Château-Thierry. On June 3, the 9th Machine-gun Battalion of the 3rd Division relieved the 7th Machine-gun Battalion and on



CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

Showing Belleau Wood to the left and position of 3rd Division to right.

leaving the town for its short rest, the latter unit was given the highest praise by the French in orders:

“The episode of Château-Thierry will remain one of the most remarkable deeds of this war. It is a pleasure for us all to know that our valiant allies have shared with us there.”

Contrary to the popular belief, there was no gap in the line at Château-Thierry as there had been after March 21 in front of Amiens. The French lines were intact and the German drive had reached its limit. Americans of the 3rd Regular Army Division, the 7th and 9th Machine-gun Battalions and the 4th Infantry Regiment, were put in to relieve the French who had stopped the drive and to prevent the Germans from exploiting their success. It is but just to these units and to those of their number who fell there to make it clear that

there were no units of the Marine Corps in Château-Thierry.

The remainder of the 3rd Division, less the Artillery Brigade, was now brought up and relieved French units along the south bank of the Marne, and became a part of the 38th French Army Corps. The division was placed eastward from Château-Thierry in order from left to right as follows: 4th Infantry in the town, connecting with the 39th French Division on its left; 7th Infantry, 30th Infantry, 38th Infantry, which connected with the 125th French Division in the Jaulgonne bend of the Marne. The line was stabilized now along the river. The 3rd Division was holding the south bank, sending constant patrols across the river into German territory on the north bank, and, in so doing, gaining their first experience in the line in action.

The 39th French Division, which connected with the 4th Infantry in Château-Thierry, had stopped the Germans west of Château-Thierry on the line Monneaux-Vaux. This gave the enemy Hill 204 which dominated the whole position, and overlooking Château-Thierry made the protection of the river crossings there most difficult. The lines in this sector had become stabilized on this general line of the tributary of the Marne which enters at Essomes.

On the night of June 6, a combined attack of French and American Infantry (3rd Division) was launched and captured Hill 204. This secured Château-Thierry to the Allies, who held it from the south bank of the Marne principally with machine-gun battalions of the 3rd Division, supported by the French occupancy of the Hill 204. From this time on, the line from Château-Thierry east along the Marne being stabilized, the 3rd Division, on the south bank, kept up constant patrolling on the north bank, and the German attempts to reconnoiter the south bank were frustrated.


The 2nd Division (9th and 23rd Infantry, 5th and 6th Marine Regiments), which had been moved in French trucks from Chaumont-en-Vixen, arrived at Meaux, twenty miles east of Paris on the Marne, and immediately started toward the front. The trucks could go no further than the town, the roads being congested with the huge traffic of supplies for

the new front, and with refugees leaving the scene of battle. On the night of June 1, the 2nd Division went into position in support of the French who were making a stand on the line Bouresches, Belleau, Torcy, Bussiares. The 6th Marine Regiment was now moved up to the support position from Le Thiolet (four miles west of Château-Thierry), Triangle Farme, Lucy-le-Bocage, to Hill 142 southwest of Torcy. By midnight of June 1-2, the 9th Infantry Regiment was in position on the right, south of the Paris-Metz road, and the 23rd Infantry Regiment on the left from Champillon west. This put the 2nd Division in the support position immediately behind the French who were holding the line.

On June 3 and 4 the Germans attacked the French, but gained very little ground. The French, however, by this time were in need of reorganization, and accordingly at 4 p. m. on the 4th of June they retired through the line held by the 2nd Division. This put the Americans in the front line. By this time the divisional artillery was in position, and the division was ready to stand alone. But the front the division was now holding was much too long to be held by that division alone and accordingly the 167th French Division relieved the 23rd Regiment of Infantry on the extreme left of the position from Champillon west. The 23rd Infantry then moved to the right and went in between the 9th Infantry Regiment and the 6th Marine Regiment. The 5th Marine Regiment was now brought up and took over the sector from Lucy-le-Bocage to Champillon. The line was thus formed and the sectors established on the night of June 5-6. Although there was some shelling of the lines while they were being established and one attack shortly after the French passed through, the fight for Bouresches and Belleau Wood was not begun until June 6. The 2nd Division was now a division of the 21st French Army Corps, joining up on its right with the 39th French Division (which in turn connected with the 3rd American Division in Château-Thierry). The 2nd Division connected on its left with the 167th French Division.

On the night of June 5 the Allied line ran: South bank of the Marne, Essomes, west edge of the Bois-du-Loup.

Crogis, northeast edge of the Bois-de-la-Marette, east edge of the Bois de Clerembauts, Lucy-le-Bocage, Champillon. The German line was as follows: North bank of Marne, Bois de Corteau, Monneaux, Vaux, western edge of Boise-de-Belleau. This put the Germans in an advantageous position for continuing the attack at any future time, for their front lines were just over the crest of the hill with the line of woods behind them, and behind these woods lay the shallow valley of the tributary of the Ourcq, containing the towns of Belleau and



BELLEAU WOOD

Showing advance of 2nd Division in June, 1918.

Bouresches. The Allies were in a very disadvantageous position, being much more in the open, with no woods behind them, and in positions lower than the Germans, which gave the latter observation of the Allies' rear, while the German rear lay in the shallow valley. Accordingly an attack was ordered to take the wooded crest including the Bois-de-la-Marette and the Bois-de-Belleau and the town of Bouresches, in order to put the Allied front line over the crest of the hill and get the woods behind them.

The attack was launched on the morning of June 6 by the 2nd Division under a rolling barrage to improve their position. Bouresches was captured by the 6th Marine Regiment who also gained a secure footing in the Bois de Belleau. The 5th

Marine Regiment advanced a kilometer ($\frac{5}{8}$ mile) in the direction of Torcy. The 9th and 23rd Infantry advanced their lines beyond Triangle Farme and the Bois-de-la-Marette. The Germans had fortified the Bois-de-Belleau with machine guns, and "Belleau Wood," a forest about a mile square, with dense undergrowth, was practically impossible to penetrate. Held as it was by determined infantry, well entrenched, whose machine-gun nests and trench mortars were well concealed and well supported by artillery, it was a strong position which rendered almost futile any attempt to take it. The capture of one machine-gun nest only disclosed that its position was commanded by another nest of guns. But the Marines would not give up, and, despite terrific casualties, they maintained their foothold in Belleau Wood. Two additional advances in the next three days gave some additional ground, and there were almost continual skirmishes in the wood until June 10, when General Harbord, commanding general of the Marine Brigade, called attention to the condition of his brigade and asked for relief. To afford some measure of relief, General Bundy, the division commander, readjusted the brigade sector and assigned the ground from Triangle Farme to Bouresches to the 3rd Brigade (9th and 23rd Infantry), which it took over on the night of June 13. On June 14, the 167th French Infantry Division took over some of the sector of the 2nd Division to include Hill 142, thus relieving the Marine Brigade on the left as well as on the right and making their sector Belleau Wood alone. But the resistance remained the same and very little progress was made.

Arrangements were then made to borrow the 7th Infantry Regiment from the 3rd Division, and it was placed at the Marine commander's disposal for six days. The 7th Infantry Regiment relieved the Marine Brigade on the night of June 15, in Belleau Wood. For six days the 7th Infantry attacked continuously. It was able to gain but very little ground. However, it did not lose any ground, and on the 21st-22nd of June, when the six days were up, the regiment was withdrawn, the Marines, who once more took over Belleau Wood, did so on

almost the same lines on which they had been relieved the week before.

Though the Bois-de-Belleau (Belleau Wood) was reported clear of the enemy on June 12, when the capture of 300 prisoners was announced, it was not wholly and finally taken until June 26; the fight for its possession had gone on almost continuously from the initial attack on June 6. With its capture this part of the line was stabilized.

The 3rd Brigade (9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments) during these twenty days, held the sectors assigned to it, and co-operated in various attacks, until the morning of July 1, when a battalion from each regiment, supported by the 12th, 15th and 17th Artillery Regiments, in conjunction with the French who were attacking on their right, captured the village of Vaux and the Bois-de-la-Roche.

This put the Allied lines on the dominant ground from Château-Thierry westward, including Hill 204, Vaux, Bouresches, and Belleau Wood. On the night of July 9-10, the 2nd Division was relieved by the 26th Division (New England National Guard) who had just come from the Toul Sector and the 2nd Division was placed in reserve.

The relief of the 2nd Division by the 26th Division brought to a close the Belleau Wood-Vaux action, which, while not a part of any major engagement, was a brilliant local engagement which prepared the 2nd Division for the big work ahead of it. Like Cantigny, it was a local action, to relieve an awkward position on the front of the division, and had no part in the Second Battle of the Marne. But, although the fighting in this sector by the 2nd Division formed no part of any great strategical battle, its importance must not be overlooked. The capture of 1,680 enemy prisoners, an advance of two kilometers on an eight kilometer front, and the seizing of such strong positions as Belleau Wood, Bouresches and Vaux from a determined enemy, coming just at the moment when the Allies were stunned by the German successes; all this had a profound psychological effect upon the Allied Armies and in the Allied countries. Clemenceau made public announcement of the American victory to the French people,

and everywhere was the news sent, that the Americans had won a truly great battle in Belleau Wood, Bouresches and Vaux. In recognition of the brilliant achievement of the 4th Marine Brigade in their stubborn fight for Belleau Wood, the French Government ordered the name of that now famous bit of woods changed to *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*.

The 2nd Division left this sector for replacement and rest with the assurance that they had established a remarkable record for bravery, courage and reckless gallantry in action. They had captured 1,680 prisoners in the month's steady fighting, and a feeling of comradeship and coöperation had developed between the soldiers and the Marines.

The Marine casualties in this action were 113 officers and 5,598 men killed, wounded and missing, while the other brigade of the division, the 9th and 23rd Infantry lost 65 officers and 3,496 men.

CHAPTER V


THE MONTDIDIER-NOYON DEFENSIVE

1st Division in Line

The German drive on Paris, which began on May 27, was finally stopped on June 5. The Germans had reached the banks of the Marne between Château-Thierry and Dormans. They had advanced 35 miles from the Chemin des Dames to the Marne river, and the effective force of the attack had spent itself. The Germans, by this drive, had placed themselves in a long narrow salient stretching down from the original battle front to the River Marne. This salient, 28 miles in length, was but 22 miles wide and hence vulnerable to attacks on the flanks. The width of the salient was limited on the east by the strongly fortified city of Reims, which the French held. The dense and impenetrable forest of Compiègne limited the width of the salient on the west. Two plans were available to widen the salient. Either they could take Reims and push eastward or else they must come down west of the forest of Compiègne just as they had come down east of it to Château-Thierry in May. For the Germans to take the city of Reims, the cost in men and time would be prohibitive. The city was surrounded by the most elaborate defenses of the western front, which practically eliminated all plans for a German frontal attack. The other plan to take the city involved the costly encircling from the Champagne plateau, on the east, and former attempts at this point had always met with failure. The plan to widen the salient on the west was therefore adopted. The forest of Compiègne, which limited the salient on the west, was too dense to permit of any active fighting, and accordingly the Germans decided to attack west of the forest, to form another salient parallel to the Château-

98 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

Thierry salient which would connect with the latter, as soon as the forest was enveloped. This plan of widening the dangerously narrow Château-Thierry salient was attempted by



BATTLE LINE OF JULY 9, 1918

German attack between Montdidier and Noyon failed to widen the Marne Salient.

the Germans, and on July 9 they launched the attack between Montdidier and Noyon.

The 1st Division (Regulars) was still sitting in front of Montdidier in the Cantigny sector, where it had been since

April 25, vainly speculating on when the division would be relieved. The sector was still so hot that the daily toll of casualties was very high, and the casualties from the Cantigny attack had left great gaps in the regiments, both among officers and men. For some days the German attack had been expected. Each night saw more and more Allied artillery move into the sector, and this time it was batteries of 155-mm. G.P.F., those long-barreled, high-powered, six-inch rifles on rubber tires, which move around almost like field artillery and deposit their projectiles with great accuracy eighteen kilometers (11 miles) away. Then too the infantry had not been idle. Each night the position of platoons and machine-gun nests was changed, so that the photographs taken by the German aviators would be useless for artillery targets. The additional artillery, and the frequent changes in the positions of the American infantry showed clearly that the Allied staff expected a German attack in this sector. The third and most unmistakable sign of all was the sudden increase in German airplanes over the sector.

Beginning about midnight on the night of June 8-9, the area along the support positions, where all the batteries and headquarters were located, was deluged with a most intense bombardment of gas and high explosive shells, which lasted until dawn and cut every means of communication. Throughout it all, however, the Allied artillery kept up its immense schedule of firing on every road in the German lines which led to the front, the gunners suffering heavy casualties despite the fact that gas masks were worn all night. With the coming of dawn, all the light guns of the Allies concentrated their fire, forming a barrage along the Allied front, through which the Germans would have to pass to assault the Allied line. From the support lines it was impossible to see the front because of the heavy fog and the gas cloud which had rolled down off the hill of the support position, and lay in the shallow valley where the front lines were. All communications with the forward battalions was cut off, and the artillery was firing merely on the supposition that the Germans had launched their

attack. Communication with the front became the immediate concern of every one along the support position.

This contingency had been anticipated; mounted orderlies had been stationed at each of the forward Battalion Headquarters; and a mounted officer with two mounted orderlies had been sent to the forward Battalion Headquarters of the French regiment on the right of the 1st Division, in the draw which the Germans were expected to come up. They were to bring messages to the 26th Infantry Regimental Headquarters, where a buried cable gave telephone connection to all the artillery and headquarters in rear. Soon after dawn the messages began to arrive. It appeared that so far the German infantry had attacked on a broad front, but not on the front of the 1st Division. The French division on the right of the 1st was involved. The artillery was immediately notified, and the fire was shifted to the front of the French division. It soon became apparent that the 1st Division would not be included in the infantry attack of that morning, although it had been included in the intense artillery preparation. The mounted orderlies were a new thing in trench warfare, but their use justified itself in the accurate information they brought. They presented a strange spectacle to that little group of officers standing on the hill by Regimental Headquarters, looking eagerly towards the sea of poisonous fog which enveloped the front. Out of this yellow cloud suddenly appeared galloping furiously a foam-covered horse, splashed to the withers with mud and made monstrous by wearing a gas mask, and on him riding as fast as his spurs could make him, a man disguised beyond recognition by his gas mask.

The attack between Montdidier and Noyon failed. The Allies had banked too much artillery to permit of any other outcome. The guns stood almost hub to hub along this entire front; and in those few spots where the German infantry did penetrate the line, they were unable to bring up the reinforcements necessary to continue the advance. The French had played a clever game. Practically the entire garrison of the sector attacked had been withdrawn in accordance with Marshal Foch's tactics to the main line of resistance, a line

MONTDIDIER-NOYON DEFENSIVE 101

of wooded heights from two to five kilometers in rear of the front lines; and at this point the advance of the Germans had been in all but a few points definitely stopped. The German infantry had attacked in waves only to be mowed down by the Allied artillery and machine guns.

The Germans tried to continue the attack during the succeeding five days, but without any further success; and in some parts of the line, French counter-attacks easily won back some of the ground, and the second phase of the attack on Paris was stopped. The sector then rapidly became quiet, as the Germans withdrew their assault divisions and artillery in preparation for their last great attack on Paris. The 1st Division remained in the Cantigny Sector until July 7, when it was relieved by a French division, and the 1st went for needed rest a few miles north of Paris. After 78 days in the Cantigny Sector, the whole division was worn out from the strain, and the cost in casualties to this division was 238 officers and 5,593 men. A long rest seemed to be in store for it after its six months' continuous duty in the line.

CHAPTER VI

A MONTH OF WAITING

Allied Forces Shifted About—Nine New Divisions Arrive—Celebration in Paris on Eve of Last German Drive

The failure of the German attack between Montdidier and Noyon marked the close of the second phase of their advance towards Paris. Both sides had fought themselves to a standstill. The activity on the front gradually quieted down, and there ensued thirty days of tense waiting, during which both sides reorganized their fighting forces, regrouped their reserves, and vainly tried to outguess each other's intentions. The Allies were still on the defensive, for the Germans had superiority in manpower. But on the other hand, the Germans were in a deep and narrow salient pointing towards Paris, and in a much wider salient towards Amiens, so the grouping of the Allied reserves in the right angle between these two salients was logical, for it was evident that in the very near future the Germans would strike again in one or the other of these two directions. The few American divisions which were in this area, were now made part of the Allied defensive reserve, for the quality and dependability of the troops was no longer a question, but an assured fact. The 1st Division at Cantigny, the 2nd at Belleau Wood, Bouresches, and Vaux, and the 3rd at Château-Thierry, had established an enviable record for the American Army. And now while the Germans were organizing for their next offensive the stage was being prepared for the employment of many more American divisions, both those that had recently arrived and those that were due to arrive within a few weeks' time.

This month of waiting, from June 15 to July 15,

marked some of the greatest troop movements in the war. The British and French regrouped their reserves, and the American divisions were moved about in conformity as they formed part of these armies. The seasoned divisions were assembled back of the line between the two German salients, while the newly arrived divisions were rushed down to the quiet sectors in the Vosges mountains to relieve more experienced divisions for service on the Marne.

On July 5 the 1st Division was relieved in the Cantigny sector, by the 152nd and the 166th French Divisions, and was assembled in the Beauvais Area. On July 11 the division was made a part of the Tenth French Army, and immediately proceeded to Dammartin en Goele, on the Paris-Soissons road, in immediate reserve of the front at the juncture of the two German salients.

On July 9 the 2nd Division was relieved by the 26th Division in the Belleau Wood Sector, and the 2nd Division was assembled at Montreuil-St. Aulde, in general reserve for this part of the front. Here it rested after the forty days of active fighting around Belleau Wood, while replacements of officers, men and animals filled once more the ranks to strength.

The 3rd Division remained in the line on the banks of the River Marne, and gradually drew in their extended battle line until their front was compact and all was in readiness for a resumption of the attack by the Germans.

The 77th (New York City National Army) the first of the National Army Divisions to arrive in France, had by this time finished its preliminary training with the British at St. Omer and was now ready to go into a quiet sector. Major-General George B. Duncan, who as a brigadier had commanded the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division, was assigned in May to command the New York Division. The 77th Division was carefully watched by every one, for it was indeed an experiment to take a thousand "candidates" from civil life in May, 1917, train them for three months, then commission them and order them to Camp Upton with only a dozen Regular Army officers to instruct them. In September the

first increment of the draft arrived; and, by gradual stages the regiments, which at first were composed solely of the officers, were filled to strength. My mid-October, 1917, the division was practically complete and was drilling to all appearances like veterans. Eight months later, in June, 1918, the 77th was in France, packed into the funny little *Hommes 40 Cheveaux 8 cars*, a battalion on each train, hastening eastward across France, past Paris, past Nancy, until finally the trains stopped at a little, unheard-of place and the troops were ordered out of the cars. Two days marching followed, and then the different units were all finally grouped in the vicinity of Rambervilliers. It was now announced that the 77th was to occupy a quiet sector on the front and would relieve the 42nd or Rainbow Division in the Baccarat Sector. For the first part of its stay, the New York Division was to occupy the sector jointly with the French 61st Division, as was the usual custom when new divisions went in the line for the first time, and the sector remained under the command of the French, who acted as instructors in the little points of trench warfare. This was the first time the 77th had come in contact with the French Army and it was the beginning of that close friendship which grew stronger between these comrades in arms as the war progressed. The relief was completed by the 26th of June.

The Rainbow Division (National Guard from many States), commanded by General Menoher, had held the Baccarat Sector since March 23, and had been in the line there 140 days, being finally relieved on June 21. This division in these three months of trench warfare in the Vosges had tasted every experience of trench warfare; and, while the sector was quiet, still there were occasional raids and minor attacks by both sides, besides gas attacks by shell and projector, so that the Rainbow Division had now completed its preliminary training in the line and was considered a first class combat division, ready to fight as a unit with best French, British and American Divisions in the counter-offensive which was sure to come. This division was then transferred by rail to the Marne valley, and placed in reserve in the troop-worn

towns between Vitry-le-Francois and Châlons-sur-Marne, along the Paris-Nancy highway. Here it remained until the night of June 28-29, when, as part of the Fourth French Army, commanded by General Gouraud, it began its long march of 35 kilometers towards the front; and at dawn reached the famous maneuver field known as the CAMP DE CHÂLONS, 15 kilometers behind the CHAMPAGNE front, midway between Châlons and Suippes. Here the Rainbow Division began a series of rehearsals for an attack in conjunction with divisions of the Fifth French Army, all under General Pell, the French Corps Commander. The Americans welcomed this chance to do some real fighting, for after three months in a quiet sector, taking the daily shelling and discomforts, without ever the chance to strike back, this seemed like the opportunity that all had been waiting for. It was, however, never carried out. Instead, the ever threatening German attack caused the Rainbow Division on July 4th to be made a part of the 21st French Army Corps, to defend the Champagne.

The 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), under the command of General Muir, was gradually assembled during June, less the 53rd Artillery Brigade, in the area just north of Paris. June was a very tedious month for its four infantry regiments (109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th) and for the 103rd Engineer Regiment, for looking in one direction they could see Paris, and in the other the flashes of the guns at the front. Yet they could go to neither place, but worked on and on according to an endless training schedule wondering all the time whether the war would be over before they should ever get into it. Towards the end of June the evidence that the Germans would attempt to cross the Marne became unmistakable, and more reserves would be needed. The 28th Division was the nearest, and, while it had never been in action and still lacked its Artillery Brigade, it was nevertheless ordered to a position in reserve, about ten miles south of the Marne, in rear of the 3rd Division, and became a part of the French Army defending the road to Paris.

The 4th Division (Regulars), commanded by General

Cameron, landed in May and was training with the British in the Sammer area while its Artillery Brigade went to Camp de Sourge to get its guns and horses and learn the working and firing of the French 75's. This division on June 9th was entrained and brought down from the British area to Meaux, midway between Château-Thierry and Paris on the Marne river. Here it remained in general reserve until June 15th, when, as it was still without its artillery and had not yet been in the line, it was ordered to join the 164th French Division at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, twenty kilometers west of Château-Thierry on the Marne. The infantry regiments immediately began training for an attack with the French, while the engineer regiments constructed a secondary position for defense along the hills above Crouttes.

This arrangement of the American divisions in June put two American divisions in the line of the Marne salient, the 3rd (Regulars) from Château-Thierry eastward, and the 26th (New England National Guard) in Belleau Wood. Five other American divisions were located in rear of the lines of the salient, in reserve, as follows:

1st Division at Dammartin, 20 miles northeast of Paris.

2nd Division at Montrieul-aux-Lions, 10 kilometers behind Belleau Wood.


4th Division, La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, west of Château-Thierry.

28th Division at Montmirail, 10 miles south of Château-Thierry.

42nd Division at Camp de Châlons, north of Châlons-sur-Marne.

The great mid-summer troop movement was now in full swing. Troops were landing in every port and were assembled in training areas, put through the preliminary training, and then sent to quiet sectors under the British and French. In the month of June nine combat divisions (two hundred and fifty thousand combat troops) and one depot division were landed in France. This gave an added stimulus to the Allies in that month of waiting, as General Pershing says in his report:

"The great June-July troop movement from the States was now well under way, and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training before being put into action, their very



DIVISIONS IN THE MARNE SALIENT IN JUNE, 1918

presence warranted the use of all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves."

The 82nd Division was the first to arrive. Organized at Camp Gordon, near Atlanta, Ga., under the command of

Major General Eben Swift, with personnel drafted from the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, it was called upon to furnish replacements for the National Guard divisions from these states, which left it but 863 of its original men. It was in turn filled with men drawn from almost every state of the Union, and these soldiers were descended from every nationality in Europe. So thoroughly did it represent the nation that it was called the All-American Division. This division left the United States on April 24, 1918, the first elements arriving in France, via England, in the middle of May, and by June 1st the whole division was in training with the British on the river Somme west of Abbeville, except the Artillery Brigade, which went to La Courtine in central France to receive its equipment and final training. During its stay in the British area, it was under tentative orders to form part of the defense of Amiens, should the Germans attack again. On June 16th, this division left the British area without having gone into the line, and went by train to the Toul Sector, where, in conjunction with a French Division, it occupied the line.

The next division to arrive was the 78th (National Army) with men drawn from northern New York, New Jersey and Delaware and commanded by Major General James H. McRae. This division was organized at Camp Dix, New Jersey, and on May 8, 1918, began the movement overseas. The Artillery Brigade landed in France and proceeded to Brittany for training. The infantry units landed in England on June 4th and 5th and crossed to Calais by boat, three or four days later. The last unit arrived in France on June 11. The infantry began its training behind the Hazelrouk front in the British area, and on July 19, moved to the St. Pol Area, west of Arras.

The 33rd Division (Illinois National Guard) was trained at Camp Logan, Texas, with Major General George Bell, Jr., in command; and on April 23, 1918, the first units left camp for overseas. The division arrived in France at Brest, the last units arriving on June 11. The division was immediately sent to the Huppy area, near Abbeville, and on June 9th, pro-

ceeded to the Eu Training Area in the British zone. On June 13, the 108th Engineers of the 33rd Division were sent forward to work on the defenses of Amiens, where the next German drive was expected, and on June 20-21 the remainder of the division moved into the Amiens area. Here it was trained by the British, occupying portions of the front line and participating in a number of small operations. On July 4 four companies of infantry from the 33rd Division, namely, Company "C" and "E," 131st Infantry, and "A" and "G," 132nd Infantry took part in the attack on Hamel. These were the first American troops to fight alongside the Australians, and this was the first time that Americans had fought with the British in an action of any magnitude. Although of minor importance, the attack on Hamel was of great value in showing the British that not alone the American Regulars, but all the American troops were capable of the bitterest fighting. It was an Australian Colonel who met these companies on their return from this mission, saying: "Yanks, you're fighting fools; but I'm for you."

The 80th or Blue Ridge Division was organized at Camp Lee, Petersburg, Va., by General Adelbert Cronkhite. Its name was derived from the fact that the enlisted personnel were drawn exclusively from the States of Virginia, West Virginia, and western Pennsylvania—the region of the Blue Ridge Mountains. On May 17, 1918, the division began to move to France, where the troops debarked at Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, and Brest; and on June 12, the entire Blue Ridge Division, less the Artillery Brigade, was sent to Calais, where in the middle of June it was assembled in the Sammer Training Area for instruction by the 16th (Irish) and then the 34th (English) Divisions, which through losses were but mere skeleton divisions.

The Infantry of the Blue Ridge Division, after the completion of the first phase of their training, was transferred southward to the Third British Army Sector, where, until August 20, it was posted along the secondary lines between Albert and Arras. Attached as it was to the British for the dual purpose of its own training and the support of the British

in case of an emergency, battalion units entered the front line trenches and participated in minor local actions with the Corps to which they were attached. The nature of the experiences during this period is evidenced by nearly 400 casualties which the division suffered until August 20, when it was relieved.

The 92nd Division, popularly known as the Buffaloes, was made up of colored National Army men from all parts of the United States. It was trained at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton, Meade, and Dix. On June 2, 1918, the division was assembled at Camp Upton for embarkation overseas; and on June 19, Major General Charles C. Ballou and Division Headquarters arrived at Brest. After a period of training the division entered the line at St. Die, in the Vosges Mountains.

The 37th or Buckeye Division (Ohio National Guard) was organized at Camp Sheridan, Montgomery, Alabama. For more than ten months it was trained in the United States until, on June 11, 1918, under the command of Major General Charles S. Farnsworth, the Buckeye Division began its movement overseas. The division on arrival was assembled, less the Artillery Brigade, in the Bourmont Area.

The 30th or Old Hickory Division (National Guard from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee) was organized at Camp Sevier, S. C. The first units sailed for overseas service on May 5, 1918, and the last units landed at Calais on June 24. The division was ordered to the Eperlecques Training Area, with the British, and remained there until July 4, when it was ordered into Belgium to serve with the Second British Army Corps, being placed in support of the 33rd and 49th British Divisions. Division Headquarters was located at Watou, and it was in this sector, with Major General George W. Read in command, that the division received its first training in the line.

The 89th or Middle West Division was organized at Camp Funston, Kansas, from men drawn from the States of Missouri, Kansas, South Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico and Arizona, by Major General Leonard Wood, who remained in command until he was relieved on the eve of the

embarkation for overseas. Major General William M. Wright commanded the division during its active campaign. This division, less the Artillery Brigade, began to leave Camp Funston on May 22, 1918, arriving in France late in June, where it was assembled in the Fouche-Trampot Training Area.

The 29th or Blue and Gray Division was made up of the National Guard of New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, and was commanded by Major General Charles G. Morton. From the fact that States both of the North and the South were represented in the division, the name Blue and Gray was adopted. The division left Camp McClellan, Alabama, and arrived in France at the end of June, 1918, at the ports of Brest and St. Nazaire. This division was then ordered to the Prauthoy, 10th Training Area, while the Artillery Brigade was sent to Camp Meucon, just outside of St. Nazaire, for its training and equipment.

In addition to the above nine combat divisions, the 83rd Division (Ohio and West Virginia) arrived in France on June 21, 1918. This division was organized at Camp Sherman, Ohio, under the command of Major General Edwin F. Glenn. Upon arrival in France, the 83rd Division was designated as a Depot Division, and was ordered to the Le Mans Area, midway between Paris and St. Nazaire. Here the division was broken up; the 158th Artillery Brigade and special units, such as the 308th Engineer Regiment and the 308th Field Signal Battalion, being sent forward as corps and army troops. The other organizations of the division were held in the area and trained as replacements for the combat divisions at the front.

By the end of June, therefore, there were twenty American combat divisions in France, about 240,000 rifles. Seven of these were in the Marne area, four with the British, and the remaining nine divisions were either in or about to enter quiet sectors in the Vosges Mountains for their preliminary training. This was how matters stood with the American Army during that long month of waiting, from June 15 to July 15. Gradually, unmistakable signs pointed to a recommencing of the drive on Paris in the near future; the Allies estimated the

day as July 5, but that day passed quietly, and still there was no evidence of the drive starting. All France was tense with anticipation. Could this drive be stopped as the Montdidier-Noyon drive had been stopped a month ago? No one knew just how much the Germans would be willing to sacrifice to gain Paris. It would have to be an enormous sacrifice, for the French had filled the Marne valley with troops and guns, so that marching on Paris would not be as easy for the Germans as they had expected. And yet no one could be confident that the German drive could be stopped. If the German High Command should strike with fifty divisions, pay the cost and continue the drive on Paris, what then?

To the outsider Paris seemed even gayer than before. True, the long-range German gun was dropping a shell into the city every twenty minutes, but no one paid the slightest attention to that. The Germans were but fifty miles away, and Paris was bombed nightly by aeroplane, which made the city absolutely dark at night. Those who had cared to flee had done so months before, and those who had remained watched the events with that sort of fascination which holds one in the presence of great danger. No places of business were closed, but in most of them the books were carefully packed each night so that they could be placed on a wagon and taken to a place of safety, should the need arise.

The 14th of July, the great national holiday of France, came at the climax of this month of waiting. A great parade was staged in Paris on that day. Each of the Allied nations was to send a battalion to represent it in the parade, and word was received that the 1st Division had been selected to represent the United States. A battalion was hurriedly made up of one company from each infantry regiment, and with the 5th Field Artillery's band, they boarded trains for three days' stay in Paris.

Perhaps there shall be even greater parades, but this one stands to-day as the summit. On this bright clear July morning of the national holiday, all Paris turned out to see the Allies parade. Battalions from each of the Allied nations, French Chasseurs Alpains, British Guards, American Regulars, Italian

Bersaglieri, Portuguese, Russians, Czechoslovaks, Poles, Rumanians, Serbians, Greeks, each with their national colors displayed and their bands playing national airs marched down the Champs Élysée from the Arc de Triomphe towards the Place de la Concorde. And through it all, the sky was filled with allied planes, for the Germans were but 50 miles from Paris, and protection from the air was necessary. Despite the proximity of the enemy, which threatened the city with capture, the people for the time forgot their dread in their enthusiasm, in the reassuring confidence which that parade gave. This was the most brilliant and inspiring spectacle of the war.

The enthusiasm passed all bounds, the enemy was forgotten, and Paris enjoyed this one day to the full. That evening the Provost Marshal sent word by the military police for all American officers to return at once to their organizations; and at dawn the next morning, July 15, the German army crossed the Marne in its final attack on Paris.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE

3rd, 28th, 42nd Divisions in Line with the French, Halt the Last German Drive—McAlexander Holds the Surmelin Valley

The month of waiting between the close of the Montdidier-Noyon defensive and the beginning of the Champagne-Marne defensive (June 15 to July 15, 1918) was a period of terrific tension, despite the manifest gaiety of Paris which culminated in the parade of the 14th of July. The troops on the front, however, had shared none of this gaiety. To them this month was one of swift preparation for the great German assault which everyone knew was soon to be launched. Like a chess player, maneuvering for position, Marshal Foch moved the Allied divisions so as to be ready for any eventuality. General Pershing had given all the American divisions to Marshal Foch, who had distributed them here and there, as parts of the various British and French Armies. There was no "American Army" at this time, but the American divisions which took part in stopping this last great German drive, did so as units of different French Armies, with many British and French divisions fighting on either side of them.

Three American divisions were in position in the line along the front on which the Germans attacked on the 15th of July. These were the 3rd Division (Regulars) on the Marne at Château-Thierry; the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), on the Marne west of Jaulgonne; and the 42nd Division (Rainbow National Guard) in the Champagne plateau, west of Reims. The actions of each of these divisions, while simultaneous and all a part of the same big defensive action which stopped the German Drive, were in themselves such separate and distinct actions that it seems best to narrate each

singly, in detail. For this reason, the 3rd Division will be told in full, then that of the 28th Division, and finally that of the 42nd Division.



BATTLE LINE, JULY 15, 1918


The 3rd Division, under the command of General Dickman, had now been holding its position along the Marne for a month and a half. We have seen that in the early days of June, when it was for the first time in the line, it had demonstrated superb courage and gallantry in preventing the Ger-

mans from crossing the bridges at Château-Thierry. During June and early July, the 3rd Division had clung to its position on the south bank of the Marne in anticipation of this second and much heavier attack. In the attack in June, the German Army was almost spent and therefore much more easily stopped, whereas now it would come with the full force of a new drive, with its artillery up in close support, with pontoons, and with preparations made to overcome all opposition in crossing the Marne, and then to drive ahead on the road to Paris.

As the front settled to a state of semi-stability during June, the elements of the 3rd Division were gradually brought together into a more compact sector, which occupied about a ten-kilometer ($6\frac{1}{4}$ miles) front on the south side of the river, reaching from Château-Thierry on the left (west) to the Jaulgonne Bend of the Marne on the east. Under heavy fire from the hills across the Marne, a sector had been made. Three belts of barbed wire were started, but only a small part of this had been completed by July 15 when the attack came. The front line consisted of rifle pits dug in at the water's edge on the river bank, which were occupied each night at dusk by one platoon from each company in the front line, and evacuated each morning at dawn. Three or four hundred yards in rear of this, the Paris-Metz railroad ran on a high embankment through the low flats of the south side of the river. Trench warfare had ceased with the launching of the German offensive of March 21, and this line of rifle pits corresponded closely to the American "outpost" system whereby a few men, as sentries, held the very front line while the main body of the defending troops were held in a more sheltered position about a half mile in rear. In this case the south side of the railroad embankment sheltered the main body, and this naturally became the line of resistance. On the north side of the Marne the steep hills which came to the water's edge effectively screened all but the front lines of the enemy, and gave them direct fire into the positions held by the 3rd Division. The division had the 125th French Division on its right, and the 39th French Division on its left. The latter crossed the Marne

at Château-Thierry and connected with the 26th Division in the Belleau Wood Sector.

An attack by the Germans to extend the Château-Thierry Salient southward, to force a crossing of the Marne in the Jaulgonne Bend, to capture the heights on the south side of the river, which commanded the valley of the Surmelin River, and thus to debouch to the south towards Montmirail and the



THE MARNE SALIENT

highway to Paris, and at the same time to widen the Château-Thierry Salient to the east of Reims in the Champagne had long been expected. Air reconnoissance, prisoners, and captured documents all confirmed this. In the latter part of June, a French patrol had crossed the Marne near Dormans, and captured a German engineer officer who had in his possession the plans for the crossings at Mont St. Peré and Jaulgonne. The only question was when the attack would take place. On the supposition that it would come on the night of July 4-5 to catch the Americans when they were celebrating

their national holiday, the French Fifth and Sixth Armies, to which all the American division in the Marne area belonged, were kept on the alert that evening, but when morning dawned with no sign of the expected attack another date had to be guessed at. Thereafter every night these two armies were "alerted," for patrols of the 3rd Division had heard what sounded like pontoon bridges being brought down to the river's edge.

THE GERMANS CROSS THE MARNE

Early in the evening of July 14 word was passed along from the rear that the long expected attack would come at dawn next morning. About midnight the German artillery began a very heavy fire on the Allied positions in preparation for the attack. The Germans had moved up much artillery until on the front of the 3rd Division they had eighty-four batteries—336 guns—against thirty-one American and French batteries—124 guns. The Artillery Brigade of the 3rd Division had just come up from its training area, and this was its first glimpse of actual combat. With this preponderance in artillery, the Germans were able to smother all the Allied batteries, and in addition they drenched the whole country with gas, high explosive, and smoke shells, so that by 3 o'clock in the morning, when the German infantry began moving out over the hills down to the river, where their pontoons lay concealed in the brush, they were unseen by the men of the 3rd Division until they were in the boats and starting for the south shore. The following account by Lieutenant Lovejoy, 38th Infantry Regiment, tells of what he experienced that day on the south bank of the Marne:

"The shelling on the river bank began about 3 o'clock. Fifteen minutes of this destructive fire preceded the rolling barrage, and the few *liaison* agents from the river platoons who reached their company P. C.'s on the railroad line reported that the enemy, under cover of smoke screens, was about to cross. Day was just breaking; and through the mist, fog and smoke one could see the boats and rafts loaded to the gunwales with enemy infantrymen and machine gunners set out for the

southern bank. That was about 3:30 o'clock. Yet not one crossed that day in the center of the sector, in front of Company H or on the right in front of Company E. Men of the 38th, who had escaped the hours of shelling, met every attempt with rifle and automatic-weapon fire. Scores of those boats were shattered and sunk or else disabled and sent drifting harmlessly down the river. Hundreds of Huns jumped into the water and were drowned. Those who reached our side by swimming were either killed or captured.


"Soldiers wounded in the early morning, remained at their automatic rifles or in their rifle pits unflinchingly until killed. One man of Company G was later found lifeless with his rifle and pistol empty, and in front of him a heap of twelve dead Germans. Another private's body was found surrounded by five of the enemy, all killed by a bayonet; but his own rifle was clutched in his hands, ready for more work, when he was stopped by a bullet from a machine gun.

"At this time Company G was really the pivotal point of the attack, because in front of this company the Germans had erected a pontoon bridge, over which swarmed a host of machine gunners. By means of a second pontoon bridge, the enemy was enabled to direct a flanking fire on the left. But Company G, under Captain Wooldridge, made heroic counter-attacks, in the course of which it took more than 400 prisoners, in spite of overwhelming odds."

The brunt of the attack by the right wing of the German Army in its attempt to cross the Marne on July 15 fell on the 3rd Division. The 39th French Division and the First American Army Corps, comprising the 26th Division, and the 167th French Division, were not involved. In fact the attack was all east of Château-Thierry. No crossing was attempted on the front of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Division; but on the front on the other three infantry regiments—the 7th, 30th, and 38th, respectively—and further to the east, on the front of the 125th French Division, crossings by boats and pontoon bridges were attempted. Near Mezy, and up the river above it, in the Jaulgonne Bend, the Germans managed to get two pontoon bridges laid across the river; and the 30th

Infantry was forced out of the town of Mezy. A line of battle was hastily formed near Fossoy, about a mile back of the river and prolonged toward the Surmelin River by the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments. This new line was never broken despite furious attacks by the Germans from Mezy.

By eight o'clock on the morning of July 15 the fighting on the left and center of the 3rd Division (7th Infantry and 30th Infantry Regiments) had virtually ended. On the extreme right (38th Infantry), however, the situation was yet serious.



THE GERMAN ATTACK OF JULY 15, 1918

Showing German Advance, on the right, while, on the left, is shown the American Advance on Belleau Wood of the month before.

The 38th Infantry Regiment was still holding its outpost line in the rifle pits along the edge of the river. The 125th French Division, on the right of the 38th Infantry, had fallen back in conformity with the divisions on its right who were making a stand some miles back from the river on the first high ground, for the railroad at this point went along the river bank and was useless to the defenders.

This left the right flank of the 38th Infantry Regiment, on the extreme right of the 3rd Division, exposed to attack from the Germans who had crossed and were occupying the Jaulgonne Bend. The 38th Infantry Regiment could not, however, withdraw from its position along the river bank, for to

this regiment had been entrusted the front where the Surmelin River, flowing due north down a narrow valley, emptied into the Marne, and along both sides of this river lay two splendid roads leading to Montmirail, upon which the Germans had planned to transport their artillery and supply trains for the exploitation of the first success. The Surmelin River valley, then, with its two roads, was the crucial point in the whole attack; and the 38th Infantry was holding this front with the object of preventing any pontoon bridges from being thrown across the river to connect with these roads. All other crossings were useless to the Germans if they could not seize these roads; and consequently from both the right and the left, where they had succeeded in crossing, the Germans concentrated their attacks on the flanks of the 38th Infantry Regiment.

To hold his position Colonel Ulysses G. McAlexander, 38th Infantry, was obliged to throw his right flank around facing northeast across the hillslope toward Varennes, which town the enemy had captured. He had foreseen the possibility of this, and two days before had dug a series of rifle pits in "echelon" (one behind the other, parallel to the front, and so dug that all could fire at once) just over the crest of this hill to cover his entire right flank. The reserve battalion of the 38th Infantry was brought up under fire, and occupied these pits, while the French were withdrawing before the heavy attacks of the Germans. In addition to this, the capture of Mezy by the Germans, and the reforming of the line by the 7th and 30th Infantry in the vicinity of Fossoy, seriously menaced the 38th Infantry from attack on its left flank as well as its right, while its front still held on the river bank and prevented by its determined rifle fire any crossing of the river here. Time and time again the Germans in boats and pontoons tried vainly to land, but each time the boats were sunk in mid-stream either by rifle fire or by hand grenades. Colonel McAlexander's regiment had a left flank of two kilometers, a front of two kilometers, and a right flank of nine and a half kilometers, a total of thirteen and a half kilometers (8½ miles). During fourteen hours' fighting the 38th held this

position and effectually beat off the continued attacks of two first-class German divisions—the XIII and the XXXVI, which were made up of such regiments as the 6th Prussian Grenadier Guards and the famous 5th Grenadier Guards, so much importance did the German High Command attach to the capture of the Surmelin Valley.

The courage and confidence of the men of the 38th Infantry on this morning of the 15th of July was shown by the message which Major Rowe, surrounded on three sides, and holding the point on the river, sent to Colonel McAlexander that morning: "Am holding the line, and could do so indefinitely."

Colonel R. H. C. Kelton, General Staff, Chief of Staff of the 3rd Division, in an article in the *Century Magazine* entitled "The Miracle of the Marne," says:

"No finer example of control by a regimental commander, or of confidence of the men in the wisdom of his instructions, can be conceived than this performance of the 38th U. S. Infantry on July 15, 1918; and it may be very justly said that Colonel U. G. McAlexander was the Rock of the Surmelin Valley, just as General George H. Thomas was at Chickamauga; nor is there any finer example of soldierly coolness and courage under fire than the action of Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Adams of the 38th Infantry, who personally directed the change of front on the extreme right flank, and thereby won his Distinguished Service Cross."


In his report to the Secretary of War, General Pershing said:

"The 3rd Division was holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of the Surmelin to the west of Mezy, opposite Château-Thierry, where a large force of German infantry sought to force a passage under support of powerful artillery concentrations and under cover of smoke screens. A single regiment of the 3rd wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans, who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical

CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE 128

points, which succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners."

By the evening of the first day, July 15, the German attack was brought to a standstill by the sudden and unexpected resistance of the French and American troops along the whole front from Château-Thierry to the east of Reims, where the



28TH DIVISION ON THE MARNE

42nd Division (Rainbow) was in the line. On the 16th and 17th of July, the Germans tried by local attacks to gain some ground and better their positions.

The 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), commanded by General Muir, had been for some time in the vicinity of Montmirail, ten miles in the rear of the 3rd Division. The 109th Infantry Regiment of this division was brought up on July 13 as far as Condé-en-Brie, in the Sormain Valley, three miles behind the lines. The regiment went into position on the line Monthurel-St. Agnan, about two miles

south of the Marne, where it dug in on the crest of a hill. The 110th and 111th Infantry Regiments were also stationed on this general support line, as was the 103rd Regiment of Engineers, and the line held was the support line running roughly from Chezy (two miles south of Château-Thierry on the Marne as it turns and flows south from Château-Thierry) to Vaux (west of Château-Thierry, where the 26th Division connected with the 39th French Division). This put the 28th Division in immediate support of the French on a wide front.

This division had had no previous experience in the line, and when the call for reënforcements was put in—a company or so at a time—with French units. The situation was too delicate to allow any chances to be taken. Regimental and Divisional Staffs without experience could not be given a sector unless it was absolutely necessary, but individual companies and battalions could be of the utmost assistance in warding off local attacks. Four companies (L and M of the 109th Infantry, and B and C of the 110th Infantry) were engaged in the main attack of July 15. On the evening of the 14th, French Staff officers conducted these companies to positions where the French lines were weak; Company M, 109th Infantry, below Passy-sur-Marne, and Company L back of Courtemont-Varennnes, in the Jaulgonne Bend of the Marne, while the two companies of the 110th were back of Fossoy and Mezy. Then, at midnight on the 14th-15th of July when the German offensive began with galling barrage and artillery preparation, the regiments in the support lines shared equally with the four companies of the division in the front the awful havoc of those three and a half hours of preparation, which with German thoroughness were intended to search out every nook and cranny in the whole landscape, and in this they succeeded admirably.

At 3:30 a. m., under cover of the barrage, the Germans had thrown their pontoon bridges across the river against this position, and over them marched through the smoke and fog the vanguard of the seemingly never ending hosts of gray-green figures. The four American companies which were

scattered in among the French were for the first time in the line. But as the enemy advanced the nervousness and fear, which the three and a half hours of preparation by artillery of all calibers and the rolling artillery barrage had caused, suddenly dropped from them. The French said afterwards that they were amazed and deeply proud of the steadiness and calmness of their American comrades. Nothing seemed to stop the Germans. Though machine-gun and rifle fire mowed them down they continued to come on and when they had enough men on the south side, they swarmed to assault the Allied line. Up the wooded slopes they swept in waves, regardless of the furious fire of the defenders. One man fell only to have another take his place. They broke into the first line. Gone then was the science and skill of war; there was but one thought, kill or be killed. Hand to hand and breast to breast they fought. Companies were no more. Men fought in little groups and no group knew what the other group was doing. And then came the tragedy for those gallant four companies of the 28th Division. Something had gone wrong. Somewhere, due most probably to the difference in language, the order had not been understood, or perhaps the officer to whom the order was given to retire had been killed. At all events, the French had slowly drawn back to the main line of resistance, and it dawned upon the Pennsylvanians that they were alone. The French had used their "yielding defense" tactics of which these brave men were ignorant. Alone now, little determined groups a thousand yards apart, they were facing the entire German assault army. The majority of those who still remained alive were quickly surrounded (the groups were so small) and were taken prisoners; but some groups—led by officers to whom this was the first battle of their lives—fought their way out, and by a skillful rearguard action brought the survivors back to the lines where the French were making their stand. Such is the heroic story of four companies of Pennsylvanians in the Second Battle of the Marne.

The remainder of the 28th Division, while not figuring quite so spectacularly as those tragic four companies, soon found that the support line which they had dug the night be-

fore had become the front line. Alternating along this front, French and American companies and battalions fought side by side. In response to Colonel McAlexander's request, Companies "H" and "D" of the 109th Infantry Regiment were sent to hold the Bois de Condé, which menaced the position of the 38th Infantry. When they arrived there they found that it would be necessary to take the wood, which they did. Fighting as small units along that front, this division of the Pennsylvanian National Guard won for itself the right to the distinction from that time on of being ranked with the finest assault divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces. That proud title they never lost.

On July 16, counter attacks along the Fossoy-Crezancy-St. Agnan line drove the Germans back across the Marne, so that by July 18 the German offensive was over—a complete failure.

The 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), brigaded with the French on the right (east) of the 3rd Division, had borne the full brunt of the German attack of July 15, and with the French had made the stand along the heights south of the Marne until July 18th, when, by persistent counter attacks, gaining a little ground here and there, they had finally, by July 20, driven the Germans back and were once more on the banks of the Marne. It was evident to all that the Germans were in retreat. There was therefore no further need of reënforcement for the French at this point, as the line was shortening; so on the night of July 21 the elements of the 28th Division in that line were drawn out, and the entire division was assembled in rear of the front to rest. Details from the various organizations were sent out to bury the dead on the battlefield over which they had fought so gallantly with the French. The 28th had suffered heavily in those six days of its first action. The 109th Infantry Regiment especially had experienced very bitter fighting, with casualties of 4 officers and 75 men killed, 10 officers and 397 men wounded, and 6 officers and 311 men missing, a total of 20 officers and 783 men casualties for the one regiment. The other regiments suffered proportionately heavy casualties, but


those six days on the Marne had demonstrated to all the world the mettle of the Pennsylvania troops, and they left the field with the conscious pride that in their first engagement they had met and helped to stop the most furious and most powerful attack of the German Army, and had then with dash and drive pushed the Germans back across the Marne.

The 26th Division (New England National Guard), under the command of General Edwards, had meanwhile been holding the sector northwest of Château-Thierry, which, although it was not involved in the battle, was far from a pleasant place. The shallow and incomplete trenches extending from near Vaux and Bouresches around the east and northeast edges of the *Bois de la Brigade de Marine* to a point near Bussiares were under constant harrassing fire from the German batteries running far back across the hills to the northeast, while German machine guns and snipers were comfortably installed all along the edges of the woods, and in the ruined villages of Belleau and Torcy. On the morning of July 15, coincidentally with the big attack on the 3rd and 28th Divisions, the Germans made a small demonstration on the front of the 26th Division at Vaux, and made somewhat of a penetration by infiltration. A barrage was brought down which stopped all further attempts, and counter attacks drove the Germans out of the part of the line they had captured.

The 42nd Rainbow Division (National Guard from every State), commanded by General Menoher, was brought up on July 5 and made a part of the Fourth French Army, and on that day this division took over the defensive positions in rear of the 170th and 13th French Divisions on the Champagne front, midway between the city of Reims and the Argonne Forest. For several weeks evidence had been accumulating that the next German attack would extend the Château-Thierry Salient south of the Marne, and at the same time widen it toward the east in order finally to effect the capture of Reims and overrun the terrain to the southeast as far as Châlons-sur-Marne. This was evident from many things. Air reconnaissance, prisoners, and all else pointed to the attempt to widen the salient on the east, since the attempt to widen it

from Montdidier to Noyon, on the west, had failed on June 15.

The Champagne front where the 42nd now found itself had been for a long period the most continually active sector on the whole front, but now it was as quiet as those sectors in the Vosges Mountains. Great preparations, however, were



CHAMPAGNE FRONT

Showing Battle Line of July 15, 1918, where 42nd Division helped the French in repelling the last German attack.

in progress for the defense against the impending German attack, and General Gouraud's army had these practically completed. The positions on both sides were very strong by nature, and, in addition, had been organized for defense with incredible labor and detail.

General Gouraud's plan of defense, devised both to defeat the new German method of attack by "infiltration" and at the same time to break the force of the assault, was as ingenious

as it was bold. It was, simply, that at the last practicable moment after the beginning of the enemy's concentration fire on the first positions, the Allied lines should withdraw to a second strongly prepared position and from there concentrate a heavy fire upon the positions just evacuated, and so cut in pieces the enemy advancing to take them. Signal groups were to remain in the front line positions to keep the artillery and infantry informed of the enemy's progress. There were intermediate positions to be evacuated according to plan.

Elements of the 42nd were detailed to these intermediate stations, but the main body of the division was assigned to the second position to which the front line was to retire.

On July 7, in readiness for the attack, General Gouraud issued his famous order:

"To the French and American Soldiers of the Fourth Army.

We may be attacked at any moment.

You all know that a defensive battle was never engaged in under more favorable conditions.

We are awake and on our guard.

We are powerfully reinforced with infantry and artillery.

You will fight on a terrain that you have transformed by your own work and your perseverance into a redoubtable fortress.

This invincible fortress and all its passages are well guarded.

The bombardment will be terrible.

You will stand it without weakness.

The assault will be fierce, in a cloud of smoke, dust and gas.

Your positions and your armament are formidable.

In your breasts beat the brave and strong hearts of free men.

None shall look to the rear, none shall yield a step.

Each shall have but one thought: to kill a plenty, until they have had their fill.

Therefore your General says to you:

You will break this assault, and it will be a happy day.

GOURAUD.

By authority of the Chief of Staff;

PETTELAT."

For an entire week the suspense continued and then, on the night of July 14, word was sent up from Twenty-first Corps

Headquarters that the German attack would come at dawn, and for all troops to take their battle stations. The lethargy of the quiet sector was gone. White with the chalk of the trenches the men looked weird in the moonlight. All was quiet, but they had not long to wait. Shortly before midnight the silence of the past weeks was broken by the sudden roar of thousands of guns, French and American, from the little three-inch 75mm. of the divisional artillery, to the big guns and mortars of the Corps artillery, whose monstrous guns mounted on railway cars, one to a train, belched forth with titanic fury as they fired at maximum speed. Looking forward the earth was lit up with splotches of red, yellow and green, where the shells were bursting, while, looking to the rear, the sky was white with the gun flashes. For ten minutes the Allies were firing alone; and then, on the dot of midnight, according to schedule, all of the powerful artillery which the Germans had brought up for this grand attack thundered forth messages of death and destruction upon the Allied lines. The artillery of both sides covered the entire countryside. Dumps were set afire and burning and the light turned everything into fantastic shapes; roads were torn beyond recognition, while rest billets in rear, which for so long had been spared by both sides, were made a shambles in that four hours of preparation.

At dawn the German rolling barrage began, and behind it those German troops who had not been caught by the French artillery's counter-battery and counter-preparation moved forward in wave after wave to the attack; and again the French artillery with the American artillery came down, and for a steady hour played on that front line. Up went the rockets from the signal groups whom the French had left behind in the front line, telling the Allied artillery just where the attacking force was.

The Germans had gained the outpost position, and were reforming to assault the intermediate positions. This message was given the Allied gunners, and in a minute all the Allied light artillery was playing on this captured position which the Germans were now holding.

Meanwhile the German artillery had been battering the Al-

lied trenches ahead of this infantry. In the intermediate positions a few of the Allied infantry had been left to break the full force of the blow; and while they had borne heavy casualties from the German artillery barrage, still through smoke and fog, they began firing on the advancing waves of Germans while the Allied artillery placed the protective barrage in front of these positions. Again and again the Germans renewed the assault, but each time with less force, and finally the attack ceased.

The intermediate positions on the front of the Twenty-first Army Corps with the exception of two small points, had not been entered by the Germans. The German Army, which by 10 o'clock had figured on being through the second position and along the road from Suippes to Châlons was stopped in front of the intermediate position. They had taken, with terrible losses, just that ground which General Gouraud was willing to give them.

In the holding of its part of Gouraud's front line the 42nd Division lost a total of 43 officers and 1,610 men.

On all parts of the front the great and last effort for an offensive on the part of the Germans was completely defeated and by July 18, three days after the drive had started, it was forever crushed. Hertling, the German Chancellor, said three days before his death that on July 1, 1918, he was convinced the Allies would propose peace before September. He said: "We expected grave events in Paris before the 15th of July. But on the 18th, even the most optimistic among us knew that all was lost. The history of the world was played out in those three days."

Colonel Kelton, in the article previously quoted says: "There is no better epigrammatic reference to the character and the result of the fighting on July 15 than Frederick Palmer's remark that 'We did not dash the cup of victory from his lips; we smashed it to splinters in his face.'"

CHAPTER VIII

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE

1st and 2nd Divisions Attack Toward Soissons—German Line Broken and Their Army Forced to Retreat from the Marne—Capture of Berzy le Sec

On July 16, 1918, the war was at a standstill. Both the Allies and the Germans were momentarily paralyzed, the Germans, from the failure of their great offensive, despite the preponderance of men and guns at their command; and the Allies, from the sudden realization that, though the weaker force, they had halted the enemy's fierce attempt to break through. Both sides stood on dead center without any plans. General Pershing at this time urged Marshal Foch to use the Americans and strike at the hinge of the Marne salient. A day's delay might mean failure, for the Germans could in that time recover their equilibrium and protect themselves against attack at this point. The Germans had taken the supreme chance. They had exposed themselves in a long narrow salient that reached from Soissons on the west to the River Marne at Château-Thierry, thence east along the Marne almost to Épernay, thence north back to Reims, where it joined again the straight line which ran due east and west from Montdidier to Verdun. Twice in vain the Germans had tried to widen this salient, only managing to lengthen it. Its two most vulnerable points were: one on the west, just southeast of Soissons, where it hinged at right angles with the main battle line; the other just northwest of Reims, at the junction of the salient with the main battle line. If the Allies were to strike at all, one of these two points must be chosen. Marshal Foch decided to attack at the very hinge of the Marne salient from the

west, by driving straight east for Soissons and thereby cutting the communications of Château-Thierry.

The risk was enormous,—the Germans still had the superi-



WESTERN FRONT ON JULY 18, 1918

Showing vulnerable Marne Salient made by the successful Allied defense.

ority in men and guns, the Allies were almost worn out by the heroic defenses of the spring and summer—but it was an opportunity, one that General Pershing thought should not be missed. He urged that the four veteran American divisions

(1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd), although tired, were still fresh enough and eager to strike back. There was another factor which strongly influenced the decision to attack at this time. The great May and June troop movement from the United States had landed seventeen new American divisions in France. These had not been reckoned in the calculations of the Allied Supreme Command, because of their inexperience; but, when the news spread that green, untried American divisions, the 3rd and the 28th, had assisted the French in defeating the mightiest German offensive at the Marne, the Allies discovered that the American Army was no longer a promise of future strength, but a powerful military actuality. If newly arrived troops could fight like that, then there were available twenty-five divisions capable of offensive action, instead of the four veteran divisions which, but the day before the Allies had reckoned as the limit of America's striking strength. Foch promptly determined to attack, hoping to make the entire salient untenable by the Germans.

The decision made, speed and secrecy were the two great points to be kept in mind,—speed to deliver the attack before the Germans recovered their breath from the defeat on the Marne, and secrecy to prevent the reserves in the salient, which were now down ready to cross the Marne, from being brought hastily back to strengthen the position about to be attacked.

The attack was to be made by three divisions, brought up the evening before to the Forest of Retz. They were to attack from the Forest of Retz, due east, across the broad flat plain just south of the River Aisne, and, to keep on going, delivering one attack after another until they had cut the German line of communications to Château-Thierry. Meanwhile the other divisions which were in the line of the west side of the Marne salient from the Aisne river down to Vaux (where the 26th American Division was in the line) were to move slightly forward on their fronts in conformity with the attack. To General Mangin, then commanding the Tenth French Army, was given this mission. Mangin was the attacking general of France. At the outbreak of the war, the grizzled Colonial soldier had been a colonel, and his speedy rise to the command

of an army was due to his skill and daring in always attacking with whatever troops were at his disposal. This sudden surprise attack, without any artillery preparation, was to add another great victory to the now swelling list of his achievements. The best troops were needed for the attack, but as there was no time to bring 60,000 troops from other fronts or rest areas far away, troops at hand had to be used.

From the million men concentrated around the Marne area, Marshal Foch chose the three divisions to make the main attack. He chose the 1st American Division (Regulars), which, although worn through six months' constant fighting, had demonstrated its fine mettle at Cantigny; the 2nd American Division (Regular Army and Marines), which also was in need of rest and replacements after its heroic struggle in Belleau Wood and Vaux; and the famous French 1st Moroccan Division, of which the Foreign Legion formed a part. With these three divisions, the pick of the Allied Army there present, Marshal Foch delivered what turned out to be the crushing blow of the war to the German Army on July 18, 1918.

Without any preparation, without any warning, these divisions were suddenly concentrated on the night of the 17th in the Forest of Retz, near Villers Cotterets. At dawn, preceded by a rolling barrage, they jumped off in an attack which drove a flying wedge into the very hinge of the German salient; then, turning due east towards Soissons, they cut the enemy's line of communications to Château-Thierry and threatened the entire German Army in the Marne salient with capture unless it immediately pulled out across the fields back to the Vesle river. By this sudden attack on the weak link in the German position, Marshal Foch wrested forever the initiative from the Germans; and it was this attack which started that succession of never-ending thrusts into the vital points which caused the great German Army to withdraw so swiftly from France in the succeeding four months.

With the beginning of their great spring offensive in March, 1918, trench warfare, except in the quiet sectors of the Vosges, ceased. The Germans once more took the initiative on the Western front, and now, no longer content with

small advances, brought forth their new tactics of 1918. Before each attack careful preparations were made in the sector. Huge quantities of supplies were brought forward, an artillery concentration was effected, and then during the six hours of preparation fire by the German artillery, fresh German divisions were rushed up to the point where the attack was to be made. At dawn, following a rolling barrage, the German infantry attacked, and pushed on by sheer weight of numbers and force of guns, until they had captured all the Allied positions and all the Allied artillery in that sector. This was done in one sudden thrust and usually before 9 o'clock in the morning of the attack. The road thus cleared for the Germans they pushed on without much opposition, until they were forced to halt that their supplies could catch up with them. Here the attack stopped until new divisions were rushed up, and going through those which had made the first assault, continued the attack. All this was new to the Allies. Heretofore, months were spent by the Germans in preparation for the assault, and the advance was pushed to a limited objective of a few thousand yards. With this new plan, the Germans prepared only during the three days prior to the attack, which did not give the Allies time to make counter preparations. Another startling innovation of the Germans was in having their divisional artillery follow closely behind the infantry, making effective artillery fire at all times possible. Attacks with limited objectives of a few thousand yards were no more.

It will be well to look back into the intensive training of the winter of 1917-1918, when the Allies foresaw that the Germans would attack in the Spring. The British evolved in their defensive tactics a system of overlapping machine guns covering a depth of several thousand yards. The German tactics of 1918, however, were adapted to cope with this, for, in the fog of early morning, under cover of a terrific barrage, they pushed completely through the elaborate British system. When the fog and smoke cleared away, the Germans were behind the British lines and in open country. In much the same manner did they pierce the French lines, but with less success,

for the French "yielding defense" proved more of an obstacle than the British fixed line. In contradiction to both these plans of defense, General Pershing insisted upon the American army's training being in offense. The heroic defense of the 38th U. S. Infantry on the Marne vindicated this for defensive tactics, and, in this ensuing action, the splendid victory established for all time the wisdom of General Pershing's decision to cling to American tactics.

Having decided that the time had come for the Allies to strike, Marshal Foch realized that success depended not only on keeping from the German Intelligence Section any intimation of the impending attack, but also upon the employment of new tactics. Accordingly all artillery preparation was eliminated. Heretofore an attack had always been preceded by several hours' destructive artillery fire. This was done to cut the barbed wire, level the trenches and demoralize the defenders. To attack without any artillery preparation was, of course, taking a terrible risk. If the Germans had the slightest suspicion of the coming attack, they could decimate by artillery the attacking troops while they were concentrated for the jump-off, or else sow the front with machine guns, quickly brought up from the rear, and remove their infantry to the reserve lines, just as Gouraud had done in the Champagne three days before. No works would be destroyed for the attacking troops, every feature of the German defense would be intact, and the Allies would have only their divisional artillery, with what ammunition could be brought up during the night before, to help the infantry through against the machine guns and batteries. Happily, the defenses were very light on this front. There were no trenches, no barbed wire, for the lines had not been stabilized for very long, and the sector was quiet. To this point in the Marne salient, both the Germans and French had sent divisions to rest and to be ready for a second thrust when needed, and they were spread out over the sector, with no anticipation of anything bigger than a raid on that front. Both sides relied on their intelligence section to inform them of future trouble in time to move in sufficient in-

fantry, machine guns, and artillery to make the line impregnable.

It may be explained that preparations for an attack are always an enormous task. In the first place the artillery supply must be provided for. Dumps of all caliber ammunition must be located at the proper points so that the supply will be never-ending. Food dumps must be worked well forward so that the ration carts of the companies in the front line can get food to the men at nightfall at the extreme point of the advance. Watering points must be selected near the front, so that horses, men, and kitchens can get water when they need it. The evacuation of the wounded is a big problem and requires a definite plan, with mobile hospitals, evacuation hospitals, and ambulance trains to work between these and the aid stations of the front line troops, while special railroad trains for transporting the wounded to base hospitals must be arranged for. These are a few of the enormous staff problems to be met and solved long before the attack order is written and the artillery schedule made or the troops brought into the area. Months were usually spent in such preparations, but for this attack no time was available for any such purpose. Whatever was done in the way of preparations was decided after the troops were actually moving into position. Everything seemed a gamble in that attack. Everyone had to take his very brief instructions and interpret them for himself. It was a necessary trusting to luck that each would do his utmost to make the attack a success. Not a wheel was turned, not a movement made in the sector until after dark on the night of July 17. At dawn the artillery was to fire a rolling barrage from positions not reconnoitered beforehand, firing to be entirely by map and schedule, while the infantry which had marched up during the night jumped off for the attack. The attack order stated that after a certain point had been reached, the artillery dump would be at a certain point, and yet, at dawn there were no signs of any artillery ammunition at this point. If the officer in charge failed to get the ammunition, if a map put it at a wrong point, or if something happened on the railroad which was to bring up this ammunition, what would happen to this

attack? Many things had to be taken for granted by those Regimental Commanders of Infantry to whom the attack, once it had started, was entrusted. They knew very little about where to get what they most needed, but they had supreme courage and great faith, and they went ahead, trusting that those in the rear would anticipate their every want, send them food, ammunition, water, maps, ambulances, and the thousand and one things which are essential so that advancing troops can push the initial victory and continue the advance. To General Mangin and the Staff of the French Tenth Army, to the General and Staff of the French Twentieth Army Corps, to the Division Staffs of those three divisions (the 1st and 2nd Regulars and the French 1st Moroccan Division), as well as to the great gallantry and never faltering heroism of the infantry and artillery which made the attack, is due the extraordinary success of this greatest of all ventures—the boldest stroke of the war!

The 1st Division (Regular Army) was on its way to a rest area when it received the news that it was to go back to the line. During the past six months it had been almost constantly in the line and had suffered casualties until there was great need of replacements to bring the infantry regiments and the artillery up to full strength. This division had left the Beauvais area, where it remained a few days after its relief from the Cantigny sector, and had reached the Dammartin Area, just north of Meaux on the Paris-Soissons road. Here the division was to remain a few days while a battalion paraded in Paris on the 14th of July. So when the order came on the afternoon of July 15th for the 1st Division to entruck at once for the front, there was a big problem ahead of it, for the various elements were scattered about throughout the countryside in little hamlets and towns. Some of the officers and many of the men were still in Paris with the battalion, and every one was taking his ease, little suspecting that he would have to go back to the line at once. But these new orders not only called for action, but for immediate action. No destination was given. French officers arrived with the trucks; they merely had orders to go north on the Paris-Soissons road

to a regulating station, where further orders would be given. Regimental Staffs, who but an hour before were dreaming of their first leave at Biarritz, were now madly trying to get extra trucks at the last minute for the rations and "business end" of the rolling kitchens, for the animal-drawn transport was to follow by another road, and sad experience had taught them the necessity of always taking food and the kitchens along with the troops as trains were the easiest things to lose in France. But the 1st Division was experienced and no order within reason could excite it. Order was swiftly brought out of chaos; each company loaded its kitchen and rations on a truck, and then marched off to the other trucks, where, twenty men to a truck, they climbed in and made themselves comfortable for a long night's journey. It was not the first time that they had been moved virtually at a moment's notice. One by one the headquarters were closed, and the whole division was on the road; the infantry and machine-gunners in a thousand French trucks, while the artillery and trains followed the same general direction, but by roads used only by horse-drawn traffic. In two hours after the receipt of the order, the 1st Division was off on this great adventure.

Dawn broke, the trucks stopped, and weary officers crawled down off the trucks at the insistent clamor of the French drivers. They would go no further. Just then a Division Staff officer came along in a motorcycle side-car and gave instructions to get the men out of the trucks immediately and march them with all speed across the hill and into the forest before it grew light enough for the Germans to see. Evidently this place was near the front. The gloom of early morning was now and then pierced by the white rockets the Germans always sent up to illumine No Man's Land at dawn, and now and then an occasional gun would boom away its morning tidings. Surely this was a quiet sector to which the 1st was being sent! The men pulled themselves out of the trucks, slung their packs, fell in on the left of the trucks, as they had always done, and one by one the platoons were marched over a hill and into the woods, which proved to be the western extremity of the Forest of Retz. The rolling kitchens were

brought up and, under cover of the forest, breakfast was cooked and then every one went to sleep. It was the morning of July 16. That afternoon orders were received that the 1st Division would that night move up in close support to the French division which was holding the line, and reconnoiter the position preparatory to relieving the French. Great secrecy was to be maintained, no movements were to be made by daylight, and the troops were to be well screened in the forest by dawn. Dawn of the 17th found the 1st Division ten miles behind the front in the Forest of Retz.

About three o'clock in the afternoon of July 17 came the attack order. Battalion and company commanders were quickly called together, the plan was read to them, the intricacies explained, maps marked and gone over, the order of battalions given, then all returned to hurry along the evening meal, which for many would be the last hot meal in many days, and, when dusk gathered, platoon by platoon, the 1st Division started its long march to the front, to jump off at dawn.

Luckily it rained that night, so that the German airplanes (which the night before had made it necessary for the moving columns to take to the fields instead of the roads, for the latter were white ribbons in the moonlight), did not notice the movement into this sector of three divisions of troops and all the materials of war. A heavy thunder shower—a rare thing in France—kept the sky overcast and the German aeroplanes did not venture forth. Truly God must have been with the Allies in this enterprise, for the roads that night presented an unmistakable target. Along the three roads leading toward the front, came two American and one French divisions, 67,000 men, 5,000 animals and 3,000 vehicles, each with a separate mission to reach a certain point before a certain hour. The pitchy darkness which so effectually screened the movement from the enemy, added to the confusion of the Allied troops going along that unfamiliar road. Artillery pieces and caissons held the center of the road, while the infantry trudged along through the muddy ditches. Then several battalions of big French tanks came wallowing down the highway, and as they took the center of the road, everything had to give way towards

the fields. Then came five-ton motor trucks, Staff cars, motorcycles, side-cars, and in and out among them all marched the steadily plodding infantry platoons. Everything was unutterably mixed in the awful congestion of those roads. No two kinds of traffic went at the same speed. The tanks banged and roared down the middle of the road, slower than the trucks, but faster than the artillery, and the terrific roar they made drowned out the shouts of the frantic platoon leader, who dimly through the gloom saw his sergeant leading half the platoon off in apparently a wrong direction. Then, ten five-ton trucks, bringing all but the most necessary part of a field hospital, came sliding along, trying to pick their way through the tanks, while the officer in charge wondered where they had lost the other two trucks. By this time the infantry was resignedly off the road and trudging bravely through the wheat fields on the side,—heartbreaking work it was, for the ground was soft and the rain had made it almost a quagmire. Suddenly a tiny village emerged from the darkness. This was a problem, for it choked the width of the road down to twenty feet, and through this neck the whole traffic must go. Down the main street wallowed a tank, then from each side, where they had been patiently waiting their turn, two platoons of infantry started, only to be cut in two by a three-inch field piece, which with a Dodge staff car was trying to negotiate the street. Traffic could only go in one file through town, and at the far side officers tried vainly to straighten things out. There were no military police. Captains gave up all hope of keeping their companies together, lieutenants could not keep even their platoons together, and yet they all were surging in the pitch blackness along the one road which that division was using to go to the front. Tanks, artillery pieces and caissons, Signal Corps reel carts laying telephone wires, little one-mule machine-gun carts, five-ton trucks, ambulances, combat wagons, escort wagons, staff cars, motorcycles, and never ending columns of Infantry, were twisted and mixed and jammed but never stopped moving along that one road to the front.

Finally officers became desperate. Their watches showed that in an hour would be the jump-off and still there was no sign of that point at which the French were to have the guides stationed to take them to the line. Then just ahead there appeared a mounted man in the middle of the road.

"What Battery is that?" he shouted.

"Gun No. 2 of D Battery of the 6th Field," came the guttural reply from the driver of the lead team, who had been cursing a French tank until he was hoarse.

"Very good, turn sharp to the left, the rest of the battery is about a hundred yards in there."

The discouraged Battalion Commander of the Infantry felt much better. He knew he did not have much further to go, now that he had passed the artillery positions; the road was free of everything but the infantry. Parts of sixty-four companies were trudging along, finally dividing themselves into four great groups of the four regiments, then sifting out by battalions, and finally here were the French guides, at French Battalion Headquarters, and there was the Colonel, cool, composed and smiling.

"Everything all right, Major?"

"Thank you, Sir, I believe it is. Will send you word when I am in position."

"Good-luck." The miracle of that awful night was how every unit of the division reached its position before 4:30 a. m. Another miracle was that during it all scarcely a German shell was fired. And now the great question was, were the Germans ready for us?

At 4:35 a. m. the stillness of the night was rent with one terrific crash, as every Allied gun from the Aisne to Château-Thierry roared with the rolling barrage, and the infantry went over. This was the hour for which every member of the 1st Division had waited so patiently through the grim months of maneuver and trench warfare, for here now, man to man, they were to prove themselves in attack, and to show to all the world that American troops had entered at last on the real mission of hurling back the Germans.

Every step forward was a yard snatched away from the

enemy, where yards counted most, for they were closing the neck of a salient.

To General Bullard his promotion had come too soon. He now commanded the Third American Army Corps, and the change had come on the very day before his 1st Division, which he had trained and watched develop under his careful guidance, was to make the attack which would print its name in letters of gold throughout the ages. Brigadier General Charles P. Summerall, who had so efficiently commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the 1st Division was that night made Division Commander.

The 2nd Division (Regular Army and Marines) had been out of the line but one week, when it received the order to move to the front in trucks. This division was constructing defensive positions for another line of defense at Montrieul-aux-Lions, ten kilometers behind the Belleau Wood Sector, on the Paris-Metz highway. Here, under General Bundy, the 2nd Division was busily engaged in reorganizing after the month's hard fighting in Vaux and Belleau Wood, and in training the replacements which had not quite filled the division to strength. On the night of July 16, orders were received to move the 2nd Division in French trucks, while the transport followed in the general direction of the Bois de Retz. This was a repetition of what the 1st had gone through. Commands were hastily gathered together and entrucked, and dawn found the infantry and machine gunners in the western edge of the Bois de Retz. At four on the afternoon of July 17, the attack order was sent out to the various units, and at dusk the movement began. If the 2nd did not have as far to travel that night as did the 1st, they had infinitely the worst of the bargain in all other respects, for, while the 1st was moving out over an open plain to the north, the 2nd had to march directly through the forest. That part of the line from which the 2nd was to jump off, was in the eastern part of the forest of Retz, an immense, thick forest which had seen fierce fighting in the first battle of the Marne. The few roads through this forest were swamped with the traffic of the division, but this time there were no fields on either side for the infantry

to move in, and the confusion was a thousand times greater in the blackness of the forest. The heavy rain made things worse. You could not see your hand before your face. Trucks and tanks, ambulances and combat wagons, jammed together and cut in two the infantry platoons, while frantic sergeants in charge of artillery sections tried to gallop their much belated guns into position down those avenues in the forest. Even had the officers reconnoitered the position, they would not have found the way that night any more easily. The infantry colonels, forward at their posts of command, became uneasy when, at four in the morning, with the attack set for 4:35, the battalions which were to lead the attack had not arrived, and rumors sifted in that the 2nd Division was lost in the wood. It would have been of no use, even had any one thought of so doing, to attempt to halt or delay the attack. At 4:35 the barrage would cut the stillness of the night, and, if the infantry of the 2nd Division were not there to go over, there would be a gap in the line, where the Germans would remain, and the divisions on both sides would be enfiladed and the attack ruined.

The French who were holding the line and eagerly awaiting the arrival of the infantry of the 2nd Division, sent every available man back through the woods to find the retarded battalions. Finally, before it was too late, the leading elements of battalions of the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments and the 5th Regiment of Marines appeared. They were hurried into position just as they came, without reference to order, and by 4:34 some sort of a line of infantry was ready to go over a minute later when the guns began the great rolling barrage. By the light of the gun flashes the last of the infantry and Marines found their way and joined their comrades, coming up the last hundred yards through the forest in the light as bright as day from the incessant firing of the guns, and as they took up the orderly march they were able to straighten themselves out, for the few Germans who were there to hold the line were outnumbered a hundred to one. The artillery had arrived and was firing by schedule and map, the infantry was there on time and the reputation of the 2nd was forever


saved. Then came the great good tidings. As the 2nd emerged from the woods, the advancing wave of the infantry had connected on its right and left with the French divisions who were joining in the attack, and wounded officers coming in proclaimed that "everything is fine, and going well."

Day broke now, and as far as the eye could reach over that broad, flat plain, 10 kilometers (6¼ miles) square covered with wheat fields, and cut here and there with occasional deep ravines, the Allied line with the 1st Division on the left, and 1st Moroccan Division in the center, and the 2nd Division on the right was steadily advancing behind its rolling barrage. On the north of this line, the 153rd French Infantry Division was holding its pivot in the Aisne valley, while its southern extremity was moving out of the Ambleny-St. Banbry-Cutry ravine in conformity with the 1st American Division. This French division was one of the best, and had of necessity to be, for its mission was to move out in the very apex of the line (where it formed a sharp right angle by turning due south from the Aisne valley down the ravine), keeping the left flank of the division in the Aisne valley, while it swung the right flank in connection with the advancing 1st Division, which meant a turning movement in the face of the enemy, the most difficult of military operations. The 1st Division attacked with all four infantry regiments in line, in order from left to right (north to south) 2nd Brigade (28th and 26th Infantry Regiments), 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Infantry Regiments). At 4:35 a. m. it had jumped off from the line Cutry-St. Pierre Aigle, where it connected with the 1st Moroccan Division. The mission of the 1st Division was to push straight forward across the flat plain towards Missy aux Bois and Chaudon and then to keep on going.

The center of the attack on July 18 was the famous Moroccan Division, which was to set the pace for the American divisions on either flank. This veteran division of many attacks with the justly celebrated Foreign Legion (to which war was an every day affair, which after each offensive was quickly replaced by foreigners in France from every nation who came

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 147

to fight hard and die fighting) was once more in the kind of action it most loved. Caution was cast aside, as it had not been since the First Battle of the Marne. There were no fixed objectives, merely lines on which to reform, and then push on. But now there was an added stimulus, for here were American divisions on either flank, eagerly rushing ahead, and the Mo-



JUMP-OFF, JULY 18, 1918

Showing the position of the three divisions in the surprise attack on Soissons.

roccan Division knew that the hour had come to show to these newcomers in the war, what the *élite* of the French Army could do. On the right of the Moroccan division, coming out of the forest of Retz and moving due east towards Vierzy came the 2nd Division, 5th Marines, 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments. The 6th Marine Regiment was then in Corps Reserve. These three divisions delivered the main attack.

General Pershing says in his report:

"The place of honor in the thrust towards Soissons on July 18 was given to our 1st and 2nd Divisions in company with chosen French Divisions. Joining up with the right of the 2nd American Division was the Seventh French Corps."

Brigaded with divisions of the Seventh French Army Corps was the 4th Regular Division less the 47th Infantry which was held in Corps reserve. On the right of this French Corps was the First American Army Corps, from left (north) to right (south) in the line, 167th French Division, 26th (New England National Guard) Division. These divisions also advanced their front slightly, the 26th Division acting as the southern pivot. This division was in the Belleau Wood Sector, and its mission was to hold the left (southern), pivot of the attack at Vaux, while the remainder of the line moved slightly forward and took the villages of Torcy and Belleau. The 52nd Brigade was in the line at this time (103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments) and without much difficulty, it moved forward on July 18 and captured these two points in the enemy front lines, and took 26 prisoners in the first assault, the front line being very lightly held. Some elements of General Cole's command, forgetting that the 26th was not an attacking division, but a pivotal division, and with the vivid memory of facing Mont Sec for two months in the Toul Sector, continued their advance past the given line of the railroad, and up the slopes of Hill 190. They had almost reached the summit when they were hastily recalled. The attack had not at this early hour advanced to such a point where flanks could be left wide open, and army orders in such cases were explicit, so down they came, back to the valley, while the Germans moved up machine guns on the crest of the hill.

This was the Allied line of battle, from the river Aisne to the river Marne, on the 18th of July, 1918. All these divisions advanced their fronts in conformity with the main attack, which was made by the 1st and 2nd American Divisions, and the French 1st Moroccan Division.

At 4:35 a. m. on the morning of July 18, the calm of the early hours was broken by the roar of a thousand guns as the three Allied divisions jumped off in the great counter-

attack southeast across that broad plateau towards Soissons. There were three objectives laid out in the orders for the day's attack; other orders were to follow for the attacks on the succeeding days. It was an anxious moment, that moment of the jump-off, for to every one along the whole battle line the question came—how much artillery have the Germans massed behind this sector? The barrage started forward, bursting ahead of the infantry and then up went the rockets and flares from the German front lines calling for their own artillery to put down a protective barrage. On went the Allied barrage and behind it the waves of infantry of the leading battalions. A minute later came the German artillery reply, but it was not strong; it was apparent that they did not have many guns on this front. Forward swung the Allies on a five-mile front, following their barrage, but that day the barrage was not as close protection as it had been at Cantigny, for the gunners did not dare to lay their fire too close to the infantry since they had not fired a single registration shot and were firing solely by map. This gave the Germans time, after our barrage had passed them, to come up and man their machine guns before our infantry came upon them. The Allies passed the front lines without any check. There were no trenches except little shell holes, there was no wire, the front line was not well organized. Evidently the Germans in their two weeks' occupancy of this line had not thought it worth while to dig in, probably expecting to move on toward Paris almost any day.

The Germans certainly had put into practice all the theories of open warfare. That first line was nothing more than an outpost line, thinly held and meant only to check an advance long enough to warn the second line, and get them out of their dugouts and into the positions. But this time there had been no warning. There was no Allied artillery preparation during which the German troops in the second line could be led stoically out of the dugouts and into their fire positions. Also there was no warning from the higher staff that an attack was expected. The Germans were taken completely by surprise. And the Allied soldiers who were making the attack that

morning were the first to realize this. The Germans had been outwitted and it would be easy going for the Allies, until the Germans got themselves together and recovered from their surprise. Accordingly to every man it came that he must push on at top speed, that no machine-gun nest which got into action between our barrage and our infantry should be allowed to check that rush, and that the infantry must keep up behind the barrage as close as they could, to prevent this.

Then came the second German defensive line, and that was almost as easy as the first had been. The defenders were few and far between. What machine guns there were in action were silenced by the swift rush the Allied soldiers made to stop them. It was Allies' day. Sweeping ever forward went the Allied line. Meanwhile the second wave of the leading battalion stopped on the second German line to mop it up. They were well repaid for their pains. That second line was full of Germans in dugouts who had not been notified in time to get out to their positions before the Allied waves were upon them. The moppers-up took a heavy toll of them—in German prisoners—ten here, fifteen there, fifty in a cellar, a hundred in that cave, so that the score soon ran into the thousands. Usually they came out without any fuss on hearing that unmistakable challenge of the mopper-up. But there was one cave that the leading battalion of the 26th Infantry passed over out of which shots kept coming. The second wave tried to surround the cave and this drew machine-gun fire. Try as they might, no one could get within range of the mouth without drawing a great deal of attention. This was holding up the second wave when one of the big French tanks came along. The officer sent word to the tank to come over and help clean out the cave and in a few minutes the tank was waddling up to the mouth like a huge turtle, while the machine-gun bullets bounced off its thick sides. Down into the mouth of the cave it went firing all its guns. All was silent for a moment, and then the tank backed out, and following it came a column of German Infantry, their hands held up over their heads. Six hundred prisoners including a Colonel came out of the cave, and a shame-faced lot they were to be caught in a hole like

that. But it was still more strange to see the consternation on their faces when they saw the Americans. The surprise of that attack was written on the face of every one of those prisoners, and with it was the dread lest the stories be true that the Americans killed all the prisoners they took.

By 5:35 a. m., one hour after the attack began, the assaulting lines were on their "First Objective," that blue line on the official map where the barrage was to stand for so many minutes, while the assaulting waves were reorganized, the front rank filled up, while the moppers-up were busy cleaning out the German second position. But this time the infantry did not have to "dig in." Very soon the barrage which was bursting out in front while the heavies were pounding the next line of German resistance would move on and with it would go the infantry. The Allies had progressed well in that first hour. The 1st (Regular) Division had swung swiftly across that flat plateau, meeting very little resistance, and the Second (Regular and Marine), when it came out of the wood, after its final rush to get in the line, found that it was abreast of the French divisions on its *right* and *left*, and the whole line was moving along as per schedule.

Then the barrage started forward again. The Allied guns were shooting at almost their extreme range now, and the barrage was placed well ahead of the infantry, for the zone of dispersion increases with the range. Then, too, some batteries were not firing, for the Allied artillery was now moving forward, a battery at a time and this thinned down the barrage. Still, the advancing waves pressed on, and now the tanks were there to help them. As soon as a German machine-gun nest opened its fire, word was sent to the nearest tank and it headed for the nest and began firing its sawed-off 75mm. gun and all its machine guns, and the Allied Infantry rushed the spot as soon as the German fire slackened. The German resistance was stiffening but was not yet fully organized. This the attacking troops realized, and they realized also that speed and still more speed would be the salvation of that day. Every yard they went forward meant a yard lost to the Germans, but more than that, every minute that they lost meant stiffer

resistance on the German third line which they were approaching. It was the first great attack for the Americans, and to both the French and the Americans, there was that feeling that they had been selected from all the Allied strength to make this decisive blow which, as the news spread, would cheer the hearts of millions in all the Allied countries, who the day before were silently wondering when Paris would fall. To be the picked troops, champions of all the Allies, and to be fighting alongside the famous 1st Moroccan Division with its Foreign Legion, was incentive enough to those officers and men of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, from the Regular Army and the Marine Corps, to bring out the greatest qualities of heroism in pushing the line forward.

For instance, the citation for the award of the D.S.C. reads: "Jim Quinn, second lieutenant 28th Infantry. For extraordinary heroism in action near Soissons, France, July 18, 1918. With a small platoon he attacked and captured a fortified French farm-house in an open field. He so courageously and skillfully handled his men that this German strong point, held by 100 men and 5 machine guns, was promptly captured." Every farmhouse on that broad, level plateau 6¼ miles square was a fortress to the German defenders, and every one captured was taken by just such skill and heroism on the part of the attacking troops.

But not alone to the infantry is the credit for that swift advance due. The field artillery of those three divisions also did heroic work in that attack. Heedless of personal danger, they limbered up the guns and took them forward along the shell-swept roads, across the fields on which the German artillery was beating and went into battery behind the infantry. As soon as the attack began, all attempts at screening of movements, all camouflage for batteries was abandoned. Speed in getting the guns forward so that the infantry should have all the protection that it was possible to give them, speed in bringing up caisson after caisson of ammunition so that those guns should never be silent, and speed in running forward observation officers with telephones, were the watchwords with the artillery that day. The batteries fired from each position until

the range became too great; then one by one they limbered up, and went forward at a gallop to the place where the battalion commander, coolly sitting his horse on that shell-torn field, gave them orders to put the battery into action. Swiftly the guns were unlimbered despite the hail of German machine-gun bullets and high explosive; and the horses were scarcely led away before the guns were in action, so perfect was the teamwork of gunners and drivers. The roads, once the attack started, were a mass of transports moving forward. Every road out of the forest was choked with the trains of a division, while through them all galloped the artillery. It was once more "Forward the Guns," that old cry of open warfare almost forgotten in the three years of trench warfare. To see the guns go forward is the sure sign of victory.

The other sure sign of victory was the stream of walking wounded and the prisoners moving back across the plain in little groups slowly finding their way to the rear, the wounded acting as guards for the prisoners, and the prisoners supporting the wounded to the aid station. Meanwhile the stretcher bearers followed the advancing waves in search of the more seriously wounded, and as they found them they carried them to the nearest road where in groups on litters, or on blankets over rifles, they waited the first caisson, slat wagon, or empty ambulance going to the rear. And for many it was a long wait that day. There had been no time to arrange for extra ambulances, and the division had to use its ambulances not only to gather the wounded forward, but also to transport them back to the railroad where the train lay to take them to southern France. But, though the delays were long, there was never a murmur of protest from those white, drawn faces of the wounded as they lay there in the hot glare of the July sun on the flat plateau.

By noon of the first day, the Allies had advanced across that great plateau, half the distance to Soissons. Apparently the German defenders had been caught unawares, and the Allied infantry had broken through. Everywhere the line was advancing swiftly, and meeting practically no resistance. It was just possible that the break through had been complete.

If so, the entire German garrison of this sector had either been captured or killed. The total tally of prisoners seemed to warrant this assumption. They came pouring in to the divisional headquarters in great columns, and as the divisions had flashed back the news, the conviction grew that the Allies had pierced the main battle front. If this were the case, then here was the great opportunity for cavalry to go in and roll up the flanks. Therefore, General Mangin decided to send in his army reserves, two regiments of Cuirassiers, the *élite* of the French cavalry. One regiment was to charge through the advancing lines of the 1st Division, while the other went similarly through the 2nd Division.

Meanwhile the infantry, with the exception of the extreme flanks, had progressed to the line of the last objective for that day. On this line they halted, under orders, while the artillery was being moved up to support them. Immediately upon halting, the lines were organized, units regrouped, and the front echeloned in depth, to prevent counter-attack. In other words, as soon as the final line for the day was reached, the advancing infantry waves halted. Under orders the men immediately lay down, while the officers and sergeants regrouped those men about them. An outpost line was immediately sent forward a few hundred yards, consisting of a few men with automatic rifles, while the remainder of the attacking troops were formed in two main defensive lines, several hundred yards apart. The machine guns were put in position in the rearmost of these lines.

This was the situation, late in the afternoon of the first day of the attack. By a series of most gallant infantry charges, half of the great plateau towards Soissons had been cleared of practically all the German defenders, and the infantry had halted and was echeloned in depth. The extreme flanks were still heavily engaged, but in the center it seemed as though the infantry had broken through. While the artillery was moving forward at a gallop, there came moving majestically out of the forest of Retz, two columns of splendid cavalry.

It was one of the most inspiring sights of the war. On

they came, at a slow trot, their blue steel helmets flashing in the sun. Like a triumphal parade, each man in a new blue uniform, with button, bit and spurs burnished bright, rode proudly across that wheat covered plateau as though in review before the whole world. Apparently heedless of the German shells from the heights beyond, they swept across the newly won ground. Through the artillery, through the infantry supports they went, and as they passed the rearmost line of the infantry, the Colonel turned in his saddle and shouted the command. Every trooper drew saber, as the column spread out fanwise into line of battle. Raising his saber the colonel signalled the charge. The lethargy of the trot vanished. Each trooper jabbed his spurs into the horse's flank, and the line sprang forward at the charge. On they went towards the Allied infantry outpost line, and then, of a sudden, there sounded the sickening tattoo of hundreds of German machine guns. The charging cavalry was literally cut to pieces. The handful still mounted tried vainly to reform, but it was evident that not until every machine gun was taken, could cavalry hope to get through. This was to be an infantry battle.

By six that evening of the 18th of July the center of the allied line was on its "Third and Day's objective." The Moroccans and the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division which adjoined them were on the line and had dug in. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division and the 153rd French Division, however, were still heavily engaged in the Missy ravine, while the 2nd Division was held up in front of Vierzy. The Missy ravine cut into the flat plateau, a deep narrow ravine running north, filled with trees and brush, and the Germans had organized it for defense with all their tactical skill. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division had cleaned out their end,—the shallow end and the head,—but were unable to advance until the French cleared their end. Thirty pieces of German artillery were captured at the point of the bayonet in the Missy ravine. Since standards are no longer carried in battle, captured cannon are the one great sign of victory. But not alone for this did the 1st Division relish taking these guns, for in them they saw not

only the guns which that morning had been firing on the advancing waves, but also they pictured in them all the guns which had been firing on them in the past six months of trench warfare when they were powerless to strike back at them. The capture of the first guns was a gala occasion for the 1st Division. The fighting in the Missy ravine was bitter, hand-to-hand work, for the Germans clung desperately to their positions under orders to hold at all costs until reinforcements were sent.

Meanwhile the 2nd Division on the right of the Allied line, was held up by a ravine, as was the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division. But in the case of the 2nd Division, the ravine ran almost parallel to the axis of attack while the Missy ravine ran parallel to the front. The 2nd Division had run into this ravine very soon after emerging from the wood, and had fought its way up the ravine all day long. This ravine towards its head forked into a Y and at the head of the eastern arm of this Y lay the village of Vierzy. The railroad from Villers-Cotterets to Soissons ran up this ravine and at Vierzy entered a tunnel through the plateau. The tunnel was about a mile in length and the other end of it was the broad valley of the Crise. This valley was the real objective of the Allied attack. The Crise flowed due north down its valley and joined the Aisne at Soissons, and in the valley lay not only the railroad but also the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway. Soissons lay at the juncture of these two valleys—the Crise and the Aisne. The Allies were attacking across the broad, flat plateau which ended abruptly overlooking both valleys and the city of Soissons. If the Allies secured this plateau, Soissons, the railroad center and the meeting point of six national highways, the center of the German supply system for the Marne salient, would have to be abandoned by the Germans. In their initial assault, the Allies had gained half of this plateau, but now that the German resistance had stiffened somewhat, the Allied lines were held up before Missy-aux-Bois on the north and before Vierzy on the south. This was at 6 o'clock on the evening of July 18, the first day of the attack.

The 2nd Division held Vauxcastille, the little village on


top of the plateau overlooking Vierzy and the mouth of the railroad tunnel in the ravine, but all attempts to take Vierzy had been met by fierce counter-attacks from the tunnel. To hold Vierzy, as General Harbord realized, necessitated the capture of the far end of the tunnel and the hamlet of Lechelle where it emerged, and to do this meant taking another half mile of the plateau. The 5th Marine, and the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments were worn from the long night's march through the forest, as well as from fourteen hours of continuous fighting, but General Harbord knew that to wait until morning would only give the Germans time to reënforce the position, and accordingly he ordered an attack for 6:30 that night. The artillery was brought up and from the information sent back by the troops who had gained a footing in Vierzy and had been thrown out again, a complete artillery schedule was prepared. The attack was to be made by the 2nd Division and the Moroccans, for the village of Lechelle was in the Moroccan sector, and fifteen big French tanks were brought up to assist the infantry through the machine-gun nests on the forward and reverse slopes of the rise in the plateau. That night the 23rd Infantry Regiment, supported by the 5th Marines, wrote the 2nd Division into history, when, in one great sweeping attack, they mustered all their reserve strength, captured the hill, the town of Vierzy, and the tunnel, despite the utmost resistance of the German defenders, and established a line on the forward slope of the hill overlooking the village of Tigny. They were now well beyond their day's objective, 2,965 prisoners and seventy-five guns were captured in one day's fighting, which is a remarkable record for three regiments.

While this attack was going on, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division (28th and 26th Infantry Regiments) fought their way doggedly through the underbrush and tricky defiles of the Missy ravine. Tanks were of but little assistance there, and by nightfall, the town of Missy-aux-Bois was captured and the line extended slightly beyond the town and beyond the Missy ravine. Further advance was stopped by machine-gun fire from the hill northeast of the town. That night the

26th and 28th Infantry Regiments dug in on the line, while in the twilight on the rising ground in front and to the left of them, just across the Paris-Soissons road, they could plainly see German machine-gunners bringing their pieces up and putting them in position. General Summerall was faced with a peculiar situation. His right brigade was advanced and on its third objective beyond the village of Chaudon which the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments had taken, while his left brigade was held up on the line of the second objective just beyond Missy-aux-Bois. This left an exposed left flank of the 1st Brigade open for a kilometer with only one battalion of divisional reserves to hold it. General Summerall believed that the 2nd Brigade would advance in the morning and accordingly left the 1st Brigade in its advanced position, while he moved the 1st Engineer Regiment up with the 1st Machine-gun Battalion as Divisional Reserve, for there was a big possibility that, if the Germans had large reserves near at hand, they might counter-attack in force down the Paris-Soissons road which came diagonally across the plateau and separated the 1st and the 2nd Brigades. A quick movement of this kind would let the Germans in behind the Allied attack. At nine in the evening of July 18, the Allied line was stabilized for the night to include the towns of Breuil, Missy-aux-Bois, then out one kilometer to Chaudon (which the 1st Brigade, 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments, had taken early in the day), thence along the forward slope of the hill, where the Moroccans were holding, to include the new position of the 2nd Division.

That night was a busy one for the Allies as well as for the Germans, and the artillery of both sides fired all night on the roads to cut supply lines. The 6th Marine Regiment was brought up and put in position so as to jump through the line at dawn in the sector of the 2nd Division, while in the sector of the 1st Division the engineers were moved forward, battalions shifted about and the front line organized in depth to prevent the possible German counter-attack at dawn on this one weak spot in the line. All over the Allied sector, artillery moved forward, ammunition was brought up in great quanti-

ties, ambulances plied back and forth, and out of the forest of Retz at nightfall began a seemingly never ending procession of little one-mule ration carts and water wagons with a hot meal and drinking water for the troops in the line. The congestion on those roads during the day was simple as compared with the congestion of the night, and regimental staffs worked



EVENING OF THE FIRST DAY

Jump-Off Line shown dotted, Advanced Line shown solid.

all night to see that the food, water and ammunition carts went forward to the proper points and that carrying parties met them at the right time, while the Regimental Commanders went back to Brigade Headquarters and thence back to Division Headquarters to be given the attack orders and the maps with the sector boundaries and objectives for the next morning's attack. When the commanders returned with these orders, copies of orders and maps were sent to the battalion

commanders in time for them to notify everybody in their battalions before morning.

The staffs had an enormous task that night which would have been difficult had the short hours of darkness been quiet. But throughout the night the Germans shelled the area behind the lines with all the artillery that was within range. Then to add to this, the first German supports to reach this sector was their air service. Late that afternoon, Baron Richthofen's "Circus," those unmistakable red-nosed planes whose number appeared to be as the sands of the sea, quickly drove the Allied planes from the sky. Then, after locating all the Allied positions for their artillery, they flew back over the lines and bombed the transport on the roads, and shot up with their machine guns the Allied infantry, defenseless in their little shallow holes. The activity of these enemy planes seemed to increase with the coming of darkness, when the Allies began moving bodies of troops about. The German planes flew low and dropped great balls of light suspended in the air by parachutes, and, by the light of these, which lit the whole plateau like daylight, they were able to bomb the Allies with great effect. Yet, through it all, the drivers on the carts with the ammunition, food and water (the scarcest thing on the hot dry plateau) never faltered, but pushed ahead with only one thought in mind—to get their load forward to the troops, to get water forward to their companies.

At 4 o'clock in the morning of July 19, under cover of another rolling barrage, the Allies attacked along the whole front; but during the night the Germans had put in all the reserves in the area, and the resistance that morning was much stiffer than it had been the day before. Especially was this true of the northeast corner of the plateau. It was this corner that the Germans had to hold at all costs, for the loss of it meant to them the loss of Soissons; so during the night they had sewn this three-mile square with machine guns backed up by artillery. Access to this corner of the plateau from Soissons was easy for the enemy as the Paris-Soissons highway bisected that corner of the plateau between the Missy ravine and the Crise valley which the Germans chose

to defend to the end. When the Allied advance began that morning, therefore, it was met by a withering fire from in front of the 153rd French Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, and the remainder of the Allied attack which was ahead of these two units received an enfilading fire on their left flank which, added to the frontal fire, made that day's advance very difficult. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division had again the most difficult part of the whole Allied sector, for it was on its front that all these German machine guns had been planted, where the terrain best suited this kind of defense. In front of the 2nd Brigade the plateau rose gently, and just below the crest of the rise the Paris-Soissons road ran diagonally across the front. This gave the Germans plunging fire on the attacking waves; nevertheless the 2nd Brigade went on.

As soon as the situation was sensed, all the available tanks were rushed to the aid of the 26th and 28th Infantry Regiments, which were making such heroic attempts to cross the road and reach the hill-top. The arrival of the tanks made things go more easily. They waddled over the road and up the slope, shooting up every machine-gun nest that lay concealed in the tall grass, but as they reached the summit they met a swift end. The Germans had left several 77mm. field guns on the far side of the slope, and, as the tanks came up on the skyline, the Germans put them all out of action by direct fire. The presence of these guns was not known to the Allies, as all the Allied airplanes had been driven from the sky. The Allied infantry, which had followed the tanks closely, was now on the crest of the low hill. It seemed impossible to advance, for the slightest movement brought a hail of bullets which cut down every one standing. The artillery was then brought up closer, and under cover of short bursts of fire, little by little the line was advanced, and by night, at the terrific cost of more than 3,000 officers and men, it had reached the head of the Ploisy ravine. The 1st Brigade and the Moroccans also met stiffened resistance that day. The fire from their front was determined, but what stayed them was the galling flanking fire which enfiladed them from the

left (just where the Germans were expected to counter-attack); this held their gain for that day down to one mile, and they were forced to stop at the head of the Chazelle ravine.


In the sector of the 2nd Division, the 6th Marines (who had been held in corps reserve during the first day) leap-frogged the remainder of the division, as they were still fresh, and alone followed in support by the 2nd Regiment of Engineers, the 6th Marines attacked at 4 a. m. and with their usual dash and reckless driving swept over the remaining two miles of wheat-covered plateau, through, into and past machine-gun nests, until they reached the Château-Thierry road. They had met bitter German resistance all the way, had fought their way along yard by yard, but they had not stopped until they reached the road. Once on the road they met the full force of the German resistance. Time after time, by repeated assaults, they reached the road only to be thrown off again; finally they dug in, facing the village of Tigny, which lay just west of the road. They had accomplished their mission, and won immortal glory, for the road now lay in No Man's Land and the communications between Soissons and Château-Thierry were cut. On the night of the 19th of July, therefore, the Allied advance rested its right (south) on the Château-Thierry road, at Tigny, whence the line ran northwest across the heads of the Chazelle and Ploisy ravines, where it turned sharply to the west back to the Missy ravine.

That night, the 2nd Division was relieved by the 58th French Division. It had cut the road to Château-Thierry in the face of the utmost resistance of Von Hutier's attacking army. The four enemy divisions it met and defeated, in its magnificent dash across the plateau in those two days, were the pick of the entire German Army, who had been selected to make the assault on Paris. Against these the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) advanced eleven kilometers (7 miles); but in so doing the losses were very heavy. The Germans threw every man they had into the line to save this position, and the taking of the plateau was accomplished at a cost of 183 officers and 4,742 men, total casualties. The 2nd Division captured more than 3,000 prisoners (of whom 2,125

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 163

were credited to the 23rd Infantry) belonging to eleven German regiments, and in addition to this captured 75 guns and countless machine guns. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments lost a total of 70 officers and 1,927 men.

The Germans then held but three big knolls and the two



ADVANCE OF JULY 19, 1918

Showing plateau southwest of Soissons which the Germans chose to defend to the last.


ravines which separated them at the northeast corner of the wide plateau. General Mangin now ordered the French and the 1st Division to capture the three knolls and the two ravines, Ploisy and Chazelle, so that the Allies could look directly into Soissons. The largest of the knolls (the northern one, bounded on the west by the Missy ravine, on the north by the Aisne valley, and on the east by the Crise valley) was too large to be taken by frontal attack, as it was protected by

the heavily reënforced artillery on the heights behind it north of the Aisne; but by capturing Berzy-le-Sec, which dominated the Crise valley, the Germans would be flanked out, and forced to evacuate the northern knoll, which would give the Allies command of Soissons. In order to take Berzy-le-Sec, the two smaller knolls and the two ravines had to be taken first, and on these the Germans were also massed in great strength. During the night, the Germans brought up several divisions and among them the 1st Prussian Guards Division. Their artillery was reënforced, both on the actual front where the attack was to come and on the big knoll on the left flank. There were guns of all calibers, but worst of all, 6-inch rifles, which enfiladed the ground over which the Allies were to attack in the morning. Machine guns in great quantity were put into position to cover every angle of the Allied advance, and, while the German airplanes bombed the rear areas during the night, the German artillery fired gas and high explosive in great quantity into the whole area.

On the morning of the 20th of July, the third day of the Allied attack, the assault was carried forward. The orders called for the French on the left to push on straight along their front and take Berzy-le-Sec; the 1st Division was to take the Ploisy ravine and in *liaison* with the French to take the knoll in front of Berzy-le-Sec. The Moroccans were to advance their line to the Château-Thierry road. At dawn the Allies attacked in accordance with this order, and again and again the last of the three American battalions to be put in the line advanced resolutely to the assault only to have the ranks thinned and very little ground gained at each attempt. The Germans were making a desperate stand. Machine-gunners of the Prussian guards lay in the small clearings they had made in the wheat, and as the waves of attacking troops approached they loosed off belt after belt of ammunition, firing at top speed, regardless of the certain death that would come to them when the Americans came through that galling fire. There were no prisoners taken in this fierce assault. The Germans fired until they were killed. Still the Allies advanced. Each rush gained some ground. Commands were shattered,

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 165

but the discipline and the heroic gallantry of the troops carried them on, until finally they crossed the crest of the knoll, where they stopped and dug in. The 1st Division won its objective, but the French had not taken Berzy-le-Sec. Had another assault been necessary there would not have been enough men, so heavy had been the losses. The last knoll of the plateau,



JULY 20, 1918

Showing the advance of the 1st Division toward the Soissons-Château-Thierry Road.

overlooking the wide valley of the Crise, was taken, and the outskirts of Soissons were visible. But the knoll was difficult to hold. The Germans still held half of it, for on the left the French had been held up, and were exposed to the direct fire of 6-inch rifles from the north. There was a hayshed on the summit of the knoll, and to go within a hundred yards of it meant death, so accurate was the enemy artillery.


At twenty minutes before 2 o'clock that afternoon, an order was received by the Regimental Commanders of the 26th and 28th Infantry (1st Division) to attack Berzy-le-Sec at 2 p. m. From this order it was apparent that the heavy artillery fire which the Allied batteries had been and were still firing was the two hours' preparation fire. It was over a mile to the leading battalion, and the order had to reach it in time to get every one up and started by 2 o'clock. The Staff officers took the order and ran. They reached the battalions just as the barrage began. The men had to be told, and the word passed quickly down the line. As there was too little time to do this, the attack lacked the usual initial punch, but still the troops went on. Wave after wave marched stoically into the German machine guns, and down the wooded slopes toward Berzy-le-Sec. They advanced the line in the face of a murderous fire, but they did not take the town. The 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Infantry), however, had finally reached their objective and dug in on the railroad.

That afternoon Major General Summerall went all over the lines. His 1st Division had been ordered to take Berzy-le-Sec and though the ranks were thin, with but few officers left, he decided to take the town next morning. Accordingly, during the night, the ranks of the 26th and 28th Infantry of the 2nd Brigade were recruited on the field of all available men—cooks, kitchen police, orderlies, clerks from Regimental Headquarters, military police, and engineers—and with what was left of each of the infantry regiments all were grouped together for the final assault. At dawn, on the morning of July 21, the fourth day of this historic attack, the artillery of the 1st Division skillfully played on the treacherous wooded defiles which led down into Berzy-le-Sec, while the infantry doggedly worked its way forward into the very teeth of the German machine guns, but always continued the advance. Finally General Buck, who commanded the 2nd Brigade, took personal command. His citation is as follows:

“Beaumont B. Buck, brigadier general, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division. Before and during the attack on Berzy-le-Sec,

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 167

France, July 21, 1918, he displayed conspicuous gallantry and heroic leadership of his command. When most of the officers of his brigade had fallen, General Buck, with contempt of personal danger, and in spite of heavy artillery bombardment and machine-gun fire, traversed the front of his advancing forces, gave correct directions to his organization commanders, and led the first wave of the culminating attack which stormed and captured the town."



CAPTURE OF BERZY-LE-SEC

Showing Final Line of advance of the 1st Division which opened the city of Soissons to observation and fire of the Allied artillery.

The 1st Division had taken Berzy-le-Sec. It had cleaned out the town by its intense artillery preparation, which was as skillful as it was heavy, and the town fell before the gallant assault of its two regiments of infantry of the old Regular Army (the 26th and 28th). The line now held was the western bank of the Crise. The 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Infantry) had crossed the Château-Thierry-Soissons highway

and railroad and with the Moroccans by assault had arrived on the high plateau of Buzancy. This was a veritable fortress, which the thinned ranks, on this the fourth consecutive day of the attack, were called upon to storm. Regardless of the cost they took the hill; the 18th Infantry alone took more prisoners than it had troops left in its assault battalions. The Germans were pinched out of the pocket and the Allies commanded the city of Soissons, which lay but three miles down the valley of the Crise from the present front lines. The loss of Soissons was the greatest defeat the Germans had suffered since 1917. It meant that the entire Marne salient would have to be abandoned, and it would show to all the world, both friend and foe, that a crushing defeat at the hands of the Americans had been administered to the German Army. In this their first major action, the 1st and 2nd Divisions, representing the American Army, had defeated the finest fighting troops Germany could put in the field.

The fighting was now over for the 1st Division, and it was to have been relieved that night; but somewhere along the line the relieving troops were held up and daylight found what was left of the division still in the line along the Crise, with the sector organized for defense. On the evening of July 22-23, the 15th Scottish Division of the British Army marched up at dusk with their pipes playing, and relieved the division.

The 1st Division was now assembled in the Forest of Retz, where the kitchens of each company were ready with a hot meal, for many the first in five days. One by one the companies and battalions marched in. There was but a handful left of each of the four infantry regiments when they gathered that evening. Scarcely a company had an officer left to command it; sergeants, corporals and in one case a private was in command. Battalions were commanded by captains, and in the majority of cases by lieutenants, for every infantry battalion commander of the 1st Division was a casualty. Three of the regiments lost all of the officers above the rank of captain except the colonel, while the 26th

Infantry lost all of its field officers, including Colonel Hamilton A. Smith, and came out commanded by a captain (Barnwell R. Legge) of less than two years' experience.

The price paid for victory was the highest to date for any division, 8,365 casualties, of whom 1,252 were killed. One officer to every sixteen men was killed, an extraordinary proportion which tells its own tale of highest gallantry and heroic devotion to duty. The cost to the infantry in casualties was staggering; 75 per cent. of the officers above the rank of captain, 60 per cent. of all infantry officers, and 50 per cent. of the enlisted men were lost in this action. The captures from the enemy included 125 officers (of whom one was a colonel), 3,375 men, 75 cannon, 50 mortars, 300 heavy machine guns and a wealth of ammunition and supplies. Promotions quickly followed this victory of the 1st against six German divisions. General Buck and General Hines were given their second stars and their divisions, while Colonel Holbrook of the 7th Field Artillery, Colonel Parker of the 18th Infantry, and Colonel Bamford of the 16th Infantry were made brigadiers, and the promotion of the other officers throughout the division followed soon after. Meanwhile the French and American Governments decorated many of the officers and men for their gallantry in this action.

While the infantry and the majority of the units of the 1st Division were relieved by the Scotch, the artillery and sanitary train of the 1st Division were left behind by General Summerall. This was done to assist the Scotch, for their artillery and ambulances were delayed on the road. The 1st U. S. Field Artillery Brigade fired the barrage the following morning under cover of which the Scotch continued the attack, and the following letter was sent General Summerall relative to the relief:

July 24, 1918.

"To General Officer Commanding 1st American Division.

"I would like, on behalf of all ranks of the 15th (Scottish) Division, to express to you personally, to your staff, and to all our comrades in your splendid division, our most sincere thanks for all that has been done to help us in a difficult situation.

"During many instances of 'Taking-over' which we have experienced in the war, we have never received such assistance, and that rendered on the most generous scale.

"In spite of its magnificent success in the recent fighting, the 1st American Division must have been feeling the strain of the operations accentuated by heavy casualties, yet, we could discern no symptoms of fatigue when it came to a question of adding to it by making our task easier.

"To your Artillery Commander (Colonel Holbrook) and his staff and to the units under his command, our special thanks are due. Without hesitation, when you saw our awkward predicament as regards artillery support, the guns of your division denied themselves relief in order to assist us in an attack. This attack was only partly successful, but the artillery support was entirely so.

"Without the help of Colonel Mabey and his establishment of ambulance cars I have no hesitation in saying that at least 400 of our wounded would still be on our hands in this area.

"The 15th (Scottish) Division desires me to say that our hope is that we may have opportunity of rendering some slight return to the 1st American Division for all the latter has done for us, and further that we may yet find ourselves shoulder to shoulder defeating the enemy in what we hope is the final stage of the war.

H. L. REED,
Major General,
Commanding 15th (Scottish) Division."

CHAPTER IX

THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE MARNE


3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, 42nd and 77th Divisions Follow the German Retreat from the Marne to the Vesle.

The swift success of the attack by the 1st and 2nd American Divisions and two French Divisions southeast of Soissons had forced the Germans to pull back across the Marne, and its continuance up to the very doors of Soissons forced them to decide to evacuate the whole Marne Salient. If they could evacuate slowly, they would be able to pull out most of their *matériel* and especially the great wealth of guns brought down for the assault on Paris; but if pressed hard, they would have to abandon everything. Accordingly the Allies pressed them on every front of the Marne salient, and to save their guns the Germans had to fight a determined rearguard action all the way back from the Marne, then across the Ourcq to the Vesle. From time to time they made a stand until the guns could be withdrawn, then the whole line would retreat until another height was reached where they would stand again. The First American Army Corps, General Liggett, and the Third American Army Corps, General Bullard, comprising six American Divisions, the 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd, fighting as part of three French Armies, took part with the French in this following action, and fought their way forward to the River Vesle, forcing the Germans to abandon much valuable material in their retreat.

On the night of July 19-20, the Germans evacuated the south bank of the Marne, and set up their machine guns on the north bank to prevent Allied troops from following them over. The 3rd Division (Regulars) was on the Marne from Château-Thierry east as far as the Jaulgonne Bend, where

they had been since June 1. Here they had stopped the first drive in June, the big drive of July 15, and now once more on the morning of July 20, they were still on the Marne and the Germans had pulled back to the northern bank.

On the morning of July 21, the 26th Division (New England National Guard) finally received the long awaited order to attack. They had lain in the Belleau Wood sector taking their daily casualties too long to suit any of them, and here was the opportunity for which they all had longed. That



BATTLE LINE ON THE MARNE, JULY 20, 1918

morning they were to attack, but the Germans had fled in the night. The 26th was ordered to pursue them in *liaison* with the French division on either flank. German tricks had to be ever kept in mind, so as they went on, they carefully felt out all the pockets in the rough, broken country for stray machine guns, left behind to cut to pieces the pursuing columns.

The Soissons-Château-Thierry road was crossed without incident. The division advanced until they came to the villages of Trugny and Epieds, with the forests of Epieds between them. Here the Germans made a stand, their line sewn thickly with machine guns, while from the forest their artillery opened a heavy fire on the advancing American and French lines.


Trugny and Epieds lie in a shallow valley, four miles north of the Marne, between Château-Thierry and the Jaulgonne Bend, and the German stand was to protect the road running north from Jaulgonne to Fere-en-Tardenois, so that they could get their ammunition and artillery out. The 26th Division immediately opened out into line of battle and began the assault on this well-held German line.

On the left of the 26th, the French were also advancing, and brigaded with the divisions of the French Seventh Army Corps were units of the 4th American Division (Regulars). The 47th Infantry Regiment with two companies of the 11th Machine-gun Battalion and two companies of the 4th Engineers were held out in reserve, while the remainder of the 4th Division began the attack on July 18. Day by day they advanced with the French through the villages of Hautevesnes, Courchamps, Chevillon, Sept Bois, Priez, in conformity with the main attack towards Soissons on their north, and by July 22, they too had crossed the Soissons-Château-Thierry road and had taken the Bois de Chatelet. At this point the elements of the 4th Division were withdrawn from the line and the division assembled in the vicinity of the original line as reserve to await the arrival of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade which was still in training at Camp de Souge, outside of Bordeaux.

Meanwhile, on the morning of July 21, the 3rd Division had received orders to attack across the Marne. Bridges were laid without much opposition, and at dawn, the 4th Infantry Regiment crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry and found the city practically deserted. Patrols immediately began the ascent of the ravine east of the town, while other patrols cleared the north bank, thus permitting the 7th Infantry Regiment to cross at Mezy. The 30th and 38th Infantry Regiments crossed the Marne in the Jaulgonne Bend, and by the evening of July 21, a secure bridgehead had been established, and the line of enemy resistance developed up the valley towards Le Charmel. By the evening of July 21, Château-Thierry was completely evacuated by the Germans and the line held by them showed a retreat of from three to six miles. But here the 3rd Division

met determined enemy resistance well staged to make the most of the natural defenses of the hills and forests north of the Marne. Each day the division pressed the attack and gained ground now here, now there. They were proud of their title, the Marne Division. They had heroically defended the Marne twice, and now had come the opportunity to clear it forever of the German troops who were making a temporary stand on these wooded hills.

The 3rd and 26th Divisions, on the morning of July 22,



ADVANCE OF JULY 21, 1918

were both attacking the line where the Germans were making their first stand in this stubborn rearguard action, the 3rd on the southern flank, the 26th on the western flank. The 3rd had been fighting continuously since July 15, first on the defensive, now on the offensive, and during the past eight days there had been no let-up in the intensity of the fighting. The 3rd crept steadily up the steep wooded heights, in the face of determined fire from the German entrenchments. When night fell, the line had advanced a thousand yards.

The 26th Division, despite the fact that in the fast advance of the day before, units had become mixed and the transport delayed, attacked the well entrenched line of German defenses between Epieds and Trugny, time after time. But the Ger-

mans were too well organized for an attack of this kind to penetrate; so General Edwards halted the attack until night. The next morning (July 23) after a skillful battering of the German positions with gas and high explosive shells by the divisional artillery, the 101st Infantry assaulted the Bois de Trugny, and by noon had penetrated almost through to the other side of this piece of woods. But in the afternoon the Germans rallied; machine-gun nests firing from every angle of the woods forced the Americans to draw back to the western edge. That night the Corps Commander, General Liggett, reënforced General Edwards with the 56th Infantry Brigade of the 28th Division, Brigadier General Weigle in command. This brigade (111th and 112th Infantry Regiments) was disposed by General Edwards during the night to assist the 26th Division in the attack next morning on the Bois de Trugny. But, when the attackers moved out on the morning of July 24th, they met with no resistance in the woods; the Germans had held it long enough to suit their purpose, and had, during the night, pulled back their lines to a new position. To locate this new position the Americans and French pushed valiantly forward that day. Leading the pursuit went the motorized 101st Machine-gun Battalion of the 26th Division, much as cavalry did in former wars. On they went across that rough country and through the forest of Fere until they were stopped by heavy fire from the Croix Rouge Farme on the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road. Here the whole division was quickly put on the line and the German position discovered. The 39th French Division, on the right of the 26th, and the 3rd American Division on its right, were also held up on this line; so the Allies dug in until the artillery could be brought up and an assault made in the morning. On the night of July 24, the Germans were holding the line of the Jaulgonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road, from Le Charmel (where the 3rd Division was held up) to La Croix Rouge Farme, two miles north of there (where the 26th and the 28th Divisions had been stopped).

The 26th had in the seven days' fighting from the 18th to the 24th of July, suffered heavy casualties. The total losses


since it had entered the sector were about 5,300 officers and men. It had advanced 17 kilometers in pursuit of the enemy, had captured 250 prisoners and had taken four field pieces of German artillery. On the night of July 24-25, it was relieved by the 42nd Division (Rainbow National Guard).

The 83rd Brigade (165th and 167th Infantry Regiments) of the 42nd Division took over the front held by the 26th Division along the eastern edge of the Foret de Fere. The 56th Brigade of the 28th Division was withdrawn from the line and became Corps Reserve. Then during the night the Allied forces were shifted about. The 84th Brigade of the 42nd Division (164th and 166th Infantry Regiments) was brought up and took over the front of two French divisions on the north. The shortening of the Allied line by the German withdrawal had practically squeezed these divisions out so that the actual front of the 42nd Division was only three kilometers (2 miles). This division now occupied the entire front of the First American Army Corps. The other two divisions of the Corps (26th American and 167th French) were in reserve. In this position the 42nd Division remained for 24 hours, the whole Allied line being at a standstill, until the afternoon of July 27. The Allied line ran now in almost a straight line from Soissons south to Le Charmel (3 miles north of Jaulgonne on the Marne), and the key to the southern end of this portion of the line was the strongly fortified buildings of the Croix Rouge Farme, opposite the front of the Rainbow Division. The 3rd Division was on the southern face of the right angle which the German line made at this point and was part of a French Corps.

At 5:30 p. m. on July 27, the Allied advance was taken up once more. The 42nd Division, after heavy artillery preparation, crossed the open space which separated the Croix Rouge Farme from the forest, and took the position with great dash at the point of the bayonet. So swift and brilliant was this action that it cleared the way for further advances. Meanwhile the 3rd Division also attacked, and in spite of heavy resistance, advanced its front toward Roncheres, while the left flank reached and seized Hill 190, overlooking Roncheres and

GERMAN RETREAT FROM MARNE 177

the valley of the Ourcq. The backbone of the watershed between the Marne and the Ourcq was now crossed. Continuing that night the 42nd Division cleared the remainder of the dense forest of Fere, while the southern half of the Division swept down the slopes towards the Ourcq, and in spite of furious machine-gun fire from the heights on the north bank



LINE ON THE OURCQ

Showing advance of the Allies in the Marne Salient from July 18 to July 27, 1918.

and from the towns of Serpy and Cierges, three battalions were pushed across the stream that evening.

The Germans were making a determined effort to stand on the line Fere-en-Tardenois, Serpy, Cierges, Roncheres. But the taking of Hill 190 by the 3rd Division had already partly turned the flank of this position. On the morning of July 28, the 3rd Division took the town of Roncheres, and then, swinging more to the left moved against Cierges, while the 42nd Division improved its position in front of this town. Hard fighting with little or no progress ensued this day and

the next. The Germans drenched the valleys with gas. On the extreme northern flank, however, the 165th Infantry Regiment of the Rainbow Division advanced with the French and seized Hill 184 which made possible the capture of the towns of Seringes and Nesles by the Americans, and completed for the French the encircling of Fere-en-Tardenois.

During the nights of the 29th and 30th of July, the 3rd Division was relieved by the 32nd Division (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), which had been holding for two months a sector in Alsace. The 3rd Division retired for rest to its old area south of the Marne. The spirits of these regular troops,—who had been in the line constantly since June 1, and in the last fifteen days had been heavily engaged in the most bitter of defensive and offensive fighting—were high as they once more crossed the Marne, this time with their bands playing, for they had won a great battle. They had won the name “MARNE DIVISION” in the “Second Battle of the Marne.” The Divisional Artillery remained behind until August 2 to help drive the enemy from the Ourcq, then it also joined the division in the rest area. The 3rd Division had in the two weeks’ fighting played a decisive part in defeating the last German offensive, and then had advanced 15 kilometers (10 miles) through most difficult country where every foot was contested by the defenders. In these actions it had lost 5,986 officers and men, of whom 40 officers and 876 enlisted men were killed. Following this great success, General Dickman was placed in command of the Fourth Army Corps, and General Buck, who had captured Berzy-le-Sec with the 2nd Brigade, was sent to command the 3rd Division.

Between the 42nd Division and the 3rd Division, the 39th French division had been fighting constantly without a single day of rest since May. Depleted through the heavy losses, it was not in condition to take part in a heavy assault. Accordingly the 55th Brigade of the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) was sent in to leapfrog the French Division, and with the veteran 42nd Division on its left and the untried 32nd Division on its right, the 28th Division now entered the line under command of its own Generals and

Colonels. The enviable reputation it had made on the Marne was done with the various companies acting as parts of French regiments. Now was to come the test with General Muir in command.

As the line formed a right angle, of which the Allies held the outside, all three divisions were practically headed for the same objectives, and this accounts for the fact that claims for the capture of many towns are advanced by men of all three divisions. It is most probable that men of the 42nd, 28th, and 32nd Divisions participated in the capture of these towns and strong points.

A little after 2 o'clock on the afternoon of July 30, the 32nd Division (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) and the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) took up the attack and pressed on into Grimpettes Wood. This wood lies midway between Courmont and Cierges. The attack was met by heavy machine-gun fire from Grimpettes Wood and from Cierges Wood, but, never faltering, both divisions pushed on through these woods until they came to the edge of the village of Cierges, only to find that the village was full of gas. The lines were withdrawn to the edge of the woods and during the night a heavy counter-attack was driven off. Meanwhile the 32nd Division relieved the 28th Division, as this division was worn from the long marches and heavy fighting with the French in this same sector, and on the morning of July 31, the 42nd and 32nd Divisions together held the line on the Ourcq, with some troops of the latter across the river.

The 42nd Division, with two battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Division (Regulars), starting at 5:00 a. m. July 28, crossed the river Ourcq and after vigorous fighting, took Seringes-et-Nesles and Sergy, with its left flank just east of Fere-en-Tardenois. Being ahead of its schedule, it went over into the sector of the 32nd Division and took Hill 212. On the morning of July 31, the 32nd Division took Cierges, and on August 1 it took Hill 230 and Planchette Wood. The fighting throughout was a bitter struggle to advance in the face of strong machine-gun fire; the Germans


used these weapons with the utmost of their tactical skill. Each gun seemed to be covered by two others; to attempt to outflank one gun meant to draw fire from two others, and still, through it all, each day showed a steady advance against that accurate rearguard action of the Germans.

Then came August 2. That morning when the two American Divisions began the attack, they found no Germans on their front. The whole position was evacuated, and the French on their flanks reported a like experience. That was a great day for the Allies. Soissons had fallen, Reims was freed, and the Germans had fallen back on the line of the River Vesle. Both American Divisions were immediately ordered in pursuit. The 42nd Division put its engineer regiment (117th Engineers) in the line on the left and by nightfall the line had cleared the forest of Nesles, which had been holding up the division, and the last ridge south of the Vesle was reached on the line Chery-Chartreuve, Mareuil-en-Dole. Here the 42nd Division was relieved by the 4th (Regular) Division on the night of August 2, and marched back to the valley of the Marne. During its eight days of fighting on this front, the 42nd Division, under the command of General Menoher, had advanced 15 kilometers in the face of resistance at a cost of 184 officers and 5,469 men in this action.

The pursuit from Fere-en-Tardenois, led by French Cavalry, had been a great occasion for the 42nd and the 32nd Divisions, but the situation next morning on the heights overlooking the valley of the Vesle river presented the Germans again in position, this time well entrenched on the banks of the river with their supports and artillery on the heights just north of the river. It took three days of very fierce fighting for these two divisions to establish themselves on the river banks, every attempt to cross the river in force being met by violent counter attacks from the Germans. The 32nd Division won the last of its honors in that sector when it drove the Germans out of the town of Fismes, which lies on the south side of the river, and held the position, with the Germans strongly entrenched in the suburb of Fismette on the north bank of the river. Taken and lost, and taken again by

GERMAN RETREAT FROM MARNE 181

the 127th Infantry Regiment, Fismes finally remained in the hands of the Americans. On August 4, the command of the American forces on the Vesle passed to the Third Corps, and Major General Bullard, formerly of the 1st Division, took command. Once more, then, the line was straight from Soissons to Reims, the Marne Salient was no more, and the



THE LINE ON THE VESLE

Showing the advance of the Allies in the Marne Salient from July 18 until the salient was wiped out on August 14, 1918.

last German offensive was not only stopped, but was hurled back almost to its starting point. A terrible defeat had been given to an enemy who but three weeks before had seen victory and Paris within its grasp. The 32nd Division had completed its mission with glory, and on the night of August 5, it was relieved by the 28th Division, and the 32nd was assembled on the heights and in the villages between the Ourcq and the Vesle. In the seven days of fighting the division had gained 19 kilometers (12 miles) broken through the line of

the Ourcq, taken the town of Fismes and in doing so had suffered 3,547 casualties, including 77 officers and 645 men killed. Nine pieces of German field artillery were captured. These Michigan and Wisconsin troops, under the command of General Haan, had entered the fighting zone as an untried division, but left it a combat division of high standing among those of the American Army.

The 77th Division (New York City National Army), the first of the National Army Divisions to reach France and to go into a sector, was relieved from the Baccarat sector and on August 4 was brought up to the Vesle. On August 11 this division entered the line alongside the veteran 28th Division. Every one in the army watched with eager interest this first National Army division, commanded by General Duncan, as it went through its initial acid test in this "Hell Hole of the Vesle."

The 4th Division, which on the night of August 2-3 had relieved the 42nd, had advanced during August 3 and 4 to the Vesle River. Here it was stopped by the intense artillery and machine-gun fire from the hills north of the Vesle, but in spite of this fire, small elements were pushed across the river. The next few days were spent in digging in and bettering the positions. Every attempt to cross the stream in force was met by the Germans with strong resistance and well organized counter attacks from the hills. Nevertheless, the 4th Division had put its front line definitely across the river by the night of August 12-13, when it was relieved. In this action the 4th Division advanced from the Ourcq to the Vesle, but in the entire offensive from the Marne to the Vesle, elements of the division acting with other divisions, and then the division acting as a whole, under the command of General Cameron, had advanced 17 kilometers (10 miles) and had lost in killed 752, wounded 4,912, and missing 590. Shortly after this action, General Cameron was given the command of the Fifth Army Corps, and General Hines, who had commanded the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division at Soissons, was put in command of the 4th Division.

GERMAN RETREAT FROM MARNE 183

On August 27, General Pershing published the following General Order to the American Expeditionary Forces:

"It fills me with pride to record in general orders a tribute to the service achievements of the 1st and 3rd Corps, comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd and 42nd Divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces.

"You came to the battlefield at a crucial hour for the Allied cause. For almost four years the most formidable army the world has yet seen had pressed its invasion of France and stood threatening its capital. At no time has that army been more powerful and menacing than when, on July 15th, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed to it and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

"Three days later, in conjunction with our Allies, you counter-attacked. The Allied Armies gained a brilliant victory that marks the turning point of the war. You did more than to give the Allies the support to which, as a nation, our faith was pledged. You proved that our altruism, our pacific spirit, and our sense of justice have not blunted our virility or our courage.

"You have shown that American initiative and energy are as fit for the tasks of war as for the pursuits of peace. You have justly won unstinted praise from our Allies and the eternal gratitude of our countrymen.

"We have paid for our success with the lives of many of our brave comrades. We shall cherish their memory always and claim for our history and literature, their bravery, achievement, and sacrifice.

"The order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formations following its receipt.

PERSHING."

The following order was issued by General Degoutte and spread upon the minutes of the United States Congress on September 9, 1918:

"GENERAL ORDER

(TRANSLATION)

Sixth Army, Commanding Post,

August 9, 1918.

"Before the great offensive of July 18, the American troops, forming part of the 6th French Army, distinguished themselves

by clearing the *Brigade de Marine* Woods and the village of Vaux from the enemy and arresting his offensive on the Marne and at Fossoy.

"Since then they have taken the most glorious part in the second battle of the Marne, rivaling the French troops in ardor and valor.

"During twenty days of constant fighting they have freed numerous French villages and made, across a difficult country, an advance of forty kilometers, which has brought them to the Vesle.

"Their glorious marches are marked by names which will shine in future in the military history of the United States; Torcy, Belleau, Plateau d'Etrepilly, Epieds, Le Charmel, l'Ourcq, Seringes-et-Nesles, Sergy, La Vesle et Fismes.

"These young divisions who saw fire for the first time, have shown themselves worthy of the old war traditions of the regular army. They have had the same burning desire to fight the *boche*, the same discipline which sees that the order given by their commander is always executed, whatever the difficulties to be overcome and the sacrifices to be suffered.

"The magnificent results obtained are due to the energy and the skill of the commanders; to the bravery of the soldiers.

"I am proud to have commanded such troops.

DEGOUTE.

The Commanding General of the 6th Army."

CHAPTER X

THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY

Foch Releases American Divisions From Allied Armies, and Pershing Forms the First American Army

The Aisne-Marne offensive stopped when the French and the Americans reached the Vesle. This was accomplished on August 6, and on August 8, the British, with a few American divisions, began the offensive towards Cambrai, which was directed to wipe out the Amiens-Montdidier Salient. This was Marshal Foch's strategy: to hit the German line a succession of swift short blows at the weakest points. By August 6, the Germans had concentrated the majority of their reserves behind the Vesle front, and accordingly Foch ordered the British to attack from in front of Amiens for it was this part of the line which the Germans had depleted of reserves to reënforce the Vesle front. This strategy also was effective, in that it gave the French, who had been fighting almost steadily for a month, time to rest and reorganize.

During all this time, since the Germans had begun their offensive in March, 1918, there was no American Army. Instead the various American Divisions were scattered far and wide along the front as parts of many British and French Armies. General Pershing relinquished the actual command of all the American combat troops in France, when Marshal Foch was made Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied forces. At that time it was a necessity for many reasons: the Americans lacked Army and Corps Staffs and Corps troops—particularly guns, aeroplanes, horses and trucks. Then, too, the Allied morale was badly in need of the visual support which could best be given by having the Americans mix in the hardest fighting on every front; but most of all, for the reason

that the Allies were badly in need of men. By August 8, however, all these conditions had changed. American Generals and Staffs had received the training of actual experience; American divisions had fought on every front and with every army; the great American mid-summer troop movement from the United States had given superiority in numbers to the Allies; the Germans were once more on the defensive and the crying need for support of the French and British Armies, both moral and physical, was no more. Accordingly Marshal Foch decided that the time was at hand for the American Divisions to be withdrawn from the Allied Armies and assembled for the first time together as one army, the First American Army, under General Pershing. Coupled with this decision came the necessity of selecting a field of operations for the American Army. This had practically been decided upon when the first Americans arrived in France, and during all this time, the very elaborate system of the American Service of Supply ("S.O.S.") was being perfected with this in view. It was natural therefore that to the First American Army should be given that part of the front which centered on the St. Mihiel salient, from Verdun east to the Moselle river. (The reasons for this decision were explained in Chapter I.)

But it is now necessary to go back and take up successively the arrival of American Divisions in July, the American Divisions with the British, the American Divisions with the French, the gradual concentration of these divisions into the American sector around the city of Toul, and finally the arrival of five more divisions in August. All these movements, while seemingly disjointed, formed part of the big plan of assembling the First American Army.

Five more divisions arrived from the United States in July, which brought the total rifle strength of the A.E.F. to 288,000. Of these four were made combat divisions and the fifth was made a replacement division. This brought the total number of combat divisions in France on August 1 to twenty-four, and with the three replacement and depot divisions, twenty-seven American Divisions had reached France by August 1, 1918.

The first of these five new divisions to arrive was the 90th Division, with men from Texas and Oklahoma. It was organized at Camp Travis, Texas, by Major General Henry T. Allen, so that all the men from Texas went to the 180th Brigade, and the men from Oklahoma to the 179th Brigade, better known as the "Texas Brigade," and the "Oklahoma Brigade." By June 30 all units of the division had sailed from Hoboken. The majority of the units landed in France, while the 358th Infantry paraded in Liverpool on July 4, and was given a banquet by the Lord Mayor of Liverpool. The division was assembled in the Aignay-le-Duc Training Area, with the exception of the Artillery Brigade which was sent to Bordeaux for its training and equipment. Here the division spent six weeks intensive training, and on August 24, it had completed the relief of the 1st Division in the sector on the left bank of the Meuse at Pont-a-Mousson.

The 27th (New York National Guard) Division was trained at Camp Wadsworth, S. C., under the command of Major General John O'Ryan of the New York National Guard, who was the only National Guard Division Commander in France, and who commanded the 27th from its organization, until it was mustered out of the service. The last units of this division arrived in France on July 7, 1918, assembling in a British training area, later entering the line with the British opposite Mt. Kemmel, and on August 20 the division was moved up to occupy the Dickebusch sector in Belgium.

The 91st Division, with men from California, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Montana and Alaska, was organized at Camp Lewis, Washington, and the first units sailed from the United States July 6. The last units arrived in France July 26, and the division was assembled in the Eighth Training Area, with the exception of the Artillery Brigade, which trained at Clermont-Ferrand. On August 31 Major General W. H. Johnston succeeded Brigadier General F. S. Foltz in command. This division remained in training in this area until September 6, when it moved up and constituted part of the reserves for the St. Mihiel attack.

The 36th (Texas and Oklahoma National Guard) Di-

vision was organized at Camp Bowie, Texas, and on July 18, the division sailed for France and arrived in France July 30, whence it proceeded to the Thirteenth Training Area in the vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube, near Chaumont. Here the division remained in training until September 27, when it moved to the Champagne and entered the line to reënforce the 2nd Division. The division was at this time commanded by Major General W. R. Smith.

The 76th (New England National Army) Division embarked for overseas July 5, and the last units arrived in France July 31. Upon its arrival in France, this division was designated as a Depot Division and ordered to St. Aignan. Here the division was broken up, and the personnel was sent up to the front as replacements to the combat divisions. The specialized units were sent forward entire as corps and army troops. The division was commanded by Major General H. F. Hodges.


At the beginning of August, 1918, there were five American divisions in sectors in the Vosges Mountains and Alsace, the southeastern extremity of the Western Front. Five American divisions were fighting towards the Vesle, west of Reims, and between these there was but one American division in the line. The 82nd (All American National Army) Division which, since June 16 had been in the Toul Sector. This sector was on the southern side of the St. Mihiel Salient, not far from St. Mihiel. The first weeks in August saw three other American divisions moved up to take sectors along this same line, for this had been designated as the American Area on the Western Front.

The 89th (Middle West National Army) Division had now finished its training behind the lines and was moved up by bus to the Toul Sector, where, on the night of August 5, it relieved the 82nd Division. The sector, as now held by the 89th Division, ran along the Metz road from Bouconville on the west to Limey on the east. On September 6, Major General W. M. Wright succeeded Brigadier General Winn in command of the division.

The 82nd (All American) Division which was relieved

after holding the quiet Toul Sector for a month, moved back to the Blenod-les-Toul Training Area, on the Toul-Neufchâteau road fifteen kilometers south of Toul, where it remained in training until August 19 when it was again moved up to the line.

Adjoining the Toul Sector, on the right (east) was the



AMERICAN SECTOR

Showing line of August 10 when American Divisions gradually took over the southern side of the St. Mihiel Salient.

Saizerais Sector, which ran from Limey, on the east, to the Moselle River at Pont-à-Mousson. On August 7, the 1st (Regular) Division relieved the French in this sector. It was very quiet, as this sector had seen practically no fighting since 1914, but the fame of those terrible days and nights of fighting in the Bois-le-Prete, where the front line still stood in a maze of old trenches and quarries, still clung to the place. But 16 days before, the 1st had come out of the attack southeast of Soissons a mere skeleton of its former strength. It

had lost 8,365, the heaviest casualties of any division to date, and one officer had been killed to every 16 men, and yet eleven days later, with battalions still commanded by First Lieutenants, and companies by Sergeants, the 1st was back in the line, breaking in the new replacements in officers and men which were daily arriving in small groups from the rear. The new men were learning from the old the spirit and traditions of the 1st Division, and its battle record, while the newly-joined Second Lieutenants were learning much every day from the Sergeants who had commanded those companies so well at Soissons.

The Moselle River at Pont-à-Mousson was the boundary line between two sectors, the Sazerais and the Marbach, and it was in the latter sector, two days later, on August 9, that the 2nd (Regular Army and Marine) Division relieved the French. This was just twenty-one days after the 2nd Division had been withdrawn from the Soissons attack where it had lost 4,742 men, and this division was undergoing much the same things in breaking in its replacements as the 1st was doing. General Le Jeune of the Marine Corps had succeeded General Harbord in command of the 2nd Division, when the latter, on August 2, was placed in command of the enormous "S.O.S." The two sectors were ideal for this work. The divisions each held the line with one battalion, another battalion was in support, while the third battalion, which was nominally in reserve, was actually spending its entire time in open warfare maneuvers, putting into practice all the lessons learned at Soissons, and training the new men.


As the line then stood on the tenth of August, 1918, American troops were holding practically the entire southern side of the great St. Mihiel Salient. The line held extended from the lakes and swamp, just east of Apremont, east almost as far as Clemery, which was practically the front north of Toul and Nancy. This was the American Sector. The 1st Division had taken over the trenches from the French in January, 1918. At that time the plan was gradually to develop this into a sector for an American Corps, and later enlarge it for an American Army. The German offensive,

however, changed these plans; the experienced divisions were needed elsewhere, and the scheme for an American Army was postponed. This one sector, however, remained constantly in the hands of succeeding American divisions sent there for training, and now the front held by Americans here was gradually increasing as more divisions were moved in. The front had remained much the same at this point in the line since the 1st Division left in the spring, but the rear areas around Toul had undergone a great change. During those four months while the American combat divisions were busy elsewhere, the troops of the Service of Supply had been busily engaged in taking over from the French all the rear area. Toul was now an American city. There was scarcely a French soldier or officer to be seen in the streets, whereas four months ago the Americans were stared at as newcomers. Americans ran the railroads, the narrow-gauge, every supply dump was American. At every cross road throughout that rear area were American Military Police. The French had turned over the entire area to the Americans, and it became the "AMERICAN ZONE OF OPERATIONS."

The 1st (Regular) and 2nd (Regular Army and Marine) Divisions stayed in this sector three weeks. They were relieved on August 24 and went back of the lines for the final rest and training for the St. Mihiel attack. The 2nd Division was relieved in the Marbach sector (east of the Moselle) by the 82nd (All American) Division, which had come up from Blenod-les-Toul, where it had been since it left the Toul Sector. The 90th (Texas and Oklahoma) Division relieved the 1st (Regular) Division in the Sazerais Sector (west of the Moselle). This was the first time that the 90th Division, which had arrived in France in July, had been in the line, and the 1st Division was now to replace the French as instructors of new divisions going into the line. The relief began on August 19. A battalion at a time was brought up and put in the line alternately along the front. These functioned under the regimental commanders of the 1st Division until everything was going smoothly. Then the Regimental Commanders of the 90th Division took over, and functioned under

192 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

the command of General Summerall and the staff of the 1st Division, and finally on August 24, the command of the sector passed to Major General Allen of the 90th Division. The 1st



WESTERN FRONT, SEPTEMBER, 1918

Showing American Divisions in position in the American Zone.

Field Artillery Brigade stayed over with the 90th Division as its Artillery Brigade was still in training near Bordeaux.

Thus, in the American Zone towards the end of August, three divisions were in the line, from west to east (left to

right, St. Mihiel toward Nomeny): the 89th (Middle West) Division, the 90th (Texas and Oklahoma) Division, and the 82nd (All American) Division. In reserve for this position were the 1st (Regulars) and the 2nd (Regular and Marine) Divisions. Two American Army Corps divided the sector between them. On the right the 1st Corps (General Liggett) had the 89th and 90th Divisions in the line and the 2nd Division in reserve, while on the left, the 4th Corps (General Dickman) had the 82nd Division in the line, and the 1st Division in reserve. Meanwhile the First American Army under General Pershing, was making preparations formally to take over the sector from the French Eighth Army, under which the two American corps were now serving.

The French and American attack which began July 18, was brought to a close on August 2, with the capture of Soissons, and a few days later the line was finally established along the Vesle. And now it was time for the British to attack. The Crown Prince of Bavaria had reduced his reserves in front of the British in order to assist the Crown Prince of Germany between Soissons and Reims. The Allied plan contemplated a series of sharp swift blows wherever the front was weakest. Accordingly, on August 8, the Great British offensive began in the vicinity of Amiens, which offensive continued and grew in size until Mons had been retaken and on November 11 the Armistice was signed.

The 33rd (Illinois National Guard) Division had been training with the British in the Amiens area since June 20, and had occupied trenches in the Amiens sectors along with various British divisions. On the Fourth of July it had sent four companies to attack with the Australians and the village of Hamel was taken, the Americans being complimented greatly by the British in this action. And now the 33rd Division was chosen to take part in the initial assault which began the great British offensive. Here this division fought with great gallantry and broke the German line at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood. On August 23, the 33rd (Illinois National Guard) Division was transferred by rail from the British Front to the area of the First American Army,

around Toul, and was concentrated in the area of Tronville, between Bar-le-Duc and Toul, until September 5, when it was sent to Verdun.

Two other American divisions were also with the British at this time, the 27th (New York National Guard), and the 30th (Old Hickory National Guard) Divisions. Early in July the situation around the northern and center portions of the British lines was extremely critical, and accordingly, even before the completion of the brief training period, these two divisions were transferred to the Second British Army, under General Plumer, and placed in the support positions immediately in rear of the Ypres and Dickebush sectors in Belgium. The situation at this point was tense. The Crown Prince of Bavaria had in April attacked at Armentieres and captured the commanding height of Mt. Kemmel, and it was daily expected during the first weeks of July, that the attack would be continued to the Channel ports and the Bethune coal fields. The attack never came, however, and on July 15, the Germans showed their hand in the drive on Paris and Reims, and at last on July 18, the initiative finally passed to Marshal Foch. During this time the 27th and 30th Divisions, lying in the support positions under the supervision and accurate artillery fire from Mt. Kemmel, rapidly became veterans. The critical situation on this front passed with the Allied counter-offensive of July 18 southeast of Soissons, and on August 17 the 30th division, under the command of General Lewis (who had assumed command when General Read was placed in command of the Second Army Corps), took over the Canal Sector, extending from Ypres to Voormezeele, and on August 20 the 27th Division, commanded by General O'Ryan, took over the Dickebush Sector in front of Mt. Kemmel.

Owing to the gradual withdrawal of the Germans to meet the Allied attacks further south, the Second British Army found the area opposite it sufficiently weakened to begin a local offensive operation to improve its position. On August 31 the attack was launched. The 30th (Old Hickory National Guard) Division advanced 1,500 yards, took Lock No. 8 on the Ypres Canal, Lankhof Farm, and the village of Voor-

mezele, while the 27th (New York National Guard) Division advanced about 2,000 yards and occupied the Vierstraat Ridge and the northern slopes of Mt. Kemmel, and made some progress up the eastern side of Wytschaete Ridge. The British division on the left of the 30th and the British division on the right of the 27th Division made similar progress. With this substantial beginning, these two American divisions were withdrawn from the line between September 3 and 5, and were sent to training areas, for further instruction under the British in the use of tanks.

The decision to form an American Army did not contemplate the complete withdrawal of all American divisions from the British and French Armies. Certain American divisions remained permanently with the French, while others were made a permanent part of the British Army. It fell to the lot of the 27th Division (New York National Guard) and the 30th Division (Old Hickory National Guard) to be selected for permanent service with the British.

As the Second American Army Corps, under Major General George W. Read, these two divisions made a record for themselves worthy to stand beside that of the best American fighting units wherever engaged.


The 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) Division which was relieved from the Vesle front on August 5, was assembled in the valley of the Ourcq, where it remained in rest for about ten days when orders were received to move the division to Soissons and report to General Mangin of the French Tenth Army to which the 32nd American Division had been assigned. Upon its arrival the division was placed in support of the 127th French Division and, on the night of August 27-28, it relieved the 127th French Division in front of Juvigny. The town of Juvigny lies at the head of a ravine five miles north of Soissons, and that night the battle line ran north from Soissons along the railroad just west of Juvigny. The French Tenth Army was attacking due east, and on the morning of August 28, the 32nd Division attacked with the French and easily captured the railroad track and about 100 prisoners. There was no attack on the

29th of August, but on the 30th, word came that the French division on the right (south, towards Soissons) was advancing its front rapidly and for the 32nd to advance in conformity. The division on the north of the 32nd was held up by determined machine-gun fire, and accordingly the American division was forced to make a turning movement and attack Juvigny. As the attack developed, the left flank of the 32nd Division and the French Division on its left (north) were unable to advance, while the right flank moved forward rapidly despite determined opposition, until the town of Juvigny was practically surrounded on three sides. This clever maneuver took the Germans by surprise, and moppers-up swiftly entered the village from the southwest and after some sharp street fighting, captured 3 officers and 153 men, and Juvigny was retaken by the Allies. This put the division in the unpleasant position of being ahead of the division on its right and ahead of a portion of itself and the division on its left which had been held up. On the 31st of August a plan of attack was issued to correct this. The attack began with a triple barrage, and those portions which were behind, started forward. That portion which was forward waited until the others came abreast, a very delicate operation in the face of machine-gun fire, but it was highly successful, and by night the front had reached the Soissons-Bethune highway. The casualties this day had not been as heavy as on the day before. On the night of September 1-2, the 32nd Division was relieved by the 1st Moroccan Division, and the 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) Division was moved to Joinville, north of Chaumont, where it remained until early in October. In the attack on the Juvigny plateau this division had advanced three miles in the face of determined resistance, and had assisted the French Tenth Army in its attack which outflanked the Germans on the Chemin-des-Dames and on the Vesle. The battle was brief but severe. General Haan's 32nd Division in this operation of five days lost 15 officers and 335 men killed, and a total of all casualties amounted to 2,848. Parts of five German divisions were

THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 197

identified among the 937 prisoners which the division took, and of these nine were officers.

The German positions on the hills north of the River



WITH THE ALLIES

Showing location of 27th, 30th, 32nd and 33rd American Divisions which were engaged in August, 1918, with the British and French.

Vesle were by this stroke outflanked, and the Germans were forced to draw back to the Aisne. On September the 5th, the Germans withdrew and the Third American Army Corps which consisted of the 77th (New York City National Army)

and the veteran 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard) took up the pursuit and followed the Germans to the River Aisne, five miles to the north. Here they found the Germans well entrenched in the ravines south of the river. Major General Robert Alexander was appointed to command the 77th and relieved Major General George B. Duncan during this operation. On September 8, the 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard) Division was relieved by the French, while the 77th continued the attack, pushing forward their front continuously until September 14 when the Italians relieved the New York Division. The 28th Division was moved to the east in a support position for the Argonne offensive, and on September 20 entered the line; while the 77th Division followed, and on the same day entered on the left of the 28th Division in the Argonne Forest.

By the 1st of August there were in France twenty-four American Combat Divisions, of which nine had taken active part in the attack which had reduced the Marne salient. These nine would form the nucleus for any attack which the Americans might make for they now were certainly all veteran divisions. Five Army corps had been formed, two of which had carried on active operations in the reduction of the Marne Salient. Of these corps, the 2nd was with the British, and the 3rd was still on the Vesle, so there were the veteran 1st Corps, and the 4th and 5th Corps available for use in the coming American operation. On August 10, therefore, the FIRST AMERICAN ARMY was formed, and General Pershing took command. The Headquarters of the Army were established in the city of Ligny-en-Barrois, and plans, long dormant with the American staff, were once more brought to life for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. The British were beginning their attack and when this spent itself on its first phase, the American Army would be given its first opportunity to attack.

The First American Army held no portion of the front until August 30, but those twenty days were spent in drawing in its combat divisions from all over France in preparation. There were, however, five divisions in the area, three of

which were in the line (82nd, 89th, and 90th) while the 1st and 2nd were in reserve of the front which the American Army was to take over. Slowly the other divisions were moved in.

The 5th (Regular) Division since its arrival in France in May, had spent three months in sectors in the Vosges Mountains, where it had gone through the customary training with the French and participated with them in two minor operations which entailed a total of 300 casualties. Then the 5th Division took over the sector and on August 17 the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Regiment U. S. Infantry in company with engineers and machine gunners attacked the town of Frapelle and captured the town and two German prisoners. This town formed a little salient in the German lines and at one time had been heavily garrisoned. But the new system of defense pulled practically the entire garrison back to the second line and the battalion in the attack met no resistance. The capture of the town was very easy. Then, while the Germans shelled the town the Americans reversed the trenches and connected them with the American trenches. Next morning the Germans attempted to reënter Frapelle but were repelled by the Americans who were holding on to the much-battered remnants of the village. The casualties suffered were heavy for the result achieved. A total of 571 casualties of whom 1 officer and 35 men were killed and 11 officers and 176 men were gassed, was a costly affair for taking so small a section of useless trench, except that it gave the division its first taste of actual war. Relieved on August 23, the 5th Division moved to the American Area and joined the First American Army Corps.

Fourteen American Divisions during August and early September were concentrated in the American Army Zone, as follows:

Divisions.	Location.	Arrived.
1st (Regular)	In line, then in reserve.....	Aug. 7
2nd (Regular)	In line, then in reserve.....	Aug. 9
3rd (Regular)	Entered line	Sept. 10

Divisions.	Location.	Arrived.
4th (Regular) Reserve	Sept. 1
5th (Regular) Line	Sept. 10
26th (N. E. N. G.) Reserve	Aug. 25
33rd (Ill. N. G.) Reserve	Aug. 26
42nd (Rainbow N. G.) Reserve	Aug. 30
78th (N. Y.-N. J. N. A.) Reserve	Sept. 10
80th (Blue Ridge N. A.) Reserve	Sept. 1
82nd (All Amer. N. A.)	In line Pont-a-Mousson	Aug. 24
89th (Mid. West N. A.)	In line Toul Sector.....	Aug. 5
90th (Tex. & Okla. N. A.)	In line Pont-a-Mousson	Aug. 24
91st (Wild West N. A.) Reserve	Sept. 11

In the thirty days preceding the St. Mihiel Offensive these divisions were assembled. Three, the 82nd, 89th, and 90th Divisions, were in the line, the 33rd (Illinois National Guard) Division left this group on September 7 and was sent to the line in front of Verdun, which left ten divisions in reserve. These divisions constituted the First American Army which, on the 12th of September, were to attack the St. Mihiel salient. These divisions were all rested and six of the ten in reserve were veteran divisions of the Marne attack. There could have been but little doubt in the minds of the German Staff, whose intelligence service kept them constantly informed as to the location of all the Allied divisions, what to expect in the St. Mihiel salient in the near future. This concentration of ten first-class divisions behind Toul proclaimed the intended attack even more plainly than the Paris papers which hinted at it, and the Swiss papers which confidently predicted it.

Meanwhile the number of American divisions in France was constantly growing, and in August five more divisions arrived. Three of these became combat divisions which swelled the total of combat divisions from twenty-four to twenty-seven, and two divisions were made replacement divisions on arrival which made a total of five replacement divisions. These five replacement divisions supplied 60,000 new infantry to the combat divisions.

The first of the August divisions to arrive was the 79th

(Liberty) Division. This division was organized at Camp Meade, Md., with men originally drawn from eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Most of these men, however, were sent off to fill up southern divisions and the later increments came from New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. The overseas movement was begun on July 9, and the last units arrived in France August 3. The artillery brigade went to Clermont Ferrand for its training and did not join the division until after the Armistice. The remainder of the division was assembled in the Tenth Training Area around Prauthoy and Champilite, between Chaumont and Dijon under the command of Major General John E. Kuhn. Here it remained until the St. Mihiel Offensive when it was moved to the Robert Espangé Area, near Bar-le-Duc, in the American Army Zone as reserve for this attack.

The second of the August divisions to arrive in France was the 85th (Custer) Division. It was organized at Camp Custer, Michigan, from men drawn from Michigan and Wisconsin. The overseas movement began on July 21, and the last units arrived in France on August 12, 1918. Upon arrival in France, this division was designated as a Depot Division and ordered to Pouilly (Nièvre), north of Nevers on the River Loire, where the infantry regiments were broken up and sent to the front as replacements for combat divisions, while the special units became Corps and Army troops. The division was commanded by Major General C. W. Kennedy.

The third in order of arrival in August was the 81st (Wildcat) Division. This division was organized at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, from National Army drafts from North and South Carolina and Tennessee. The overseas movement began on July 30, 1918, and the last units arrived in France, via England, on August 26. Upon arrival in France the Wildcat Division was ordered to the Tonnerre (Yonne) Training Area, between Troyes and Nevers, where it remained until the middle of August. The division then was sent to the St. Die sector in the Vosges Mountains where on September 19 it entered the line and operated in the line

as a part of the French 33rd Army Corps. This division was commanded by Brigadier General Chas. H. Barth until October 8 when Major General Chas. J. Bailey assumed command.

The 6th (Regular Army) Division was the next to arrive in August. It was organized at Camp McClellan, Alabama, from units of the Regular Army, and was later sent to Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina. Preceding the division, the 318th Engineer Regiment arrived in France on May 18 and was engaged in construction work at Gievres before joining the division. The remainder of the 6th Division, less the 6th Artillery Brigade, began the overseas movement on May 8 and the last units arrived in France on August 28. The division had spent some time in training in England. The Artillery Brigade landed on July 29, and went to Valdahon for its training, while the remainder of the division was assembled in the Châteauvillain Area, southwest of Chaumont. The 6th Division left this area on August 27 and proceeded to the Gerardmer Sector in the Vosges Mountains, where it entered the line under French command, less the 6th Field Artillery Brigade. Brigadier General Jas. B. Erwin was in command of the division.

The 40th (Sunshine) Division was the last of the August divisions to arrive in France. It was organized at Camp Kearny, California, from the National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. The overseas movement began August 7, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on August 28. Upon its arrival in France, the 40th Division was designated as the 6th Depot Division and was ordered to the La Guerche Area, west of Nevers, where the units were broken up and used as replacements for the combat divisions. Major General Frederic S. Strong commanded the division.

In September, 1918, therefore, there were twenty-seven combat divisions in the A.E.F. These were in five separate groups, as follows:

(1) In the Vosges Mountains for preliminary training, under the French, the 35th, 37th, 92nd, 29th, 6th and 81st. This made six in all, and on the eleventh of September, the

35th (Kansas and Missouri National Guard) Division was withdrawn from the Vosges and sent as army reserves to the St. Mihiel operation. This left but five combat divisions in the Vosges Mountains, and Alsace, near Switzerland.

(2) In the American Army Area were the following fourteen divisions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th (Regular Army); 26th, 35th, 42nd (National Guard); 78th, 80th, 82nd, 89th, 90th, and 91st (National Army).

(3) The 36th (Texas National Guard) Division was in training area.

(4) In the vicinity of Verdun and the Argonne Forest were five American divisions: 28th, 32nd, 33rd (National Guard); 77th and 79th (National Army) Divisions.

(5) With the British as the Second Corps composed of the 27th and 30th National Guard Divisions.

The movement of over half the available combat divisions into the First Army Area around the city of Toul and especially as there were for the most part the experienced divisions which after a month's rest were ready to attack once more, gave strong evidence that it was time for the American Army to strike its first great blow single handed in the war. Fourteen of the twenty-seven combat divisions, four hundred thousand divisional troops alone were now assembled in this area.

CHAPTER XI

ST. MIHIEL


**With Army Three Times as Large as Grant's Army of Potomac,
Pershing Reduces the Salient and Captures 16,000 Germans**

For four years the activity on the Western Front was all west of Verdun. The line from Verdun to the Swiss border had seen practically no active fighting, whereas from Verdun to the North Sea the line was almost constantly shifting. The line east of Verdun was still stabilized and trench warfare was the rule. At Verdun, and at Nancy, southeast of Verdun, the Germans had been stopped in 1914 and all further attempts to take these two fortresses had proven futile. Between these two cities the Germans established the St. Mihiel salient. The German efforts in 1914 to capture Verdun culminated in an attempt to surround the city, and they succeeded so far as to command it on three sides, the east, the north, and the west. Eventually they were forced back on the north and west, but on the east they stuck.

Bavarian troops had captured the city of St. Mihiel, about 20 miles southeast of Verdun on the Meuse, and forced their way a short distance across the river, and there they remained for four years. By reaching the Meuse at this point, the Germans cut the railroad communication to Verdun, for Verdun lies also on the Meuse and the railroad ran down the valley. The only other rail communication for Verdun was the line from St. Menenhould, which ran so close to the front west of Verdun that it was constantly cut by shell fire.

Verdun and Toul are two of the fortified cities of the eastern chain of defenses of France, and between them lies a long ridge of hills, the "Hauts de Meuse," which form the watershed between the Meuse and the Moselle. In 1870 the

Germans entered France south of these mountains, through Toul and Nancy up the valley of the Moselle, and in 1914 they tried to come up both the valley of the Moselle and the valley



WESTERN FRONT

Showing line of September, 1918.

of the Meuse. But they found these two entrances to the plain of France too strong. Thus the main battle line, from Verdun east to Nancy, lay on the German side of the mountains. In one place, however, the Germans had driven a wedge


across these mountains, and this sharp, abrupt projection of the battle line crossed the range of hills and rested its nose on the river Meuse, at the town of St. Mihiel. This was the St. Mihiel salient referred to above, and it was a constant menace to Verdun. Prisoners taken July 15, 1918, in the Champagne said that the plan of that attack was to widen the Marne salient to the east in order to join it subsequently with the St. Mihiel salient and thus surround Verdun.

The salient jutted out sharply on the northwestern hinge at Les Eparges, 10 miles southeast of Verdun. Les Eparges is a small village on the German side of these hills. From this village at the foot of the hills, the line on the western side of the salient ran almost due south 10 miles, crossing the high forested hills and descending their western slope into the valley of the Meuse, thence across the river to include a small bridgehead at St. Mihiel. Here the line turned abruptly and ran due east and included the Fort du Camp des Romains (the one French fort between Verdun and Toul which the Germans had captured and still held). Continuing due east the line again crossed the range of hills and descended into the flat marshy plain of the Woevre at Aprémont, where the lofty pinnacle of Mont Sec, a detached hill, afforded German dominance of the whole plain. From Aprémont the line ran on past Xivray, Seicheprey (the Toul sector), Fliry, Limey, Fay-en-Haye, and through the Bois le Prête to the Moselle river just above Pont-à-Mousson, about 25 miles from St. Mihiel. The total length of the line around this salient was 40 miles, and where it joined the main battle line it was 20 miles wide. Directly behind it and supporting it, with excellent rail communication, was the great German fortress of Metz, but 32 miles from St. Mihiel.

During the first year of the war, the French had made several brave attempts to wipe out this salient which so threatened Verdun, and the fighting on the heights of the Meuse was very costly, but the attempt to push little by little on those well entrenched lines by the methods of trench warfare attacks had failed utterly and the effort was abandoned. Since then the sector had become very quiet, and when the

American divisions first arrived in France the sectors around St. Mihiel salient were allotted to them as training sectors, for this was the one part of the front left where the Americans could control a line of supplies from the sea to the front lines which would not cut across either the British or French lines of supply, but would lie parallel to them.

In August, 1918, when the American Army had ten divi-



THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

sions experienced in battle tactics after their successful reduction of the Marne Salient, and the total number of divisions in France had risen until they constituted several Corps, it was in the natural order that when the First American Army was formed, the St. Mihiel Salient should be chosen as the objective of its initial operation.

There were several good reasons for removing this salient. No big offensive could be started with this menace to Verdun still intact. Its destruction would free 150 square miles of France, and a city which before the war had 10,000

inhabitants. It would reverse the threat, and this time it would be a threat of the Allies against Metz, the Briey iron mines, and the Metz-Sedan railroad line to Flanders, which the Germans used so much to shift their divisions quickly along the front.

The first step in the preparations was the formation of the First American Army Staff and the drawing in of the divisions which were to make up the army for this attack. General Pershing himself took command of this army as a natural preliminary to the command of the group of armies which would soon be formed. Then the orders, maps, and plans for the coming offensive were prepared, making a book of 56 pages; a huge problem for an untrained staff. Every little detail had to be worked out. The exact boundary for each division in the entire attack, the artillery schedule, the light railways which were to hook on to the German lines, the engineers to connect the roads, the tanks, the gas and flame regiments, all kinds of aviation, cavalry, ammunition and supply trains, dumps, motor transport, hospitals, hospital trains, signal corps, troops, Corps and Army artillery, railroad artillery, water supply, anti-aircraft batteries, traffic control, prisoner cages, and evacuation,—these and many more were the details the Army Staff worked out.

The plan was for two separate attacks to converge on a certain point. The attack from the east was to come down the plains from Les Eparges, while the attack from the south was to move up the plains from the old Toul sector. This would cut off that part of the salient which was on the hills above the Meuse. The Germans had a "Hindenburg Line," which was merely a line dug in case of just such an attack, which connected the German line at Les Eparges with the line at Pont-à-Mousson, and it was to this line that the plans of the First Army directed that the attack be pushed. The German defenses in the salient were strong. During four years the Germans had worked hard to strengthen the trenches, and about two miles back of the front line they had a second line, in reality a smaller salient within the big one. The purpose of this second line was to permit the Germans to withdraw

from the tip of the salient, and to prevent this was the object of the First Army.

Lieutenant General Fuchs, the German commander of the salient, had seven divisions in the line and four in reserve, equal to one division to every seven and a half miles of front, which with reserves would give a total of about 75,000 Germans in the salient. With all their artillery and vast stores of ammunition, their well fortified first and second zone, their machine guns and the good line of communications to Metz, these 75,000 troops were expected to put up very strong resistance.

On the front to be attacked, General Pershing disposed four Army Corps. The First American Corps, General Liggett, from Clemency (east of the Moselle) to Limey; the Fourth American Corps, General Dickman, Limey to Xivray; the Second French Colonial Corps, General Blondelat, Xivray to Mouilly (the latter Corps covered practically the entire front in the range of hills from the Toul sector to Les Eparges, where only a secondary or following attack was to take place later); the Fifth American Corps, General Cameron, Mouilly to Watronville.

From right to left the divisions ran:

First Corps (American), General Liggett—82nd U. S. Division, General Burnham; 90th U. S. Division, General Allen; 5th U. S. Division, General McMahon; 2nd U. S. Division, General Le Jeune; Reserve: 78th U. S. Division, General McRae.

Fourth Corps (American), General Dickman—89th U. S. Division, General Wright; 42nd U. S. Division, General Menoher; 1st U. S. Division, General Summerall; Reserve: 3rd U. S. Division, General Buck.

Second Colonial Corps (French), General Blondelat—39th French Division; 26th French Division; 2nd French Cavalry Division, dismounted.

Fifth Corps (American), General Cameron—26th U. S. Division, General Edwards; 15th French Colonial Division; Reserve: 4th U. S. Division, General Hines.

Of the two Corps attacking from the south the right of

the First Corps, 82nd Division, was to hold fast on its right, while its left moved in conformity with the main attack; and the left of the Fourth Corps, 1st Division, was to be the marching flank, which, as the line advanced, would drop off elements to protect the flank until the connection was made with the Corps attacking from the east. Then the 1st Division was to face about and mop up the hilly part which had not been touched by the attack. The remainder of the divisions were to attack directly to their front until the objective was reached.


Of the Fifth Corps, the 26th Division was to jump off three hours after the southern attack began and march so that its right flank should be in the town of Vigneulles the second day, where it would meet the 1st Division. The 15th French Colonial Division was to attack to its front, and the 4th Division was to form the left pivot of the attack.

The whole great maneuver was an enveloping operation to break through the hinges of the salient, close through to the center, and pocket the garrison. Three American Corps (11 American and 1 French division) were to make the attack while one French Corps held the line on the tip of the salient, and in addition, as army reserves, General Pershing had the 35th, 91st, 80th and 33rd American Divisions, in other words twelve divisions in the line of attack and seven in reserve. This meant 216,000 Americans and 48,000 French in the line with 190,000 Americans in reserve, or more than 400,000 American troops assembled is one Army for battle.

General Grant's Army of the Potomac numbered about 125,000 at its maximum strength. Napoleon's Grand Army at Leipzig numbered about 160,000 with which he fought 240,000 Russians and Prussians. The German Army at Sedan in 1870 numbered 250,000 men, and the Russian and Japanese Armies at Mukden, the largest on record before this war, each numbered but 310,000 men.

General Pershing's real opponent in the oncoming battle was not in reality General Fuchs, but von Gallowitz. A high ranking officer at the outbreak of the war, he had commanded a group of armies in Poland in 1915; later he commanded an army in Macedonia, and, in the fall of 1916 he commanded

the Second German Army on the Somme. In the spring of 1917 he was placed in command of the Fifth Army at Verdun, and after that was given command of the group of armies around Verdun, which he still had when General Pershing attacked the St. Mihiel salient. On the score of experience in manipulating masses of troops, on many victorious fields, he was a formidable opponent.



AMERICAN ORDER OF BATTLE

Showing Divisions and Corps boundaries for the St. Mihiel offensive.

Seldom in history has a military operation been carried out more precisely according to program. The troops already in the line, the 82nd U. S. Division, the 90th U. S. Division, the 89th U. S. Division, the 39th French Division, the 26th French Division, the 2nd French Cavalry Division (dismounted), and the 15th Colonial French Division maintained only their normal activities until the attack began. New batteries of artillery which came into the sector did not register with a single shot.

Aviation activity was not increased, and the great masses of troops marching into the area marched all night, and when daylight broke they were all carefully screened in the plentiful woods of the rear areas.

All the units had their orders and maps, the majority of the infantry who were to make the attack were back in the dense woods three or four miles behind the front where the eight-inch howitzers stood ready, and everyone knew just what he was to do as soon as it was announced which would be "D" day, and what would be "H" hour. Then the word was sent out. "D" day was to be September 12th, and "H" hour would be 5 a. m. Nothing moved until dusk of the 11th, and then everything began moving at once, and it began to rain as it only can rain in northeastern France. A long column of tanks started for the front, little French Renault tanks, but manned by Americans this time; batteries of artillery moved out from the cover of the woods toward the Bouçonville, Ramboucourt, Beaumont, Fliry, Limey highway, which they all knew so well, while battalions of infantry tramped once more toward that front where they had sat so long under the all-seeing eye of Mont Sec.

This time the field artillery did not move into fixed positions behind the highway, nor did the infantry go into the trenches. They both moved down, as soon as it was dark, into the maze of mud-choked, disused front line trenches. As the artillery was the first to arrive, the battery commanders soon found that there was practically nothing except an occasional sentry post between them and the Germans, so they immediately sent forward the gunners to form a skirmish line in front of the guns to protect them against German patrols. Then the infantry came and lay down in that drenching rain between the old trenches to wait for 5 a. m. while telephone lines were run back to regimental headquarters. It was an intensely black night, and the wonder is that all those divisions coming along that one great highway did not get mixed. Some few small units did, and frantic staff officers wandered all night over the slopes and finally got the stray units into the proper position, but during it all the German batteries scarcely fired a shot.

Then at one o'clock in the morning of September 12, the artillery bombardment began. At an instant the sky as far as the eye could see burst into a sheet of flame when every gun of the American Army fired in unison the opening shot of this the first American offensive, while platoon leaders who had spent a month looking up at Mont Sec wondered when the Germans from that eminence would begin to pour a deadly return fire into them. The men who knew the sector best feared the most. The 1st Division knew that at dawn they would have to march resolutely past the foot of Mont Sec. While they were in the sector the winter before they often longed for the day when they would see what was behind the hill, but now that the day was fast approaching they felt that the Germans on the summit would mightily resent it. Then there were other divisions to whom this was their first attack, who had never heard ten German machine guns firing at them at once. To them also the hours seemed to drag, and to all lying there in that drenching rain in the pitch blackness of that night,—the intense American artillery preparation was tearing to bits the German trenches and wire in front of them and the 14-inch shells leisurely sung their way along overhead,—to all came the question as to what the dawn would bring. Old hands, who had patrolled more than once that No Man's Land, shivered with apprehension at the thought of how much the little stream, the Rupt de Mad, would have overflowed its banks by morning.


Then at 5 a. m., which was still twenty minutes before daylight on that foggy, rainy morning, the rolling barrage began. Up came the stiff infantrymen. The major looked at his watch, then at the barrage, then at his watch again and gave the signal to advance. In the darkness the lines moved steadily forward until the German barbed wire was reached. Here, under cover of the intense American artillery barrage, the infantry cut their way through the belts of barbed wire. These tactics were new. Never before in the whole four years had infantry dared to assault until the artillery had, by heavy concentration, cut the enemy wire. The American artillery, during the five hours' preparation, had not played on

the wire, but instead, had smothered the German batteries. The new scheme worked perfectly. The wire was soon cut, and the infantry moved forward in wave after wave toward the German front line.

There were to be many surprises that day to those troops who had fought their way up from the Marne and knew what real hard fighting German resistance actually was. The much dreaded German machine guns were smothered by the terrible barrage, and before the German gunners could start to fire, the Americans were upon them. On went the rolling barrage and following it closely went the infantry, and as dawn broke it showed them like drowned rats; they had lain all night in that marshy front position, and some had swum the creek, and caked with the slimy yellow clay they looked like nothing human as they plodded on behind the barrage. The few German batteries which had lived through the heavy bombardment of the night before, poured a bitter fire into the advancing Americans. There were not enough guns left, however, to seriously impede the advancing troops, and the guns were quickly surrounded and taken. On went the ever advancing line, and, with the taking of the German third line, the last strong German resistance was passed. Not a single shot had come from Mont Sec that day. By nine o'clock in the morning, when the sun came out it was a maneuver for those troops in the center, and, plodding almost knee-deep in the awful quagmire, they followed the barrage which splashed in the mud in front of them; the majority of the few casualties suffered were from following this barrage too closely.

Little groups of Germans who had given themselves up began to filter back towards the rear, then bigger groups went back. The advance proceeded with all the precaution arranged for beforehand. Town, woods and machine-gun nests were all very adroitly outflanked, and then mopped up. The Fourth Corps had far to go that day, and the succeeding German lines were taken almost as fast as the troops could march over them. The only serious opposition met that day was in the last trench of the Quart de Reserve. This was a small wood about a mile square, lying midway between Seicheprey and Nonsard.

Here the 1st Division met determined machine-gun fire, and it cost about 600 casualties to take the woods. After that everything went easily, and before noon the line of the First Phase had been passed. By evening the line of the "First Day" was passed. The Fourth Corps had reached the southern edge of Bois de Nonsard and Bois de Thiacyourt; both



THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

Showing advance of the first day by the First American Army.

towns were captured. The infantry had done over ten miles that day, and were almost worn out, for the mud made each mile seem like three. The tanks and accompanying artillery had long since been passed and now the infantry lay down to rest.

Meanwhile a provisional squadron of three troops of the 2nd U. S. Cavalry Regiment was rushed up and ordered forward to cut the railroad which led from St. Mihiel to Metz in order to prevent the German divisions in the tip of the

salient from escaping. The railroad was on the far side of the woods, and there was a path through the wood up which they went. By 4 p. m. they had reached the railroad and highway, but, finding that they were not in sufficient force, the cavalry retreated. The 1st Division was then ordered to march that night through Bois de Nonsard and cut the railroad. All night they picked their way through dense forest, the men so tired that they could scarcely walk, and yet on they went until at 10 that evening, when a company of the 28th Infantry finally cut the road and stopped the Germans from taking any more troops from the tip of the salient. A brigade from the 3rd Division was rushed up to support the left flank of the 1st during this movement, so that the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division was freed to push on up the Nonsard-Vigneulles road, and by dawn of the 13th, the leading elements had cut the road north out of the tip of the salient. At 7 a. m. the patrols of the 1st Division, coming from the south, met the patrols of the 26th Division, coming from the north, in Hattonchattel. Thus the two Corps met; the salient was no more.

The three remarkable features about the operations on this day were: First, that after 9 in the morning, the German resistance dwindled, especially in the center of the attack; second, at about 9 in the morning, great columns of heavy black smoke began appearing from behind the woods and spread until there was not the slightest doubt that the Germans were burning all their supplies; and third, the Allies had the superiority of the air for the first time since American troops had been on the front. Squadrons of British, French and American planes cruised all over the sector unmolested, and bombed at will the enemy's retreating columns.

Meanwhile the French, on the point of the salient, performed their mission with great success. One hour after the main attack started they made small limited objective attacks which kept the Germans busily engaged on that front so that they could not withdraw. Part of the 39th French Division followed up on the left flank of the 1st Division and placed a block astride the Heudicourt-Vigneulles road. The remainder occupied the Germans on the front until the proper time came,

when with vigorous raids they penetrated the lines and occupied St. Mihiel.

The cutting off of the St. Mihiel salient was practically accomplished in one day, for by that time the 1st and the 26th Divisions had met, and all other divisions were on or beyond the army's objective. During the 13th, 14th, and 15th, further progress averaging three or four kilometers (2 or 3 miles) was made in exploitation along the front, and this was accompanied by very heavy local fighting. But in that first day, the First American Army took practically all of the 14,500 prisoners and 443 pieces of artillery which were captured in the whole operation. This was done at a cost so slight in American casualties that the long lines of ambulances over which the staff had spent such weary hours never moved from their strategic positions, and operating teams in mobile hospitals which had been brought up in great numbers, stood outside the tents and watched the Allied airplanes as they swept the sky. The only units who really met any opposition and had a problem which exceeded their expectations were the engineers. Building roads and bridges across that swollen torrent and through that mud taxed their powers to the limit.

The explanation of this sudden giving away on the part of the Germans was not far to seek. There was nothing secret about the intention to attack. Paris was talking about it for weeks before. Every supply officer up and down the long line of communications who had received an order to send an abnormal amount of his special stock in trade up to the St. Mihiel salient by September 10 predicted to a few friends that the American Army would attack. The Paris papers openly hinted at the time and the place, and the Swiss papers in their guess only missed the date by one day. But even without all these, the German Intelligence Service knew very well what was going on behind the Allied lines. Day by day von Gallowitz saw more and more divisions moving in behind the front, and with them came regiment after regiment of American coast artillery with British eight-inch howitzers and French six-inch long rifles. Then the railroad artillery began

to arrive with their fourteen-inch long rifles, and it was not hard to determine what to expect.

There were but 75 000 Germans in the salient and they were for the most part very poor troops, which included one Austro-Hungarian Division, and they could not be counted upon to offer much real resistance to 400,000 Americans backed up with that enormous artillery support. The position was none too good and the Germans, outnumbered five to one, would need enormous reserves to hold it in the face of such an attack. Accordingly, the Germans began a careful withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, and had the American attack been delayed two days longer, there would have been but a handful of Germans left in the St. Mihiel salient.

Von Gallowitz could get no reserves from any other portion of the Western front, for the British and French by their ever growing offensive in the Somme and the Chemin des Dames, held all the otherwise available German-reserves there. So von Gallowitz executed his skillful retreat and saved four-fifths of the garrison by the maneuver. Its cost to the Germans was slight in men, 14,500, but the cost in strategical position was great, for, in abandoning the salient, they gave up forever the hope of taking Verdun. Then, too, the cost in prestige was enormous, for the result materially shortened the Allied line, opened the communication to Verdun, freed forever that city, but above all, it gave the Americans the inspiration of victory which was to carry them so far in overcoming the bitterest German resistance in the Argonne.

The 82nd Division (All American National Army) which on August 24 had relieved the 2nd Division on the Marbach sector (east bank of the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson) formed the right pivot for the attack. The Fourth and Fifth Corps closed the salient while the First Corps, of which the 82nd was the right, was to swing forward like a door in conformity with the quick movement of the Fourth Corps. As the 90th Division on the left advanced, the 82nd Division took over the west bank of the Moselle river, and astride this wide river it advanced its left flank in a turning movement, five kilometers (3 miles). The Germans on this front were not retreating

and put up a stiff resistance. It cost the 82nd Division 1,200 casualties to execute this difficult advance in the face of hot German fire from the hills east of the Moselle. The 82nd Division remained in this sector until September 21, when it was relieved and moved by bus to the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The 90th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Army) occupied the west bank of the Moselle. The front of the division was narrowed just prior to the attack from nine to six kilometers and the 5th Division moved in on the left and relieved that part of the 90th Division. As the artillery of the 90th Division had not yet finished its training, the 153rd Artillery Brigade of the 78th Division in Corps reserve, supported the 90th Division in the attack. Prior to the attack, patrols were sent out to cut gaps in the wire on the whole front, and at 5 a. m. on September 12, the infantry followed its artillery barrage and went forward in assault on the German positions. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon the division was on its objective, the 357th Infantry on the left had advanced four kilometers (2½ miles) through dense woods, wire and trenches, and the remainder of the division, while not advancing so far, had accomplished their missions.


On the 13th, Brigadier General U. G. McAlexander (who won undying fame when he commanded the 38th Infantry Regiment on the Marne two months before), was commanding the 180th Infantry Brigade. With these two regiments, 359th and 360th Infantry, he assaulted and captured the famous stronghold of the Bois le Prête, the scene of terrible sanguinary combat in 1915. It was a mass of trenches, caves, machine-gun nests, and barbed wire all cleverly coördinated in that dense forest, but, by a very clever flank movement in the early morning, this fortress was reduced, and thereby freed the right flank of the Allied line. Meanwhile the 179th Brigade took the Vencheres woods and advanced the line to the vicinity of St. Marie Farme. On the 14th the advance was continued to the Bois des Rappes, while the 180th Brigade took Villers-sous-Preney, and on the 15th, Vandieres and the Bois de Villers were taken and the Bois des Rappes cleared out. On the 16th of September the advance was continued

until the line was pushed forward to the edge of the woods in front of Preny, where the infantry dug in and the line remained until the division was relieved on October 10 by the 7th Division, and the 90th Division was sent to the Meuse-Argonne. In the four days of this attack, the division captured 14 German officers and 650 men, 8 pieces of artillery, 24 heavy trench mortars and a large amount of materials. The advance cost the division in total casualties 39 officers and 886 men. The extremely low number of casualties in the 90th Division and its steady advance proved this division to be one of the best of the new divisions, with officers skillful, daring and efficient.

The 5th Division (Regular Army) entered the line between the 90th and the 2nd Divisions, and took part in the attacks on the four successive days from the 12th to the 16th of September, when it was relieved. At the time of the relief the division was holding a small front facing Rembercourt on the Rupt de Mad. This division captured in all 1,243 prisoners, of whom 32 were officers, 13 pieces of artillery, at a cost of 1,563 casualties, of whom 11 officers and 249 men were killed.

The 2nd Division (Regular Army and Marine) formed the left of the First Corps. It was given the mission of taking the town of Thiacourt, the capture of which would flank the Germans out of their last positions in the salient and force them to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line. On the morning of September 12, the 3rd Brigade (9th and 23rd Infantry) made the assault for the 2nd Division. Enemy lines of resistance were speedily passed. Advancing, with great dash, the assault was pushed into the town of Thiacourt. This was captured and the lines moved on, down the valley of the Rupt de Mad, until Jaulny and Xammes were taken. By this time the 2nd Division had again made a wonderful record, for not only had it taken every objective, but the toll in captured German cannon numbered 95, a record for a day's fighting for the 9th and 23rd Infantry. The divisions on the flanks had not been able to maintain this swift pace of the veterans, and maintained *liaison* with the 4th (Marine Bri-

gade) which was following in support. On the night of September 13-14, the 4th Brigade (5th and 6th Marines) passed through the 3rd (Infantry) Brigade, and advanced the lines two kilometers to the Hindenburg Line, near Rembercourt and Mon Plaisir Farm. This made the total advance of the 2nd Division eleven kilometers (7 miles). The Di-



ADVANCE OF SEPTEMBER 13, 1918

Showing the reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient.

vision captured 3,300 prisoners and 95 cannon, and suffered but relatively few casualties. On September 16, the 2nd Division was relieved from the St. Mihiel front, and was ordered to the Marne. It had rapidly advanced nine kilometers (6 miles), captured a vast amount of prisoners and supplies, and suffered comparatively few casualties. A captured German report alluded to the 1st, 2nd and 42nd (Rainbow) Divisions as the three "First Class attacking Divisions of the American Army.

The 78th Division (New Jersey and Upper New York National Army) moved into the reserve position of the First Corps on September 11, while the artillery went forward to support the 90th Division. Here the division remained until September 15, when it moved up to Thiacourt and on the next night relieved the positions held by the 5th and 2nd Divisions. This division had never had the advantage of any experience in a quiet sector. As a whole it had never been under fire. The relief required the taking over of a new and unorganized sector from two divisions at a point where there was danger of counter-attacks and where the sector was very active. For seventeen days the 78th Division (Lightning) held this front of five miles, facing four German divisions in the Hindenburg Line, and in doing so suffered a total of 2,107 casualties. On October 4th the division was relieved and went to the Meuse-Argonne.

The 89th Division (Middle West) was the right division of the Fourth Corps. The front of this division was reduced the night before the attack until it covered a front of two miles in front of Fliry. The mission given to it was to attack directly to its front, to assist on the right the capture of Thiacourt by the 2nd Division, and to assist the Rainbow (42nd) Division on its left to capture Essey. On September 12 this division had to pass immediately through the Bois de Mort Mare. This forest, on the extreme southern edge of which the Germans had their front lines, occupied the entire front of the division, and, as it was very dense and over a mile in depth, great credit is due the 89th Division for so speedily extricating itself from this and continuing on to catch up with the two veteran divisions on its either flank. That night the division reached the town of Beney and by midnight was on the day's objective. After various small advances, the 89th Division relieved the 42nd Division on the night of September 30, and took over the front of that division. On October 4 it also relieved the 78th Division, as the front was then very quiet, and on October 8, was relieved by the 37th Division, and was moved to the Meuse-Argonne.

The 42nd Division (Rainbow, National Guard) was the

center division of the Fourth Corps. This division also had a wood on its front, but it was a smaller wood, the Bois de Sonnard. The division had been in many attacks. In a few spots the German defenders put up real resistance, but for the most part the division rushed through the wood in the early dawn, then formed up on the other side of the wood and continued its orderly advance up either side of the Fliry-Essey highway, taking without much difficulty the towns of Essey, Pannes, and Lamarch on the first day. Early on the morning of the 13th the Rainbow reached its final objective, the town of St. Bénôit, and by 9:30 a. m. had firm possession of this line with patrols far out in front along the highway towards Woël, where with a couple of lost tanks the patrol fought a small war of its own up and down that highway. By this time the 39th French Division, which had come up the left flank of the 1st after the battle began, squeezed out the 1st Division, and with the 42nd formed the line which faced the Hindenburg Line. In less than 29 hours, the Rainbow Division had advanced 19 kilometers (12 miles). Here they made a sector which was held until September 30, when the Rainbow Division was relieved by the 89th Division, and the Rainbow (42nd) Division proceeded to the Meuse-Argonne.


The 1st Division (Regular Army) was the left of the Fourth Corps, and was the marching flank of the attack from the south. This division advanced past the foot of Mont Sec (constantly "refusing" its left flank by dropping off companies successively to face to the west, against probable counter-attack from the hilly part of the salient which was not under attack) and in this the 18th Infantry was used. Meanwhile the 16th, 28th, and 26th Infantry regiments pushed on until Nonsard was captured early in the afternoon of the first day. The cavalry was then thrown in to cut the German line of retreat, and when the cavalry failed and retreated, the 2nd Brigade, which had won such fame at Soissons, and the 16th Infantry were ordered to push on through the dense forest and cut the road. This was done when, at 10 p. m. a company of the 28th Infantry arrived on the road. Meanwhile a brigade of the 3rd Division and the 39th French Division advanced along the

left flank of the 1st, which relieved the 1st brigade. This brigade was hastily assembled and marched up the Nonsard-Vigneules highway and at 3:15 a. m. the patrols of the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments reached Vigneules; at 7 a. m., September 13, the patrols of the 1st Division and the 26th Division met, and the salient was cut. The 39th French Division then went past the left of the 1st Division and with the 26th and 42nd Divisions formed a line facing the Hindenburg Line. The 1st Division was held for a time in general reserve for this line and then was sent to the Meuse-Argonne. In nineteen hours it had advanced 12 miles, captured 5 officers and 1,190 men, 30 pieces of artillery and much war material; the total casualties suffered were 13 officers and 594 men.

The 3rd Division (Regular Army), better known as the "Marne Division," after its heroic defense of Château-Thierry, was in reserve of the Fourth Corps. One brigade was moved up late on the afternoon of September 12, in close support of the flank of the 1st Division in case of possible German counter-attack from the hilly portion of the salient to the west, but as it soon developed, there were so few Germans in the salient, that this attack was impossible. On September 14 the 3rd Division was relieved and sent to the Meuse-Argonne.

The 26th Division (New England National Guard) formed the right of the Fifth Corps, which was to attack from Les Eparges on the upper western side of the salient three hours after the main attack from the southern side was launched. Accordingly at 8 a. m. the 26th Division and the 15th French Colonial Infantry Division attacked, and by noon had reached the crest of the hill of Les Eparges, and were close up to the western edge of the village and woods of St. Remy, where they met stiff resistance from the well entrenched Austro-Hungarian Division. But the Allies greatly outnumbered the defenders and the 15th French Colonial Division captured Les Eparges hill and held it against counter-attacks. Meanwhile the 26th Division followed the retreating Austro-Hungarian Division and drove it from each succeeding position until it beat a disorderly retreat through the woods. The 26th Division, following in pursuit, occupied the towns of St. Remy

and Donmartin. The 26th had now passed the last of the German positions, and there lay but five miles of forest on top of the plateau through which it must penetrate before it came out on the heights of Hattonchattel which overlooked the entire Wœvre plain. By the time the 26th reached Donmartin it was dark, and it was decided to wait until morning.



THE NEW LINE

Showing the complete advance of the First American Army in the reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient, September 12 to 15, 1918.

General Pershing personally directed that the 26th Division have a regiment in Vigneulles by 5 a. m., Sept. 13th. This was part of the same movement by which the 1st Division was to pierce the Bois de Nonsard and both were to meet in Vigneulles. The 102nd Infantry, which had been following in divisional reserve all day, was given this mission, having the whole night in which to cover the five miles down the highway through the forest. It had to go slowly, as the woods were infested with the enemy as was evidenced by the

capture of 280 prisoners. At 7 a. m. the patrols of the two divisions met in Vigneulles and the salient was closed. The remainder of the 26th Division then occupied the plateau, and moved down into the plain to form part of the battle line in front of the village of St. Hilaire. Here it remained until October 7 when it was relieved and sent to the Meuse-Argonne. In addition to a great quantity of military stores the 26th Division captured 2,400 prisoners practically the entire Austro-Hungarian Division, and its 50 pieces of artillery.

The 4th Division (Regular Army) was in reserve of the Fifth Corps. On September 12, however, the 59th Infantry Regiment went in the line as the left pivot of the Allied attack. Here it remained until the 14th, when, following the German retreat, it occupied the town of Fresnes-en-Wœvre and Manheulles which advanced the line several kilometers out into the Wœvre plain. Here the division remained until the 19th of September, when the 4th Division was withdrawn and sent to the Meuse-Argonne.

The four divisions in Army Reserve were not brought up for this operation, and when it closed on September 16, the 33rd, 35th, 80th and 90th Divisions were sent to the Meuse-Argonne.

General Pershing says in his report on this battle:

"At the cost of only 7,000 casualties mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners, and 443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found that they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with."

CHAPTER XII

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE

September 26—October 3—German Retreat Had Reached Hindenburg Line—Foch Decides to Force the Fighting—Combines Attack—Nine American Divisions Used—Hindenburg Line Pierced

Since July 18, 1918, when the Allies turned from defensive to offensive tactics, the strategy of Marshal Foch had been to deliver a succession of sharp, swift blows on those points of the Western Front where the Germans were weakest. In the two months' fighting culminating in the St. Mihiel Drive of the First American Army, the French, British and Americans had gradually forced the Germans back to the original battle line. This was the famous Hindenburg Line, the first of the German lines of defense. It was from this line that the Germans had launched their 1918 Spring Offensive, which they had carried almost to the sea ports and to Paris itself in five months of furious fighting, and in less than two months the Allies had driven the Germans back to this Line. Here, however, the Allied attacks were effectually stopped, for the Hindenburg Line was at that time the most securely fortified battle line on the Western Front. It was in reality not a single line, but a series of interweaving trenches. This had been fortified until the whole area was a checkerboard of concrete machine gun emplacements and concrete shelters, protected by belt after belt of barbed wire. It stretched from the North Sea to the Vosges Mountains, and averaged in depth seven miles. Entrenched in this formidable line, the Germans were now able to cope with the successive thrusts of the Allies and a new strategy was necessary if the Allied attack was to be continued.

In March the Germans had on the Western Front a great

superiority of men and guns, and their troops were inspired with a high and well founded confidence in a speedy and complete victory. Five months later, however, in September, they no longer had this superiority in men and guns, and their *morale* as well as their numbers was badly shattered by the awful casualties which the Allies had inflicted upon them both in the attack and in the defense. They had not the replacements to fill up their ranks after such staggering losses. Whereas the Allies, due chiefly to the speedy arrival of American troops during the summer of 1918, had not only replaced their losses during the same period, but had actually increased their strength. And more than this, by stopping the furious German attacks, and by their great success in the counter-attack, the confidence and enthusiasm of the Allies had so risen that the desire was universal to attack the Germans in the hope of overthrowing them completely. Accordingly, Marshal Foch decided to strike with his whole force.

"When this decision to force the fighting to conclusion in the fall of 1918 was reached by the Allied supreme command," says the *Stars and Stripes*, "the attack was planned not against one point or one front only, as had been the practice of Ludendorff and the German General Staff, but against all the fronts, excepting Italy, at practically the same time and on a scale far greater than had even been attempted before. Every considerable body of the enemy was to be engaged, and thus there would be none left free to reënforce other hard pressed fronts. It will be worth while to note once more the order in which the successive attacks were delivered.


"On September 21, General Franchet d'Esperey launched the attack on the Macedonian front which at once broke through the lines of the Bulgarian Armies and speedily annihilated them.

"On September 23, the British Army under General Allenby assailed the Turks in Palestine with results quite as rapid as decisive.

"On September 26 General Pershing's First American Army, with nine divisions in line, and General Gouraud's Fourth French Army, with twelve divisions in line, struck

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE 229

against the vital portion of the German Western front centering on the Argonne forest from the Meuse to the Suippe river.



COMPLETE WESTERN FRONT

Showing the scope of the Allied attack which stretched from Palestine to the North Sea.

“On September 27, General Horne’s First British Army, with nine divisions in line, and General Byng’s Third British Army, with eight divisions in the line, following up their counter-offensive operations by which, during the preceding two

months, the enemy had been driven back from the proximity of Amiens, attacked the Hindenburg Line between Gonzeaucourt and the Senseé river, with Cambrai as the main objective.

"On September 28, their advance was extended southward as far as the front of St. Quentin by the attack of General Rawlinson's Fourth British Army, with six divisions in line, and from St. Quentin toward La Fère by that of General Deneney's First French Army, with seven divisions in line.

"On September 28, also, the Belgian Army, with about four divisions in line, and General Plumer's Second British Army, with eight divisions in line, attacked in Flanders on a front extending from Dixmude to a point southeast of Ypres. (It must be borne in mind, however, that the American Divisions were at full strength, 28,000 men; whereas, the British and French Divisions scarcely averaged 10,000 men at this time. This made an American Division equal almost to three Allied Divisions in numbers.)

"From the beginning, all these attacks met with success, more or less rapid, according to the difficulties encountered. But all were sustained with unrelaxing vigor, and all drove forward with increasing momentum as time went on and the enemy became more and more exhausted, until the complete victory was achieved. The wisdom of placing the command of all the Allied Armies in the hands of one leader, Marshal Foch, could have received no more impressive vindication than was given by the precision and power with which, in a period of eight days, the successive blows of armies extending from Asia Minor to the English Channel were delivered like hammer-strokes upon the vital fronts of the Central Powers."

Between France and Germany lie a series of concentric mountain ranges over which it is impossible to move an army. These mountains extend from the Swiss border northeast almost to Brussels in Belgium; through them there are four great gateways between Germany and France,—at Belfort, Nancy, Verdun, and Reims,—while north of the Ardennes, the furthest north of these mountains, lies the flat plain of Belgium. In 1814 the Prussian invaders entered France just

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE 281

north of the Swiss border through Belfort. In 1870 the Prussians invaded France through Nancy. In 1914 the German Armies tried to enter France through each of these gate-



THE ASSAULT ON THE HINDENBURG LINE

Showing the position of the Allied Armies in the continued attack which began at the end of September, 1918.


ways. At Belfort, Nancy and Verdun they struck a stone-wall of French resistance and were unable to penetrate it. Through the Champagne and Reims they met less resistance, for Mezières, the fortified city of the gateway on the border, faced

Belgium and was not so well guarded. But through Mons and Valenciennes the Germans made their greatest entry into France, for here was the way through the plains of Belgium into the plains of France, having no mountains or fortifications of any importance to hinder the attack.

Once the Germans were established in France, they took the greatest precautions to keep these two lines of communications back to Germany (Mezières-Sedan, and Valenciennes-Mons) protected against any possible attack. In France and Belgium they had seized the manufacturing and coal mining regions around Lille and the Briey iron basin near Metz, and in the four years of occupation of northern France and Belgium they had constructed four successive defense systems. The first of these defensive systems was the Hindenburg Line. It was the longest and strongest of the four and, until the latter part of September, 1918, had withstood all attacks. It was the German first line of defense and ran from Metz to the sea, and was organized in great depth by interlacing trenches often eight miles in depth. Behind the Hindenburg Line lay the Lille-La Fère line which ran from Lille to Cambrai to La Fère, thence east to the Aisne, along the Aisne to the Argonne, and joined the first line just north of Verdun, at Ornes. The third line provided for the Allied capture of the seacoast; it ran from Ghent to Lille to Valenciennes to Mezières, thence along the Meuse to Verdun. The fourth line ran from Ghent to Valenciennes, behind the Ardennes to Givet, thence along the Meuse to Verdun. All these lines were connected together by switch lines so that a break-through at one point would have little or no effect on the remainder of the line. The Metz, Mezières, Valenciennes railway was the German means of lateral communication along the front, by which the Germans shifted divisions so rapidly from one sector to another. The first two German lines of defense protected this railroad, and the safety of the German positions in France and Belgium depended almost entirely upon it.

The part which the American First Army was to play in this grand Allied offensive was to be the right pivot of the Belgian, British, French and American drive on the Germans

entrenched on the Hindenburg Line. This combined attack had as its objective the cutting of the German lines of communication between France and Germany, thereby threaten-



WESTERN FRONT

Showing German lines of defense.


ing the entire German Army in France and Belgium with capture unless they withdrew. The British were to drive north of the Ardennes mountains in the direction of Valenciennes, Mons and Liège and thereby close the northern entrance to France, for the Ardennes are impassable for large bodies of

troops. The French and Americans were to drive northward between Reims and Verdun, toward the Ardennes and the great railroad centers of Mezières and Sedan, and thus close the central entrance to France. Meanwhile the line from Verdun to the Swiss border was to hold fast as it had done for four years, and keep closed the southern entrance to France. Once the Allies reached Valenciennes and Mezières, and held Verdun and Nancy, all the entrances to France would be blocked and whatever parts of the German Army which remained in France at that time would be captured, as there would be no way to get them out. This combined attack was to hinge on Verdun, and the objective was the Mezières-Sedan-Valenciennes railroad, twenty-five miles due north on the Meuse River. The American First Army was to rest its right flank of its attacking force on the Meuse north of Verdun, and stretch over the plain of the Meuse valley to the middle of the Argonne forest, where it connected with the French Fourth Army. This French Army would attack west of the Argonne forest, in the Champagne, while the First American Army attacked east of the Argonne forest in the broad Meuse valley.

The Germans had always been aware that the Meuse Valley was one of the most probable points of attack. An incision of the line of 25 miles here to Sedan would cut the communications between the German armies in Belgium and those in the Metz area. The German lines in France and Belgium were in reality an enormous salient whose base was Cologne and Metz—a line 200 kilometers in length—while the extremity of this salient at Arras was 300 kilometers from the base. In this salient the Germans had the greater part of their army and plants and stores of four years' accumulation. If therefore an attack were launched on the left flank of this great salient, and this attack were pushed north towards Cologne, the German armies in the tip of the salient would be faced with capture. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that on this front on either side of the Argonne forest the Germans had with prodigious labor, fortified this area until it became one great zone of defensive works almost thirteen miles in depth. Time and again the French in small attacks tried to

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE 235

break through only to be hurled back with enormous losses. To this front were now sent the American First Army and the French Fourth Army with the hope that, if all the German



MEUSE-ARGONNE

Showing seventy-two mile front which the First American Army took over on September 20, 1918. This was merely an extension of the St. Mihiel Front.

forces on all the other fronts were engaged, the German High Command might not be able to send enough divisions to this front to check the advance.

On September 20 the zone of the American First Army was extended westward to take over the entire front of the

French Second Army as far as La Harazee in the Argonne,—this gave General Pershing seventy-two miles of front to command,—from Clemery, north of Nancy, to the Argonne.

The area between the Meuse and the Argonne had been for a long time very quiet. Four enemy divisions held the line with but one in close support. But this front of twenty miles between the Meuse and La Harazee in the Argonne forest was perhaps the most formidably fortified portion of the German lines in France, in addition to its natural facilities for defense. Says the *Stars and Stripes*:

“Resting upon the deeply eroded valley of the Meuse river on the left flank and the precipitous and densely wooded hills of the Argonne on the right, all the country between for a long distance northward is furrowed at intervals of a few kilometers by the transverse ravines and beds of numerous small streams which, originating in the watershed that extend northwestward by Esnes, Malancourt, Montfaucon, Gesnes, Remonville, and Buzancy, fall eastward into the Meuse or westward into the Aire. Between these ravines are a corresponding succession of high and steep ridges and detached hills, dotted with numerous woodlands and villages. Quite aside from the elaborate entrenchments and entanglements with which it had been artificially strengthened, the topography of the country lends itself in a striking degree to that system of defense by the cross-fire of machine-gun nests which the Germans had developed to a fine art.

“The dominating height of the whole region is Montfaucon, which, rising 342 meters above sea level, is more than 30 meters (100 feet) higher than any other eminence between the Meuse and the Argonne on either the German or Allied side of the old battle line. From a concrete observation post on Montfaucon it is said that the German Crown Prince watched the attack of his troops on Verdun in 1916; and Dead Man’s Hill and Hill 304 which figured so prominently in that terrific struggle, are well overtopped by it. To safeguard this unrivaled point of observation the Germans had covered the seven kilometers (5 miles) which intervene between it and their front line with a multitude of defenses. But still other defenses extended far north of it, the four great Zones previously mentioned, though so closely woven together as to seem practically one, being in fact, first the Hindenburg line, then the Hagen Stellung, then the Volker Stellung, and

last, a little farther back on the line of heights and woods defined by Champigneulle, Landres-St. Georges, Romagne, and Briulles, the Kriemhilde Stellung.

“But, formidable as were the positions between the Meuse and the Argonne forest, the latter was in itself the strongest position of all. The forest stands upon a plateau, rising abruptly on its eastern side (Meuse) to heights of about 100 meters (300 feet) above the valley of the Aire, sloping off more gradually on the western (Champagne) side to the valley of the Aisne, into which the Aire flows through the gap of Grand Pré, about 15 kilometers (10 miles) north of La Harazée. The southern half of the plateau and forest was within the Allied line, the northern half within the German. Though they made several attacks upon it before and during 1915, the French were never able to break through the German front in the forest, and in the years which had elapsed since the last of these major attacks was made, the invaders had greatly strengthened and deepened their zone of resistance by interlacing with barbed wire the dense timber and tangled underbrush, which everywhere closed the precipitous ravines and hillsides, and by siting machine-gun emplacements and zones of cross-fire. The Argonne forest was in fact so strong that the entire scheme of attack of the First American Army and the Fourth French Army west of it was governed by the necessity of forcing its defenders from it by out-flanking rather than by direct attack.”

The plan of attack was very carefully worked out. The French Fourth Army attacking west of the Argonne forest in the flat plain of the Champagne, did not have as great natural obstacles to contend with as did the First American Army on the east of the forest. Accordingly their advances were to be a little deeper than those of the Americans in order that they might tend to outflank the Germans in front of the Americans. Objectives were carefully laid out for all attacking divisions except those divisions in the Argonne forest itself. The French and American advance on each side of the forest was to leave the Germans in a deep and narrow salient out of which they would be forced, as the Allies gradually approached from either side the cut in the forest at Grand Pré. The Allied divisions in the forest were merely to follow the

retreating Germans and keep in touch with their rearguards.

The date for the attack was set for September 26, and by September 22, the 33rd, 79th, 91st and 28th American Divisions and two French divisions were holding the line. The sector was very quiet, and it was planned not to bring in any new divisions until the night of September 24th, so as not to give warning to the Germans of the impending attack.

In accordance with this plan, therefore, as soon as each unit was freed from the St. Mihiel attack (Sept. 12-15), it began its movement toward the area behind the front between the Argonne forest and the River Meuse. Corps and army artillery and divisions in army reserve were the first to leave, and these were followed by the various divisions as soon as they were relieved. Great caution was used in bringing the troops into this section in order that the enemy might not become aware of the intended attack in time to move in large reserves to stop it. Referring to this in his report General Pershing says:

"The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization, and, while the mass of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions and notably its machine-gun defense were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible, and was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front, and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do."

The front from the Meuse to the middle of the Argonne was divided into three areas and each was assigned to a corps. The Third Corps rested its right flank on the Meuse. In the center was the Fifth Corps, and on the left, connecting with the French in the center of the forest of the Argonne, was the First Corps. Then the divisions were assigned; reading from right to left (Meuse to the Argonne) they were:

Third Corps—General Bullard.

33rd Division (Ill. National Guard)—General Bell.

80th Division (Blue Ridge, National Army)—General Cronkhite.

4th Division (Regular Army)—General Hines.

Fifth Corps—General Cameron.

79th Division (Penna. National Army)—General Kuhn.

37th Division (Ohio National Guard)—General Farnsworth.


91st Division (West Coast National Army)—General Johnston.

First Corps—General Liggett.

35th Division (Kans. and Mo. National Guard)—General Traub.

28th Division (Penna. National Guard)—General Muir.

77th Division (New York National Army)—General Alexander.



BATTLE ORDER FOR THE JUMP-OFF

Showing the direction of the attack of the nine assaulting divisions.

On the night of September 25-26, nine American divisions were in line, ready for the jump-off at dawn next morning against the most formidable position on the Western front. These nine divisions gave the First American Army a rifle strength of about 108,000 men in the line at the jump-off, and the number of American infantry actually fighting seldom exceeded this number. For the most part these troops had but little previous experience in actual battle. To some it was to be their first experience under fire. Behind these first line divisions were a few veteran divisions who could be counted on to give a good account of themselves under any circumstances.

Reading from right to left (from the Meuse to the Argonne) the nine divisions in line were as follows: The 33rd, which had attacked with the British on August 8, was to clear the Meuse valley for five miles, and then face to the right and establish the line parallel to the axis of attack along the west bank of the Meuse river to protect the flank of the advancing army. On its left was the 80th, which had been in the line with the British in the active Artois sector. It was to advance straight to its front until the 33rd dropped off, when it was to become the right flank. The 4th was on the left of the 80th, and these three divisions formed General Bullard's Third Corps. The 4th was a veteran of the July offensive from the Marne to the Vesle, and was put in as the pace-maker for the new divisions. On the left of this division was the 79th, which was in the line for the first time; before it was the height of Montfaucon, which it was to capture. On its left was the 37th Division, which had spent six weeks in the line at Baccarat. Next came the 91st Division, which was in the line for the first time. Next came the 35th Division, which had been for over two months in quiet sectors in the Vosges, and was given the difficult Aire valley to take. On its left was the 28th Division, veteran of the Marne and the Vesle.


The mission assigned to the 28th Division was the most difficult of all. It had to maintain *liaison* on the right with the division which was advancing rapidly down the Aire Valley, while on its left the 77th, with which it had also to main-

tain *liaison*, was in the forest itself, and would advance but slowly as the Germans were flanked out. The real mission of the 28th therefore was to swing around, pivoting on its left, and to outflank the high plateau of the Argonne, and yet always to keep advancing down the valley of the Aire. It practically amounted to facing the forest and then side-stepping along its front. The Argonne plateau which these troops were to face was a series of promontories sticking out towards the east, and it meant constantly pulling the southernmost troops out, marching them along the front, and putting them in on the north of the line.

In reserve for this attack were six divisions. Three of these, the 1st (Regular), 3rd (Regular), and 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) were veterans of all the battles in which American troops had played a part. They formed a most dependable reserve; their Staffs were experienced, the discipline was that of veterans, and the spirit and confidence in their officers would carry these troops through any obstacles. The fact that only partially trained divisions were used to make the initial attack, was due to the fact that the veteran divisions could not be brought up from the St. Mihiel attack in time for the opening action. Of the three other divisions in reserve one, the 82nd (All American National Army), had proved itself in the St. Mihiel offensive, while the other two, the 29th (Blue and Gray National Guard) and the 92nd (colored National Army), had each spent a month in quiet sectors in the Vosges. East of the Meuse were, in order from left to right (Meuse to the Moselle) the Seventeenth French Corps, the Second French Colonial Corps, and the Fourth American Corps (commanded by General Dickman). In the latter two corps facing the new German line where the St. Mihiel salient had been cut off were the 26th Division (New England National Guard), 42nd Division (Rainbow National Guard), 89th Division (Middle West National Army), 78th Division (New Jersey and New York National Army), and the 90th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Army).

These three Corps formed a part of the American First

Army and they were ordered to join in the artillery bombardment and assist the attack west of the Meuse by making deep raids to their front and, in addition, the 17th French Corps,



DIVISIONS IN LINE, SEPTEMBER 26, 1918

Showing the nine attacking divisions, with six in reserve, and the divisions holding the remainder of the front.

which extended to the Meuse, was charged with careful supervision and counter-battery work against German batteries which from the east bank of the Meuse might fire on American troops advancing on the west bank of the Meuse.

Had this Meuse-Argonne offensive of the First American

Army occurred in 1914 it would have been the greatest battle in history in point of numbers alone, for General Pershing employed in this battle more than 630,000 American troops, and 138,000 French troops, a total of 770,000 men, against which the Germans opposed 607,212 men. The Meuse-Argonne attack functioned as part of Marshal Foch's big offensive in which two million Allied troops were attacking in unison from the English Channel to Verdun, on a front of 203 miles.

In his report to the Secretary of War, General Pershing divides the Meuse-Argonne offensive into three phases of the fighting between the river and the forest. Covering a period of forty-seven days, on a front of seventy-two miles, this one great American offensive, in which three-quarters of a million Allied troops were engaged, and in which 120,000 Americans became casualties, cannot be treated as a whole, but must be studied in the three natural phases which developed. The first phase covers the first eight days of the battle, September 26 until October 3, between the Meuse River and the Argonne forest. The second phase covers the fighting within the same limits between October 4 and October 31. The last phase, which began on November 1, carried the fighting west of the Meuse as far as Sedan on the day of the Armistice. East of the Meuse, the First and the Second Armies, beginning October 8, made several advances to rectify the line and then, on the eve of the armistice the battle developed which was to isolate and surround Metz.

Operating with the Allies during the progress of this offensive were other American divisions and the records of these divisions with the Allies is placed in between the various phases of the Argonne-Meuse battle so as to endeavor to keep before the reader the fact that the Meuse-Argonne offensive was but a small part of the Allied offensive which brought the war to a successful termination.

The Meuse Argonne Offensive began at 11 p. m. on September 25, when 3,928 guns of all calibers from the divisional three inch (75's) up to the fourteen inch railroad guns, fired in unison the first shots of an artillery preparation which tore

to pieces the concrete and barbed wire of the Hindenburg Line, and in the succeeding six hours upheaved the earth until it was a shambles. Every German battery on the front was smothered in this intense bombardment, which prepared the way for the infantry, who jumped off at 5:30 a. m. September 26, 1918, in the greatest battle of the American Army.


On no other front of similar extent had there been such a terrific bombardment. The aggregate of French and American artillery averaged one gun for each eight meters of front, whereas on July 15 the Germans had in the Champagne one gun for each twenty-five meters of front. In the first day the artillery between the Meuse and the Argonne fired over a quarter of a million rounds of artillery on the German forward positions and barbed wire. This so paralyzed the enemy defenders that at 5:30 a. m., when the eager assaulting waves jumped off behind the cover of their rolling barrage, they met practically no German resistance. The infantry and machine gunners swept across the sea of mud, shell holes, shattered wire, and ruined trenches, mopping up the few German dug-outs that had weathered that frightful storm of metal. The impetus of the initial attack carried these new troops many kilometers before they encountered any determined German resistance.

It was not only infantry and artillery which drove forward on that day. Five hundred and eight French and American airplanes took the air that first morning. It was clear for the first time in weeks—ideal flying weather, and they swept the sky of every enemy plane. Continuing ahead they adjusted the fire of the large guns on the targets as they appeared, while some of them flew over and behind the enemy lines on reconnoissance and bombing missions. Behind the advancing waves of infantry came the seventy-three tanks. The fall rains had turned No Man's Land into a quagmire; through this the tanks churned and wallowed with the accompanying batteries of the artillery, both falling further and further behind the infantry. During this first day while the tanks and artillery drove on through that awful battle-scarred terrain,

the infantry without their support pressed on to the corps objective.

By evening the 33rd Division had cleaned up the town and the wood of Forges and had rushed along the west bank of the Meuse as far as Dannevoux. They had then faced to the right and dug in along the west bank of the river on a four-and-a-half-mile front.

The 80th Division pressed on ever further until its right rested on the Meuse beyond Dannevoux, but the left of this



THE JUMP-OFF

Showing positions of nine attacking divisions on the morning of September 26, 1918, in the Jump-off of the First Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

division did not progress so far, being held up by determined resistance from the Bois de Septsarges.

The 4th Division also reached with its right flank the Bois de Septsarges, while its left flank was bent sharply back to maintain contact with the 79th Division which was held up in front of Montfaucon.

The 79th Division passed the first and second German lines by 1 p. m., only to be held up in front of the Bois de Cuisy. With the aid of tanks they fought their way through this, but it was then 4 p. m., and it was six o'clock before the assaulting lines reached the foot of Montfaucon. Their ar-

tillery was not yet up when, at dusk, with the aid of two tanks, the 313th Infantry Regiment assaulted that impregnable mountain fortress, only to be hurled back by the German defenders.

The 37th Division had the dense wood, the Bois de Montfaucon, to penetrate on the jump-off, and although the machine gunners of the enemy put up a good resistance, this division penetrated the wood and was occupying the ridge beyond. The left of the division was up on the Corps objective looking into the little town of Ivoiry. The right of this division, however, was held up by the failure of the 79th Division to take Montfaucon.

The 91st Division rushed through the Bois de Cheppy and the Bois de Very and by 5 p. m. had their patrols in the town of Epinonville, six miles from the jump-off line.

The 35th swept across the abrupt crest of Vauquois, which had been shattered in the bombardment, into the sea of tangled trenches and onto the valley of the Aire, where they ran into a heavy fog which slowed down the first burst of speed and made *liaison* difficult. At Varennes they met resistance in the form of machine-gun cross-fire which practically wiped out the first assaulting waves, and it was not until tanks were brought up that the villages of Varennes and Cheppy were finally taken. The advance continued until Very was taken and the line established on the hill beyond that town.


The 28th Division pushed its right flank down the Aire Valley past Varennes as far as Montblainville; the left (112th Infantry) going along the edge of the Argonne plateau, went too deeply into the sector of the 77th and was held up by machine guns. It did not reach its objective until late in the afternoon; it captured Hill 263, that promontory sticking out from the Argonne from which the Germans had put down such an effective fire on the 35th Division.

The 77th Division jumped off into the dense maze of the Argonne and advanced its right three kilometers (2 miles) while the left advanced slightly less; still it was well into the German lines by night and had captured immense stores.

Thus by dusk of that first day, the Americans were on the

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE 247

Army objective on the extreme right, and at all other points except Montfaucon were on the Corps objective. They had met but little resistance from the enemy except in front of Montfaucon and Varennes, and in all other points the line had rushed forward almost unopposed until they ran into the German Volker-Stellung, which had been pierced at two points. Meanwhile the French Fourth Army west of the Argonne forest had penetrated into the German positions in the Champagne to an average depth of over three miles, capturing



FIRST DAY'S ADVANCE

many strong positions and 7,000 prisoners. The Americans had averaged four miles for the first day's advance and had taken 5,000 prisoners.

From the prisoners taken, six German divisions were identified which showed that there were still over 80,000 German troops in the area and that the front positions had been very lightly held. The defenders, stunned by the terrific artillery preparation, had offered very little resistance to the assaulting waves. The American plan of attack was now disclosed and the German Staff did not take long to reorganize their whole position. Fresh units were rushed up from the rear, the line was straightened, and by morning when the

attack was renewed, it met with a strong German resistance.

Montfaucon, the dominating height from which the German Crown Prince used to view Verdun, had to be taken at once, otherwise the Germans could reënforce it. This strong position was holding up the advance in the center. The 4th Division, on the right, and the 37th Division on the left, were far beyond this height on either side of it. To leave it there uncaptured during the day would mean ruin to those troops who had passed it by on either flank. Accordingly at 7 a. m., September 27, the 313th Infantry of the 79th Division again attacked Montfaucon, creeping up the sides of that steep hill, while the heavy artillery was pounding the top. Before noon they had mopped up the entire hill and the town of Montfaucon, and the hill was now an American observation post.

On September 27 the 33rd Division had reached their Army objective along the Meuse river. Their front was now the river, and they had to lie there under a fierce fire from the Germans on the east bank.

The 80th Division was able to advance its right flank slightly along the river on this day, but its left flank was stopped in front of Brioules-sur-Meuse. The Germans had fortified this town and it was protected by a cross-fire from the east bank, with the result that assault after assault was mown down before it.

The 4th Division also suffered the same fate, and each attack toward Brioules on the river banks was stopped by this galling crossfire. The left of the 4th Division, however, gained the northern edge of the Bois de Brioules, and the extreme left, 39th Infantry, went even further, but had to pull back to the Brioules Nantillois road. The 4th Division suffered from lack of artillery in these attacks and it was not until the 4th Engineers finished building a complete artillery road with two bridges from Esnes to Malancourt, across No Man's Land, that the artillery was brought forward. In building this road 40,000 sandbags were used.

The 79th Division, after their spectacular storming of Montfaucon in the morning, spent the afternoon mopping up the town and the ravines east of it. The 177th Infantry Bri-

gade (313th and 314th Infantry Regiments) were too exhausted after the heroic capture of the hill to continue the attack that night to Nantillois and the Bois de Bruge and accordingly it was arranged to have the 178th Brigade relieve them during the night and attack in the morning.

The 37th Division attacked at 5:30 a. m. on the 27th. The left (74th Brigade) by 9 o'clock had penetrated the Volker Stellung, while the right (73rd Brigade) met a swift German counter-attack on its flank which was drawn back to keep in touch with the 79th Division. This was driven off and before noon Ivoiry and the hill east of it were taken. The fire from the Bois de Bruge, however, forced them back and the front retired to the Montfaucon—Ivoiry road.

The 91st Division, on the first day's advance, had pierced the Volker Stellung and on the 27th progressed against Epinonville and Eclisfontaine and while it suffered heavy casualties from machine guns on its front and flanks, and especially on its left flank where it was completely out of touch with the 35th Division, it continued the advance until the front rested on the Eclisfontaine road.

The 35th Division, after its bitter experience on the first day, continued the attack at 5:30 a. m. on the second day and fought its way forward down the eastern side of the valley of the Aire until they reached Charpentry. Here the attack was checked by machine-gun fire, and forced back with severe losses. Tanks were brought up and the assault was tried again, and again the lines were halted before the town, but one battalion of artillery being available for support. The artillery was then brought up and, at 5:30 p. m. the third attack carried Charpentry and the assaulting waves went on until they had passed the town of Baulny.


The 28th Division, with its peculiar mission of advancing its right and flanking the forest with its left, again made another spirited advance and forced its right (111th Infantry) 500 meters beyond Montblainville by noon on the 27th, while the left flank was in touch with the right flank of the 77th, which was in the forest itself.

The 77th Division, after its brilliant rush through the

250 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

forest on the first day, could make but little progress on the succeeding days. The Germans were endeavoring to save some of their *matériel* and the more important gun positions on the plateau, and their rearguards offered stubborn resistance to the thrusts of the 77th.

Thus at the close of the second day of the attack the line ran from the Meuse, just below Brioules, to just north of Montfaucon. From there it ran through Ivoiry, Epinonville, Eclisfontaine, Baulny, 500 yards north of Montblainville, and



ADVANCE OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1918

thence back along the steep wooded slopes of the Argonne plateau to where the line ran through the forest, two miles from the jump-off line. West of the forest the French Fourth Army had also met determined German resistance on that second day, but had pushed ahead and were equally far advanced as the American First Army. The line held by the Americans was in reality a straight line with two big salients sticking forward into the German lines. One of these was on the extreme right of the line along the Meuse, and the other was where the 91st Division had pushed itself so far ahead at Epinonville and Eclisfontaine. Meanwhile the Ar-

gonne forest was still a salient, for the Germans, but one that was lengthening with every day's advance.

The first phase was now almost over, the American divisions were still moving forward, and many of them were on the Army objective or approaching it. The German resistance was very strong, but small gains were being made. The Germans were moving in more artillery, and the fire from the east bank of the Meuse and from that part of the Argonne plateau which faced directly into the flank of the advancing Americans was a galling flank fire which cuts *morale* ten times as fast as frontal fire. By the night of the second day, September 27, the line had advanced five miles from the original jump-off line, and there were but twenty miles to go to Sedan.

Early in the morning of September 28, the Germans delivered a sudden counter-attack from the town of Brioules on the front of the 80th Division. It was checked by determined rifle and machine-gun fire, and the 80th Division then attacked towards Brioules. This attack suffered a similar fate, and again and again during the day, the 80th Division vainly tried to assault the town, and each attack was thrown back. On the extreme right, however, this division cleared the river bank, and in so doing the front facing the enemy was reduced to almost nothing. In other words, the bend in the Meuse at this point practically squeezed the 80th Division out of the action. The small front it still held was that night taken over by the divisions on either side, the 33rd and the 4th, and the 80th Division was placed in reserve. Under the command of General Cronkhite, this division had made a brilliant success in the two days. It had advanced nine kilometers, captured 35 German officers, 815 men, and 16 pieces of artillery.

The 4th Division did not attack on September 28. It was still far ahead of the 79th Division on its left, and lacked both guns and ammunition. A captured German battery was put into service and fired 15,000 rounds of captured ammunition back at the Germans.

During the night of September 27-28, in the sector of the 79th Division, the 178th Brigade (316th and 317th Infantry

Regiments) had relieved the 177th Brigade, and attacked at 7 a. m. from Montfaucon. By early afternoon the 316th Infantry had fought its way through the Bois de Beuge, capturing machine guns which were used to aid the assault over a kilometer of open lowland up and on to the wooded crest of Hill 268, where the advance troops dug in. The 315th Infantry, meanwhile, with the aid of tanks entered Nantillois by 11 a. m., took the town in hand-to-hand fighting, and pushed on towards the woods around the Madeline Farm. Here the tanks were put out of action and the advance was held up by cross-fire from the guns east of the Meuse and frontal machine-gun fire from the woods. A second attack was tried but it was without success, and the lines were withdrawn behind Hill 274, so that by evening the brigade was dug in on either side of the Nantillois-Cunel road.

The 37th Division, which on the evening of the 27th had established its line on the Ivoir-Montfaucon road, attacked with both brigades on the morning of the 28th towards the town of Cierges. By 11 a. m. the Bois de Beuge and the Bois de Emont were cleared, and the way was open to Cierges, 1,000 yards in front. But here the attack was stopped. The Germans poured a fierce fire from the town on the advancing waves, and filled the woods in rear, where the supports and batteries were coming into position, with mustard and phosgene gas. Despite the gas, the 55th Artillery Brigade came up and fired heavily all afternoon and at 6 p. m. a second attack was launched, but it too was stopped, and the advance halted. The lines were then established at the edge of the woods.


The 91st Division continued on the 28th its phenomenal successes of the preceding two days. The 181st Brigade (361st and 362nd Infantry) on the right smashed forward from Epinonville through the stoutly held Bois des Epinettes, and in the afternoon attack entered the Bois de Cierges and linked their right flank with the left element of the 37th Division in the Bois Emont. Meanwhile the 182nd Brigade (363rd and 364th Infantry) to protect its left flank, for it was far in advance of the 35th Division, crossed over into their sector

and occupied the Bois Bouleaux and Serieux Farm, and then driving ahead took Exmorieux Farm. Then later in the day in another great drive it took the Bois de Baulny and Tronsol Farm and the slopes leading down into the Gesnes brook in the Exermont Valley. The 91st Division at the close of the third day, after a skillful advance, found that instead of holding a front of two kilometers, it had a front of eight kilometers.

The 35th Division, which had reached Baulny the night before, withstood a heavy counter-attack on the morning of the 28th, and immediately after this, the division attacked. In spite of heavy fire from the Argonne, the assault was carried until Chaudron Farm and the Bois de Montrebeau were cleared, and the division was also on the heights overlooking the valley of the Gesnes creek and the strongly fortified town of Exermont which lay at the juncture of two valleys. Here they dug in on a line with the 91st Division, but somewhat to the left of their sector.

The 28th Division during the night of the 27th-28th executed a skillful maneuver. The plateau of the Argonne, as it slopes down to the valley of the Aire, is cut by several deep ravines running east to the river. The big noses which projected between these were the enemy strong points, and to get from one ravine to the next meant either going over the top of the nose which lay between, or going around. During the night, in order to move up and attack the next promontory, the 56th Brigade, less two battalions of the 111th Infantry which remained to hold the line in the old position and keep contact with the troops in the forest, was withdrawn from the front to the valley of the Aire, then marched down the river until they came to the front lines held by the 55th Brigade, and then marched sharply to the left; before daylight it was in position facing the strong promontory called Le Chene Tondu. In the morning the whole line attacked and by noon the right brigade had taken Apremont, and by evening were pushing forward towards Chatel-Chehery, where the attack was stopped. The 56th Brigade was held fast before Le Chene Tondu, and while it helped the advance of the 55th Brigade, it could not advance itself.

The 77th Division meanwhile was slowly pushing its way forward with the French 1st Division in the Argonne forest itself. Long and bitter work it was in those deep wooded ravines bound with wire where the German rearguard could fight off any force which tried to rush that line. But slowly the line moved forward as the Germans were forced out of one pocket after another by the Americans and French on either side of the forest. The 28th Division was now three miles ahead outside the forest.



ADVANCE OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1918

The evening of the 28th of September showed the battle line in a much better position. It had stood fast on the Meuse, where it had been so far ahead, and, along the center, it had progressed about a mile. It was slow steady fighting, but it was through the heart of the German defensive system. Each day there was less wire to pass and along the roads across the original No Man's Land the ammunition and much needed guns were coming forward, and food, which had been so scarce those first two days, was now coming up in great quantities. Behind Cheppy at the end of the narrow gauge was the beginning of a great dump. The Germans still held

Brieulles on the Meuse, and from there the line ran to Cierges, which they also held. From Cierges the line ran roughly along the heights above the Exermont valley where the Gesnes creek flows, and then turned back to Apremont, and still further back to where the 77th was engaging the German rearguards in the three-mile-deep pocket of the Argonne. The French Fourth Army had advanced west of the Argonne slightly further than the Americans had pushed east of the Meuse, and the evening of the third day showed the line evenly advanced on both sides of the forest, and the Germans in the pocket were in a very poor position in the forest itself.

On the 29th of September, the 33rd Division remained in position on the Meuse facing east. Connecting with its left flank was the 8th Brigade of the 4th Division, which during the night had relieved the 7th Brigade and the small front of the 80th Division. All attempts to advance that day were futile, and during the next three days the only advance made on the right was the mopping up of the Bois de Brieulles.

The 79th Division, after an all-night preparation by the Corps and Army artillery, moved forward to the assault. The 315th and 316th Infantry Regiments managed to penetrate the Bois des Ogons, but were unable to hold the position and fell back to the jumping-off line. That afternoon the 312th and 313th Infantry Regiments took over the front and under the heavy shell-fire they withdrew a kilometer to the edge of the Bois de Beuge.

The 37th Division, which had seized the Bois de Emont on the evening of the 28th, found by that morning the Germans had infiltrated behind their positions. Ten tanks were sent forward along the eastern edge of the Bois de Emont to clean out these nests, but as they crossed the ridge the Germans directed a heavy artillery fire upon them and the tanks which were not disabled returned. Later in the afternoon a battalion of infantry tried to advance between the Bois de Emont and the Bois de Cierges. A burst of machine-gun fire killed the Major and the attack halted. That night the few remaining men who had held the far edge of the Bois de Emont

were drawn back and the line was established south of the woods.

The 91st Division did not attempt to advance its lines on September 29. The 37th Division on its right and the 35th Division on its left were still far behind, and any advance by the 91st Division would merely lengthen the salient in which it stood. Accordingly this division dug in on the crest overlooking the Gesnes creek, and held its ground.


The 35th Division, on the morning of the 29th of September, renewed the attack in order to straighten the line and reach the objective. They were behind the divisions on their right and left and before them lay the heights overlooking the Gesnes creek. The assaulting waves moved forward under heavy fire from the well entrenched German machine-guns. This was the third day of attack and the path of this division had been particularly difficult. It was also their first big battle and the organization of headquarters and lines of communication was weak. Food and supplies were worked forward with difficulty, and this coupled with heavy losses lessened the morale of the troops. There was no loss of impetus in the attack, however. The advance was pushed over the heights overlooking the Gesnes creek, and down into the Exermont ravine. The German resistance was strong and with utmost skill the most had been made of the deep ravine. Never faltering, the 35th Division reached the town of Exermont, then the unexpected occurred. From both ends of the valley a sweeping cross-fire stopped the advance, while the machine guns from in front opened a direct fire on the troops in the valley. Believing themselves surrounded, the forward elements began to withdraw. The casualties had been heavy in officers and apparently there were none there to stop this movement which grew in volume until the entire division was falling back. The crest overlooking Gesnes Creek was evacuated, as was the hollow and the Bois de Montrebeau. Finally the movement was halted and some sort of a line was formed of the scattered units on the line between Serieux and Chaudron Farms, three kilometers back from Exermont.

On the extreme left of the front of the First American

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE 257

Army during the 29th of September there was practically no advance. The 28th Division, which like the 91st Division was ahead of the divisions on its right and left, dug in during the day. The 77th Division on the extreme right, made a little progress through the dense Argonne forest.

By the evening of September 29, the situation on the attacking front of the First American Army was greatly altered. The impetus of the swift advance of the first two days had



CLOSE OF FIRST PHASE

Showing final advance line. The dotted portion in front of this shows advance that could not be held.

been lost. The German main line of resistance had been reached. All attempts to advance on the right of the battle line had met with failure. On the extreme left of the line a slight gain had been made, whereas, in the center, three divisions, the 35th (Missouri and Kansas National Guard, under General Traub), the 37th (Ohio National Guard, under General Farnsworth), and the 79th "Liberty"—(Pennsylvania National Army, under General Kuhn), had suffered a severe set back. Under the galling fire from the Germans, reinforced in their line of resistance, the forward units of these three divisions had retreated. Some sort of a line of battle was

formed, but the morale of these troops was too badly shattered to permit of reorganization on the field. Accordingly orders were issued for the 1st (Regular), 3rd (Regular) and the 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) Divisions—then in reserve—to move up immediately and take the place of these three divisions in the line. The center of German resistance between the Meuse and the Argonne had now been definitely located, and to these three fresh, veteran divisions was entrusted the mission of breaking through.

September 30 marked no change in the American lines between the forest of the Argonne and the Meuse. But the French Fourth Army, west of the Argonne, was steadily continuing its pursuit of the Germans, who were retiring to their second position. When the French Fourth Army reached this position, the 2nd American Division was used to break through. The 77th Division was the only American unit which advanced its front during this day. The Allied lines outside the forest were much further advanced than those in the forest proper, which put the Germans in a narrow salient from which they had to retreat. Slowly the 77th followed the German rearguards and each day advanced the line somewhat in the forest. It was very difficult work. The dense foliage, the deep ravines, and the barbed wire made progress extremely slow, but it was not until October 1, that a definite defensive line was met. This line stretched east and west through the Bois de la Naza and thence across a ravine to Binarville.

Meanwhile, during the day of September 30, the three veteran divisions, the 1st, 3rd, and 32nd, which had been held back of the original jump-off line, out of shell fire, in case of such emergency, were hurrying at top speed toward the front to relieve the three divisions which had fallen back. The experiences of all three divisions were much alike, and that of the 1st fully illustrated those of the 3rd and 32nd.

The 1st Division, under the command of General Summerall, was in rest billets near Verdun on the afternoon of September 29, when orders were received to entruck immediately and relieve the 35th Division. Hurriedly the various

units were collected, the headquarters closed, the kitchen ends of the rolling kitchens placed on trucks along with the rations, and then the infantry and machine-gunners were entrucked, sixteen men to a truck, and before dark the division was under way.

All night they rode in those little French trucks, driven by French Chinese, by a long route so as to take advantage of the most passable roads, and before dawn the trucks halted in the vicinity of Vauquois, and the troops were put under cover of a woods immediately behind the old front. Here they awaited the horse-drawn transportation and artillery while the senior officers went forward to reconnoiter the routes. Before noon marching orders were received, and the columns of the various regiments started forward over the ground which, for four years had been one of the most active fronts in the whole war. The town of Vauquois was conspicuous by its absence. There was not one stone upon another to mark the site of the village, and only the abrupt hill served as the landmark. The ground was torn and scarred until there was no trace of vegetation. Then the column passed through what had once been a forest. It looked like a forest of telegraph poles, for continuous drenching with gas had killed all vestiges of life. Next came the old No Man's Land. The outlines of the trenches were still visible, but the bombardment for the attack had reduced everything so that it looked like a relic of a former war. Across No Man's Land the engineers were working with mad haste to reconstruct the road, which had not been used for four years, and thus connect the roads behind the old front with those which the Germans had used. This was made doubly difficult in that the Germans had placed huge mines in the road which had blown holes hundreds of feet in diameter and 10 to 20 feet deep. Around the largest of these a temporary plank road was laid, wide enough for one way traffic. Military police at either end passed traffic one way for ten minutes, and then the other way for ten minutes. Over this one road was moving forward the ammunition, food, water, and artillery supplies of three divisions, and the tie-up was holding up further advances until sufficient artillery could be moved forward. Meanwhile com-

ing back over this same road was an endless stream of ambulances and trucks full of wounded. Beyond No Man's Land lay the little village of Cheppy, the headquarters of the 35th Division. Here more detailed instructions were received and the columns moved on. By evening, these troops which had ridden in trucks all night, and then marched all day, reached the valley of Very and began the ascent of the hill. The German shell fire was becoming more intense, and the valley was soon filled with gas. On reaching the summit a skirmish line was formed and the 1st Division moved across the broad plain, under cover of darkness. By this time there was little left of the 35th Division, and what few there were were passed by in the night. The 1st Division, now in line of battle, moved forward until, on the line of the Serieux-Chaudron Farms they ran into determined German machine-gun fire. They had fulfilled their mission for that night, they had gained contact with the enemy, they had filled the gap in the line, patrols were pushed out in front and to gain contact with the units on the right and left, and when morning broke the 1st Division was holding the broad front facing the Bois de Montrebeau which the 35th had taken and lost. The 1st Division was dug in, in four successive lines of defense, and was ready for the order to attack.

In much the same manner, with the precision of veterans, where every officer and non-commissioned officer knows exactly what to do, the 3rd Division (Regulars), commanded by General Buck, relieved the 79th Division, and the 32nd Division (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), commanded by General Haan, relieved the 37th Division. By the morning of October 1, the front of the American First Army was once more ready to resume the attack.

No attack was ordered for October 1. The first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive was finished. The first position of the German system was penetrated and the Allies on either side of the forest now faced the Kriemhilde Stellung. Much artillery would have to be brought forward before the assault on this formidable and last of the German defensive works might be attempted. The building of roads and light railways

to connect this army of 250,000 men who had crossed this battle-worn No Man's Land of four years standing, with the supply bases behind the old front must first be finished.

During the first three days of October the front was inactive, but sensitive. Each division patrolled well to its front to keep in contact with the enemy, and usually had little trouble in so doing, for the Germans were also busily engaged in bringing up artillery and machine guns to make this last line hold at all costs.

The only movement in the American lines between October 1 and October 4 was in the Argonne forest. Here on the morning of October 2, the 77th Division attacked the strongly fortified and wired position running through Binarville and the Bois de Naza. The position was a very strong one and no progress was made except at one point. Major Whittlesey with six companies of the 308th Infantry found a gap in the line in the bottom of a deep ravine, one mile east of Binarville. He pushed down this ravine for about 1,000 yards until it emptied into another ravine running west. At Charlevaux mill he was stopped. The remainder of the division did not advance, being held up by the German rearguards, who put up desperate resistance behind their own wire. Major Whittlesey therefore found his force alone, almost a mile in front of the division, in the bottom of a deep ravine with Germans occupying the high ground on all sides of him. The rescue of this famous "Lost Battalion" by the remainder of the division was a part of the "Second Phase" of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which began on October 4.

On the night of October 3, the 91st Division was relieved by the 64th Brigade of the 32nd Division. This put both brigades of the latter division in the line for the attack next morning. The 91st Division, which, under the command of General Johnston, had made such a fine record those first five days, was brought back to rest. The 181st Infantry Brigade, however, remained over, and operated under the command of the 1st Division, filling the space between the 1st and the 32nd Division.

The "FIRST PHASE" of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive

closed on October 3. For this opening attack of the big offensive fresh but inexperienced divisions had been used. Of the nine, four divisions: the 33rd (Illinois National Guard, General Bell), the 37th (Ohio National Guard, General Farnsworth), the 35th (Kansas and Missouri National Guard, General Traub), and the 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard, General Muir), were National Guard Divisions; four divisions: the 80th (Blue Ridge, General Cronkhite), the 79th ("Liberty," General Kuhn), the 91st ("Wild West," General Johnston), and the 77th ("Metropolitan," General Alexander), were National Army (draft) and one division, the 4th, General Hines, was Regular. During the first two days they had swept over the German defenses with an ardor characteristic of new troops. The attack came as a surprise to the Germans, and at this time dash and enthusiasm were of more value than experience and skill would have been.

By the third day, however, the Germans had brought up from rest billets several divisions, and these arrived in time to garrison the second position, the Kriemhilde Stellung. Against this the seven American divisions attacked on September 29, but they were too spent and lacked sufficient artillery to make effectual their attacks. Then, late that afternoon, the Germans seized the psychological moment and delivered heavy fire and counter-attacks on the American front line. In the majority of cases the weary troops held their ground, but the forward units of three of the center divisions yielded. These divisions were immediately replaced by more experienced divisions, and the 327th Regiment of the 82nd Division was put in to fill the wide front which the 28th Division had developed. Once more the stage was set for the second phase of the battle.

There were isolated cases in which a division or a part of a division did not carry out the instructions of higher authority with that dash and vigor so necessary to and so evident throughout our combat operations; but these cases were very rare and no doubt there were certain combinations of unfortunate circumstances to which these rare failures may be attributed.

The short period of training and the unavoidable rapidity with which it was imparted, both at home and in France, was not conducive to the making of efficient fighters. Some units were less fortunate than others, in that their camps billets, or sectors permitted less training than those of others. Local climatic conditions, too, had a definite bearing on this condition of affairs.

The standard for officers in some of these units was not as high as in others, and as a consequence a few of the units went into battle with officers who were either not capable or insufficiently trained for the all-important and highly psychological duty of leading their fellows in battle.

Whatever may have been the causes for the failure of these units in their baptism of fire, each, without exception, gave proof in succeeding actions and trials that when these causes had been removed or corrected, they could retrieve and regain that enviable place in our victorious Army to which their American blood and associations in the American Expeditionary Force entitled them.


CHAPTER XIII

WITH THE ALLIES

27th and 30th Divisions With the British in Flanders—2nd and 36th Divisions With French—2nd Division Seizes Blanc Mont Which Breaks German Line in the Champagne.

While the First American Army was driving forward with nine divisions in the valley between the Meuse and the Argonne forest, the French, British and Belgian Armies were also assaulting the German positions. One great battle was raging from the North Sea to Verdun, and the operation of the First American Army in the Meuse Valley was but a small part of this. When the First American Army was formed, in September, 1918, the majority of the American Divisions, which had been fighting as part of various British and French Armies, were withdrawn. There were at that time twenty-seven American combat divisions, and of these twenty were incorporated into General Pershing's Army. The other seven were left with the Allies. This was done largely to give visible proof to the Allies that American forces were at last taking a vital share in the fighting along all fronts. The 27th and 30th Divisions were in Rawlinson's Fourth British Army. The 2nd and 36th Divisions were in Gouraud's Fourth French Army, while the 5th, 6th, and 81st Divisions were a part of the French Eighth Army in the Vosges. There never was a day, in the short time from June until November, 1918, when the American Army was actively engaged in the war, that American Divisions were not participating with the British and French, as part of their Armies, on every front from the English Channel to the Swiss Border, and especially was this true of the last two months, when the action of these divisions loaned to the Allies tends to become dimmed by the

greater concentration of American Divisions in the American First Army fighting down the Meuse valley. The fact that American Divisions were fighting in the Allied Armies during



THE ALLIES' ATTACK

Showing the Allied Armies in position in late September, 1918, for the assault on the Hindenburg Line.

this time helps to keep in mind the fact that all the Allies were joining in this final attack, and that is why all succeeded.

The 27th Division (New York National Guard), commanded by General O'Ryan, and the 30th Division ("Old

Hickory" National Guard from Tennessee, North and South Carolina) under General Lewis, were assigned to the Second U. S. Army Corps under the command of General Reed. These two divisions had landed in midsummer and, after a period of training, were put in the line in front of Ypres. This was at that time a quiet sector, where the infantry gained the necessary experience. Here these two divisions remained until September 1, when they were withdrawn and sent to a training area for instructional purposes in tactics particularly involved in the advance with British tanks. Towards the end of September the Second U. S. Corps was made a part of General Rawlinson's Fourth British Army, and was assigned to the sector fronting the old Hindenburg Line, midway between Cambrai and St. Quentin.

During the two months since July 18, when the Allies took the initiative, and more particularly since August 8, when the British began the attack on the German lines in front of Amiens; the British had driven the Germans back little by little until, by mid-September the Germans had been forced back along the entire front to the Hindenburg Line. Once more the lines stood as they had been before the German attack of the preceding March, and Marshal Foch decided upon the plan which was to engage every body of German troops on all fronts from Palestine to the North Sea, in the hope of forcing the fighting to a conclusion in the fall of 1918.

The plan for the great Allied offensive provided that the British attack toward Cambrai on September 27, the day after the Americans and French had attacked on either side of the Argonne. The British First and Third Armies were to attack on the 13-mile front in front of Cambrai, which was to be followed by an extension of attack southward at a later date. In this attack by the British Fourth Army and the First French Army, the Second American Army Corps was to hold the center of the British Fourth Army, with the Ninth British Corps on its right, and the Third British Corps on its left, and the Australian Corps supporting the center.

On September 25, the 27th (New York National Guard), and the 30th ("Old Hickory" National Guard) Divisions

relieved the 18th and 75th British Divisions on the front. The 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions were brought up in close support of the American Divisions.

The portion of the Hindenburg Line, which they were to attack, was about 6,000 yards long, the limits of the sector being approximately determined by the length of the tunnel of the St. Quentin Canal. This was the most formidable portion of the Hindenburg Line on the front of the British Armies.

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, in his dispatch of December 21, 1918, to the British Secretary of State for War, described this part of the front as follows:

“Between St. Quentin and the village of Bantouzelle, the principal defenses of the Hindenburg system lie sometimes to the west, but more generally to the east of the Scheldt Canal. The canal itself does not appear to have been organized as the enemy's main line of resistance, but rather as an integral part of a deep defensive system, the outstanding characteristic of which was the skill with which it was sited so as to deny us effective artillery positions from which to attack it.

“The chief rôle of the canal was that of affording covers to resting troops, and to the garrisons of the main defensive trench lines during a bombardment. To this end the canal lent itself admirably and the fullest use was made by the enemy of its possibilities.

“The general configuration of the ground through which this sector of canal runs, produces deep cuttings of a depth in places of 60 feet, while between Bellicourt and the neighborhood of Vendhuille, the canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of 6,000 yards.

“In the sides of the cuttings, the enemy had constructed numerous tunneled dug-outs and concrete shelters. Along the top edge of them he had concealed well-sited concrete or armed machine gun emplacements. The tunnel itself was used to provide living accommodations for troops and was connected by shafts with the trenches above.

“South of Bellicourt the canal-cutting gradually became shallow until at Bellenglise, the canal lies almost at ground level. South of this town of Bellenglise, the canal is dry. On the west-

ern side of the canal, south of Bellicourt, two thoroughly organized and extremely heavily wired lines of continuous trench run parallel to the canal at an average distance from it of 2,000 and 1,000 yards respectively, except in the tunnel sector.

"The double line of trenches known as the Hindenburg Line proper, lies immediately east of the canal, and is linked up by numerous communication trenches, with the trench lines west of it.

"Besides these main features, numerous other trench lines, switch trenches, and communication trenches, for the most part heavily wired, had been constructed at various points, to meet the local weaknesses, or take advantage of local command of fire.

"At a distance of about 4,000 yards beyond the most easterly of these trench lines, lie a second double row of trenches known as the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, very thoroughly wired, and holding numerous concrete shelters and machine gun emplacements. The whole reserve of defense with the enemy's villages contained in it, formed a belt of country varying from seven to ten thousand yards in depth, organized by emplacements of every available kind into a most powerful system, well meriting the great reputation attached to it."

It was upon the center of this position that the Second American Army Corps was to attack. Neither the 27th (New York National Guard) nor the 30th ("Old Hickory" National Guard) Divisions had their artillery brigade with them, but these two American Divisions were substantially supported by the Divisional artillery of the 5th Australian Division, which made a total of 438 guns for the two divisions. Also supporting the Second American Army Corps in this attack, was the Third Australian Air Squadron, and the Third and Fifth British Tank Brigades, which included in the sector of the 27th Division, the 301st American Tank Battalion. This 301st Tank Battalion was the only American heavy tank unit on the Western front.

The British Divisions which the Second Corps relieved had not yet fully cleared all the old outpost positions from which the attack of September 29 was to jump off.

On the morning of the 27th of September, under cover of the heavy bombardment, when the First and Third British

Armies began the attack, the 106 Infantry regiment of the 27th Division, attacked these points, from which, two days later, they would have to advance. The positions were captured, but found very difficult to hold, for the Germans made constant counter-attacks upon them.

At 5:50 a. m., on the 29th of September, in the midst of a heavy fog, protected by an intense barrage of high explosive gas, and smoke shells, and accompanied by two brigades of tanks, the 27th and 30th U. S. Divisions attacked, with the Fourth British Army. Their path lay up the long open slopes towards the blazing German trenches and the ruins of Bellicourt and Bony, on the canal ridge. The 30th Division attacked with the 120th Infantry regiment on the right, and the 119th Regiment on the left. The 117th Infantry regiment followed on the right and was to deploy, facing southeast, after crossing the tunnel in order to help the 46th British Division to advance to the canal.

The 27th American Division attacked, with the 107th Infantry on the right and the 108th Infantry on the left, while the 106th Infantry followed to mop up the Hindenburg trenches, and the 105th Infantry was to face to the north after crossing the canal, just as the 117th Infantry faced to the south.


The fog that morning concealed the attacking troops from the enemy, and thereby permitted the attack to reach the lines with few casualties, but it caused the inexperienced units to lose contact, and pass by German machine-gun nests without destroying them. This was particularly important, in that all of these positions were connected by passages with the canal tunnel, and, after the first wave of the attack had passed, the German troops came up and occupied these machine-gun emplacements in the rear of the advancing troops.

The 30th Division went forward rapidly with few losses, and accomplished their purpose in crossing three trench lines of the Hindenburg system, and taking the town of Bellicourt, the village of Requeval, and the canal entrance, and finally taking the divisional objective, Nauroy and Etricourt. The 120th Infantry had advanced 4,300 yards from its jumping-

270 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

off trenches, and had passed all but the last of the three German trench systems, but in doing this, through fighting through fog, the advance had been carried chiefly by small groups, and the division was not well organized on reaching the final objective.

On the right of the 30th Division, the British had also ad-



THE SOMME OFFENSIVE

The small triangle to the left shows the advance of the 2nd Corps on September 29 and 30, 1918.

vanced brilliantly, but on the left, the 27th Division was in difficulties in the northern half of the Second Corps sector. The 30th Division had mopped up its sector during its advance, and had captured 47 German officers and 1,434 men. The 27th Division, while its front wave advanced rapidly, was fired upon from the rear by machine guns, which seemed to be almost at the jumping-off line. The advance stopped, almost the entire division was forced to return and mop up the numerous tunnel

entrances through which the Germans came up and fired after the lines had advanced. One battalion of the 107th Infantry, however, reached Lecatelet, on the left, and was completely cut off for a time, while the assaulting battalion of the 108th, with the greatest difficulty held the position which it had gained in the Hindenburg Line south of Bony. The Australians, following in close support, leap-frogged the 27th Division that day, and the command of the sector passed to General Gellibrand of the Third Australian Division shortly after midnight.

The attack was continued on the following day by the 30th American and 3rd Australian Division. The two units of the 27th Division which had reached their objective on the first day, continued in the attack with the Australians on the second day, when the Hindenburg Line was completely pierced. Late in the afternoon the 5th Australian Division relieved the 30th American Division, and the units of the 27th Division were withdrawn from the 3rd Australian Division. The Second American Army Corps was then withdrawn from the front and sent to the vicinity of Peronne for rest and replacements.

The 27th Division had suffered the greatest casualties. From the four Infantry regiments, the regiment of engineers, and the three machine-gun battalions it had lost 4,006 officers and men. It had taken about 1,530 German prisoners in this action. About 5,500 replacements were needed by the 27th Division for it had been below full strength on entering the action, but these were not available at that time. The 30th Division also needed many replacements, but the training was completed with the thinned ranks not yet filled, and when called once more to the front, the Second Corps, still without its artillery, was not a large force.

By October 4, when the Second American Corps was ordered back to the front, the Australians had reached the line just east of Montrehain, four miles beyond Nauroy. This was the distance the Australians had advanced in their five days of fighting, during which they had broken through the third and last German trench system of the Hindenburg Line.

On the night of October 4-5, the Second American Corps relieved the Australian Corps, with the 30th Division in the

line, and the 27th Division in reserve. Trench warfare was now at an end, and the fighting from then on was in the open. The front which the 30th Division now held was three miles wide, just east of Montrehain, between Cambrai and St. Quentin, facing northeast. To their front over gentle rolling country, lay the river Selle, nine miles away, and six miles beyond that lay the Sambre canal and river. In the valley of the Selle the main railroad from Metz to Valenciennes lay, and this made the Selle valley the objective of the first attack.

From October 5 until October 8 the Second American Corps, once more the center of the Fourth British Army, remained inactive on this front. On its right was the 6th British Division of the Ninth British Corps, while on its left was the 25th British Division of the Thirteenth British Corps. The Second American Corps, with the 30th Division in the line and the 27th Division in support, had the 117th Infantry regiment on the right, and the 118th Infantry regiment on the left.

At 5:10 a. m. on October 8, under cover of a rolling barrage and a dense fog, the First French Army, the Fourth British Army, and the Third British Army attacked along the entire front of these three armies, and, with the aid of tanks and the covering fog they passed rapidly through the German lines of defense despite the heavy German counter-barrage, and thereafter met very little resistance. The 30th Division by noon had taken Brancourt and Premont, an advance of three miles, and their front rested on the road from Bohain to Premont and Cambrai. Here the advance was halted until the 6th British Division on the right, which was held up by a strong rearguard, could extricate itself and move forward.

On the morning of the 9th the attack was resumed, and soon it became evident that the enemy was retreating rapidly on the whole front, and the attack became a pursuit. The whole horizon became black with the smoke from the burning stations and dumps, which gave a clear evidence of the German intention of evacuating that portion of the front. By 5 p. m. the 6th British Division was in Bohain, while the 30th U. S. Division had taken the towns of Busigny and Becquigny, and

were astride of the Metz-Mézières-Hirson-Valenciennes railroad, a total advance of four miles for that day.

The taking of the railroad did not stop the advance, for the Germans were retreating rapidly all along the entire front, and the pursuit was taken up next morning. The 30th Division took Escaufort and reached the outskirts of St. Souplet and Vaux-Andigny, and the line was established on the west bank of the Selle river. Here, however, the advance was stopped by heavy bursts of fire from the heights on the east bank of the river where the German rearguards were making a stand. The advance had gone so fast that the artillery of the Allies was not yet up, and that day and the next were spent in mopping up the west bank of the Selle and the villages of St. Souplet and Vaux-Andigny. On the night of October 11-12, the 30th Division was relieved by the 27th Division.

The advance of the Allies had by this time passed the desolate "Somme Country" where every trace of civilization and cultivation had been blasted away in the four years of bitter fighting. The country which now lay before the Allies was the rich fertile country around Valenciennes. It was open rolling country, plentiful in gardens, farm houses, and small towns, and, but for a few weeks in 1914, had never seen actual combat. The houses were intact, the roads were good, and, as soon as the Allied transport could be brought up, the attack would be carried forward. The only delay now was the terrible condition of the road behind the Allied Armies which kept continually slowing the advance.

On the 14th of October, the artillery had not yet been brought forward and supplies were too few to permit of any forward action, but there was great speculation as to whether the Germans were still holding the hills in front of the British Fourth Army with any great force. Accordingly the 27th Division sent out a daylight raid of thirty men, who waded the Selle, and surprised thirty Germans in a dugout, and brought them back as prisoners. The information gained was that the hills opposite were still strongly held. Plans were then made for the assault. On the night of the 16-17, the 30th Division reentered the line, and took over the right half of the sector


held by the 27th Division. This gave each division a front of about 2,000 yards which was large enough, for both Divisions needed replacements and the combined infantry strength was then but 15,000 instead of the 24,000 with which they had begun the battle.

On October 17, at 5:25 a. m., the Allied Armies attacked again. This time, in a dense fog and pouring rain, they followed their rolling barrage while the Germans put down a heavy counter-barrage; but, led by the remaining fourteen tanks of the 301st American Tank Battalion, the 27th Division smashed its way forward through the most determined German opposition, and established themselves two miles ahead on the line Arbre de Guise. It was a most gallant action, for the 25th British Division on their left and the 30th American Division on their right were held up by machine-gun fire, and the flanks of the 27th Division were of necessity bent well back to connect with these other two divisions. Here the 27th Division stood and for a while fought off many severe German counter-attacks. By their valor on this day they had entirely wiped out the failure of the 29th of September, and by holding on to the ground once taken, even though assailed from three sides, established a high record for the Division.

On the 18th of October the assault was continued. The 27th Division attacked in conjunction with the Thirteenth British Corps on their left. The 30th Division also attacked and after a very bitter struggle took the town of Ribeuville. Then, about the middle of the afternoon, the enemy resistance suddenly weakened, the whole front gave way, and once more the Germans were gone. The last of the rearguards had been reached, and the assault turned into a pursuit. By nightfall the lines were pushed over the crest of the next hill and lay but two miles from the Sambre Canal and the town of Chattillon. That night, by moonlight, the 30th Division, assisted by the 27th Division, took the town of Mazingheim.

On the 19th the pursuit was checked until the Allied artillery and trains could be brought up; meanwhile, the positions along the whole front were improved. The 27th Division sent patrols as far as the canal, while the 30th Division cleared

the ridge. Another German line of resistance was found on the far side of the canal, and an assault was planned. But by this time the two American divisions of the Second American Corps were too weak in numbers to continue much longer in the attack, and accordingly they were relieved. On the night of October 20-21 the 1st British Division relieved the 30th



ADVANCE OF THE 2ND CORPS

Showing total advance of 27th and 30th Divisions, from September 29 until October 20, 1918.

Division, and the following night the 6th British Division relieved the 27th Division.

The Second American Army Corps was then assembled near Amiens, where they rested, then trained, and then awaited replacements, until the armistice was signed. The 27th and 30th Divisions, from the 29th of September until the 21st of October had advanced sixteen miles. The 27th (N.Y.N.G.) Division in these actions lost a total of 236 officers and 7,901

men, while the 30th Division lost a total of 253 officers and 7,084 men. The 27th Division advanced seven miles, and the 30th Division advanced eighteen and a half miles. The 27th Division captured from the enemy 2,355 men, and the 30th Division captured from the enemy 3,848 men and 81 pieces of artillery. The 27th Division lost captured by the enemy three officers and 225 men, and the 30th Division lost captured by the enemy six officers and 71 men.

The Second American Army Corps received the highest praise from the British after this operation. General Monash of the Australian Corps, General Rawlinson of the Fourth British Army and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig all paid tribute to the heroic valor of these two divisions which contributed no small part to the advance of the British Fourth Army. Even greater in importance was the actual proof given to the British that the American Army was actively taking part in the final struggle, and as such these two divisions worthily upheld the prestige of the American Army and left the field worthy to be ranked with the best of American Divisions.

THE CAPTURE OF BLANC MONT

Fighting as a part of General Gouraud's Fourth French Army on the west side of the Argonne forest the 2nd and the 36th Divisions played an important part in the early days of October, in pushing the line forward west of the forest. The Fourth French Army, which, with the First American Army, was squeezing the Germans out of the Argonne forest, had also a special mission for the advance of its left flank. Every kilometer the right of this army advanced, it made the Argonne more and more uncomfortable for the Germans, while every advance on the left of General Gouraud's Army relieved the pressure on Reims.


The fighting on this side of the Argonne forest also developed into phases. In the first phase, which ended October 1, the French had in four days broken through a great part of the German defensive system, in some points as far as 12 kilometers (7½ miles). Here, however, the French had run into

the German main line of resistance, which had served as the enemy stronghold since 1914. Here the Germans were making a desperate stand. The key to this entire battle line in the Champagne (between Reims and the Argonne) was the stronghold of Blanc Mont. The French had taken the difficult system of trenches south of Somme-Py in several days of terrible fighting and, on October 1, were one kilometer north of Somme-Py. It was here that General Gouraud decided to place the 2nd American Division, which had been put at his disposal after the St. Mihiel offensive. There were two very good reasons for this: This division was famous for its reckless daring in attack, and then the moral influence upon the French troops, after four heartbreaking years of war, when they should see these splendid young fighters from America in their own line, he knew would be very great.

The 2nd Division, under General LeJeune, had spent a week in rest after it was relieved from the St. Mihiel offensive. It was then transferred to the French Fourth Army, commanded by General Gouraud, and, on September 26-27, the 2nd Division moved by railroad to Chalons-sur-Marne. On September 29, the Division was moved by truck to Suippes, and from there it marched to that point in the lines just north of Somme-Py, where it relieved, on the night of September 30, the 61st French Division, which had so gallantly taken these trenches. The country which the 2nd Division passed over between Suippes and Somme-Py was perhaps the most badly scarred terrain of the Western front. It had been one of the most active sectors throughout the four years and was completely desolate. As the men marched they passed over mazes of battered trenches cut deep in the white chalky soil and shattered belts of barbed wire, while the whole country was pock-marked with shell holes. Not a tree was standing, not a blade of grass could be seen, and here and there, scattered over that broad plain, lay countless bodies of the still unburied dead, both French and German, putrefying in the sun. Dead horses marked the roads, while great ugly mine craters and smashed cannon deepened the conviction in the minds of the men, that

this was to be the most terrific battle of the war for the 2nd Division.

The 2nd Division became the left division of the Twenty-fourth French Corps, with the 170th French Division on its right, and the 21st French Division of the Eleventh French Corps on its left. The front which the division held was the



THE CHAMPAGNE FRONT

"Essen" trench, one of the German lines of defense which the French had captured and reversed. The 36th American Division was placed in reserve of the 2nd Division.

The sector immediately in front of the 2nd Division, which it was to assault in the coming attack, lay open ground, dotted here and there with small woods which rose gradually to the rolling highland of Blanc Mont. Between the long narrow woods which covered this entire plain were belts of barbed wire and trench systems, built about strongly fortified "strong

points," which were so laid out as to give the defenders a deadly cross-fire on any advancing troops. Medeah Farm lay just outside the sector to the right, while the Bois de Somme-Py lay just inside the left boundary. The position was a very strong one and, as it was dominated by Blanc Mont, the assault against determined resistance promised to be a very costly as well as slow proceeding. It was the center of all German resistance west of the Argonne, therefore the assault had to be carried through to the last of these defenses as speedily as possible. That the Germans would put up a stiff resistance was evidenced by the fact that the 2nd Division spent its first day in the line cleaning out the last of the enemy from the Essen trench. The Germans were clinging to every bit of ground in the hope of holding this line.

At dawn on October 3, the French Fourth Army, after five minutes' preparation by the artillery, attacked behind a rolling barrage. The plan of the attack of the 2nd Division was, in reality, two separate, converging attacks, one by each brigade, which were to meet three kilometers from the jump-off line. This was done so as to pass around the large triangle of difficult terrain on the immediate front of the division. The 3rd Brigade, on the right, attacked with the 9th Infantry in line and the 23rd in support, while the 4th Brigade, on the left, had the 6th Marines in the lead, with the 5th Marines in support. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of French tanks assisted the assault and were of material assistance in maintaining the swift advance. The Germans put up a splendid resistance and, from their trenches, poured a hot fire into the advancing lines; but, without faltering, the now famous 2nd Division maintained its stride. Trenches were taken in hand-to-hand fighting and, heedless of the staggering losses, the 2nd Division pushed on until, at 8:30 a. m., the "Divisional Objective" had been reached and the line was being pushed out in exploitation toward St. Etienne. The success of that first attack was greater than had been anticipated. Sixteen hundred prisoners from four German Divisions had been captured. These, for the most part, were taken in the triangle which the two converging attacks surrounded. The whole action was carried

forward with the same reckless daring with which it had been planned. In less than three hours of terrific fighting, the 2nd Division had seized the crest of Blanc Mont ridge.


The Germans reacted violently and immediately. Blanc Mont ridge was swept with a deadly artillery fire, and early in the afternoon the Germans launched a determined counter-attack against the left of the 4th Brigade (Marines), which was, however, beaten off, and heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy. The left flank of the 2nd Division was in an awkward position, for the French on their left had been held up by a very strong group of machine-guns in the Essen Trench, almost at the jump-off line. In order to relieve this position, the 5th Marines, which had been in support during the morning, were sent in to attack with the French 21st Division in order to attack this strong point from two sides. This attack was only partially successful and, when darkness fell, the Germans were still holding their position in the Essen Trench.

Meanwhile, at four in the afternoon, General LeJeune ordered the remainder of the 2nd Division to resume the assault. Another mile was added to the American gains for that day, and the wooded heights south and southeast of St. Etienne were seized. During this operation, the 23rd Infantry passed through the 9th Infantry and, with the 6th Marines, established the final line for the day.

The situation, at the end of the first day, was generally satisfactory, although decidedly precarious. The 2nd Division held a front of six kilometers (almost four miles) shaped like a triangle, with the tip threatening St. Etienne. Both flanks were exposed, and the Germans moved in a wealth of machine-guns and artillery on all three sides of this triangle. The morning of October 4 promised to be a critical one and, during the night, all possible efforts were made to defeat any enemy counter-attacks which the morning might develop.

At daybreak, October 4, the enemy launched two powerful counter-attacks, striking at both flanks, nearly two kilometers back of the extreme point of advance. The German plan was to drive these two attacks through until they met and then turn due south and attack the base of the triangle. This, if

successful, would have surrounded the majority of the infantry of the 2nd Division. The counter-attacks were delivered with dash and skill and were strongly supported by artillery and machine-gun fire. On the right the Germans met the



BLANC MONT

9th Infantry, which was in support of the 23rd. In spots temporary successes by the Germans were immediately beaten back, and, throughout the line, the regiment clung tenaciously to its front and defeated every German effort to advance. On the left, the 5th Marines had begun a local advance to improve their line. The German counter-attack on this side

began about the same time. Advancing behind a heavy artillery barrage, the Germans assaulted without opposition until they ran into the advancing Marines. So swift and sudden was this action that the bewildered Germans found themselves surrounded, and surrendered. The Marines continued their advance and established their line one kilometer southwest of St. Etienne. Thus ended the German counter-attacks for that day. Late in the afternoon, the 2nd Division resumed their advance against the long wooded ridge running east from St. Etienne. The woods were heavily wired, and it was only by suffering very heavy casualties that a foothold was gained in them. Throughout the evening the German artillery fire on these positions grew in intensity, but the American spirit was not broken.

At 6:15 a. m. October 5, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Marines, in conjunction with the 17th French Infantry Regiment, after an hour's artillery preparation, rushed the strong point of Blanc Mont and took it absolutely without loss, capturing 213 prisoners and 75 machine guns. This cleared the whole situation on the left. The 22nd French Division (now on the left) advanced at once to St. Pierre and the edge of St. Etienne, where the Marines joined them about 500 yards short of the town, being stopped by a line of trenches, wired and stoutly held by many machine guns.

On October 6, after artillery preparation of an hour, the 23rd Infantry and the 6th Marines attacked and carried the German positions before St. Etienne. The town itself, however, was well defended by the Germans. The French on one side and the Marines on the other tried again and again to enter the town, and each time were driven out by the intense fire.

During the night of October 6-7, the 71st Brigade of the 36th Division relieved part of the 2nd Division. This was its first experience under fire, and its relief of the 2nd was spread out so as to introduce the new division into one of the bitterest fights of the war in company with the veterans of many battles. The 141st Infantry went in on the right, relieving one battalion of the 23rd Infantry, and with the 141st Infantry the 9th Infantry also went in, the two having alternating bat-

talions in the line. In much the same way the 142nd Infantry relieved the 5th Marines, and with it the 6th Marines took over the front. All the next day was spent in organizing for the coming attack. The 2nd Artillery Brigade was moved up, as it was to stay in, the 36th Division's Artillery Brigade not having completed its training.

On the morning of the 8th, the 71st Brigade of the 36th Division assaulted behind a rolling barrage after a heavy artillery preparation. The 2nd Division units stood fast on the jump-off line and became the reserve for the 36th Division, which had taken over the front. Supported by the two battalions of French tanks, and following their barrage closely, the 71st Brigade attacked like veterans. They pushed forward through the village in spite of a heavy fire, enveloped and took the cemetery and 208 prisoners, and went on a half mile beyond the town to a ravine, where at 10:30 a. m. a wired trench system held them up. The 2nd Division, meanwhile, occupied St. Etienne, mopped up the few remaining Germans in the town and organized it for defense.

On the right the 141st Infantry had not progressed as far, and this put the 142nd in an awkward position, exposed to flank fire; at 4:30 that afternoon when the Germans delivered a strong counter-attack, they were forced to fall back upon the positions of the 2nd Division in front of St. Etienne. These were firmly held, the confusion of the 142nd Infantry was quickly straightened out, and that night the elements of the 2nd Division were withdrawn from the town. The 142nd Infantry Regiment had suffered heavily that day, both in officers and men, but it reorganized and occupied the line in front of the town. All the next day was spent in organizing the positions, and in completing the relief of the remainder of the 2nd Division by the 72nd Brigade; by dawn on the 10th this was completed.

General LeJeune, who commanded the 2nd Division in this famous attack, summed up the action as follows:

"General Gouraud, the distinguished commander of the Fourth French Army, to which we are attached, has congratulated the division on its wonderful success and has reported


to the commander-in-chief of the French Forces that the German Army east of Reims is in full retreat, due to the magnificent attacks of the 2nd Division and its tenacity in holding its advanced positions."

The division advanced a distance of nine kilometers through a series of the strongest positions on the Western Front, capturing 2,296 prisoners from nine enemy divisions. The casualties in the 2nd Division totaled 5,435 for the seven days' fighting.

As a result, the Germans were forced to retire along the entire front from Reims to the Argonne, behind the River Aisne. The Massif "Notre Dame des Champs," which had dominated Reims for four years, was evacuated by the Germans. The greatest efforts made by the German Staff and Armies had failed to defeat this attack. The 2nd Division retired for a brief rest at Somme-Suippes before moving to the First American Army for the final phase of the attack.

The 36th Division was now alone in the sector, and, on information that the enemy was retiring, attempted to advance on October 10, but was met with a withering fire. Late that afternoon, in conjunction with the French 73rd Division on the right, the 36th Division was ordered to keep abreast of the advance of the Eleventh French Corps to its left, and the slow movement was begun. That night, while advancing, the 72nd Brigade relieved the 71st Bridge, 143rd Infantry on the right, 144th Infantry on the left, and in the darkness and under enemy fire the units became confused. But the advance continued and slowly the tangle was straightened out. The Germans were evidently retiring towards the Kriemhilde Stellung, which on this side of the Argonne lay north of the river Aisne. For three days the French and Americans followed the retreating Germans. The 36th Division directed its advance on Givry upon the Aisne river and the Ardennes canal which paralleled it, pushing steadily through the light resistance of the German rearguards, until on the evening of October 12, the line halted on the hills overlooking the Aisne valley. Patrols were pushed forward to the canal, where the Germans were found in force.

On the morning of the 13th, the Germans were found to be in position north of the Aisne, and all the bridges across the river destroyed. The Allies established their outpost line along the canal, and the main line on the hills. All attempts to cross the canal and river met with prohibitive fire from the German defenses. Here the 36th Division remained in the



THE CHAMPAGNE

Showing line of October 1 and the Aisne River, to which the pursuit was pushed.

line until the evening of October 27, when the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry assaulted and took Forest Farm, two miles east of Attigny, in a loop of the river and canal. This last mission was carried out with marked success in half an hour. That night the division was relieved and moved to the Triacourt area of the First American Army.

In this, its only action in the war, the 36th Division made an enviable record. It advanced 21 kilometers (13 miles)

through the defenses of the Champagne to the Aisne, captured 549 prisoners from four German divisions, and 9 pieces of artillery, at a total cost of 2,710 officers and men lost, of whom 591 were killed.

During September five divisions arrived from the United States. Two of these, the 7th and the 88th were combat divisions, while the other three became replacement divisions and sent their personnel forward during October to take the places of the men who had fallen in the combat divisions in the heavy fighting of the last three months of the war. This brought the total of American combat divisions in France to twenty-nine, and the number of replacement divisions to eight.

The 7th (Regular Army) Division was the first to arrive in September. Organized at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, January 1, 1918, from elements of the regular army, the division arrived at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, in February for training. The overseas movement began on July 31, and the last units arrived in France September 3, 1918. On August 19 the division entered the 15th Training Area, Ancy-le-Franc, and by September 20 the entire division, less the artillery, was in training there. On September 30 it moved to the vicinity of Toul, where on October 10-11 it relieved the 90th Division on the west bank of the Moselle. The 7th Artillery Brigade did not join the division until after the Armistice, and the 5th Artillery Brigade supported the 7th Division in this sector.

The 39th Division, organized from the National Guard of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas, at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, began the overseas movement on July and the last units arrived in France September 7, 1918. The division was designated as the 5th Depot Division, and was sent to the St. Florent Area, where it remained until November 1, training its personnel as replacements for the combat divisions. The training cadres were then transferred to the 1st Depot Division at St. Aignan.

The 88th Division was organized at Camp Dodge, Iowa, from men drawn from North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Illinois. The overseas move-

ment began August 8 and the last units of the division reached France September 9, 1918. The division was assembled in the 21st Training Area at Samur, where it remained until September 14, when it was placed in the Fourth French Army, and on September 23 relieved the 38th French Division in the center sector of Upper Alsace.

The 87th Division was organized at Camp Pike, Arkansas, from men drawn from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The overseas movement was begun on August 23, 1918, and the last units reached France September 13, 1918. This division was turned over to the S.O.S. and placed on work throughout the Intermediate Section of the S.O.S.

The 84th Division, organized at Camp Taylor, Kentucky, from men drawn from Indiana and Kentucky, arrived in France late in September, and was designated as a depot division, and ordered to Le Mans where the units were broken up and sent to the front as replacements for the combat divisions.

CHAPTER XIV

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE

(October 4-30, 1918)


Main Line of Resistance Broken—American Casualties Reach Peak of the War—1st Division's Signal Honor

By October 3, the Allied offensive which was being pushed on every front from the English Channel to the Holy Land had met with signal success. Bulgaria made peace on October 1, the British and French Armies entered St. Quentin on October 2, the British in Palestine were in Damascus on October 3, Armentières was captured October 3, and the Fourth French Army on the same day began the second phase of its attack west of the Argonne. On the morning of the 4th, the First American Army began the Second Phase of its attack in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The advance of the Fourth French Army west of the Argonne had passed Binarville; the line stretched northwest, with Condé-les-Autry, Marvaux, and Somme-Py well within the French lines, and Reims was almost delivered from its four years' siege. This advance had been held up, however, before a very strongly held line, and it was here, on October 3, that the 2nd American Division was put in to break through for the French Fourth Army. By the night of October 3 the First American Army, on the eastern side of the Argonne forest, was ready to continue its advance. For four days there had been no forward movement by this army. This was due to no lack of enthusiasm or readiness on the part of the troops in the line, for each day they stayed there gave the Germans another day to dig in and to mass more machine guns. The delay was due to the necessity of building roads across the morass of the

old No Man's Land for the transport of artillery and ammunition.


Of all the Meuse-Argonne fighting, the Second Phase was



ALLIED ATTACK 1918

the hardest, and the fighting there between October 4 and 14 was the hardest which the American Army encountered in this war. The terrain was almost insurmountable. Between the Argonne forest and the Meuse river, a distance of 15 miles, the First American Army had in line on October 4, from the

Meuse river west toward the forest: the 33rd Division (facing east along the river), 4th, 80th, 3rd, 32nd, 1st, 28th, and 77th Divisions (the latter within the forest). The American



OCTOBER 4, 1918

Army front stretched in a straight line from Brieulles on the Meuse to Apremont on the Aire. In front of it lay the Kriemhilde Stellung, the last of the German lines of defense in this sector. It was ideally sited for defense. The Aire river here ran close in beside the eastern side of the forest, and just west

of it lay the valley of Exermont with the Gesnes creek, running west. Immediately behind this was a group of wooded hills and ravines which seemed to have been piled in there together to make this place impassable to any assault. It formed a barrier three miles in depth and three miles in width, and before taking it, the assaulting troops would have to cross a mile of flat wooded plain, push down the Gesnes valley, and then force their way into these wooded heights. It also must be borne in mind that the Germans had spent four days of comparative quiet in siting their machine guns, and in emplacing four crack divisions for the defense. From this position the Germans could overlook the whole Meuse valley to the east and the Aire valley to the west. This group of hills, covering nine square miles in the middle of the Meuse-Argonne battlefield, was the key position commanding the whole front of the American First Army. The mission of the 1st Division (Regular Army) was to drive a wedge into the German lines at this point, and effect a junction with the French Fourth Army at Grand-Pre. This would close the Argonne and establish the line of attack for the last phase.


Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Palmer in *Collier's Weekly*, paid this tribute to the 1st Division, writing from the headquarters of the First Army:

"I think that possibly when the 1st Division went into the Argonne battle it was the most efficient American Division that ever wore shoe leather; if it were not, then perhaps the 2nd was—as all men of the 2nd will agree. We were all thrilled when the 1st took the place of the 35th and advanced over the ground where the 35th had fought desperately. The dead of the 35th were in groups in the Exermont ravine. When the men of the 1st saw them, they knew how good it was to be veterans under exacting competent direction; for veterans do not bunch under the enemy's fire. This is giving the enemy a target. And Summerall was in command. He had led the 1st in the drive toward Soissons. . . . The 1st, with Summerall in command! We knew it would go through! It always had gone through. This was the part cast for the 1st in the A. E. F."

The front line of the First American Army on the night of October 3 ran from the Meuse, just south of Brioules, which the Germans held and had heavily fortified, southwest along the Brioules-Nantillois road to Nantillois, which lay in the American lines. Thence it ran along the northern edge of the Bois de Beuge to the town of Cierges, which the Americans also held. From there the line ran along the northern edges of the Bois de Cierges and the Bois de Baulny, and ran out to include Tronsol Farme. Here the line dropped sharply back, at a right angle 2,000 yards to Serieux Farme. The effort of the 26th Infantry, the right regiment of the 1st Division, which had been stopped on October 1 at Serieux Farme, to advance its lines by strong patrols to Tronsol Farme, had met with the most deadly fire. One patrol of two officers and seventy men did reach a point just west of this point; here they stayed, surrounded on four sides, fighting off one attack after another until there was left but one officer and seven men, who withdrew under orders on the night of October 3, as the assault and barrage would begin the next morning back on the line Serieux Farme-Chaudron Farme, and cover the intervening territory. From Chaudron Farme, the line ran north of Apremont to Binarville, where it joined the line of the French Fourth Army. This was the line from which the First American Army jumped off in the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The German strength in their positions was well known by the American Army, for, in the three days preceding the attack, each division on the front had sent out strong patrols. These had in all cases been cut down by terrific machine-gun fire, and the survivors brought back the most definite information of the determined resistance which the German Army might be expected to put up when the attack was launched. Not only were the Germans strong in machine-guns, but their artillery concentration, which was cleverly concealed in those wooded hills north of Exermont, was enormous. The troops of those divisions which were to make the attack suffered heavy casualties during the three days of waiting, between October

1 and 4, from the constant and well-directed German batteries. The rear areas were swept with high explosive and gas, and every indication pointed to the fact that the Germans were ready for the attack to be resumed. During these three days, the troops on the front of the American First Army lay quiet in the little holes which each man had dug to protect himself from the sweeping German artillery fire. Meanwhile in the rear, engineers, labor battalions, pioneer infantry, and all available troops worked at top speed to complete and widen



JUMP-OFF OF SECOND PHASE

Showing battle order of First American Army and objectives.

the roads so that sufficient artillery ammunition could be sent forward to the guns.

Finally by the night of October 3, all was in readiness. The artillery, both light and heavy, had all been moved up in close support of the infantry, and the ammunition and food was coming in a steady stream along the new roads across the old No Man's Land. Accordingly the order was issued for the First American Army to attack at 5:30 a. m. on October 4 along the whole front from Brieulles on the Meuse to Binarville in the Argonne forest. The Germans were not holding a line of trenches, but instead their line of defense was merely

a host of machine guns hidden under the cover of the plentiful small woods and defiles. For this reason it was practically impossible to determine in so short a time, the exact location of these positions, and consequently any artillery preparation before the attack would be futile. All the available guns of the Army, however, were ordered into simultaneous action for the rolling barrage which was to protect the attacking troops, and, at 5:30 a. m. on October 4, the quiet of the early morning was blasted and the assault began.

The 33rd Division, along the bank of the Meuse, did not take part in the attack, but all the other American divisions in order from left to right: 4th, 80th, 3rd, 32nd, 1st, 28th, 77th, took part in this attack. There was no surprise to the Germans in this attack and consequently no such enormous initial success. With the moving forward of the infantry came that unmistakable rattle of German machine-guns which multiplied until it seemed as though there were one behind every tree. In some places the assault gained some ground, while in others it was stopped on the jump-off line, but an appreciable gain was made by the end of the first day, and eight German divisions were identified on the front that first day. Four of these were on the front of the 1st Division. For seven days the attack was pushed with the greatest heroism by those assaulting troops and each day showed a small but considerable gain, and the furious German counter-attacks never made the slightest impression on that ever advancing line of veteran divisions, who with the greatest skill and heroism took bit after bit of the German defensive system until the Kriemhilde line was pierced.

On October 8, the 33rd Division crossed the Meuse and in connection with the divisions on the east bank cleared those heights which had enfiladed the main attack. This action straightened out the line from Sivry to Ornes, and Verdun was freed from its four years of imprisonment. The attacks on both sides of the Meuse were continued in decreasing force towards the end of October, and on November 1, the Third Phase of the offensive was begun.

(In relating the daily activities of the various divisions, the actions of each day of the attack will be treated singly until the main attack is completed and then the treatment will be by divisions or areas. For the main attack, however, the description will begin with the division resting on the Meuse and continue through each division to the west until the Argonne forest is reached. It is impossible at present to obtain the necessary data concerning the French daily advances west of the Argonne other than those relating to the 2nd and 36th American Divisions fighting under French command. The capture of Blanc Mont by the 2nd American Division, forced the Germans to retire all the way back to the Aisne river. In following this retreat, there was practically no fighting for twenty kilometers. Blanc Mont was captured on October 5th, and the line reached the Aisne river on October 13. In other words the French Fourth Army was playing at least as big a part in squeezing the enemy out of the Argonne Forest as was our own Army—a fact which is often lost sight of in studying the minutiae of the attack of the American Army.)

The 33rd Division did not attack, as their front was the River Meuse, and the First American Army was not ready to extend its operations to the east bank of the river. The 4th Division did not attempt to assault the large town of Briulles, but instead attempted to go around it by the left. Accordingly on the morning of the 4th of October, the 58th and 59th Infantry Regiments jumped off from the Briulles-Nantillois road. In the first rush, these two regiments, despite a hail of German machine-gun bullets, swept down the shallow ravine of the Wassieu brook, followed their barrage closely through the Bois de Fays, crossed the Cunel-Briulles road, and entered the Bois de Foret. It was a beautiful operation which carried the line forward three kilometers (2 miles) and pierced the Kriemhilde Stellung on its eastern end.

The 80th Division, jumping off from in front of Nantillois, was not able to take the Bois des Ogons. This wooded crest offered perfect fire for the German machine guns to cover the gradual approaches from three sides, and with the Madeleine Farm in the center on the Nantillois-Cunel road, this little

hill with its wood, just southwest of the Bois de Fays, menaced the flank of the 4th Division on the right, so when all attempts to take the Bois des Ogons failed, the 4th Division was forced to pull back its advanced units to the northern edge of the Bois de Fays, and at that, there was an exposed flank of more than a mile on its left. The 80th Division had advanced over a mile across two flat ravines that day and had made two desperate assaults on the Bois des Ogons, but the 317th and 318th Infantry, failing to take the wood, established the line for the night just to the south of it.

The 3rd Division, attacking from the Nantillois-Cierges road, immediately met intense resistance. They crossed the open and were held up by that part of the Bois des Ogons which lies west of the Nantillois-Cunel road. Here the 7th and 4th Infantry were stopped by heavy German machine-gun fire from the woods.

The 32nd Division, which had taken over the sectors of the 37th and 91st Divisions, attacked with all four infantry regiments in the line towards the Bois de la Morine, which necessitated pushing down the deep ravine of the Gesnes creek and up the other side. The light barrage was insufficient, and the Germans swept the ground with such fire that no advance was made, the line remaining at Tronsol Farme.

The 1st Division, in order from right to left, 26th, 28th, 18th, 16th Infantry, attacked across the open plain and into the Bois de Montrebeau on the rising ground, where four picked German divisions were entrenched. There had been no artillery preparation, and it was here that the Germans had elected to break the attack of the whole American offensive. In speaking of the action of the 1st Division in taking the Bois de Montrebeau on October 4, the *Stars and Stripes* says: "The attack plans had been carefully prepared and they were carried out with grim precision and unflagging courage in the face of an opposition whose bitterness has seldom been equaled and at a cost of such losses as might well break the stamina of the very best troops." All day long those fast thinning ranks fought their way forward across two miles of rolling wood-dotted plains. Regimental commanders in this division had

learned not to rush around the front trying to direct five or six men, but to rely on the lieutenants who were commanding the platoons, while they themselves established headquarters along the axis of *liaison* and from there jumped one battalion through another the moment they saw that the leader had temporarily lost its punch. Battalions would thus jump each other three or four times during a day, but without the slightest confusion. The officers and men of these regiments were highly efficient fighters; the troops the bravest that ever wore the uniform. By night the left and center were in the Exermont ravine, and the 26th Infantry was on the crest overlooking the ravine. The 28th Infantry prolonged the line of the 26th Infantry along the ravine. On the left, the 16th Infantry had gallantly reached its objective on the heights south of Fleville, and the 18th Infantry, extending from the right of the 16th by the Montrefagne (Hill 204) to the left of the 28th Infantry. The barrage had been thin that day, due to no fault of the gunners who fired with their guns red hot, but the division was on a front of five kilometers, and there were only the 48 "Seventy-fives" to fire a barrage to protect infantry advancing on a front of 5,000 yards. One gun per hundred yards of front is scarcely any barrage at all. All day long those gunners, apparently heedless of the terrible hail of German shells, fired their guns at bursting speed, while the infantry quietly took their staggering losses and went through.


The 28th Division also assaulted that morning; the 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments drove down the west bank of the Aire river in company with the 1st Division on the east bank, for two kilometers that morning, until they were stopped by machine-gun cross-fire from Abbatale Farm on the east bank and Chatel Chehery on the west bank. Under intense machine-gun fire some elements of the division forded the river and at seven in the evening took Abbatale Farm, Pleinchamps Farm, and placed the extreme right of the 28th Division on the Gesnes creek at the foot of the Exermont ravine. Meanwhile the left of the division mopped up Le Chene Tondu, that promontory of the Argonne plateau which had been such a menace to the flank, and that night the line of the 28th Divi-

sion ran almost north and south at right angles to the main battle line, facing Chatel Chehery and the Argonne plateau.

The 77th Division, in the Argonne forest, had on October 2 begun the assault on the German entrenched and heavily wired line running east from Binarville. In this dense forest the troops became much involved, while the artillery was practically powerless. The battalions on the front had orders to press on, regardless of flanking units, but none were able to make the slightest advance, save one. The 1st Battalion of the 308th Infantry, under Major Charles S. Whittlesey, and a detachment of the 307th Infantry, at about 4 p. m. on October 2, found a weak spot in the enemy lines, and pushed through. They advanced down a narrow canyon until it emptied into the deep valley of the Charleveux creek at the Charleveux mill. By this time they were over a mile in advance of the remainder of the division. That night the Germans infiltrated on to the plateau which dominated the valley and Whittlesey's detachment found themselves cut off from all communication with the rear. Carrier pigeons were released telling of their plight, and immediately the division began making every possible effort to relieve this force. On the night of October 2, the 154th Brigade attacked, and on the 4th the entire division attacked the entrenched line, but made no progress.

This was the situation, then, on the night of the first day of the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The line ran from just south of Brioules on the Meuse, north of the Bois de Fays, then back and south of the Bois des Ogons, thence north of Cierges to Tronsol Farme, whence it ran along the crest overlooking the Exermont valley and included Chehery. Here it turned due southwest and included the Chene Tondu and ran from there to Binarville in the Argonne forest, where it joined with that of the Fourth French Army. Some ground had been gained almost the whole length of the line, but the big gains were where the German resistance had been greatest, on the fronts of the 1st and 28th Divisions. That night was a strenuous one on that front. Food had to be taken to the front line troops half frozen in the sharp chill

of October, and the German artillery was beating the "Devil's Tattoo" over every inch of the country. Telephone linemen went out constantly to repair the wires which the leading battalions had strung out as they went forward. Meanwhile, the reports of their positions had to be sent back, and before dawn the orders for the next day's attack received and sent forward to the leading battalions. Battalion runners, after going forward with the assault and carrying messages as to its progress all day, had to keep going all night with reports and orders



ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 4, 1918

for the next day. None but the best men could be runners in such an action.

On the morning of October 5, the attack was resumed. The 4th Division, on the extreme right, did not advance, but held its line in the Fond de Ville aux Bois, in the northern edge of the Bois de Fays. No forward action could be undertaken by this division until the divisions on its left, which were over a mile behind, had made up the distance.

The 80th Division attacked at 5:30 a. m. All day long the fighting went on. The artillery played heavily upon the Bois des Ogons and finally at 6 p. m. under cover of dusk, the final

assault carried the wood, and the line was established on the northern edge of the Bois des Ogons.


The 3rd Division attacked in conjunction with the 80th and by the end of the day had seized that part of the Bois des Ogons which lay on their front. A sergeant and 20 men of the 4th Infantry penetrated the Bois de Cunel, but as the machine-gun fire was so intense that moving forward more men was impossible, this gallant party had to be withdrawn. Madeleine Farm was the center of most of the resistance on that front and, until this was reduced, no forward movement was possible.

The 32nd Division, which on the preceding day had not been able to advance, arranged for artillery preparation on those points which offered the most resistance, and, at dawn, on October 5, the infantry attacked, and this time smashed through the intense German fire. Down the slopes of the Exermont ravine they rushed, waded the Gesnes creek, and assaulted and took the Bois-de-la-Morine, on the opposite heights a mile west of Gesnes. All this was done before noon, and in the advance of two kilometers they took 200 prisoners. That afternoon, despite a terrific hostile fire, they advanced again and took the Bois-du-Chene-Sec. This in conjunction with the advance of the 3rd Division on the right, outflanked the town of Gesnes, and it was occupied that night by the 32nd Division.

The 1st Division, on the crests south of the Exermont ravine, also resumed the attack on the 5th. The Germans had filled the Exermont ravine with machine guns, but—what was worse—on the hills opposite, not a thousand yards away, they had placed several batteries of three-inch guns which fired directly into the advancing waves. Four German divisions opposed the advance across this deep ravine. Their artillery swept the approaches with a deadly fire, while the machine guns poured a withering storm of metal into the lines. The assaulting troops of the 1st Division came through it all, but with heavy losses. The 2nd Battalion of the 26th Infantry, 30 officers and 1,000 men, went over the crest, down into the ravine, and up the steep banks on the far side and established the line

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE 801

on the other side of a little clump of woods. When the count was made, there were left of this battalion but 6 officers and 285 men. Here the 1st Battalion jumped through the 2nd and carried the line on to the objective, the southern edge of the Bois de Moncy. Hill 240 in the Bois de Boyon was taken by the 18th and 28th Infantry Regiments in a smashing attack, while the 16th Infantry improved its positions north of Fleville. By the evening of that day the line was advanced to include Arietal Farm, which the 26th Infantry took in a gal-



ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 5, 1918

lant assault. That night the line of the 1st Division formed a big salient sticking out into the German lines and overlapping both at Fleville and at Arietal Farm, the sectors of the divisions on the right and left. They were over half way through the formidable nine square miles of wooded hills of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

The 28th Division did not advance on this day, but mopped up and consolidated its positions.

The 77th Division, in the Argonne, made another vain attempt to advance its lines in the forest to rescue Major Whitteley and his six companies (the "Lost Battalion"), but the Germans repulsed each advance.

Thus on the night of October 5, the line ran from just south of Brioules on the Meuse, due west, north of the Bois de Fays, thence southward to the Bois des Ogons, thence south of the Madeleine Farm to the northern outskirts of Gesnes, thence to the Bois du Chene Sec, thence due north to Arietal Farm and west from there to Fleville. From there the line dropped back at right angles along the west bank of the Aire to La Forge (opposite Chatel Chehery), where it crossed the river and entered the Argonne forest immediately north of Le Chene Tondu, and from there, south of the Bois de Naza, to Binarville. The whole line had advanced on this day except in and alongside the Argonne forest, and the total advance for the two days was five kilometers, where the 1st Division had smashed through the German center of resistance.

The French Fourth Army was also making big inroads into the last German line west of the Argonne, and it was on this same day that the 2nd American Division (9th and 23rd Regulars, 5th and 6th Marines), which was operating as a part of General Gouraud's Army, smashed through and took Blanc Mont, an operation which let the whole line advance. By the night of October 5, therefore, the lines on both sides of the Argonne were advanced five miles beyond Binarville, where the Germans were still standing fast. This meant that the enemy was in a salient already five miles long in the forest, that the Allies were fast approaching the opening in the forest at Grand Pré, where the Aire cuts the Argonne plateau and flows into the Aisne. An advance of three more kilometers on either side of the forest would cut off those Germans in the salient who were opposing the 77th Division and they would have to surrender. It was evident that the Germans would therefore speedily pull out of this part of the Argonne forest and evacuate the plateau south of Grand Pré within the next few days.

That night the 82nd Division, under the command of General Burnham, took over the right half of the 28th Division's sector from Fleville south along the west bank of the Aire as far as La Forge. The swift advance of the 1st Division to Fleville, and the inability of the 77th to

advance in the forest had held the 28th Division immobile, as the front had been extended by this time to seven kilometers. The splitting of the sector with the 82nd enabled the 28th to regroup for the attack on Chatel Chehery while the 82nd attacked Cornay. The taking of both of these towns, which nestled close against the steep wall of the Argonne plateau was necessary in order to clear the Aire valley and complete the squeezing of the Germans out of the Argonne.

October 6, the third day of the Second Phase, witnessed very slight local advances only; here and there the line was straightened out. The 4th Division withstood several determined counter-attacks, being far ahead of the line held by the 80th and the 3rd Divisions. Its line formed a salient from which advances would be still impossible until Brioules, on the right, and Madeleine Farm, on the left, were captured from the Germans.


Madeleine Farm was the objective of the 3rd Division on this day. For two hours that afternoon a regiment of 6-inch rifles played on this group of small buildings; at 2 p. m. the 80th and the 3rd Divisions attacked, but wave after wave of their troops withered in that galling machine-gun and artillery fire, and the assault was repulsed.

The 32nd Division's Artillery Brigade rejoined the division and relieved the 55th Brigade, and the division did not attack on this day. The 1st Division held its front, which was still far in advance of that of the 32nd on its right and of the 82nd on its left, and reorganized in greater depth, placing the 1st Engineers on the reserve line and moving the artillery up. During the afternoon an order was issued for the 26th Infantry to send two companies into the Bois de Moncy and seize Hill 269, which wooded crest dominated the front of the 32nd Division. Companies were not very large after the staggering losses of those two days, but with such as they were, one Captain, a second Lieutenant and 63 men seized and held the wood and the hill in the face of over-powering numbers of the enemy. Three more first-class, rested German divisions were identified on the front of the 1st Division that

day, which brought the total to seven German divisions through which the 1st had advanced in two days.

The Brigade of the 91st Division, which, during the first two days advances had formed the juncture between the 1st and 32nd Divisions, was withdrawn from the front, as these two divisions had gradually closed in on Hill 269.

The 82nd Division spent the day in completing the move into position, while the 28th reorganized for an attack on the next day.



ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 6, 1918

The 77th Division attacked again to relieve the "Lost Battalion," but failed to advance.

While October 6 saw no great change in the front, the rear areas were busily engaged, despite terrific German shell fire, in moving forward once more all the artillery of the Corps and Army, in bringing the tanks together and getting them ready for action, but especially in bringing forward artillery ammunition for the guns. Meanwhile the air service was busy locating sensitive points in the enemy's rear for the artillery. That day the French Fourth Army continued their attack; the 2nd American Division delivered its last attack west of the Argonne, and the 36th Division was brought up to relieve it.

On October 7, the right of the American line did not attempt to advance. The 4th, 80th, and 3rd Divisions withstood vigorous German counter-attacks but could not advance until further progress had been made by the left of the American line, for, with the Germans still holding the east bank of the Meuse as far south as Forges, and Binarville in the Argonne still in German hands, any advance would only deepen the already extended salient.

The 32nd Division worked its line slightly forward and made a desperate effort to connect with the patrol of the 1st Division on Hill 269. A large body of Germans, well entrenched apparently lay between these two somewhere on the hill, and the 32nd Division was unable to reach the crest.

Hill 269 was not in the path of advance of the 1st Division, and the patrol which the 26th Infantry had pushed out on the hill was very small. This division also advanced its lines north of Arietal Farm on October 7, and the ranks were so decimated, that no men could be spared from the thin line holding the front to help clean up Hill 269. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Engineers was accordingly sent forward to Hill 269, where, without automatic rifles and with but a few machine guns they fought a small but terrible battle and finally cleared the big wooded hill of the enemy. The only divisions which attacked that day were the three on the extreme left, the 82nd, 28th, and the 77th. The French west of the forest and the American right were well up on their objectives, but the Germans in the Argonne were still holding up the American left. Accordingly these three divisions attacked at 5 a. m.

The 82nd Division, now participating for the first time in an actual assault, jumped off from the line Fleville-La Forge, across the Aire towards the two dominating hills, 223 and 180, north of Chatel Chehery. The division attacked with one brigade in the line. The 327th Infantry on the right crossed the Aire by fords and assaulted Hill 180. With great dash these fresh troops climbed the steep sides of that solitary hill and, taking 44 prisoners, continued northwest across the intervening valley until they were checked on the Cornay-Chatel-Chehery road. The 328th Infantry, however, which was to take Hill


223, became lost in the darkness while coming up to the jump-off line, and did not begin the attack until 10 a. m. Meanwhile the commander of the 28th Division, to protect his troops from enfilade fire, had rushed a company of infantry and a company of machine gunners on to this hill, which they seized and held until 1 p. m. when the 328th Infantry relieved them on its crest. The relief came just in time to ward off a heavy and determined counter-attack.

The 28th Division attacked at five in the morning, using foot bridges which the 103rd Engineers had built the night before, and assaulted the town of Chatel Chehery. This town lies about one-third of the way up the slope of the Argonne plateau, and consists of one street which clings to the steep hill. Behind the town is the plateau, and flanking the town on either end are Hills 223 (north) and 244 (south). The assault was one of the most difficult missions in the entire offensive, and not only great courage, but also the greatest skill was necessary to seize this town and corner of the great Argonne plateau. Advancing with great dash and gallantry, in 45 minutes the troops were in the town, an hour and a quarter later the entire town was mopped up and the 112th Infantry was in possession. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment was on Hill 244, and Hill 223 was quickly seized to protect from enfilade fire from the north. By this action the pressure on this front was relieved and that afternoon the 28th and 82nd Divisions assaulted the plateau and forced a footing thereon, thereby cutting the narrow gauge line which supplied the Germans further south in the forest. The 111th Infantry of the 28th Division had also attacked that morning, and in *liaison* with the right of the 77th Division had forced their way from the Chene Tonde, through that part of the woods called La Viergette, to the Bois de Taille l'Abbe, where they met the right flank of the 28th Division which had come down from the north; thus another big promontory was cut off, this time from the rear, and the lines of the 28th were established in the Argonne forest itself.

The 77th Division, which during the last four days had been vainly trying to push forward its line to the rescue of

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE 807

the "Lost Battalion," succeeded on this day. A point being found where the German lines were weak, troops were rushed in behind the German positions, and by thus infiltrating, they rendered the line untenable, and the enemy gradually retired. About nine that night the advancing Americans (307th Infantry) came upon Major Whittlesey and his much shattered command. They had stuck it out, despite the fact that they had suffered 50 per cent. casualties, and were in a state of exhaustion, but still their spirits were high. On the morning



RESCUE OF THE LOST BATTALION

Showing the advance of October 7, 1918.

of this day the Germans had sent them an offer of surrender; this had been treated with the utmost contempt, and the defenses were strengthened. The rescue of the "Lost Battalion" was not all that the 77th Division accomplished on this day, for in doing this they broke the backbone of the German line in the forest. The 28th and 82nd Divisions were advancing in the forest at Chatel Chehery, where the forest was very narrow, and as this was in rear of the German line, the enemy's retreat out of the Argonne south of Grand Pré was assured. This advance of the left of the American line also relieved the left flank of the 1st Division (16th Infantry) from the


galling fire which for three days the Germans had poured from the hills on three sides into the Fleville salient, where, on the flat river bottom the 1st had clung to its position despite a most bitter plunging machine-gun fire.

On October 8, the First American Army extended its attack to the east bank of the Meuse. No advance had been made on the right bank of the river and the progress on the left bank had made the advance of the First Army a big salient into the German lines. This gave the Germans on the heights east of the Meuse the opportunity to fire into the right flank of the advancing Americans, and also, as the lines went on, exposed an ever increasing flank where the Germans might attack in rear of the American Army.

This operation could not be undertaken, however, until the Argonne forest, south of Grand Pré, had been cleared of enemy resistance. The advances of the last two days had practically cleared this menace to the left flank of the First American Army, and the opportunity was now at hand to extend the attacking front of the Army to push the Germans off the high bluffs on the left bank of the Meuse river. Accordingly it was decided to seize the triangle of hills on the right of the Meuse, included roughly by the three towns, Briulles, Ornes, Regneville. The French Seventeenth Corps held the line on the right bank of the Meuse from Regneville (Samegneux) east almost as far as Beaumont and Ornes, while the 33rd American Division held the line along the Meuse from Regneville almost to Briulles. For this attack the 33rd U. S. Division, General Bell, was transferred to the French Seventeenth Corps of the First American Army, and the 29th ("Blue and Gray") Division, General Morton, was sent from reserve of the First Army to take part in the attack.

The hills were strongly held by the Germans, and accordingly it was planned to deliver a surprise attack. The 33rd was to cross the Meuse on its front, while the two French Divisions (18th and 26th) were to attack on their front. The 58th Brigade of the 29th Division (115th and 116th Infantry) was brought up and put in between the 33rd Division, and the 18th French Division, at Brabant. During the night of

the 7th, French and American engineers built four bridges across the Meuse at Consevoie, Brabant, Regneville, and Samegneux, and at 5 a. m. on the morning of the 8th, without any artillery preparation, but with a dense rolling barrage, the



MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLEFIELD

Showing Jump-off Line of September 26, 1918. The advance had been pushed, by October 8, until the towns of Grand Pré and Brioules were under attack. On the right of the Meuse the Germans still held the group of hills which menaced the rear of the First American Army.

Seventeenth French Corps (two American and two French Divisions) attacked. The Germans were surprised and the assault was pushed rapidly ahead. Little trouble was encountered in crossing the river, and one after another the

difficult hills were stormed and taken. The troops converging from two directions maintained perfect *liaison* and by night-fall the attack had reached all its objectives, with the Allied center resting just west of the Bois de Consevoye.


No attack was ordered by the Army for the divisions west of the Meuse between the river and the Argonne on October 8. The twenty-four hours were spent in reorganizing the battle line, and moving up artillery for the assault which was to follow on the morrow. During the day, the 4th Division withstood a determined German counter-attack from Brioules. On the remainder of the front there was little action, and the infantry, weary from four successive days of bitter fighting, welcomed the day of rest. As soon as it became dark, however, the units in the line began to shift their positions under orders, so as to be ready for the attack which was to come with the dawn. The 4th Division, on the right, remained in place. The 80th and 3rd Divisions contracted their sectors more effectually to cover, with their thinned ranks, the wooded area around Madeleine Farm. The 32nd Division accordingly moved towards the right to take over that ground which the 3rd had just left, and the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division moved in between the 32nd and the 1st Division. This permitted the 1st Division to contract slightly its front for it had three most difficult hills yet to take. On the left of this Division, the 82nd Division brought up its other brigade and completed the relief of the 28th Division. Two days before the line along the forest had been drawn out by the quick advance outside the forest and the slow advance in the forest itself. Now that the Allies on either side were fast approaching the gap at Grand-Pré, the Germans in the forest were retreating, and the 77th Division was gradually coming up abreast of the Allied troops on either side of the forest.

The 28th Division in its 13 days of almost continuous fighting in one of the most difficult positions, had carried its line forward with the greatest gallantry, and had earned a respite from this fierce battle. It had advanced more than ten miles, had captured 500 prisoners, 5 field guns and a considerable number of machine guns. In recognition of his

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE 311

brilliant achievement, General Muir was promoted to command the Fourth Army Corps, and General Hay succeeded in command of the Division.

The line of the First Army by evening of the 8th ran from just west of Ornes, on the right, exclusive of the Bois de Con-sevoye, to the Meuse at Dannevoux, thence along the river to just south of Briulles, and from there west to Fleville as it had stood for some days, and from Fleville the line ran



ATTACK EXTENDED EAST OF MEUSE

Showing advance of October 8 on the right, where the 17th French Corps joined in the attack and the advance of the 77th Division in the Argonne Forest.

just south of Cornay and thence through the Argonne on about the level of Chatel Chehery to where it joined the ever advancing line of the Fourth French Army.

On October 9, every division on the front from Ornes to the Argonne attacked. By evening the line had swung well forward and the Kriemhilde line was pierced at several points. It will be remembered that the three German lines of defense met at Ornes, and the direction of the attack of the French Seventeenth Corps on the right of the Meuse was almost parallel to these three lines. The Germans had now recovered from their surprise, and it was found necessary to swing the

attack to face east, instead of north, so as to face the bitter fire from these powerful lines of defense. This attack therefore pivoted on the 26th French Division, and the others swung around through a big arc to the right, this movement being skillfully executed under a fierce fire. The advance continued all that day, and by night, despite several strong counter-attacks, the line ran from in front of Ornes, exclusive to the Bois du Chaume, to Sivry on the Meuse whence it followed the river to Brioules which the Germans still held in great force.

The 4th Division did not attack in the morning, as it was still over a mile in advance of the line held by the 80th, 3rd and 32nd Divisions, while on the left the 1st Division was also about a mile ahead of these three divisions. Accordingly on the morning of the 9th, the 80th, 3rd and 32nd Divisions attacked resolutely to their front, and in the face of bitter resistance took Madeleine Farm, the Bois de Cunel, and advanced the line to the outskirts of Romagne, Cunel, and the Cunel Brioules road. In the afternoon the 4th Division attempted to advance with the 80th Division, but found the woods soaked with gas, and the attack was abandoned.

The 1st Division and the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division, which was attached to the 1st, attacked again on this day. There was still one row of hills to be taken. The steep wooded Hill 263, Romagne wood and the Cote de Maldah guarded the last line of the Kriemhilde Stellung and to make things worse the whole front of seven kilometers was in a dense woods and a fresh German division was identified on the right flank of the 1st, which made eight first-class German divisions on this front. The artillery of the division was much too inadequate to give any protection for an advance. For several days advances had been tried, and now the ranks were thinned so that the drive had not the impetus of new troops. General Summerall then worked out the plan by which the artillery of the whole division concentrated on the front of one infantry regiment at a time. Advancing in succession from left to right, at half hour intervals, the 1st, although weakened to a mere skeleton division, with many

of the companies ably commanded by sergeants, and majorities given on the field to battalion commanders who were so skillfully pushing their little commands up the sides of the hills, smashed through the final line of hills in face of a terrific fire, and open country lay before it.

A German infantry colonel who was captured in this assault, early the next morning made a statement in which he paid a tribute to the 1st Division, which had distinguished itself by its brilliant assaults on positions where the German Command had expected to check the drive of the Americans.

"G-2

HEADQUARTERS 1ST DIVISION,
American E. F.,
October 10, 1918.

"To-day a captured Colonel of the German Army arrived at our Division cage. He was cold, hungry and broken in spirit. After four years of severe fighting and constant service in his army, he was taken prisoner by the troops of the victorious 1st Division. The following is the substance of his remarks:

'Yesterday I received orders to hold the ground at all costs. The American barrage advanced toward my position and the work of your artillery was marvelous. The barrage was so dense that it was impossible for us to move out of our dugouts. Following this barrage closely were the troops of the 1st Division. I saw them forge ahead and I knew that all was lost. All night I remained in my dugout, hoping vainly that something would happen that would permit me to rejoin my army. This morning your troops found me and I am here, after four years, a prisoner.

'Yesterday I knew that the 1st Division was opposite us, and I knew that we would have to put up the hardest fight of the war. The 1st Division is wonderful, and the German Army knows it. We did not believe that within five years the Americans could develop a division such as the 1st Division. The work of its infantry and artillery is worthy of the best armies in the world.'

"The above tribute to the 1st Division comes from one of Germany's seasoned field officers. It is with great pleasure that we learn that even our enemies recognize the courage, valor, and

efficiency of our troops. The work done by the 1st Division during the past few days will go down in history as one of those memorable events which will live in the hearts of the American people for generations to come.

"Every member of this command well deserves the enthusiastic congratulations from, and the high respect in which it is held by our comrades in arms and by the entire American nation.

"The above will be published to every member of this command.

"By command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.
A. C. of S. G-2."


Meanwhile on the right of the 1st, the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division was smashing its way forward through the Bois de Moncy and the Bois des Gesnes. The patrol which the 26th Infantry had sent out to seize and hold Hill 269, on the front of the advancing 181st Brigade had been having a hot time on that hill. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Engineers had been sent up to take over the defense. Without automatic rifles, the engineers had dug themselves in in a hollow square, and lay there blazing away with their rifles, until two companies of the 181st Brigade were brought up through the 26th Infantry's sector, relieving the engineers whose gallant defense of the hill made possible the advance of the 181st Brigade through the dense woods.

The 82nd and the 77th Divisions were both heavily engaged in the Argonne. The Germans were retreating, but their rearguards made a stand on the 9th on the line Lancon-Cornay-Fleville, and here the two divisions made small progress but by night had penetrated and made untenable the enemy line.

On October 10 the new line was exploited. On the right of the Meuse, the 29th Division finally worked both of its brigades into the line and that night General Morton took over the command of the division sector. The 33rd Division continued the advance, which was necessarily very slow, as the German resistance was intense, and by night the line east

of the Meuse was advanced nearer the German triple line of defense. West of the Meuse the 4th Division seized the small woods lying north of the Briulles-Cunel road, and the advance elements entered again the Bois de Foret, and once more had to be withdrawn due to the machine-gun cross-fire.

The 80th Division, whose patrol from the 319th Infantry had entered Cunel and surprised and captured two German battalion staffs, 30 officers and 60 men, tried in vain to assault the town on the 10th, but were everywhere repulsed.



ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 9

Showing the resumption of the attack by practically the entire line.


The 3rd Division also attempted to continue the attack on the 10th, and gained but little ground.

The 32nd Division reformed its line in conformity with that of the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division, which continued on to where the 1st Division was pushing its line of exploitation beyond the Romagne-Sommerance road.

The 82nd and 77th Divisions attacked again on the morning of the 10th, and pushed on through the forest until night, when they emerged in the Grand Pré gap, with everything south of there cleared of the enemy. Marcq and Cornay were seized by the 82nd while Chevieres was taken by the 77th, and

liaison was established with the French Fourth Army through the Grand Pré Gap in the Argonne forest.

The 36th Division, in the center of the Fourth French Army west of the Argonne, on the afternoon of the same day also found that the Germans had withdrawn from their front, a new German battle line being established north of the Aisne river. This put the French, west of the forest, again fifteen kilometers further advanced than the Americans east of the



LOWER HALF OF ARGONNE CLEARED

The advance of October 10, 1918, chiefly on the left of the First American Army, reached the gap at Grand Pré.

forest. It was on this day that the British announced the fall of Cambrai, which with the capture by the French of St. Quentin on October 1, marked the complete break-through of the French and British Armies on this section of the Western front. Hard pressed on every front, the Germans could reinforce none; there remained but one line of defense, and if this were pierced by the Allies, the German Army would have to execute a hasty and costly retreat to the Rhine.

On October 11, the Seventeenth French Corps on the right bank of the Meuse (from right to left, 26th and 18th French Divisions, 29th and 33rd American Divisions) continued their

slow hammering of the German positions as they gradually pivoted on the right and swung the line around to face the east.

The 4th Division, on the left bank of the Meuse, pushed on in the face of strong opposition and cleared the whole of the Bois de Foret, and placed patrols on Hill 299 two kilometers northeast of Cunel. Brioules was by this almost entirely surrounded, and the only line of retreat for the garrison lay in crossing the river.

The 80th Division tried again that morning to take the town of Cunel, but ran into barbed wire of an organized position, and could not advance. This division, under the command of General Cronkhite, had fought well, but it had been in the battle since September 26, and had only been out for a four-day rest during this time. Accordingly the 5th Division (Regulars), General McMahon, was brought up from Army reserve and relieved the 80th Division.

The 3rd and 32nd Divisions were unable to further exploit their front as they had now reached the barbed wire of the German positions in front of Cunel and Romagne. The 32nd sent its reserve brigade to relieve the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division that night.

The 1st Division, under the command of General Summerall, as its parting shot, took the town of Sommerance, establishing its line on the extreme northern edge of the Bois de Romagne, and before it lay open fields. It had completed its mission. It had gone through. That night the 42nd Division, "Rainbow National Guard," commanded by General Menoher, was brought up to relieve the 1st.

During its ten days in the line, the last seven of which had been a succession of attacks, the 1st Division had advanced seven kilometers ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles) against the German I and V Guard Divisions, the XXVIII, XXXVII, XLI, XLIII and LII Divisions, and the II Landwehr Division, which were defending to the last the most formidable position at this time on the Western front. It captured 1,407 prisoners, and lost 9,387 officers and men, the heaviest casualties suffered by any American division in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. It

was the only division in the American Expeditionary Forces accorded the conspicuous honor of having a General Order from G.H.Q. devoted solely to its achievements.


G. H. Q.

General Orders

No. 201.

France, Nov. 10, 1918.

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires to make of record in the General Orders of the American Expeditionary Forces, his extreme satisfaction with the conduct of the officers and soldiers of



ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 11, 1918

the 1st Division in its advance west of the Meuse, between October 4 and 11, 1918. During this period the division gained a distance of seven kilometers over a country which presented not only remarkable facilities for enemy defense but also difficulties of terrain for the operation of our troops.

2. The division met with resistance from elements of eight hostile divisions, most of which were first class troops and some of which were completely rested. The enemy chose to defend its position to the death, and the fighting was always of the most desperate kind. Throughout the operations the officers and men of the division displayed the highest type of courage, fortitude and self-sacrificing devotion to duty. In addition to many enemy

killed, the division captured one thousand four hundred and seven of the enemy, thirteen 77 MM field guns, ten trench mortars and numerous machine guns and stores.

3. The success of the division in driving a deep advance into the enemy's territory enabled an assault to be made on the left by the neighboring division against the northeastern portion of the forest of Argonne, and enabled the 1st Division to advance to the right and outflank the enemy's position in front of the division on that flank.

4. The Commander-in-Chief has noted in this division a special pride of service and a high state of morale, never broken by hardship nor battle.

5. This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt. (14790-A-306.)

By Command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Immediately on being withdrawn from this action for its much needed rest and replacements, the 1st Division lost General Summerall, now appointed Commanding General of the Fifth Army Corps. General Bamford, who had commanded the 16th Infantry as Colonel, and as Brigadier General had commanded the 2nd Brigade, became Division Commander, and one by one the officers of the division were promoted to fill the vacancies caused in that action.


The front of the First American Army had been greatly extended by these operations. On September 26, this front extended from La Harazee, in the center of the Argonne Forest, to Clemery, north of Nancy, a distance of seventy-two miles. From September 26 to October 8, the actual fighting, however, was limited to a front of twenty miles. The remaining fifty-two miles of front, which the First American Army held, was inactive during this time. On October 8, ten more miles of front became active, namely, that portion east of the Meuse as far as Ornes, and with the lengthening of the line

due to the advance west of the Meuse, it was evident that a subdivision of this enormous front would be advantageous. General Pershing, who, until this time, had taken personal command of the First American Army, divided this army into two armies. To the First American Army he assigned that portion of the line from the Argonne Forest to Fresnes-en-Woevre (midway between Verdun and St. Mihiel), and to the Second American Army he assigned the other half of the original front, from Fresnes-en-Woevre to Clemery. Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett was promoted from the command of the First Army Corps to the command of the First Army, and Lieutenant Robert Lee Bullard was promoted from the command of the Third Army Corps to the command of the Second Army. General Pershing then assumed the command of the "Group of Armies," namely, the First and Second American Armies. The promotion of Generals Liggett and Bullard left vacancies in the First and Third Army Corps. General Dickman was transferred from the command of the Fourth Corps in the Second Army to command the First Corps in the First Army, and General Muir, who had so ably commanded the 28th Division, was promoted to command the Fourth Army Corps. General Cameron was relieved of command of the Fifth Corps and ordered back to command the 4th Division. General Summerall, who had won such fame with the 1st Division, was promoted to command the Fifth Corps, and General Hines, who, with the 4th Division had won such success, was promoted to command the Third Army Corps. To complete these great changes required some time and the next few days marked little activity on the front of the American Armies.

On October 12, the drive east of the Meuse continued to nibble away at the German lines, but on the remainder of the front there was no action, except on the extreme left. Here the 77th Division, with the 152nd Artillery Brigade in position, after a dense preparation brilliantly attacked and carried the town of St. Juvin and part of Hill 182 immediately behind it; in this operation 500 prisoners were taken. That night the 3rd Division relieved the 5th and the left brigade of the 4th

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE 821

Divisions. This gave the 3rd Division a front from about one kilometer west of the Meuse to the Cunel-Romagne road, a front of about six kilometers, which necessitated putting all four infantry regiments in line, from right to left, as follows:



SECOND AMERICAN ARMY

Original seventy-two miles of front divided between First and Second Armies on October 11, 1918.

38th, 7th, 30th, 4th. The 5th Division was assembled in the Bois des Ogons preparatory for an attack.

On October 13, the American Army made no attempt to attack. The enemy, evidently suspecting that a renewed effort was about to be made, began early in the afternoon a

heavy bombardment on the entire front of the 3rd Division and followed this with a determined counter-attack. Again the 3rd Division held its front, as it had done on the Marne, and mowed down the advancing lines, until the counter-attack ceased.

Throughout the entire front west of the Meuse, the First American Army lay facing the last line of the Kriemhilde Stellung. This consisted for the most part in a single trench system, protected by a heavy series of belts of barbed wire. In itself this would have been but a slight obstacle, but this line was supported by a line of wooded crests, and the whole so thickly sewn with machine-guns and artillery that it presented a most formidable position to assault. Held as it was by determined German infantry and machine-gunners, supported with ample excellent artillery, special preparations had to be made by the First American Army to insure the success of the attack. These consisted chiefly in the placing of fresh divisions in the line and the regrouping of those divisions which were to remain over, so as to give the maximum force on the most strongly held lines. Then, too, artillery ammunition had to be moved forward, and all these operations consumed the 12th and 13th of October.

The American line west of the Meuse, on the evening of October 13, ran from Brioules (which the Germans still held) north to include the Bois de Foret. From there it bent sharply back south of Cunel and Romagne (both of which towns the Germans held in force). From there the line ran south of Landres-St. Georges to Grand-Pre. The 4th Division held the small front which practically encircled the town of Brioules. The 3rd Division held the Bois de Foret, which formed a salient sticking out into the German lines, this division, with its other brigade, held the line in front of Cunel. On its left was the 32nd Division, facing Romagne. On the left of this division lay the 42nd Division, facing Landres-St. Georges. The 82nd Division held the line between the 42nd Division and the Argonne Forest, where the 77th Division was facing Grand-Pre.

The plan of attack was for the 4th Division to hold its line

in front of Brioules. That part of the 3rd Division which held the front in the Bois de Foret (38th and 7th Infantry) was to stand fast, as it was three kilometers in advance of the line in front of Cunel. The 5th Division was ordered forward from reserve to attack through this portion of the 3rd Division (30th and 4th Infantry), and Cunel and Bois des Rappes were assigned to the 5th Division as objectives. On the left of the 5th Division, the 32nd Division was to attack again despite the fact that it had already been in the line for thirteen days. On the left of this division, the 42nd Division, which had relieved the 1st Division, was given the difficult Cote de Chatillon and Landres-St. Georges as objectives, while the 82nd and 77th Divisions were to form the left of the attack and advance in conformity with it. The two most difficult points were thus given to the two fresh divisions: Cunel and the Bois des Rappes to the 5th (Regular) and Landres-St. Georges to the 42nd (Rainbow) Division. The purpose of this attack was to break through the last line of German resistance and thus clear the west bank of the Meuse of the enemy.

At 8:30 a. m. on October 14, the 5th, 32nd, 42nd, 82nd and 77th Divisions jumped off, protected by an intense artillery barrage, in assault of this last German line. The enemy, however, was prepared for this attack. The German reaction was immediate. Intense "Artillery Counter Preparation" swept the line of advance, while machine-guns decimated the assaulting battalions. The 5th Division, with three regiments in line, from right to left, 60th, 11th and 6th Infantry (the 61st being in support), failed to reach the jump-off line in time to follow the protective barrage. By the time the Cunel-Romagne road was reached, it was strongly held by the enemy. Here the left was held up. The right was able to advance slightly, then it, too, was stopped. Heavy fire from the front and the left flank, where Romagne was still held by the Germans, caused heavy casualties. Cunel was taken, however, and the lines ran diagonally from Romagne to the Bois de la Pultiere, when about 10 a. m. further attempts to advance were given up. In the afternoon the 32nd Division completed

the capture of Romagne, and at 4 p. m. the 5th Division tried again to advance. The 61st Infantry was put in with the 60th Infantry on the right, and the lower third of the Bois de Pultiere was taken. Here the line was halted for the night. A check-up was taken of the strength of the four regiments and it was found that only about 50 per cent. were present. The casualties had been heavy, and then, too, there were many men who were lost or mixed with other units.

The 3rd Division, on the right of the 5th Division, advanced its lines during the day to keep in *liaison* with the 5th Division on its left and the 4th Division on its right, and by evening its line was established in the Bois de la Pultiere.

The 32nd Division, with the 128th, 126th, and 127th Infantry Regiments in the line from right to left, attacked behind a rolling barrage at 5:30 a. m. and by skillful artillery *liaison*, fire was brought on the needed points and the right of the line smashed through and took the town of Romagne, and in mopping it up, took about 200 prisoners. The left, advancing in the dense Bois des Gesnes, had more difficult terrain, but by noon, the 127th Infantry forced its way to the top of Hill 258 on the Romagne-Sommerance road, after fighting through a long series of almost impenetrable wooded valleys. That afternoon the 125th Infantry was put in and the whole line straightened and connected through the woods.

The 42nd Division, with four regiments in the line from right to left as follows: 168th, 167th, 165th, and 166th, attacked the strong position of the Cote de Chatillon, and the strongly wired and entrenched position south of Landres-St. Georges. On the right the 168th Infantry encountered stiff resistance in their assault of the densely wooded knoll, the Cote de Chatillon. The attack was continued all day and by evening the Germans had been driven out of their positions on the southern slopes of the hill. Meanwhile the 83rd Brigade of the 42nd Division (167th and 165th Infantry) swung out easily across the open fields until they came upon the wired and entrenched position south of Landres-St. Georges, where the attack was stopped by German ma-

chine-gun fire. All attempts to advance the line to the assault of these trenches proved futile.

The 82nd Division also attacked on the 14th, and in conjunction with the Rainbow Division on the right, the 328th Infantry went up the Ravin aux Pierres, west of St. Georges, and seized the ridge south of that town where they made connections with the Rainbow. Here they also were stopped by the wire. The 325th Infantry on the left pushed forward and established the line on the St. Georges-St. Juvin road.

The 77th Division improved their position on the hill north of St. Juvin.

By evening of October 14, it was evident that the attack had failed. The two fresh divisions, which were put in the line for this attack (5th Regular and 42nd Rainbow), had scarcely advanced their lines. The gains for that day consisted in the taking of the towns of Cunel and Romagne, and, as these had lain in the German outpost line, their capture was of slight importance. The result of the day's fighting was that at no point had the German line of resistance, the Kriemhilde Stellung, been pierced.

The 5th and 42nd Divisions were therefore ordered to attack again on the 15th, in order to carry their objectives. Until the Bois des Rappes and the Cote de Chatillon were taken, no advance by the remainder of the American Army would be possible.

Accordingly, General McMahon ordered the 60th and 61st Infantry regiments of the 5th Division to attack at 7:30 a. m. behind a rolling barrage. The artillery fire came down on schedule time, but the infantry were a half hour late in forming for the assault, and the protection of the barrage was lost. Fire from the heavy artillery was then brought down on the Bois des Rappes, but merely a footing was gained along the edge of the woods. Pushing on from here, small groups of these two regiments forced their way forward during the afternoon and finally reached the northern edge of the Bois des Rappes, the "Divisional Objective." Colonel Wise, 61st Infantry, reported erroneously that these troops had withdrawn. General Castner, the Brigade Commander, immedi-

ately ordered fresh patrols sent forward, but General McMahon, the Division Commander, directed that no further advance be attempted that day. The line for the night was established on the northern edge of the Bois de la Pultiere.

The 42nd Division also attacked again on October 15, against the strong positions of the Cote de Chatillon and the wired line south of Landres-St. Georges. On the right, the 84th Brigade (167th and 168th Infantry), under General MacArthur, fought its way gallantly forward through the dense wood which covered the Cote de Chatillon, and wrested some of the heights from the enemy. Meanwhile the remainder of the brigade slowly worked its way around the little group of hills and, by seizing La Tuilerie Farm, succeeded in partly surrounding this most difficult point and forced the Germans to evacuate. The 83rd Brigade (165th and 166th Infantry), under General Lenihan, failed again to advance, as it had done the day before, and all attempts were stopped by the Germans from the entrenched line just south of Landres-St. Georges.

The 77th Division made its last attack on October 15. With the rumor that, after its twenty days of fighting in the Argonne Forest, the division was to be relieved, General Alexander decided to make one more attempt to capture Grand-Pre. Starting forward from the hill north of St. Juvin at 7:30 a. m., the 77th Division fought its way across the open valley and up the steep slopes of the hill and, finally, by dusk, the 1st Battalion of the 307th Infantry reached and established their line in the outskirts of the town. That night the 78th "Lightning" Division, under General McRae, moved up and relieved the 77th New York City National Army Division which, under General Alexander, had established such an enviable record in twenty consecutive days' fighting in the Argonne Forest. Their advance of ten miles had been through the Forest proper, where the natural obstacles alone presented an almost unsurmountable barrier.

The only action on October 17 was in the center of the American Line. By the seizure of the Cote de Chatillon on the previous day, the 42nd Division had relieved the pressure somewhat on the front of the 32nd Division its right. Ac-

cordingly the 32nd Division decided to assault the Bois de Bantheville, which commanded its front. Twelve hours of preparation fire were poured into this large wood, and in the morning, with all four regiments in the line, the 32nd Division swept forward and into the wood. All day long there was intermittent and fierce fighting, but by night all but the easterly tip of the wood had been cleared of the enemy, and the line firmly established against counter-attack.


The taking of the Bois de Bantheville by the 32nd Division flanked the town of Bantheville from the left. The 5th Division sent a patrol to take Bantheville, but the patrol was driven off. No further attempt was made, however, to advance the right of the division into the Bois des Rappes. General Pershing was exercising personal supervision of the front at this time and he personally relieved General McMahon from command of the 5th Division. To fill his place the Commander-in-Chief sent General Hanson Ely, one of the ablest and most experienced officers in the American Army. General Ely, when in command of the 28th Infantry of the 1st Division, had captured Cantigny. In the counter-offensive of July 18, towards Soissons, at St. Mihiel, and in the taking of Blanc Mont, he had commanded the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division (9th and 23rd Infantry), and on the 17th of October he was given the 5th Regular Division and, with the Division still in the line, he was given the mission of reorganizing and building it into a first class fighting division.

On the same day, General Buck was relieved of command of the 3rd Division, and General Preston Brown was sent from the 2nd Division to command this division. With this shake-up in the command in the center divisions, General Summerall, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, relieved General Lenihan from command of the 83rd Brigade of the 42nd Division.

On October 18, the 89th Division (Middle West National Army), under the command of General Wright, moved up and relieved the 32nd Division in the Bois de Bantheville. The 32nd Division (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), under General Haan, had added another brilliant

chapter to their glorious record in the eighteen days in the Meuse-Argonne, and left the field for a well-merited rest.

On October 19 the 3rd Division (Regular) extended its sector further to the right and thus relieved the 4th Division (Regular) from the small front the latter held encircling Brioules. The 4th Division, commanded by General Hines and then by General Cameron, was the last to be relieved of the nine divisions which had, on September 26, begun the



CLOSING ACTIONS OF THE SECOND PHASE

Showing daily gains on the front of the First American Army from October 11 to October 25, 1918.

Meuse-Argonne Offensive. For twenty-four days it had been actively engaged in the open Meuse valley, subjected not only to frontal fire, but to fierce fire from the German batteries on the crests east of the Meuse, and, during all this time, it had kept its front in advance of the remainder of the front of the First American Army.

On October 20 the 3rd and 5th Divisions were ordered to attack again in order to take their objectives, the Bois de Clairs Chenes and the Bois des Rappes. Both divisions had been fighting for six days to take these two woods, but so far little gain had been made. On the remainder of the front of

the First American Army no advance was ordered. Two Brigades of Artillery, the 4th and 155th, were put at the disposal of the 5th Division for this attack. Fifteen minutes' concentration of artillery fire preceded the attack, which was this time being made by the 11th Infantry. All day long the fighting was pushed in the thick woods, but by 9 p. m. little progress had been made. The 3rd Division, however, had been more successful. The fighting in the Bois de Clairs Chenes was bitter, but, before midnight, the wood was practically cleared of the enemy.

The attack was ordered to be repeated on October 21. This time, however, a new method was tried. The morning passed without any action and then suddenly, at 11:25 a. m., the artillery fired five minutes of preparation fire and, following this, the infantry plunged forward. A rolling barrage went ahead and, following it, the 11th Infantry mopped up the woods, taking 175 prisoners. The 3rd Division also continued its advance and, capturing Hill 299, swept down the slopes and established its line along the Andon creek.

That night the 90th Division, under General Allen, relieved the 5th Division in the Bois des Rappes. The 5th Division had been in the line for eleven days, during which time they had advanced three kilometers and suffered a total of 4,449 casualties. The division was moved back to the Montfaucon-Malancourt area. Here they were still under fire, but the opportunity was given General Ely to reorganize the division and fill the ranks with the 3,000 replacements which were received. For five days the division stayed in this place, and then, on October 26, the 5th Division was sent back into the line.

On October 22 the only forward movement on the front of the First American Army was made by the 90th Division. With the 89th Division holding the Bois de Bantheville on the left, and the right regiment of the 90th Division holding the Bois des Rappes, the town of Bantheville, which lies in the hollow between these two woods, was practically outflanked. The 90th Division therefore assaulted the town and captured it, thus straightening out the line on their front, and in ex-

plotation, advanced the whole line to the banks of the Andon creek. On the following day, patrols from the 3rd Division found that the town of Brioules had been evacuated by the enemy, and the town was occupied without incident.


The 78th Division, meanwhile, had been engaged in bitter fighting in the town of Grand-Pre, where they had relieved the 77th Division. Finally, however, on October 25, they completed the capture of this important town, and the front of the First American Army became once more straightened in preparation for another attack.

On October 26 the 5th Division, which had spent five days out of the line, was brought up and relieved the 3rd Division on the general line of the Andon creek, from the Meuse to Aincreville. The 5th Division was rested and reorganized and prepared for arduous duty. On the right of this division lay the 90th Division, which was fresh and rested. To the left of this was the 89th Division, which also had not taken part in any fighting in the Meuse-Argonne. To the left of this division was the 42nd Division. This division was relieved by the 2nd Division on October 31. The 77th Division was brought up and put in the line between the 2nd and the 78th Divisions. This was the order of battle of the First Army, west of the Meuse, at the close of the "Second Phase" of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The Germans were still holding the Kriemhilde Stellung in force on the line Clery-le-Petit, Clery-le-Grand, Aincreville, Landres-St. Georges, St. Georges, Champigneulle, to the Argonne Forest, just north of Grand-Pre. All attempts to break this line from October 11 to October 31 had met with little success, and it was evident that another attempt must soon be made.

Across the Meuse, however, the continued pounding by the troops of the First American Army had made better progress. On October 15, the 26th (New England National Guard) Division, under General Edwards, relieved the 33rd (Illinois National Guard) which, under General Bell, had been fighting steadily forward since September 26, and on October 8 had forced its way across the Meuse. Since that time it had won in desperate fighting the heights east of the Meuse.

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE 831

On October 23, the 29th and the 26th Divisions attacked eastward, after a strong artillery preparation, toward the Bois des Estrayes, which was situated on a ridge of great tactical importance. The ridge was seized and held, and the 26th



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE FRONT

pushed forward into the maze of trenches in the direction of Crepion, and the Bois de Belleu. The division was then brought back to the ridge, and consolidated the line there. On the next day General Edwards, who had commanded the 26th Division since its organization was relieved, and General Bamford was sent up from the 1st Division to assume com-

mand. The 29th Division was relieved by the 79th Division under the command of General Kuhn, and retired from its first and last battle. For twenty days the 29th Blue and Gray Division, commanded by General Morton, had fought resolutely in the face of the most galling fire. There was nothing sensational about its advance on the right of the Meuse, but the fact that each day marked an important if small advance against the juncture of the three German lines of defense, gradually opening up the Meuse valley for the main attack, is in itself a glowing tribute to the valor and devotion to duty of the 33rd and the 29th Divisions, who with the French played such a gallant part in the operations of the First American Army. The 29th Division lost in these twenty days a total of 5,796 casualties, advanced seven kilometers, and took 2,148 prisoners.

The Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, begun October 4, was now closed. In the latter part of the month the Franco-British drive swept on toward Valenciennes, while on the extreme north of the line the Belgian Army reached the full swing of their offensive and on October 17, Ostend, Lille, and Douai were regained. Two days later Bruges fell, and on October 20 the Belgian coast was cleared. Then the Italian Army late in October began its offensive, and on October 26 Austria sued for peace, while on the following morning the Italians crossed the Piave. On the following day the Serbians reached the Danube, and on October 30 an armistice was concluded with Turkey. Germany on November 1 stood alone. On every front the Allies were pressing her hard, and the German Army was regrouping for one last stand. Where this would be no one could say. It was surmised that the Germans were using every moment to withdraw their army from France and Belgium, and to establish a line on the German frontier. Any delay in continuing the American attack would therefore be in Germany's favor. Accordingly the Third Phase of the attack astride the Argonne forest was placed for November 1.

During October three divisions arrived from the United States—the 38th (Kentucky, West Virginia and Indiana Na-

tional Guard), 34th (Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North and South Dakota National Guard), and the 86th (Illinois National Army) Divisions. These were immediately ordered upon arrival in France to the Le Mans area, where the personnel was broken up into replacement units for the combat divisions, which enabled divisions to be immediately replaced to full strength, and sent back for the Third Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

On November 1 there were 29 combat divisions in the A.E.F., 23 of which had taken part in the offensive in its first two phases. Of the other six divisions, the 27th (New York National Guard), and the 30th ("Old Hickory" National Guard) Divisions were with the British. Of the other four, the 6th (Regulars) was under orders to proceed to the Meuse-Argonne, the 7th (Regulars) was in the line in the old St. Mihiel front on the Moselle, while the 88th Division was ordered to reserve on the right of the Meuse. The 36th (Texas National Guard) Division was with the French west of the Argonne.

CHAPTER XV

MEUSE-ARGONNE—THIRD PHASE

(November 1-11, 1918.)

Allies Smash Through on Every Front—2nd Division Breaks the Line—1st Division Goes Through to Sedan—Second Army Attacks on Eve of Armistice

The second phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive closed on October 31, with the last line of German trenches of the Kriemhilde Stellung still to be taken. The attempted assault made in the middle of October had failed, and the last ten days of the month were spent in reënforcing the artillery and putting new divisions into the line in preparation for the final assault.

To begin this attack, the American First Army had in line, east of the Meuse three French and two American divisions, the latter being the 26th and the 79th Divisions. No attack was made on this side of the river until November 4. On the left of the Meuse the divisions in line, from right to left were: the 5th, the 90th, the 89th, the 2nd, the 80th, the 77th, and the 78th. None of these divisions was without battle experience. The 5th, 89th and 90th Divisions, while they had only been in the sector a short time, had been tested at St. Mihiel. This last attack was organized to break through enemy positions in which elements of ten German divisions were identified, and seasoned American divisions were selected to make this final thrust.

On the morning of November 1, the final attack began. Following the most dense protective barrage that had ever been put down on the front of the American Army, the seven divisions moved forward in attack. For the first hour, the German resistance was bitter, and then it suddenly weakened,

and it was found that the Germans had retreated, leaving but a strong rearguard to check the assault. There were small local checks which in some cases became sanguinary encounters, but for the most part the pursuit was pushed with great vigor by the veteran American divisions. Each day marked big advances for the Americans, as it did for the British, Belgians and French in other sectors. The Germans were retreating out of France and Belgium to stand on their own border. During these eleven days the enemy of necessity fought a rearguard action. The resistance on a certain line would be very stiff in the afternoon, but the next morning it would be found that the line had been drawn in during the night. It was one of the most skillfully executed retreats in all history, for it cost the Allies dearly to attack those rearguards with their strong artillery supports, but it also cost the Germans much in materials which in their haste they were forced to leave behind. And then for the first time the Allies, pursuing without artillery fire, would come upon villages from whose towers white flags were hanging, which showed that civilians were still occupying them. Once more, after forty days of the utmost desolation that can be imagined, the daily advances brought the lines into towns and pastures where there was no evidence of the visitation of war.

On the night of October 31, there were no indications on the front of the First American Army that the Germans were about to retire along the whole front. The slightest attempt to advance, each patrol, encountered a sharp fire. Preparations were made on a large scale to break through the formidable wired line of trenches which now faced the American Army from the Meuse to the Argonne. The German lines opposite the First American Army ran from Ornes, on the right of the Meuse, through Beaumont, then north to a point west of Flabas, and from there, swinging in a great arc, including Estrayes ridge, the line reached the Meuse at Sivry. This put the Germans on the right of the Meuse in a bad salient. From Sivry the American line was the left (west) bank of the Meuse as far as the valley of the Andon river. The Germans still held Clery-le-Petit, Clery-le-Grand, Aincré-

ville, Le Grand Carrière Farme, Landres-St. Georges, St. Georges, Champigneulle, to the Argonne just north of Grand Pré. Here the American line joined that of the French Fourth Army, which was holding the left bank of the Aire from Grand Pré to where it emptied into the Aisne, and the left bank of the Aisne from there north as far as Voneq. Thus again the French Fourth Army was fifteen kilometers north of the line of the American First Army, and this time their line on the west of the Argonne was near the top of the forest. The plan was, therefore, for the French to change direction and attack northeast so as to cut off the top of the Argonne, while the Americans drove up the open plain between the forest and the river.

The Americans now faced the last belts of wire, the last entrenched positions south of Sedan. This line was the last position of the Kriemhilde Stellung; protected as were its flanks by the Argonne on the left and the high banks of the Meuse on the right, a frontal attack on it was necessary, and for this the artillery was assembled. The policy of relieving only the infantry of a division, which left the artillery brigade to support the succeeding division, had practically doubled the artillery strength on the American front. During the two weeks of inactivity on the front just prior to this last attack, roads, and broad and narrow-gauge railroads had been carried forward until the supply of ammunition was abundant for all kinds of guns. The fire of preparation which this concentration of artillery began on the morning of November 1, was the most terrific ever witnessed by any American troops. It blasted away the German defensive works, and, the defenders, demoralized as they were by the succession of Allied drives on every front, crumpled under the power of this last blow. The enemy's artillery reply was very feeble and, at 5:30 a. m., when the infantry assaulted behind a rolling barrage they smashed through everything to the final objective.

The 5th Division, now commanded by General Ely, on the right of the line, pivoted, under orders, on its right, and advanced its left with the 90th Division, and gradually swung around to front on the Meuse. Cléry-le-Grand was seized

by the 60th Infantry and the Bois de Babiemont by the 61st Infantry, and by the end of the day the line ran parallel to, but two kilometers back from the river.

The 90th Division, under the command of General Allen, attacked with the 359th Infantry on the right and 360th Infantry on the left, its mission being to swing towards the river on the left of the 5th Division. The advance went rapidly that first day and by night Aincreville and Andevane were taken and the line was advanced almost four kilometers.

The 89th Division, although the line had been pierced on their front and there was no wire for them to break through, had to penetrate a large wood, the Bois de Barricourt. But their advance met with very slight resistance; Remonville was captured early in the day, and by night the line was established on the far side of the town.


The 2nd Division, under the command of General Le Jeune, had been given the "place of honor," which usually meant the most costly place to take on the whole front. As the center of the First Army, it had before it the most difficult and heavily wired position in front of Landres-St. Georges, before which the veteran Rainbow Division had been stopped. The 1st, 2nd, and the 67th Field Artillery Brigades played on this for two hours in preparation, while Company D of the 1st Gas Regiment played on the position with its big trench mortars. A dense fog shrouded the German position which assisted by shielding the advance. The 89th and 2nd Divisions attacked abreast. In the latter the regiments were in line from right to left, 23rd Infantry, 5th and 6th Marines. The 9th Infantry followed in support. The advance was pushed rapidly forward under cover of the fog and the most dense barrage ever fired in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. St. Georges and Landres-St. Georges were captured in an hour and the advance was pushed to the heights of Barricourt. Resistance in the Bois de Hazois was very stubborn and it was not until the enemy garrison was wiped out that the wood could be taken. By 8:30 a. m., the 2nd and 89th Divisions swinging forward together had converged, and the first objective was taken. The attack was resumed at 9 a. m. by

these two Divisions; the 2nd Division advanced swiftly, meeting little resistance, down the slopes into the village of Landreville and up over the hill to take the villages of Bayonville and Chenery, and never stopping that glorious charge, they swept down the slope, and across the marsh, establishing the line two kilometers beyond Chenery. That day these fighting men of the 2nd Division advanced through an organized position eight kilometers (5 miles) and took 1,300 prisoners and 75 pieces of artillery, but what was even greater than this, they drove a flying wedge into the enemy's line which broke the whole system of his defense. The 89th "Middle West" Division, under the command of General Wright, was by evening in advance of the 2nd Division on its left. It had carried its principal object, the Bois de Barricourt. In this, its initial action in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, it had played a rôle fully as important as the 2nd Division, and it carried it out with all the dash of the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

The 80th Division, commanded by General Cronkhite, on the left of the 2nd, was in the Meuse-Argonne attack for the third time. The 319th Infantry on the right went through with the 2nd, took the town of Imecourt, and finally established the line just southeast of Sivry-le-Buzancy, but the 320th Infantry on the left, which was advancing with the 77th Division, was stopped just two kilometers from the jump-off line in front of Alliepont. As this left a big gap between the two regiments the reserve brigade of this division was rushed up to fill it.

The 77th Division, commanded by General Alexander, was attacking Champigneulle, which lay in a ravine. To approach this from the front would have been a costly enterprise, whereas to move a regiment around through the sector of the 89th Division and take the upper end of the ravine would insure the fall of the town with fewer casualties. Therefore, when the advance was stopped in the morning just south of the town, the latter plan was decided upon for the following day.

The 78th Division, commanded by General McRae, soaked the edge of the Argonne with mustard gas during the two-



ADVANCE OF NOVEMBER 1, 1918

Showing the break-through in the center made by the 89th and 2nd Divisions.

hour preparation, and then attacked up the open plain, but the failure of the 77th to make any advance prevented this division from taking the Bois de Loges.

The advance of the First American Army that day had been sensational. The right and left ends of the line were still on the jumping-off line, while the center had advanced five miles, making the line a sharp arc on the evening of November 1.

On November 2 the advance was continued. The 5th Division made up for its slight advance on the 1st; it swept down to the river taking the towns of Clery-le-Petit and Doulcon, and mopped up the big "Punch Bowl" which lies on the left bank opposite Dun-sur-Meuse.

The 90th Division, on the left of the 5th, took Villers-devant-Dun, and then turning towards the river, cleared the Bois du Mont until they stood on the bluffs overlooking the Meuse valley.

The 89th Division drove on due north. There was some bitter fighting but still they progressed until at 9 p. m. the towns of Tailly and Nouart being taken, another four kilometers added to the territory taken on this day.

The 2nd Division did not attack in the morning for it was already too far advanced to permit of any forward action. By afternoon, however, the division on the flank had made sufficient progress and the 2nd Division was ordered to continue on to its own objective. The advance that day was not great, but pushing steadily all afternoon and on until midnight, the line was finally established on the Fosse-Nouart road. This was the first of the famous night marches by which the 2nd Division was able to advance so swiftly.

The 80th Division attacked at 6 a. m. on the morning of the 2nd. The 317th Infantry, which had been brought up to fill a gap in the line, attacked due west across the sector of the 77th, and meeting little resistance, took Verpel north of Champigneulle and Thermonges. The remainder of the division continued on to its objectives and by 6 p. m. Buzancy was taken and the line established north of the town.

The 306th Infantry of the 77th Division executed the out-


flanking of Champigneulle by going around to the right and entering the ravine above the town. Once this was cleared, the 77th found the way open, and the 80th Division holding the towns on its front, the line was pushed on without meeting any resistance until it rested on the Buzancy-Harricourt road.

The 78th Division found that during the night all enemy resistance was gone from the Bois des Loges. Advancing rapidly along the edge of the forest, they took the few Germans in Beffu, and continued on to Briquenay, establishing the line a kilometer beyond that village.

By the end of the second day of this Third Phase, the American line was again bowed out in the center, but not so noticeably as it was on the first day. The advance was such that ration carts and rolling kitchens could not keep up with it. There were occasional centers of resistance, but these were outflanked, and the line was connected and established with Fosse as the extreme forward point on the night of the 2nd of November.

The advance of the first two days of the attack had been so rapid that the trains, artillery supplies, and reserve divisions found the utmost difficulty in keeping up with the ever-advancing front. There were but few roads available and yet all the vast trains of an army, fighting with seven divisions in the line, had to use these roads. This meant the most careful regulation of traffic by the military police, and the waits at cross roads and junction points were interminable. The 1st and 42nd Divisions were following this attack in close support, ready to be thrown in should the opportunity present itself. Using the roads for their daily advances was almost out of the question, and consequently, these two veteran divisions followed the swift attack by marching across the fields.

On November 3 the 5th Division was ordered to cross the Meuse and form a bridgehead at Dun-sur-Meuse. The 90th Division was ordered to cross the Meuse as soon as the 5th Division established a bridgehead. During the night, a battalion of the 5th Division with a company of engineers hastily threw a footbridge across the river, and amid a hail of machine-gun and artillery fire, they rushed over and took cover



ADVANCE OF NOVEMBER 2, 1918

Showing better position of Battle Line due to advance of flank divisions.

under the bank of the canal. Here they remained without support, for it was impossible for a man of either forces to move in the river bottom during daylight, so intense was the fire from the hills on either side.

The 90th Division advanced its front toward the river and maintained *liaison* with the 89th Division on the left.

The 89th Division held a wide front, with the 1st Division close up in support ready to relieve this division and continue the drive, but General Wright asked to be given one more day in the line. The 89th Division then drove on and took Beauclaire on the right and Bois la Dame on the left.

The 2nd Division jumped off at 6 a. m. on the 3rd and in spite of stiff opposition on their front, their advance never stopped, and by evening the line was on the southern edge of the Bois de Belval. Here the division faced a dense forest covering rolling hills where the Meuse turns to the left. As far as this division was concerned the forest stretched out indefinitely on either flank, and was on an average three miles in depth. Through this forest lay one road, the Belval-Beaumont road, and along the southern edge of the Bois de Belval the Germans were making a stand. With the darkness came a pouring rain, and a plan, novel to this war, but used in many previous wars, was decided upon. A battalion of the 9th Infantry with a battery of the 15th Field Artillery moved out silently, in advance guard formation, into the forest along the Beaumont road. They were on the march all night, capturing German machine-gunners asleep at their posts beside their guns, and at La Forge and Tuilerie Farms they surprised the garrison and captured them. By midnight they were through the woods and a line was formed on the northern edge. It must have been a great surprise to the Germans in the open rolling country around Beaumont when at dawn on the morning of the 4th, they found Americans six kilometers inside the line upon which the German rearguards were to make a stand. The Germans in the forest now retreated with all haste, and the remainder of the 2nd Division marched down the road.

The 80th Division on the 3rd continued to push on with-

out much resistance, and by night came up with the right of the 2nd Division in front of the Bois de Belval.

The 77th Division also found but little resistance on its front and by evening had taken St. Pierremont.

The 78th Division, in *liaison* with the 77th on its right and the French on its left, advanced more readily now that the Argonne forest was at last passed, and with open country on both flanks, seized Germont and Authé. The last German was now squeezed out of the Argonne forest; that mighty barrier was once more in French hands, while before the advancing French and Americans lay open country to the river Meuse. The French were well up on the left, and there was needed but one more push to reconquer all the ground south and west of the Meuse. Practically all the Germans were on the other bank, where, on the heights, a new line of defense was established.

On November 4 the attack was continued on the left bank of the Meuse towards Sedan. On this day also, that part of the First American Army which was on the right bank of the Meuse from Ornes to Dun-sur-Meuse, was ordered to take up the offensive. These actions, while both part of the same great offensive, took part as two separate attacks, and consequently it has seemed best to give the description of the fighting west of the Meuse, towards Sedan, during the last eight days of the war, as a separate account. Following this will be given the action east of the Meuse from November 4 to 11, and then the account of the attack by the Second American Army on the eve of the Armistice.

On November 4, the entire front of the First American Army, from Ornes on the right bank where the French and Americans were facing Damvillers, all along the line to where the French Fourth Army joined just east of Le Chesne, moved forward in attack.

The 5th and the 90th Divisions were now definitely committed to crossing the Meuse, and thus their operations on the left bank come to an end, and the narrative of their attack belongs to the description of the fighting on the right bank. This left the 89th Division as the right of the advance on

the west bank on November 4th. During that day this division gradually extended its lines to include everything from the left flank of the 90th Division at Laneuville (opposite Stenay) to the right flank of the 2nd Division at Pouilly, on the left. This was practically the big wooded point around which the Meuse swung, and while there was little resistance, still the area was large and the progress was necessarily slow. By the night of the 4th, Laneuville and Beaufort were taken and the line connected to that of the 2nd opposite Pouilly, but the point of woods was not entirely cleared.

The 2nd Division, after its sensational capture of the Bois de Belval during the night, spent the 4th in bringing up the remainder of the division and waiting until the divisions on the flanks came up, before assaulting the town of Beaumont, which lay before them across the rolling country of the open river bottom.


The 80th Division pushed on all that day through the difficult woods of the Bois de Four and the Bois de Gerache, where *liaison* was finally established with the 2nd Division on the right.

The 77th Division took the town of Ochtes, and by night had pushed on to the outskirts of La Berliere. They were still behind the division on either flank, and the lines of these were bent back to maintain *liaison*.

The 78th Division went along rapidly with the French on its left, through the villages of Brieuilles-sur-Bar, Verrieres, and on down the Bar valley until they took Les Petites Armoises. On the hill beyond, however, they ran into stiff resistance in the Bois de Sty, and here the division was still engaged when darkness fell on the 4th of November.

On the 5th, the 89th Division finished its attack and reached the river Meuse at all points along its front from Laneuville to Pouilly, but not in time to prevent the Germans from destroying the bridges. The patrols which reached the river drew such a hot fire from the hills across the river that there was no doubt of the German strength on that line.

The 2nd Division, on the 5th, sent the 5th Marines to assist the 89th Division in mopping up the woods, and to reconnoiter



ADVANCE OF NOVEMBER 5, 1918

the bridges at Pouilly and Inor. Meanwhile the remainder of the division attacked with the 80th Division, and in one great rush, in the face of terrible flanking fire from the hills across the Meuse, Beaumont was captured by the 2nd Division and Yoncq was taken by the 80th Division. This was the last assault for the 80th Division; with the line resting on the Yoncq-Beaumont road, it was relieved that night by the 1st Division. The 80th Division, commanded by General Cronkhite, left the field with conscious pride in its battle record. Three times, in each of the three phases, it had smashed its way forward in the Meuse-Argonne battle, and its fighting was in the open rolling country where the German resistance was greatest. It advanced during those fourteen days 37 kilometers (24 miles) and captured 103 officers, 1,710 men, and 88 pieces of artillery, and lost a total of 210 officers and 5,464 men.

The 77th Division continued its advance on the 5th with the taking of Stonne, and connected its right with the 80th Division just west of Yoncq. On its right the 78th Division also fought its last battle of the war on this day. Pushing on through resistance in the Bois de Sty, it finally cleared these woods and pressed on, taking the towns of Tannay and Sty, and established the line a kilometer and a half beyond on the road to Chemery, where during the night the 42nd Division relieved them. On October 16th the 78th Division, under the command of General McRae, had begun its first offensive operation, and from that day fought continuously until relieved. It established for itself a record that will never grow dim, which cost, however, a total of almost 5,000 casualties.

On November 6, the 89th Division, with its line now definitely along the Meuse, reached its objective. On its left, the famous 1st and 2nd Divisions, now for the first time side by side in an attack, jumped off to clear the last bit of enemy ground south of the Meuse river. On they swept towards their goal in a mad race which the spirit of rivalry between the two best divisions of the A.E.F. had engendered. Within two hours the left bank of the Meuse was cleared. The 2nd, on the right, did not have so far to go to reach the river as did the 1st on the left, but each went equally fast, and by 10

a. m. the line of the 1st lay along the Meuse opposite Muzon, and a long string of prisoners was going to the rear.

The 77th Division, on the left of the 1st, kept up with the swift advance and established the right of their line on the Meuse at Autrecourt, while the left was three kilometers south of the Meuse, where it joined with the 42nd Division, which also had made a mighty advance that day, and had taken the villages of Chemery and Bulson. The left of their line, where it joined that of the French Fourth Army, lay six kilometers south of the river. That afternoon the 1st Division received orders immediately to leave the front they were then holding, and to march so as to take Sedan at dawn. Tired after the long march in reserve, these troops were assembled back on the Beaumont-Stonne road as soon as it was dusk, and the long, bitter forced march was begun.

On the 7th, the 89th and the 2nd Divisions maintained the line on the river, while the latter took over the sector which the 1st had left open by its hasty withdrawal for the march on Sedan. The 77th Division on the left of the 2nd, made its final attack and reached with its entire front the banks of the Meuse, 6 miles east of Sedan.

The 42nd also made its last attack and they too reached the Meuse, with the extreme left but two miles east of Sedan.

Meanwhile the 1st Division wrote the last page in its full book of battle experiences. After five days of continuous marching in reserve in support of the whole line, which meant making two marches a day, the division had marched on the night of the 5th-6th 20 kilometers ($12\frac{1}{2}$ miles) to the point where they leap-frogged the 80th Division. In the assault on Muzon on the 6th, the 1st Division advanced seven kilometers. Then that afternoon, under rush orders, the division came back to the Stonne road, and began at dusk a forced march of 33 kilometers to Sedan. All night they marched—those troops who had not slept for two days. The artillery went ahead while the troops were being brought back and given a hot meal, just before starting. During the night the infantry passed the 1st Artillery Brigade standing on the road where the Germans in their retreat had blown up a big

bridge. In spite of their fatigue, General Summerall, then commanding the Corps, chose his old 1st Division to make this long march because he knew that they would surely get there. Across the sectors of the 77th and the 42nd Divisions, they marched along the road from Beaumont, through Stonne to Chemery, where the brigades split, taking either side of the valley; dawn broke with them advancing rapidly towards Sedan. The 16th Infantry reached a point just south of Sedan, the 28th was on the hills between Wadelincourt and Chevenges, and the 26th Infantry on the hill north of St. Aignan. Here a French Division, the personnel of which were natives of Sedan, and to whom the city meant more than the capture of the greatest German base on that whole front, came up. General Summerall went forward to the front line and, finding elements of the French division and of the 42nd American division along the line occupied by the left of the 1st Division, ordered the 1st Division to confine its operations to the area between the right of the 42nd Division, and the Meuse. Shortly afterwards, orders were received from the Army to withdraw the 1st Division, and its line was transferred to the 42nd Division. The advanced elements of the 1st Division were just approaching Sedan when the halt came.


Aside from the glory of taking the town which was denied them, the tired troops of the 1st Division were glad to rest. In thirty hours they had marched 61 kilometers ($38\frac{1}{4}$ miles) and fought two engagements. The sheer grit of those troops was unbelievable. Several officers and men fell unconscious from fatigue. Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who was commanding the 26th Infantry, although suffering from a machine-gun bullet wound in the leg which he had received at Soissons, and which the surgeons decided made him unfit for active service, left his car where the artillery stopped, and continued the rest of the way, 12 kilometers, on foot. That march of 38 miles in 30 hours, which included two engagements, while it is not the military record, stands as the record for the A.E.F., and forms a suitable closing for the gallant battle record of the famous 1st American Division,

and entitled it to its place in the center of the Rhine Bridgehead of the American Army.

During November 7, the right flank of the Fourth French Army was moved to the right which forced the 83rd Brigade of the Rainbow Division out of line. The 84th Brigade remained in line on the river until the night of November 9, when the 77th Division relieved the 42nd and the latter left the front with a record full of bright pages of a succession of victories. On November 5, General Rhodes had succeeded General Menoher in command of the "Rainbow" Division, and on the eve of the Armistice General MacArthur assumed command. General Menoher was promoted to the command of the Sixth Corps. The 77th Division, which had been in the attack in the Meuse-Argonne continuously, except for a 10-day rest in the latter part of October, remained in the line until the signing of the armistice, and held the line along the southern bank of the Meuse. Here this division, on November 11, witnessed the laying down of arms of the German Army.

The 2nd Division held the sector along the southern bank of the Meuse from the left of the 77th as far as Pouilly, until the night of the 10th of November. On that night as soon as it was dark, the 2nd Engineers threw over two bridges, just south of Villemonty, and two battalions of the 5th Marines, with two machine-gun companies, followed by the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion of the 356th Infantry of the 89th Division, crossed the river under heavy fire. Meanwhile at Pouilly, the remainder of the 356th Infantry, and the 355th Infantry of the 89th Division crossed by using pontoons as ferries, while the 353rd Infantry of the 89th Division crossed at Stenay with the 90th Division. These crossings form a part of the action on the right bank of the Meuse, and it is necessary to go back six days to November 4, and follow the operations on that side of the Meuse which led up to the Armistice.

On the right bank of the Meuse on November 4, between Ornes and Sivry-sur-Meuse, the line was bowed out to include Estrayes ridge. On the right of this line was the 10th French



SEDAN

Showing the location of the American Divisions when, by the advance to Sedan, the fighting on the west bank of the Meuse was finished.

Colonial Division, on its left the 26th and left of this the 79th American Divisions, while the extreme left was held on the Meuse by the 15th French Colonial Division. Just across the Meuse on the left bank was the 5th Division, whose front stretched along the Meuse from Sivry-sur-Meuse, to above Dun-sur-Meuse.

By the evening of November 2, the 5th Division had established its front along the west bank of the Meuse. Here, with both brigades in the line, the division occupied a front of eight kilometers (5 miles). All during the day the Air Force was reconnoitering behind the German lines and reported that the Germans were retiring rapidly from the east bank of the Meuse. Every road was filled with troops and the railroads were taking away the troops in trainloads. Accordingly orders were issued for the 5th Division to force a crossing of the Meuse immediately to keep in touch with the retreating enemy. The river Meuse at this point was at that time about 25 yards wide and about 5 feet deep. Just beyond it, however, rose the steep bank of the canal, and this presented a more serious problem, for it was 20 yards wide and was deep, with a swift current. Behind the canal, the heights rose abruptly, and these were held in force by the enemy. During the night of November 2-3, Companies E and G of the 6th Infantry, were brought up to Brioules, where Company F of the 7th Engineers was building a foot-bridge across the river. The bridge was finished at dawn and Captain O'Neal had E Company across when the enemy discovered the bridge and swept it with fire. Everyone in the river flats was forced to take cover. Those on the west bank withdrew, while Company E and the Engineers took shelter behind the high bank of the canal. Here they lay all during the day of November 3. During the night of November 3-4, Company G managed to reach the eastern bank of the river, but all attempts to cross the canal were met with heavy hostile machine-gun fire.

During the night of the 4th-5th, the remaining two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Infantry were pushed across the foot-bridge at Brioules. Then, just before dawn,

the engineers completed two bridges across the canal, and, despite heavy enemy fire, the battalion was rushed across, and the bridgehead was made. This attracted so much of the Germans' attention that the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry was able to cross practically without notice, a little further up the river, using bridges made of telegraph poles and duckboards. Before morning they were in position on Hill 262. Meanwhile to the north, the 9th Brigade (60th and 61st Infantry) had tried to cross in the afternoon. The attempt had broken down and the brigade suffered heavy losses. Another and more successful attempt was made after dark, in the vicinity of Clery-le-Petit, and by morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 60th and two companies of the 61st Infantry had crossed both the river and the canal at this point and established the bridgehead. All was in readiness, therefore, on the morning of November 5, for the 5th Division to assault the heights east of the Meuse, and establish a firm bridgehead over which it might bring its artillery and thus force the Germans out of this pocket of hills from which they had menaced the flank of the American advance west of the Meuse.

On November 5, the 79th Division attacked again. Despite desperate resistance, the 315th and 316th Infantry Regiments stormed Hill 378 and held it against furious counter-attacks. That night, the 5th Division pushed over the river the remainder of the 60th and 61st Infantry Regiments. The Bois de Chatillon and the village of Vilosnes-sur-Meuse were taken by the 60th, which allowed the 15th French Colonial Division to advance and join its left with the right of the 5th. Meanwhile the 11th Infantry took Ligny-devant-Dun, and the 61st took Dun-sur-Meuse, which gave the 5th Division a front of eight kilometers across the Meuse.

On November 6 the 79th Division attempted vainly to push on towards the northwest, but each attempt was stopped by artillery and machine-gun fire. Meanwhile the 5th Division, meeting very little resistance once it had forced a crossing of the river, pushed on through the wooded heights with the 15th French Colonial Division.

On November 7, the whole line advanced. The 26th Divi-

sion on the right, on a front of five kilometers, with its regiments in the line in order from right to left: 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, attacked between Beaumont and the Bois d'Ormont (where it connected with the right of the 79th Division). Directly ahead lay the town of Flabas. The resistance, which had been very strong on this front, appeared to have broken that morning, and the advance, while contested in places, went along easily. The 79th Division, on the right of the 26th, also met with weak resistance. In *liaison* with the 15th Colonial French Division, the 79th by evening carried the enemy's works and wire on the ridge Les Clairs-Chenes near Solferino farm, which swung the line around to face more to the east. The 15th French Colonial Division in *liaison* with the 5th Division on its left, swung around to the north in continuation of this forward movement and occupied Ville-neuve and Sillon-Fontaine farms. The 5th Division pushed due east on its front, mopping up the wooded hills against light resistance, and by evening occupied Brandeville. Thus on the evening of the 7th of November, the line on the right bank of the Meuse ran from Beaumont in almost a straight line north to include Brandeville, and from there it ran west to the Meuse at Sassey, including the towns of Lion-devant-Dun and Milly-devant-Dun, which the 5th Division had taken in extending the front of their bridgehead.

On the 8th, the advance was pushed further. The 26th Division took Flabas, and the ridge facing northeast which dominated the road and railroad from Damvillers to Azannes.

The 79th Division this day changed its direction, under orders, to due east. This necessitated a skillful action, which was cleverly carried out, and under cover of a barrage the division assaulted and carried the last of the ridges and spurs on their front of that long line of hills which separates the Meuse from the flat plains of the Wœvre. By evening the line of the heights was assured, and the Germans were in full retreat across the plains.

The 5th Division with the 15th French Colonials, continued their progress across the hills and by night had also cleared the remaining spurs, taken the towns of Etraye and

Reville, Ecurey, Lissey, Breheville. The 5th also extended its line to the north in front of the 90th Division. As this extended the line too much, the 32nd Division, which after its gallant breaking of the Kriemhilde line had been rested and replaced, went into the line that night between the 15th French Colonials and the 5th Division, between La Petite Lissey and Breheville.



NOVEMBER 10, 1918

On November 10, the general attack along the whole front of the First American Army on the right of the Meuse was resumed. The 26th Division swept down from the heights into the valley of the Thinte, and, after a bitter struggle, the town of Ville-devant-Chaumont was taken, which brought the line in a position to assault Ornes, where the three German lines of defense met.

The 79th Division, in conjunction with the 26th, swept down into the valley of the Thinte. This was in continuation of an attack which started the day before, and by the evening of the 10th, the 79th Division had reached the Germans' strongly wired and entrenched positions. The towns of Wavrille, Gibericy, Etraye, and Moirey were taken on the 9th and held by this Division, and on the 10th, and the line included Chaumont-devant-Damvillers. The 15th French Colonial Division, swinging its front also so as to face due east, advanced its line and took, before night, the town of Damvillers, and crossed the Thinte.

The 32nd Division moved down from the hills into the Thinte valley and in the face of bitter fire from the German rearguards, the 128th Infantry took Peuvillers and pushed on beyond it into the Bois de Dombras, but being unable to maintain the line there, pulled back into the town. The 127th Infantry on the left cleared all the woods to the west of the Jametz-Damvillers road and established the line there for the night.

The 5th Division took Jametz and Louppy, and connected on the left with the 90th Division. This division had remained on the left bank of the Meuse waiting for the 5th Division to establish a bridgehead. When the 5th took the town of Mouzay, the bridgehead was finally secured. The 358th Infantry at once crossed and occupied the town, and the 90th Division continued the advance northward towards Stenay; after taking this town they advanced the line to Baalon.

That night the 89th and the 2nd Divisions, in the face of bitter fire, crossed the Meuse.

In accordance with orders on November 11 the attack was resumed under cover of a dense fog. Following a heavy preparation fire, the 26th Division attacked at 9:30 a. m. and had seized Ornes and Azannes, when at 11 a. m. the order to cease firing brought hostilities to an end. The key to the German line of defense in front of Etain and Brie, north of Metz, had been taken in 26 days of continuous fighting at a cost of 965 officers and men. The 26th, now under the command of General Bamford, had seen over nine months of

vigorous combat, in which it had acquitted itself with great honor.

The 79th Division, attacking at 9:30, was making good progress up the western slope of the Cote-de-Moirmont, the last stronghold of the Germans, when the order came to cease fire. The division had advanced in this attack $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers to the north, and then had executed under fire the most difficult of military maneuvers, that of changing direction under fire, after which it advanced five kilometers, a total of $9\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers (6 miles) in fourteen days. In this brilliant action, the 79th Division under General Kuhn, obliterated the former failure, and established a record among the combat divisions.

The 32nd Division had begun the attack on the wooded heights when the news of the armistice reached them. This veteran division, commanded by General Haan, then marked its line and waited patiently to see if the war were really over.

The 5th Division, commanded by General Ely, had attacked towards Montmedy, and were going rapidly towards that large railroad center when the order to halt and cease firing was given.

The 90th Division, commanded by General Allen, on the 11th had finished mopping up Stenay and Baalon, and were progressing towards the railroad in the valley of the Chiers, when the war came to an end.

The 89th Division, under General Wright, in conjunction with the 90th on its right and the 2nd Division on its left had crossed the Meuse on the night of the 10th-11th, and by 11 in the morning had seven battalions across on the right bank of the Meuse. Here ended the gallant battle record of this division, and in recognition of its record, the 89th, along with the 90th and the 5th Divisions, was chosen to be a part of the Army of Occupation.

The 2nd Division, commanded by General LeJeune, which had rushed the 5th Regiment of Marines across the Meuse during the night, lost no time in wresting from the Germans the big point on the Meuse between Muzon and Inor, and by 11 a. m. it had a bridgehead established, four kilometers in width and three kilometers deep. Here this division, so


famous for its dash and gallantry, saw the fulfillment of their ambition, when at 11 a. m. the Germans laid down their arms. Between November 1 and 11, the 2nd Division advanced 32 kilometers (20 miles), captured 1,712 prisoners and wound up their brilliant record in the war by crossing the Meuse. On their left the 77th Division, under General Alexander, was holding the line along the Meuse.

On October 12, General Pershing divided his command of 72 miles of front into two armies. To command the First Army he called General Liggett from the First Corps, and to the Second Army he called General Bullard from the Third Corps. The First Army sector extended from the Argonne to Fresnes-en-Wœvre, and that of the Second Army extended from there to Clemery, north of Nancy. From October 12, when General Bullard assumed command, or in fact ever since the closing of the St. Mihiel offensive, the sector of the Second American Army was very quiet and remained so until November 10. The history of the Second Army is interesting not so much for what it achieved, as for what it might have achieved had not the armistice come when it did.

From September 26 until November 10, this sector was used as a rest sector where divisions which had seen hard service in the Argonne were sent to rest and reorganize. The 35th, the 79th, the 28th, the 4th, the 33rd and the 92nd Divisions were among those sent there after the Argonne, while the 7th, the 81st and the 88th Divisions saw in these sectors their only action of the war.

By the first week in November, the great Allied offensive, from the English Channel to Metz, was advancing rapidly except in front of Metz itself. The extreme right of the Allied attack was in front of the town of Ornes. Between this town and the Moselle the lines were very quiet. Marshal Foch then decided that with the Germans using all their energies to pull their army out of France and Belgium, and establish their defense on the Liège-Metz line, the time was ripe to take Metz. To do this a double attack which would envelop the fortress, was decided upon. The Second American Army was to strike in conjunction with the rapid advance of the First

American Army, and drive toward Briey, north of Metz, while General Mangin's Tenth French Army was to drive for Château-Salins, southeast of Metz. For this joint attack seven American and nineteen French divisions were assembled. According to the orders, the Second American Army was to begin the attack on November 10, and the Tenth French Army



SECOND ARMY ATTACK

a few days later. The Second American Army was to drive towards Conflans, while the Tenth French Army drove towards the Saar and Rhine valleys. The Second American Army had four divisions in line, the 33rd, 28th, 7th, 92nd, along a front of 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Fresnes-en-Wœvre to Port-sur-Seille (8 kilometers east of the Moselle), while in reserve for this attack were the 4th, 35th, 88th and 82nd Divisions. These were to initiate the attack as they stood, while on the 14th of November, it was planned that General Mangin's Tenth French Army would attack through

the French Eighth Army, with ten Divisions in line, and nine in reserve. Also the First American Army was preparing to attack on November 15, with six to eight divisions, in the direction of Montmedy and Longuyon.

The extreme right of the First American Army was the Second Colonial French Corps, with the 10th French Colonial Division on the left, in *liaison* with the 26th Division, and the 81st Division on the right. At Fresnes-en-Wœvre the right of the 81st Division (General Bailey) and the left of the 33rd (General Bell) met and this was the left of the Second American Army. The left of this division touched the right of the 28th Division (General Hay) at Seigneulles brook, north of Hatton-Chatel. The latter division extended to the Rupt-de-Mad, where it joined the left of the 7th Division (General Wittenmyer). From there the 7th held the line as far as Preny, where the 92nd Division (General Ballou) formed the right of the Second American Army. This was the front which had been made on September 15 at the close of the St. Mihiel operation. Behind these four divisions in line were the four divisions in reserve, the 88th (General Weigel), 4th (General Hersey), 35th (General Traub), and the 82nd (General Duncan). Operating under the Second Army were three corps, the Fourth (General Muir) and Sixth (General Menoher) American and the 17th French. The latter had the 33rd Division in line, the Fourth U. S. Corps had the 28th Division and the 7th in line, and the Sixth U. S. Corps had the 92nd Division in the line. The divisions were on a wide front and as the operation developed, the plan was to put the reserve divisions in and thus give each corps two divisions in line.

Opposite the Second Army the Germans had eleven divisions from left to right—the III Bavarian, XIII Landwehr, LXV and xciv Reserve, v, vii, and cxxiv Landwehr Divisions of Von Gallowitz's Army and the cxlv Division and the xxxi and lxxxiv Landwehr Brigades of the Army of the Archduke of Wurtemberg.

On November 1 an order was issued by the Second Army covering the action to be taken in case the enemy retired on

the Liège-Metz line. The Seventeenth French Corps was to advance on Conflans, in conjunction with the advance of the First Army on Briey. The Fourth Corps was to advance on Vionville, and the Sixth Corps was to hold the pivot, and maintain *liaison* with the enemy by means of strong patrols. All that was needed to put this order in operation was the announcement of "D" day.

On November 4, as the Austro-Hungarian divisions had been withdrawn from the front, upon the signing of the Austrian armistice, Marshal Foch directed that vigorous local operations should be begun to discover what operations the enemy intended on this front. The Austrian armistice had withdrawn one division from the front of the Second Army, and there was every belief that the Germans, who saw them leaving, might suffer greatly in *morale*. General Pershing then ordered the First American Army to push its offensive north to the Meuse, and also to clear the right bank so that the First and Second Armies could move abreast towards their goal. Meanwhile orders were given to the Second Army which led to the selection of one brigade from the 28th Division and one brigade from the 7th Division to move through the hilly country along the Rupt-de-Mad in the direction of Chambley, with a limited objective of the Michael Stellung and the eastern edge of the Bois de Grande Fontaine. This attack was originally planned for the 11th of November, but, as the German retirement from all fronts became so rapid, it was ordered ahead to the 10th, and a greater front was covered than was at first contemplated.

While the Second American Army was making preparations for this attack, the right of the First American Army (the 2nd French Colonial Corps with the 10th French Colonial Division on the left, and the 81st Division on the right) began offensive operations between Ornes, where the 26th Division was advancing, and Fresnes-en-Wœvre, where the 33rd Division of the Second Army was about to advance. The 81st attacked on November 9 on a front of 13 kilometers, from Eix to Fresnes, with the 322nd Infantry on the left and the 324th Infantry on the right. The attack began at 8 a. m. after ar-

tillery preparation. The flanks advanced against heavy resistance, and the 322nd took the fortified village of Moranville, while the 324th broke through the German first and second entrenched lines and took the woods behind the latter. This greatly helped the left of the Second American Army in its attack next morning, and in reality forms more a part of the attack of the Second Army than of that of the First, and will therefore be treated with it.

On the morning of the 10th of November the 322nd Infantry of the 81st Division took Grimancourt, and by 11 a. m. reached Abaucourt, on the Verdun-Etain railroad, and in *liaison* with the 10th Colonial Division on its left, began the assault of the German main line of resistance. In accordance with the plan, the 33rd Division attacked that morning on the right of the 81st Division towards Conflans. The 130th Infantry on the left carried all the German defenses from Saulx-en-Wœvre to Marcheville. Here they met bitter resistance. The town was taken, but strong German counter-attacks threw out the 130th Infantry, and that night it was relieved by the 129th Infantry. On the right, the 131st Infantry moved forward and they attacked the Bois de Harville. They penetrated to the center, but were also thrown out by counter-attacks.

On the right of this division, the 28th Division, which had won immortal glory on the Marne, the Vesle, and in the Argonne, was making its last drive. In all its fighting this division had never seen a quiet sector, and that morning of the 10th it moved to the assault with its usual dash. It encountered heavy resistance, but managed to reach the Bois de Dommartin. A second assault that afternoon after artillery preparation failed to give them the woods, and the line rested there for the night.

The 7th Division began its first offensive action on the 10th of November with all four infantry regiments in line, from left to right, 34th Infantry, 64th Infantry, 55th Infantry, 56th Infantry. The 34th Infantry assaulted and took the stone quarry near Rembercourt in the hills just west of the Rupt-de-Mad, and pushed on until within a kilometer of Charey, where they ran into a dense belt of wire. On the right the 56th In-

fantry assaulted Preny bridge, but were unable to hold it, and were forced back with heavy losses.

On the extreme right of the First Army, the 92nd Division had on its left the 367th Infantry. The assault by this regiment failed because the 7th Division on its left did not hold Preny Ridge. Across the Moselle, the 365th Infantry advanced behind a rolling barrage, and drove back the enemy's outposts to a depth of about two kilometers, occupying the Bois Frehaut, near the river, the Bois Voivrette, and the Bois de Cheminot, further east. In the morning the enemy resistance was light, but in the afternoon it stiffened, and the Bois de Voivrotte was abandoned. About midnight, however, it was reoccupied by the 365th Infantry.


On the right of the Second Army the French did not advance, as this was to be a turning movement until the direction had become almost due east. It was like a door swinging only with each advance the hinge, which on September 26 was on the Meuse, and on October 8 was at Ornes, was now on the Moselle, and the plan was, on November 14, to move the hinge of the entire attack of the Allies further east, when the Tenth French Army attacked.

On November 11 (to go back to the junction of the First and Second American Armies), the 81st Division continued its advance with the 321st Infantry on the left, capturing two woods and then assaulting the strongly fortified village of Hautecourt, where they were when at 11 a. m. came the news of the armistice. The right regiment, 323rd Infantry, continued the advance in spite of severe losses to the Bois de Manheulles. Here the armistice stopped the action. In this their first action, the "Wild Cat" division had advanced 5½ kilometers against resistance, in two and a half days' battle, at a total cost of 46 officers and 986 men.

The 33rd Division also resumed the assault. The 129th Infantry, which during the night had relieved the 130th Infantry on the left, attacked the German main line of resistance at Butgneville, while on the right, the 131st Infantry was co-operating in the assault. In this, its final action, this division held true to its previous good record and was smashing through

when the armistice halted the attack. In these two days the division lost a total of 614 casualties.

The 28th Division, now under the command of Major General William H. Hay, had passed through the outer zones of



THE ARMISTICE

Showing Divisions and Battle Line of November 11, 1918, in the sector of the First and Second American Armies.

the German defenses and were in the midst of the assault on the main line in front of the Bois de Bonseil, when the armistice went into effect. Veteran of many attacks, this division was setting the pace for the newer divisions in this last offen-

sive, and as they had entered the line for the first time in the midst of furious battle, so it seemed proper that when the war closed, it should see them leading the way towards Germany in the last battle.

The 7th Division improved its positions on the following day, and assaulted the main German line, which by 11 a. m. they were slowly piercing. The division had been in this sector just a month, and the last two days of this had been its only active engagement of the war, but in that short time it demonstrated an aggressive spirit, and in the month lost a total of 1,818 casualties.

The 92nd Division recovered the prestige it had lost in the Argonne, and its advance, made in the closing hours of the war, was held.

In these two days' battle, the Second Army found the Germans making a determined stand with all the force left at their command, but the progress made gave evidence of what two more days would have developed, and with more and more American divisions coming up in reserve, the success of the breakthrough was assured. As it was, the Second Army wrested from the enemy 58 square kilometers, at a total cost of 1,380 casualties, which was just slightly more than the cost of the taking of Cantigny, where the Americans began their offensive action.

Towards the close of the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, two divisions, the 37th (General Farnsworth) and the 91st (General Johnston), were withdrawn from the front, and on October 18 were dispatched to assist the French Army operating in Belgium.

Detraining at Ypres, these two divisions began their long march across that world-famous battle-field of four years and, on October 22, became a part of Degoutte's Sixth French Army, operating under the command of the King of the Belgians, being assigned to the Thirtieth French Corps. Continuing their march by short stages, on the night of October 28 they began the relief of two French Divisions, and entered the line along the Ghent-Coutrai railroad, just across the Lys river. The Allies there were occupying the second German

line of defense which they had taken, and the ensuing attack was planned to drive the Germans back to the third and last line, running from Ghent through Tournai to Valenciennes, and eventually to break through this line. This last line was the Scarpe river, and therefore the object of the first attack was to drive the Germans back from the Lys to the Scarpe, and then to force the crossing of the Scarpe, which would throw open the road to Brussels. The general direction of the attack was southeast over the low rolling watershed, 15 kilometers (10 miles) towards the city of Audenarde.


At 5:30 a. m. October 31, after an artillery preparation of five minutes, the attack was launched. The Germans met this with all fire power at their command, but the defenders were quickly overrun so swiftly did the troops advance. The Germans were forced to retreat to the Cruyshautem ridge, the Allies in pursuit. Spitaals-Bosschen, a difficult wood, was taken by the 91st in a clever flanking movement. The attack was pushed with great vigor, the artillery kept close behind the infantry, and by a series of successful assaults, the Germans were pushed back across the Scarpe river by November 2, Audenarde being seized by the 91st. Preparations were immediately made to cross the river. Some soldiers had already swum the river, and at seven that night a completed bridge was built by the 37th Division and by the evening of the 3rd, despite the heaviest opposition, this division had over nine companies across the river. Here they remained until the night of November 4, when both divisions were relieved and returned to Thielt and Vive St. Eloi for rest.

The German last line of defense along the Sheldt being still unbroken, on November 8 these two divisions were ordered to again take over the line for the attack on November 11. This was to be the final Allied attack along the whole line. Everywhere the Germans were clinging on desperately to the last line of defense and there were not sufficient German reserves to re-enforce all fronts. The Allies planned on this day to attack this last line from the Dutch border to the Moselle river, with the full knowledge that in one or more places the line would crumble, and the German Army in France and Belgium would

MEUSE-ARGONNE—THIRD PHASE 871

be faced with capture. This attack of November 11, was to decide the war.

Entering the sector on the night of November 10, patrols again crossed the Scheldt river and, working their way forward, established a covering party on the east bank in anticipation of the attack on the 11th. Here they remained despite furious counter fire by the Germans. The attack on the 11th never came, however. The Germans signed the Armistice and



ADVANCE ON BRUSSELS

Showing advance of 37th and 91st Divisions on the eve of the Armistice.

the attack was canceled. The 37th Division suffered in this operation a total of 1,612 casualties and the 91st Division suffered about the same number. The war was over for these two divisions which had so gallantly aided the Belgians in the reconquering of their country.

The last American Divisions to arrive in France were the 31st and the 8th. The 31st Division, made up from the National Guard of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, began the overseas movement late in September and the last units arrived in France on November 9, 1918. The division was ordered to the Le Mans Area and the personnel sent out as replacements

to the combat divisions. The 8th (Regular) Division began the overseas movement on October 30, but by the signing of the Armistice only the 8th Artillery Brigade, 2nd, 81st, and 83rd Field Artillery Regiments, the headquarters of the 16th Infantry Brigade, the 8th Infantry Regiment, and the 319th Engineers had sailed. The remainder of the division never sailed, and the 8th Infantry became, with the 11th Regiment of Marines, the garrison of Brest.

This brought the grand total of divisional troops, including replacements who saw action, to 1,100,000. To this must be added the 240,000 corps and army troops who also participated in these actions, and with them the 50,000 troops of the service of supply, which brought the grand total of American troops who took part in action against the enemy to 1,390,000.


The active operations of the war closed on November 11, but the long sought rest for those weary veteran divisions was not yet in sight. On November 14, the Army of Occupation, the Third American Army, under General Dickman, was formed, with the 1st (Regular), 2nd (Regular and Marine) and the 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) Divisions forming the Third Corps, with orders to cross the Rhine. Behind them, in their long weary march through France, Luxemburg and Germany, came the 3rd (Regular), 4th (Regular), and the 42nd (Rainbow National Guard) Divisions, forming the Fourth Corps, with orders to occupy the west bank of the Rhine, while behind them marched the 89th (Middle West National Army), and the 90th (Texas and Oklahoma National Army) Divisions, forming the Seventh Corps, to occupy the Moselle valley. Behind these, moving into position in Luxemburg and France as supports for these divisions, and guarding the lines of communication, were the 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard), the 33rd (Illinois National Guard), the 5th (Regular), the 7th (Regular), and the 79th (Liberty National Army) Divisions.

For over a month the Third Army, led by the 1st (Regular) Division, followed the Germans out of France, through Luxemburg, and finally into Germany, and across the Rhine, and

MEUSE-ARGONNE—THIRD PHASE 373

once more the honor went to the 1st Division, for it was the first American force to enter Germany and the first to cross the Rhine, where it occupied, with the 2nd on its left, and the 32nd on its right, the thirty-mile diameter Coblenz bridgehead.

The signing of the Armistice, on November 11, 1918, marked the close of America's greatest series of military operations. These had been won at a total cost in battle casualties of 260,496. Of this number 50,280 were battle deaths; the wounded totalled 205,690; while those missing in action and taken prisoners by the enemy were 4,526. The infantry bore the brunt of these casualties. In each hundred infantry officers that arrived in France, eight were killed in action. The casualty among infantry soldiers was only slightly less than among the officers, where five out of each hundred were battle deaths. The following chart shows this in graphic form:



CASUALTIES PER HUNDRED


The next chart shows the weekly totals, which clearly demonstrates the importance of the several battles. The week

DE A. E. F.

included the first three
Meuse-Argonne offensive,

MEUSE-ARGONNE

shown in the table on the
one in having achieved
the greatest casualties.
France, these two di-
cent. of the total casual-
will live forever.



of military
 e. With but
 line almost
 the taking of
 ing series of
 until, on the
 twenty-nine
 attack. The
 fortress of
 nt in doubt.
 a most hu-
 before the eyes
 an Army had
 ighting which

marked the four concluding months of the war can never be adequately described. The heroism and self-sacrificing devotion to duty of every one in the Allied Armies alone made the result possible. There lie in the fields of France, Belgium and Italy, thousands of dead who bear mute testimony to the heat of the struggle. The infantry, artillery and troops of other arms won in that one gigantic battle from the North Sea to Palestine, from Paris to Metz and Mons, the victory of the ages, and the record of their deeds will brighten through the years. Truly it was an infantry battle, for to the infantry fell the lion's share of the casualties, the heartbreaking marches, and the terrible suffering. But with them suffered also the patient, efficient field artillery, and all the units of the combat divisions. However, the stoic heroism of the combat divisions would have been of no avail, had not the Auxiliary Arms and the marvelously efficient Services of Supply supported their every need.

MEUSE-ARGONNE—THIRD PHASE 377

(FOR OFFICIAL CIRCULATION ONLY.)

[G. O. 203.]

G. H. Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

FRANCE, *Nov. 12, 1918.*

GENERAL ORDERS }
No. 203. }

The enemy has capitulated. It is fitting that I address myself in thanks directly to the officers and soldiers of the American Expeditionary Forces who by their heroic efforts have made possible this glorious result. Our armies, hurriedly raised and hastily trained, met a veteran enemy, and by courage, discipline and skill always defeated him. Without complaint you have endured incessant toil, privation and danger. You have seen many of your comrades make the supreme sacrifice that freedom may live. I thank you for the patience and courage with which you have endured. I congratulate you upon the splendid fruits of victory which your heroism and the blood of our gallant dead are now presenting to our nation. Your deeds will live forever on the most glorious pages of America's history.

* * * * *

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, Commander in Chief.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

CHAPTER XVI

AUXILIARY ARMS

Heavy Artillery—Air Service—Tank Corps—Signal Corps—Chemical Warfare Service

HEAVY ARTILLERY

(Certain paragraphs of this article were taken directly from *Liaison*, copyright, 1919, by the Journal of the U. S. Artillery, Fortress Monroe, Va.)

When the United States entered the war, the Coast Artillery Corps, finding that the coast it was assigned to defend had moved over into France, packed up and followed it. Until that time there was no American big gun corps, but, before the armistice was signed, American regiments of heavy artillery had fought on every front where Americans were engaged. Working sometimes with the American Army, and sometimes with the British and French Armies, it had supported the attacks on almost every front from Alsace to the sea. The railway guns and big howitzers had helped wipe out the St. Mihiel salient, they had pushed forward in the Argonne, and had supported the final offensive by heavy firing about Verdun. More than this, trench mortar batteries and anti-aircraft units, drawn from coast artillery personnel, had done their special work at many points. Coast artillery ammunition trains had lurched over thousands of miles of shell-scarred roads, and approximately 150,000 officers and men had received the special technical training to form the reserve and active nucleus of a greater big gun corps, should the need ever arise again.

Making a big gun corps, while entirely new to the Army, would have been an impossible task without years of intensive training in the handling of heavy guns on the part of the Coast

Artillery Corps. The use of heavy mobile artillery is one of the most striking innovations which have come out of this war. Toward the end of the war heavy artillery fire as an integral part of any large infantry offensive was a necessity not to be dispensed with except in extraordinary cases. Since the Germans had startled the Allies with the Austrian Skodas and the other pieces which shattered the "impregnable" fortifications of Belgium, trenches had become deeper and deeper, dug-outs had penetrated further into the ground, concrete had replaced earth works and the defensive had regained the advantage. This advantage could be overcome only by massing greater and more powerful artillery on the offensive. It had been demonstrated that the army with the greatest weight in artillery, properly manned, would win. The American Expeditionary Forces, it was evident, must have heavy artillery. But there was no heavy artillery in the American Army except the coast artillery and that was not mobile. The task before the American Army then was twofold: to build around the Coast Artillery Corps a trained force of officers and men for service with heavy guns in the field, and to get American heavy guns to France.

The first step in providing American guns for use in France was obviously to ship "over there" what guns we had. So fort after fort along the coast was quietly stripped of its heavy guns, which were taken to be fitted with mobile mounts. This was just what the French did when they dismounted from their seacoast forts guns of all sizes and models, some of them as much as thirty-five years old, and put them on railway and road carriages. Fortunately, however, it was possible to secure guns from the French and British which could be used at once. These the big gun corps manned while new mounts were being made for the American guns. In practice, the 8-inch howitzers of British design and American make, many of which were taken over by the Americans after having been built originally for the Russians, and French railway guns of from 19 to 40 centimeters caliber, were the main reliance of the coast artillery in France.

, During the latter part of July, 1917, Brigadier General

Bartlett organized at Fort Adams, Rhode Island, the "Expeditionary Brigade, Coast Artillery Corps." This consisted of Brigade Headquarters and the 6th, 7th, and 8th Provisional ~~Regiments~~ of Regular Army Coast Artillery companies from the forts and defenses of the harbors of the Atlantic coast. It was later to become the nucleus of the Railway Artillery Reserve. Each regiment of three battalions, totalling twelve batteries of 132 men and three officers, was organized to man twelve 10-inch railroad guns, one per battery. The brigade began leaving Fort Adams August 13, and thence, by way of New York, Liverpool, Southampton, and Le Havre, went to camp at Mailly le Camp, near Troyes, early in September. General Bartlett was detached soon after and Colonel Coe was made a brigadier and took command. The name was changed to the "First Separate Brigade (CAC)," and the 6th, 7th, and 8th provisional Regiments became respectively, the 51st, 52nd, and 53rd Artillery Regiments (CAC), and later, in March, 1918, the brigade became "30th Artillery Brigade (CAC-Railway)." The last change of name came on April 3, when this brigade and all other railway artillery and attached technical units became the "Railway Artillery Reserve, First Army, American Expeditionary Forces," and on June 24 Brigadier General William Chamberlaine was assigned to the command.

The normal rôle of these guns of major caliber is as Army Artillery—that is, as units directly under the command of an Army Commander, and disposed by him wherever in the field of operations of the entire Army they are most needed. Battalions were shifted daily along the front, one day with the Americans the next with the French. In general it may be said that the American heavy artillery was first massed for coordinated action in the St. Mihiel drive. From a small Brigade Headquarters, and three regiments, the command gradually grew larger as its activities grew broader, until, at the time of demobilization, it consisted of the following organizations:

Railway Artillery Reserve A.E.F. Headquarters Staff.
 Railway Artillery Supply Depot,
 Military Police Detachment,

Motor Transport Corps Detachment.
Railway Artillery Repair Shop.
1st. Provisional High Burst Ranging Section.
1st. Railway Artillery Operation Battalion.
1st. Railway Artillery Construction Battalion.
Organization Training Center No. 6, including School.
Railway Artillery Replacement Battalion.
30th. Artillery Brigade (66 guns and howitzers).
42nd. Regiment of Artillery at Front after April 1, 1918.
52nd. Regiment of Artillery at Front after April 1, 1918.
53rd. Regiment of Artillery at Front after April 1, 1918.
43rd. Regiment of Artillery at Front after April 1, 1918.
40th. Artillery Brigade (No guns available).
73rd. Regiment of Artillery.
74th. Regiment of Artillery.
75th. Regiment of Artillery.

In effect, the Railway Artillery Reserve was a "pool" of powerful railway guns held at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief in a central base just back of the line of battle—Maily-le-Camp—where they were available for assignment to any army, French or American, for use in battle. When their particular mission was over they were returned to the "base" where they were refitted, repaired, provided with replacements of material and men, and generally made ready for another assignment. There were in all, in this "pool," 66 heavy railway guns, which were operated by the 30th Brigade; and five 14-inch naval railway guns, which were operated by five Naval Batteries under Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, U.S.N. These latter operated as an integral part of the Railway Artillery Reserve, under the tactical control of General Chamberlaine.

The honor of firing the first shot from a railroad gun goes to Battery H of the 53rd Artillery Regiment at 1:18 p. m. on February 13, 1918. Batteries H, I, and K, of the 52nd Regiment, along with Batteries H and I of the 53rd Regiment, had left the camp on February 10 by the Chemin de Fer de l'Est. They were loaned for the time being to the Fourth French Army, commanded by General Gouraud, and were therefore operating under French command. Four months training had

fitted them for any task which might be presented them. Near Somme Suippe, northeast of Chalons-sur-Marne, that part of the train in which the batteries lived was cut off and put on a switch, where the main line of the railroad passes through a cut about one and a half kilometers from the firing position. Batteries H and I, 53rd Artillery, went to work on the night of the 11th and in three hours were ready to emplace the guns. Each of these guns has a name and "La Franchette II," or "La Franchette Twice" as her crew called her, of Battery I, was the first gun of the big gun corps in position for firing on the morning of Lincoln's birthday. No firing was ordered for that day, however, but on the next day the guns were given a target, a concrete dugout, observation post, and telephone central close to the Butte de Mesnil. On the next day, February 13, the French were going to attack, to drive the Germans off the Chemin des Dames. The attack was commenced about noon by the artillery and two salvos were fired. If Battery I had won the honors of being the first in position, Battery H was fully repaid by being the first American heavy battery to fire.

The Railway Artillery Reserve took an important part in the following major operations: Defense of Paris in May and June, 1918; the defense of Reims and the decisive defeat of the Germans by General Gouraud in the Champagne sector in July, 1918; and the grand Allied Offensive during the fall of 1918, which finally defeated the German Army. In this offensive they supported the Fourth French Army in Champagne, the First American Army in the St. Mihiel and Argonne-Meuse operations, and the Seventh and Eighth Armies in the Vosges mountains.

The St. Mihiel attack was the first action of the First American Army, and for this the entire R.A.R. was concentrated and there were fired over 2,100 rounds or nearly 1,000,000 pounds of projectiles, a large part of this directed on traffic centers more than 15 miles behind the front lines, which were the nerve centers and important junction points of the German railway system, supplying the St. Mihiel salient. Conflans en Jarny was the most important of these points and the

fire directed against this railway center was perhaps the most effective delivered against any important German railway center during the entire war. Many direct hits were obtained upon roundhouses, bridges, trains and cars, which contributed largely in preventing the Germans rushing supplies and reinforcements to the salient. Important results were also obtained by fire delivered on the railway bridge in the immediate vicinity of Metz. While this bridge was an extremely small target, traffic was seriously disturbed. This was the only time throughout the entire war that artillery fired upon the immediate vicinity of Metz.

In addition to this extremely long range fire, many important strong points, cities, traffic centers, etc., which were either beyond the power or beyond the range of any other artillery of the Allies, were attended to by the railway guns. The inhabitants of the town of St. Maurice sous les Côtes, nearly ten miles behind the front lines, were pathetically grateful because these guns had bombarded their town and thus caused the Germans to decamp before they could complete their arrangements to send all of the young men and young women of the town into slavery in Germany.

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the railway artillery fired over 13,150 rounds, an aggregate weight of over 5,700,000 pounds of projectiles, and, aside from the counter-battery, and interdiction firing on roads, the interruption of German railway traffic caused by this fire was an extremely important factor in the success of the armies which finally won the war.

But the Railroad Artillery was not the sole function of the Coast Artillery Corps in France. The War Department policy provided that this corps, which before the war had been charged with the sea coast defenses, should provide the personnel for all howitzers and mortars above 6 inches in caliber, all guns of 6 inches and upward, organized as Army Artillery, and the trench mortar and anti-aircraft units assigned to Corps and Army Artillery.

The 55th Regiment and the 56th Regiment were equipped with French 155 millimeter (6-inch) G.P.F. These were the new long barrelled 6-inch rifles, mounted on carriages with

rubber tires, pulled by a tractor capable of doing fifteen miles per hour. This put them almost in the class of field artillery from the point of view of mobility; but heavy artillery they were from the standpoint of range and damage done. On August 4, 1918, these two regiments went to the front, where they remained until the armistice. The 57th Regiment was similarly armed and went to the front September 5, while the 60th Regiment, also 155mm G.P.F., went to the front September 9.

The 58th and 59th Regiments had 8-inch howitzers as did the 44th Regiment. This latter regiment went to the front April 1, 1918. One battalion of the 51st Regiment also had 8-inch howitzers, while one battalion had 240mm. howitzers, and the 2nd Battalion had 270mm. French mortars. To the 65th Regiment, however, belong the "Old Dutch Cleansers," 9.2-inch British howitzers.

This made a total of 285 guns on the line as Corps and Army heavy artillery, to support the Field Artillery Brigades of lighter calibers in places where a little pounding by something heavier than the 6-inch field howitzer was able to accomplish the desired result. In the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne, these regiments won high praise for the accuracy and constancy with which they fired into the enemy.

Then there were the anti-aircraft batteries, the First and Second Battalions, and the first to twentieth batteries, armed with 3-inch special rifle on motor mount, which shoot at airplanes whose average speed is 54 yards per second. This calls for the finest calculation. No longer is it a matter of one plane in figuring firing data, but, from the time the projectile leaves the gun until the thirty seconds have elapsed to carry it to the target, the target may at that time be at any point within a sphere of 1,500 meter radius, whose volume is 5,000,000,000 cubic meters. The danger sphere of a high explosive shell is 5,000 meters. Thus the chance of the airplane coming into the danger zone is one in a million. But as airplanes do not go straight up or straight down, the chance of hitting the airplane becomes about one in one hundred thousand. It must not be thought, however, that the number of airplanes brought

... ..

...

... ..

...

...

... ..


...





ADY TO FIRE











...er, which was carried at all times,



✱



midst of gas attack.



down is the true measure of effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. The most important service is to keep the aviator well up in the air and constantly dodging, and thus spoil his observation.

Two Trench Mortar Battalions, each armed with 240mm. trench mortars were also supplied by the coast artillery, and there also were Corps Artillery, with 24 mortars per battalion, while all the Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries—those jolly little “Fifty-eight Two’s” of the “Suicide Club”—were manned by the Coast Artillery Corps and, with the Ammunition Trains, constitute the major part of the corps activities in the A.E.F.

THE AIR SERVICE

In April, 1917, when the United States declared war against Germany, the Air Service of the American Army, then called the Aviation Section, Signal Corps, had a strength of only 65 officers and approximately 1,100 soldiers. It possessed only about 200 training airplanes, but not a single one of a type considered fit for service on the actual battle fronts, nor were any planes of such a type being manufactured in the United States. There was no existing foundation of practical experience or knowledge upon which could be based plans for the development of an overseas force and for the placing of an aerial army in the air.

On November 11, 1918, in the Air Service, A.E.F., there were 7,726 officers and 70,769 soldiers, of whom 6,861 officers and 51,229 men were in France. Of this number 446 officers and 6,365 soldiers constituted the Balloon Section. Of the number just mentioned, 4,088 officers were on a flying status and 219 were balloon flyers. The rest were non-flyers. Some 765 officers and 19,307 soldiers were training in England and the remainder were training and fighting in Italy.

There were being utilized 16 training schools for pilots and observers, and in addition, American officers were being trained in three schools operated by our Allies. From the training schools there had been graduated 1,674 fully trained pilots and 851 observers. There had been sent to the front

1,402 pilots and 769 observers. The schools were being operated with greater and greater efficiency, as was evidenced by the fact that between November 11, 1918, and January 1, 1919, there were graduated 675 pilots and 357 observers.

From the balloon schools there had been graduated a total of 199 officers and 623 specialized soldiers.

Up to November 11, 1918, a total of 1,213 D.H.-4 airplanes and 2,083 Liberty engines had been received overseas from the United States. Of this number 1,087 airplanes were assembled and 628 had been dispatched to the front, and some were in use in flying schools in order that the pilots who were to fly them at the front might have the proper amount of instruction on them before utilizing them in action. A total of 6,364 airplanes had been received in the A.E.F., of which number 19 were obtained from Italy, 258 from England, 1,213 from the United States, and 4,874 from France. Of this quantity 3,210 of the airplanes were of a service type and the others were training machines. Two hundred and seventy-five balloons had been received from the United States and 20 others were obtained from the French Government.

When hostilities ceased on November 11, 1918, there were actually assigned to the Armies 45 American squadrons with 744 pilots, 457 observers, 23 aerial gunners, and the necessary complement of soldiers. These squadrons were equipped with 740 airplanes, with armament of the latest type, and the flying personnel, trained in Air Service schools, was second to none in the world for aggressiveness and skill. Twelve of these squadrons were equipped with American-built airplanes and Liberty engines. This engine, in actual service, fulfilled the highest hopes which had been entertained in the United States for its success.

Of the 35 balloon companies then in France, there were 23 companies serving with the Armies at the front. This balloon personnel had been trained in the A.E.F. schools and in every test proved its worth.

Air Service depots to supply the squadrons and balloon companies at the front were in full operation and others were being prepared to maintain an enlarged force and needed steps

had been taken to provide for the equipment of such a force.

The personnel of the Air Service, which was trained in the American schools, demonstrated in actual combat that it was second to none in the world for aggressiveness and skill. Our air squadrons took part in one hundred fifty organized bombing raids, and dropped over 275,000 pounds of explosives on the enemy. They flew 35,000 hours over the line, and took 18,000 pictures of enemy positions. On frequent occasions they regulated the firing of our artillery, flew in contact with our advancing forces, and from a height of only a few yards from the ground, machine gunned and bombed enemy batteries, convoys and troops on the march.

The first American Observation Group, after a short period of service in the Toul sector, reported for duty with the First American Army Corps holding the front from a short distance west of Château-Thierry to Courchamps. This group occupied the airdrome of Saints, some 55 kilometers behind the lines. It rendered splendid service, both during the checking of the German drive and in preparations for the counter-drive of July 18. The staff was kept advised of every move behind the German lines, valuable pictures were secured, and many artillery adjustments made.

When the Third Army Corps came into line on the Vesle in August, where the enemy had stopped and clung tenaciously to the heights north of the river, a group composed of one American and two French squadrons was furnished for its use. The first complete American Aero Squadron to arrive on the Western Front was the 103rd Pursuit Squadron, which, on February 18, 1918, was assigned to the French 4th Army. This unit is known to the American Army as the "Lafayette Squadron," for its personnel was originally composed wholly of Americans who had previously served with the French "Lafayette Escadrille." The 94th Pursuit Squadron followed the 103rd, reaching the front on March 5, 1918, and was attached to the 1st American Army Corps. In May, 1918, the 1st Pursuit Group was formed. By June 12, 1918, six pursuit service squadrons had been formed; this number had risen to twenty by the conclusion of hostilities. The pursuit pilots

with the First Army secured a total of 429 confirmed aerial victories, in the accomplishment of which its losses were but 134. This gives to these pilots a superiority ration of over three to one. The American Air Service obtained a total of 753 aerial victories, in the accomplishment of which it lost 357 airplanes. Seventy-one confirmed enemy balloons were destroyed by our Air Service and the enemy air service succeeded in destroying thirty-four of our balloons.

Great preparations were made for a campaign by air during the St. Mihiel drive. The French command, realizing the importance of the first projected American offensive, placed at the disposal of the American Army heavy aerial reinforcements. An observation group made up of French and American squadrons was assigned to each corps. Long day reconnaissance missions were to be taken care of by the 91st Aero Squadron.

The regulation of our artillery, which included several batteries of long range guns capable of pounding the Metz forts, was cared for by four French squadrons organized into a group for this purpose. The French Aerial Division, comprised of about 300 pursuit and 200 day bombardment planes, was placed under American command. Aside from our two squadrons with the British, all of the American pursuit planes were available.

During the days of intensive preparation, the massing of troops and material and placing of guns, our air forces with great cunning succeeded in shielding our own movements, at the same time keeping our command fully informed as to the enemy's and all without drawing his suspicions by increased aerial activity. The 1st Pursuit Group guarded so well the airdrome at Rembercourt (which it used during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations) that it was not once photographed by the enemy.

On the four days it took to wipe out the sector, September 12, 13, 14 and 15, there was only one good day for flying, the 14th, and yet our observation planes penetrated 60 kilometers within the enemy's lines in downpours of rain that prevented them from rising to a height of over 1,000 meters; our bomb-

ing pilots swooped low and made of the forced passages of enemy retreat, avenues of fire; our machines, which were ordered to maintain *liaison*, between infantry and artillery, did their work in a gale of wind and water.

At night, the British Independent Force and a French night bombardment group, including one Italian squadron, all receiving their orders from the American Army, made expeditions over Longuyon, Conflans, Metz-Sablons and other points along the railroad line which the Germans were using to bring up their reserves.

The principal work of our air forces at the front before the Argonne drive was the screening of movements during the period from September 14 to 26. The weather was also bad for the flyers during this offensive, and it was necessary to confine photographs to most important points.

Some of the most brilliant work done by our airmen, however, was during this time. On October 4, our day bombardment planes were sent to bomb Dun-sur-Meuse and Landres-St. Georges, and succeeded in dropping a ton and a half of bombs on each objective.

The low-hanging clouds were filled with enemy pursuit planes and a group of 30 Fokkers and Pfalz planes swerved down on our formation. Our 90th Squadron, being in the lead, got the brunt of the attack. The formation closed in and held the enemy at a distance. Two other bombardment squadrons, the 20th and the 11th, attacked the enemy from the rear, shooting down two of them.

A general fight ensued. At the hottest part of the battle, 30 squads of the American Second Pursuit Group arrived on schedule time. The enemy, trapped, vainly struggled to escape. When the smoke of battle cleared away, 13 German planes lay shattered within a space of 1,000 feet on the ground. We lost one plane.

The work of American balloons at the front forms a bright chapter in our aerial history. Of the 35 balloon companies in France at the time of the armistice, with 446 officers and 6,365 enlisted men, 23 companies had been assigned to the armies which were actively engaged on the front.

Our balloon personnel, trained in the A.E.F., acquitted itself in a highly creditable manner. They made 1,642 ascensions and were in the air a total of 3,111 hours. They made 316 artillery adjustments, each comprising all the shots fired at one target; they reported 12,018 shell bursts; sighted 11,856 enemy planes; reported 2,649 enemy balloon ascensions; enemy batteries 400 times, enemy traffic and railroads 1,113 times, and explosions and destructions 597 times.

American balloons were attacked by the enemy on 89 occasions; 34 of them were burned during such attacks, and nine others destroyed by shell fire. Our observers jumped from the baskets 116 times, and in no case did the parachute fail to open properly. One observer lost his life when pieces of his burning balloon fell on his descending parachute; he had waited for a student officer to jump, and so sacrificed himself.

The actual accomplishment of the Air Service at the front was all the result of a much more tremendous accomplishment—not so spectacular, but infinitely necessary—in one of the most remarkable organizations ever put together, an organization that within a year's time sprang from a little branch of the Signal Corps, with 65 officers, and 1,110 men to a service of the army with 20,000 officers and 170,000 enlisted men.

When the war began, this organization had 200 frail training planes and fewer trained pilots; before the war ended, it had received in the A.E.F. alone, 6,364 airplanes, and 4,996 trained flying personnel had either been graduated or were in training in the A.E.F.

On November 11, 1918, the personnel of the Air Service in France was divided as follows: Zone of Advance, 24,512; S.O.S., 32,996; with the B.E.F. in France, 574; with the French, eight.

This personnel was stationed as follows at the time of the armistice:

Zone of Advance, G.H.Q., 55; schools, 1,056; depots, 3,946; French armies, 4,339; stations, 6,810; airdromes, 8,306.

S.O.S., warehouses, 293; base ports, 397; Headquarters, Paris, 505; French army, 514; Concentration barracks, 1,971;

depots, 4,268; Production center, 7,942; stations, 11,400; schools, 15,966.

At this same time our flying personnel was scattered as follows: Zone of advance, 1,490; fields, 2,141; instructors and test pilots, 821; with Allies, 94.

The American Air Service in France was fully prepared to take care of the great flotilla of planes which America was just getting ready to send across when the war stopped. To man and maintain these machines, there were being operated in the A.E.F. 16 large training schools, and eight other school detachments, in which had already been trained 1,674 fully trained pilots and 851 observers. They had actually put on the front 1,402 pilots and 769 observers.

That quantity production of flying personnel was just about ready to be obtained is shown by the fact that between the times of the armistice and the first of the year these schools graduated 675 fully trained pilots and 357 observers. Nor had the Balloon Service been neglected. Trained in every detail of balloon warfare, 199 officers and 623 enlisted men had been graduated from these schools.

The A.E.F. had the largest flying school in the world at Issoudun which grew from a mud hole to the most gigantic aviation training undertaking of the war, with 11 separate aviation fields in active operation, covering 50 square miles in the heart of France. Its first class began October 24, 1917. One year from that date it housed 1,030 officers and 5,125 soldiers, sheltered 1,022 planes, 560 of which were put to daily use; and numbered 150 barracks buildings and 91 hangars. During that year it sent out 1,751 fully trained men. Both pursuit and observation pilots were trained at Issoudun, from the most preliminary stages to a complete readiness for active service.

The two other most important training schools for the A.E.F. Air Service were at Tours and Clermont-Ferrand. Tours trained 555 observers and a large number of candidates in preliminary flying, as well as special classes in aerial gunnery, photographic, radio and medical research work. Clermont-Ferrand was our school for bombers, 447 of whom were

completely trained here, among whose number were the personnel of our three bombing squadrons at the front.

There remain three names that will forever be associated with America's air program in France; Romorantin, the cradle of our own American-made machines, and the grave of crashed airplanes; Orly, where were nursed into healthy fighting trim practically all of the machines procured from our Allies, and Colombey-les-Belles, the First Air Depot, which supplied the squadrons on the front with everything from gasoline to replacements in men and machines.

Romorantin began to get ready to receive American planes January 17, 1918. The first plane arrived May 11, 1918, a red letter day for Romorantin, which, in the meantime, had become one of the most impressive accomplishments of the S.O.S. with its great machine shops, fabricating plants, storage warehouses, armament shops and ranges, hangars, balloon work shops and artificially drained flying field.

The total floor space of the buildings at Romorantin was 3,459,000 square feet. There were eight miles of highway and ten miles of railway in the camp itself. Here, before November 11, 1918, were received the 1,213 planes and 2,083 engines sent over from America. Here the planes were assembled and tested and completely equipped with the necessary armament, radio and photographic apparatus.

Orly actually handled more machines than Romorantin, for, of the 4,874 planes and 1,446 engines received from the French, the 258 airplanes and 36 engines received from the British, and the 19 planes and 150 engines received from the Italians, Orly put the finishing touches on 3,244.

The following is a list of the forty-five service squadrons assigned to the Armies at the time of the Armistice. These are given in order of assignment, date thereof, and organization to which first assigned.

- Note:* a — Began work July 15 with R.A.F.
 b — Began work July 20 with R.A.F.
 c — Began work February 18 with French Air Service
 d — Began work March 22 with B.E.F.
 e — Began work March 17 with B.E.F.

Squadron Number	Type	Assignment	Date, 1918
1	Corps Observation	1st Corps	April 8
94	Pursuit	1st Army Corps	April 9
12	Corps Observation	1st Corps	April 30
95	Pursuit	1st Army Corps	May 5
91	Army Observation	3rd Corps, Obs. Group	May 7
88	Corps Observation	1st Corps	May 24
96	Day Bombardment	1st D. B. Group—1st Army	May 29
27	Pursuit	1st Pursuit Group—1st Army	May 29
147	Pursuit	1st Army	May 29
90	Corps Observation	3rd Corps, Obs. Group	June 11
99	Corps Observation	5th Corps, Obs. Group	June 12
139	Pursuit	1st Army	June 12
13	Pursuit	2nd Pursuit Group, 1st Army	June 28
103 (c)	Pursuit	2nd Pursuit Group, 1st Army	June 30
135	Corps Observation	4th Corps Obs. Group	July 28
104	Corps Observation	5th Corps, Obs. Group	Aug. 7
8	Corps Observation	4th Corps, Obs. Group, 1st Army	Aug. 14
24	Army Observation	1st Army Obs. Group	Aug. 14
49	Pursuit	1st Army	Aug. 14
50	Corps Observation	5th Corps Obs. Group	Aug. 14
93	Pursuit	3rd Pursuit Group, 1st Army	Aug. 14
213	Pursuit	1st Army	Aug. 14
22 (d)	Pursuit	2nd Pursuit Group, 1st Army	Aug. 22
28 (e)	Pursuit	3rd Pursuit Group, 1st Army	Aug. 22
9	Night Reconnaissance	1st Army Obs. Group	Aug. 26
11	Day Bombardment	1st D. B. Group, 1st Army	Sept. 5
20	Day Bombardment	1st D. B. Group, 1st Army	Sept. 5
258	Corps Observation	7th Corps Obs. Group, 1st Army	Sept. 10
166	Day Bombardment	1st D. B. Group, 1st Army	Sept. 20
168	Corps Observation	4th Corps Obs. Group, 1st Army	Sept. 30
185	Pursuit	1st Pursuit Group, 1st Army	Oct. 5
141	Pursuit	4th Pursuit Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 18
354	Corps Observation	6th Corps Obs. Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 21
25	Pursuit	4th Pursuit Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 22
85	Army Observation	4th Corps Obs. Group, 1st Army	Oct. 25
186	Army Observation	1st Army Obs. Group, 1st Army	Oct. 27
100	Day Bombardment	2 D. B. Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 26
163	Day Bombardment	2 D. B. Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 27
138	Pursuit	5th Pursuit Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 28
638	Pursuit	5th Pursuit Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 28
41	Pursuit	5th Pursuit Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 29
278	Army Observation	7th Corps Obs. Group, 2nd Army	Oct. 29
17 (a)	Pursuit	2nd Army	Nov. 4
148 (b)	Pursuit	4th Pursuit Group, 2nd Army	Nov. 4
155	Night Bombardment	1st Army	Nov. 9

THE TANK CORPS

The progress of the war by the winter of 1917 had shown several facts. Of these, the first was that the formidable artillery preparations assured, in a certain degree, the success

in attaining a limited objective, but the days of limited objectives were passing and deep penetration was being sought for by all the combatants, but deep penetrations were not possible by the use of artillery alone. The uncertainty of being able to pass the artillery over destroyed country in time to be of continual assistance to the infantry had been shown in several attacks, whereas the brief use of tanks had demonstrated their great use in continuing an attack, once started, and of the facility with which supplies might be brought up for the tanks in comparison with the enormous difficulty of bringing up artillery.

The purpose of tanks therefore were to break down passive obstacles and active resistance on the battle field, and the tank became an active army in the offensive, because of its ability to fight over any ground, because of its armor, which could withstand rifle and machine bullets, because it could penetrate barbed wire entanglements, because it could destroy enemy machine-gun nests, and because of its great use in counter-attacks.

Tanks were first used by both the British and French. The British built their tanks with the offensive idea, whereas the French built their first tanks more with the idea of the horse of Troy. In other words, the British tank was to carry a few men, and the tank itself was to fight, whereas the French tank was to carry a large number of men through the enemy's first position, where the men would get out of the tank and fight in the open. Both kinds were tried. The French used theirs first and failed, then the British tried theirs, and in the big test at Cambrai in the fall of 1917, the offensive type of tank was proven a success.

During the winter of 1917, various kinds of tanks were made and tried. The chief duties of tanks are as follows:

1. To crush and bury the strongest wire entanglements.
2. To cross all trenches and any kind of ground.
3. To carry fire power into the enemy's line.
4. To advance with speed.
5. To be independent as to supplies.

6. To retain *liaison* to the rear.
7. To be used in counter-attacks.

With these purposes in mind the tank corps was organized in January, 1918, in the A.E.F. by Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenback. The organization consisted of three types of tanks, the heavy tank for breaking through, the light tank for exploitation, and the medium tank to do more or less perfectly the mission of the heavy or light tank. The organization was in platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and centers.

A platoon has a fighting unit of five tanks and accompanies the infantry battalion. A company consists of three platoons, and a battalion of three companies, and usually a battalion was assigned to a division. A brigade was to be composed of two light battalions, and one heavy battalion was to be assigned to an army corps.

Two centers of instructions of tank schools were formed, one at Langres, France, where all the training was done by American officers using the small Renault tanks, and the other at Bovington, England, where British tanks and training center at that place were utilized.

At the same time in the United States, Colonel Wellborn was appointed director of the tank corps and began the recruiting and training of both officers and men for service overseas.

At the training center at Langres, the first brigade of the tank corps was organized. This consisted of men who had already been in the A.E.F. and were volunteered for the tank service. This brigade participated in the St. Mihiel offensive, operating in front of the 1st and 42nd Divisions, and had an active part in the capture of the following towns: Essey, Pan-nes, Nonsard, Vigneulles, Woel, and Joinville. These same tanks comprising the 1st Brigade, participated also in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, operating in front of seven divisions and remaining constantly in the line from September 26 until November 4. During this time the brigade made eighteen separate assaults, that is attacked on eighteen separate days, and frequently would make as many as five attacks in one day.

During all these attacks, however, although there was much mechanical trouble with the tanks, no tank was ever abandoned to the enemy. On November 1, there remained only sixteen tanks out of the 144 which had begun the operation. This does not mean that 128 had been destroyed by German fire, for only seventeen had been so destroyed, but it does mean that through minor accidents of battle caused by shell splinters, rifle bullets, and armor piercing bullets, but chiefly due to the terrific wear and tear on the machinery in the most difficult country, only sixteen out of 144 tanks were fit to enter the last fight.

Meanwhile a battalion of heavy tanks recruited in the same manner as the first brigade were trained at the training center in England. This 301st Tank Battalion began its active operations on the British front on the 29th of September in front of the Second American Army Corps, which was on that day fighting in the sector of General Rawlinson, Fourth British Army.

The second attack of this battalion was on October 8 and again on the 17th, 23rd, and November 4, successful and uniformly successful attacks were made, and a number of the men and officers received British decorations in addition to American decorations.

Like many another service in the A.E.F. the tank corps had just reached its stride when the armistice was signed. The value of the tanks in the A.E.F., however, was great, considering the small numbers engaged.

THE SIGNAL CORPS

The signal corps in the A.E.F. provided the great net work of wires which stretched from the front line trenches back through General headquarters and connected in one great system every organization in the American Expeditionary Forces. This in reality became the nerve system through which the brains of the Army received its information and sent out commands to the centers of action. The signal corps in the A.E.F. was charged with two special fields of action. In the S.O.S., it constructed, operated and maintained a general

system of communication by telephone, telegraph and radio; and with the fighting troops it had charge of every possible means of communication between fighting units.

To measure the work of the signal corps in the A.E.F. is almost impossible; to say that \$6,650,000 would represent the cost to transmit the equivalent number of commercial messages in the United States gives little knowledge of the service; to say that 202,500 kilometers of lines were operated, of which 62,500 were combat lines, maintained under the most dangerous condition, and of the total, only 32,800 kilometers were leased from the French. None of this gives an adequate picture of the work of the signal corps.

There were in France 396 big central offices and 14,854 telephone stations, 198 telegraph offices, but these figures mean practically nothing. One small instance of the work of the radio section: By a clever device the radio sending stations of the enemy could be accurately located and in the St. Mihiel attack the information was given by signal corps that the Germans had not withdrawn their wireless stations, consequently had not withdrawn their posts of command. At this time it had been seriously considered to send the infantry forward without any artillery preparation, as many thought that the Germans had withdrawn.

However, on this information, heavy artillery preparation was planned. In a letter to the Chief Signal Officer of the A.E.F., dated February 19, 1919, General Pershing stated: "Each army, corps, and division has had its full quota of field signal battalion, which in supplying the reserve lines in battle, accomplished their work, and it is not too much to say that without their faithful and brilliant efforts and communications which they installed, operated and maintained, the success of our armies would not have been achieved."

Three quarters of the signal corps were with the combat organizations, while one quarter maintained lines in the S.O.S. At the time of the armistice there were 809 officers and 24,403 men of the signal corps with the armies at the front, and only 167 officers and 7,925 men of the signal corps in the S.O.S. In addition, it should be borne in mind that there were 233

American women who came over from the United States as signal corps operators.

The units of the field signal corps on the front was a field signal battalion which consisted of 14 officers and 459 men, one of these was attached to each army, corps or division, and in addition there were two telegraph battalions of 10 officers and 212 men, one of which was on duty with each of the American armies. These field signal battalions were composed of headquarters and supply section, a radio company and a wire and outpost company.

The telegraph battalions were provided with motor-cycles, trailers and trucks and all the implements and material for constructing and repairing telephone and telegraph lines. When the American Army entered the war, in small units along with the British and French, trench warfare was still in existence and the work of the signal corps was merely to take over and keep in repair the existing telephone and telegraph lines.

It was not until the St. Mihiel drive that the First American Army was formed and General Pershing again took the tactical command of this army. Trench warfare had been abandoned and the divisions were fighting in the open, and the work of the signal battalion became enormous. Signal corps troops strung lines with the advancing headquarters, and at all times the telephone was the only means of communication forward and back, which speaks highly for the efficiency of the signal corps personnel in the field.

It was estimated by the signal corps from the French figures where the French Army used 1,000 kilometers of wire for each kilometer of front, that the American Army of three corps would need a daily allotment supply of 2,500 miles of wire of all types, 500 pounds of tape, 800 dry batteries, and a proportionate amount of all other materials.

Beside the telephone, however, there were many varied auxiliary means of communication for use in case telephone wires were cut by enemy shell fire. In trench warfare, the "buzzer phone" was used so that the enemy could not listen in on messages to platoon leaders in the front line. Then there was the dependable T.P.S. or ground wireless with which

any commander, forward, could drive his pin in the ground and send messages back to the rear. "Blinkers," those little search lights which winked back letters of the code, were used with great effect; but above all, the Very Pistol, which shot up star shells in various numbers of stars and colors, which gave information to those in the rear of just what was needed or what was going on in the front; and last, but not least, the carrier pigeon, which was used so effectively by the "Lost Battalion" in communicating their plight to the high commanders.

The unit farthest forward to have a complete wireless sending and receiving station was the infantry regimental headquarters and the artillery battalion headquarters. Along the American front there were six radio stations whose sole duty was to pick up the German wireless messages, and incidentally to pick up American messages, to see that all American messages were sent in the proper code. German messages were always in code, and it usually took the accumulated messages of about three weeks before the American experts had totally deciphered the new German code. For their offensive in March, the Germans on March 11 put a new code in effect. On March 13, one of these intercept stations picked up a message from some irate German commander who apparently had misplaced his new code, requesting that the message be sent in the old code. Now, the old code was well known to the Americans and thus, when the long message was repeated from the new code into the old code, the key to the new code was discovered.

There was one other interesting service, that had often passed unnoticed, which the signal corps performed. Out in "No Man's Land," in the days of trench warfare, the signal corps used to bury what looked like a piece of copper screening, with a couple of wires hitched to it. These came back to a little dug-out in the front line where there were a lot of boxes and a couple of men with head phones, and pad and paper. These men were taking down in shorthand all the German telephone conversations which were going on across the way.

Another activity of the signal corps, which was also quite

dangerous, consisted in taking pictures of the battles. The most advantageous place to take a picture was from the top of the highest piece of ground in the surrounding country and as near the front as possible. This spot was also usually the place chosen by the infantry and artillery observers to watch the action. By the time that the moving picture operators arrived on the hill-top with their camera and boxes, they found it well occupied by infantry and artillery observers, with telescopes mounted on tripods, and a telephone squad. Such a large group, in so prominent a place usually received the concentrated attention of the German artillery, for quite some time. In eleven months, these photographic sections exposed and developed in the field 383,149 feet of actual war movies.

In the S.O.S. the signal corps operated at Tours the largest military telephone and telegraph office in the world, and two others nearly as large at Paris and Chaumont. In the fall of 1917 it soon became apparent that the existing cable lines between France and the United States, but more especially between France and England, would be incapable of the service required when the A.E.F. was developed to full strength; and accordingly in January, 1918, a four conductor cable was laid between Le Havre and the southern coast of England which connected directly with London, where the signal corps established a large central connecting to the various ports and camps, which the A.E.F. were using in England.

The quipment of the signal corps was an enormous task. Each one of the 30 combat divisions required 14 little portable wireless sending and receiving stations, and as there was no such equipment manufactured in America, they had to be bought in Europe.

The work of the signal corps did not stop with the signing of the armistice. That branch of the signal corps, which devises new codes to be put into effect every two weeks, well maintained their high average of efficiency and meanwhile the lines of communication were vastly extended by the Army of Occupation, going hundreds of miles into Germany, and included Rotterdam and Antwerp in the huge system of the American Expeditionary Force.

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE *

Poison gas was first used by the Germans in 1915 when they released a cloud of chlorine gas against a trench occupied by unprotected troops. Fortunately, the Germans failed to thoroughly exploit the advantage.

Obviously the use of gas presents many advantages for particular purposes, combining accuracy with large killing area. Owing to its ability to go around corners and filter into dugouts and trenches, it is effective against certain targets which high-explosive cannot reach.

New gases and methods of using them were frequently introduced, including the use of projector drums, mortar bombs, hand grenades, and artillery shell. While the name "gas" is still used, the most used "gases" are, in fact, liquids until the shell or bomb is exploded. Few persons, outside the members of the Chemical Warfare Service, know the variety and extent of the duties of this service. They had to deal with a weapon which made very rapid progress and which bid fair to revolutionize the science of warfare. The work was exceedingly diversified, including offense and defense training and discipline; the collection and dissemination of intelligence on new developments; the collection and examination of new enemy weapons, projectiles, fuses, defensive equipment, etc.; and finally the offensive use of gas, smoke, etc.

Gas staff officers had a great variety of duties, dealing with supply, intelligence, training, gas defense, and gas offense; G.H.Q. orders required that their aid be utilized in planning artillery gas shoots. This involved suggestions as to the selection of targets, the kinds of gas, the number of shells required, and the best rate of fire. They had also to take steps to safeguard our own troops who might be subject to danger from gas thrown at the enemy and which might be blown back upon us. Thus, the gas officers came in contact in one way or another with practically all staff departments and arms of the service.

* The information in this section is taken from articles which appeared in the *Stars and Stripes*.

Chemical warfare materials had not been made before the war outside of laboratories, and little was known concerning the amounts necessary to disable a soldier. A tremendous amount of work is required to produce a new gas, and in developing it hundreds of substances were made in a laboratory and tested on animals. After a promising substance was found, much work had to be done before it could be used against the enemy. If it proved to be poisonous and easy to manufacture in large quantities, and if it would withstand the shock of explosion, the shells, grenades, etc., had to be studied and tactical methods of use developed.

These tactical uses vary according to the properties of the gas, and include its killing power, the time during which it remains effective, etc. For example, the deadly phosgene remains effective in any one locality for only a few minutes. Knowing this, our infantry could be taught how soon to advance over ground upon which it had been thrown. On the other hand, they were taught that when the advance was to be made promptly it was best to avoid areas drenched with a persistent poison such as "mustard gas."

As examples of what are now commonly used gases, may be mentioned *phosgene*, the most poisonous gas; *chlorpicrin*, intensely irritating to the eyes, and very poisonous; *mustard* gas, which burns the skin, lungs, or other soft tissue, even when only a few parts of gas in ten million parts of air are inhaled, is very slowly dissipated, and will even burn a man's foot through his field shoe. However, because of its slow rate of evaporation, high concentrations are not obtainable. Accordingly while the numbers burned are very large, the death rate is very low, probably less than 1 per 100. *Diphenylchlorarsine*, whose tactical possibilities are very great because it penetrates the gas mask, causing intense suffering and vomiting; it thus compels the removing of the mask, when phosgene may be fired for killing effect.

Strenuous efforts to develop new devices resulted in trials of numberless substances including new ointments, protective or curative, degassing methods and apparatus, gas dispersing devices, mask canisters, and new gases, too new sometimes to

have assigned to it a short name in place of its scientific name, such as *dimethyl-trithiocarbonate*, familiarly called "skunk gas."

An investigation of German gas factories was made after the war by the Chemical Warfare Service, and details of Boche methods and apparatus were secured. In spite of their boasted superiority as chemists, the Germans had been excelled in methods used and quantities produced in the United States. In the case of mustard gas, the Boche admitted having been surprised at the quantities thrown back at them. By patient study of some "duds" they had guessed the process, and in order to increase their output they had a plant partially constructed to produce the gas according to the Allied methods.

Several new and deadly offensive devices had been completely developed which might have exercised a very great effect upon the results of a 1919 campaign. They were in course of production in America in quantities which would have permitted effective use thereof by March of 1919. One device, about as large as the familiar meat can, which could be easily carried forward by the infantry, would produce a gas which at a distance of a mile would penetrate a Boche's mask and make him a casualty. To prevent any effect on our own troops due to a change of wind or other causes, a special mask, proof against the gas, had been developed. Another convenient mechanism which could be carried knapsack fashion by one man, would produce a dense smoke obscuring everything over a length of 500 yards for a period of thirty-five minutes. A spherical bomb with a range of more than 3,000 yards had been developed for use with Livens projectors, when a longer range than that obtainable with the elongated drum (2,000 yards) was desired.

In fact, at the signing of the armistice, in addition to the influences which had already been wielded, nearly every problem of importance connected with chemical warfare investigation and development had reached a solution, and the results would have had a very considerable effect had the war continued another year.

When the United States entered the war, our Allies were

devoting a great deal of study to gas warfare. As our Army was entirely without this experience, having had no chemical warfare service, an organization was provided in France with great difficulty since personnel had to be obtained from other branches of the A.E.F. In fact, until July, 1918, only four months before the armistice, the organization in America was under several different heads, frequently changed. The later growth was rapid, but due to the late organization there was always a shortage of personnel in France.

The problem was to obtain from the other services officers who could quickly review the information available and efficiently advise in the use of gas. The trained chemist found it difficult to adapt his experience with respect to the various uses to which the gases could be put. Much more was therefore demanded of other officers whose previous experience had been so far removed from the field of chemistry.

Liaison was established through the Inter-Allied Secretariat for Chemical Warfare. This involved the translation and compilation, etc., of reports of all the Allies, and this information was forwarded to the other branches of the A.E.F., to gas officers in the field and to the United States. The *Weekly Summary of Information on Chemical Warfare* at the signing of the armistice had a weekly circulation of 2,200.

Superiority in gas warfare depended upon solving quickly any new problem connected therewith. A Laboratory and Experimental Field were established in France to solve emergency problems which would not admit of the delay incident to referring them to the United States.

The Laboratory was located near Paris, where work was commenced in February, 1918. Later this became the best equipped laboratory of its kind in Europe. Its activities soon included work for the Air Service, Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps, Sanitary Corps, Camouflage Service, and even special researches to detect secret writing for the Base Censor.

"Sag Paste," to protect the skin against mustard gas, was developed at the Laboratory and a million tubes of it were made in France. In developing this many chemists subjected themselves intentionally to severe burns.

Respirator canisters withdrawn from the front were constantly being tested to be sure that those in service were efficient. The contents of enemy gas shells of all kinds and calibers, earth samples and samples of water and food suspected of gas contamination were examined. This work was of a continuously dangerous nature.

The Experimental Field at Chaumont was for large scale development and testing. Field trials of all chemical materials were made; mechanical equipment including mortars and projectors, and their transporting appliances were also designed and tested, and range tables were compiled. The emergency work concerned material for gas troops including the alteration of Stokes mortar bombs filled with thermite, and the filling of Livens drums with high-explosives.

On duty with the medical gas research laboratory at the Field were several teams of pathologists, whose duty it was to visit promptly scenes of gas attacks and there to conduct post-mortems on men killed by gas.

Early in 1918, the Chemical Warfare Service undertook the demustardizing of contaminated clothing in the field. Two large collapsible tunnels, air-tight, and fitted with revolving doors at the ends, were constructed. These were kept on motor trucks ready for immediate movement to the scene of gas attack, where they were erected and all contaminated troops (in their gas masks) were passed through the tunnel containing chlorine, thus neutralizing the mustard gas.

Later, due to the alarming increase in the number of mustard gas casualties, and the fact that prompt bathing was an essential of treatment, a motorized hot-water bathing plant carrying shelter, clean clothing, water, neutralizing solution, etc., for 700 men was devised and perfected. The complete organization and equipment was then transferred to the Medical Department where it was placed on tables of organization and 160 similar units ordered.

In spite of the non-arrival of the needed special weapons and ammunition the C.W.S., American E.F., managed to secure enough combat supplies for all the special gas troops which had arrived up to November 11, 1918. However, the

first supply problem was to secure sufficient respirators and other gas defense material for the first combat divisions.

Up to November 11, 1918, the C.W.S. obtained and issued in France 2,600,000 respirators; 375,000 spare canisters; 145,000 yards of anti-gas dugout cloth; 360,000 horse respirators; 280,000 tubes of anti-dim compound; 160,000 police rattles; 11,000 gas alarm horns; 212,000 protective gloves; 1,100 tons chloride of lime. In all, some 4,300,000 respirators and about 7,800 tons of other defensive supplies had been received from the United States, and additional large quantities from England and France.

Of the masks received 1,430,000 were defective and had to be modified before issue. A gas mask factory was quickly established for this purpose at Chateauroux, where the needed alterations were made at the rate of more than 10,000 per day. The total number thus modified was 1,250,000.

All American troops were well supplied with gas defense equipment, and at the time of the armistice 42,000 respirators were being manufactured daily in the United States.

A new American mask was developed according to requests and suggestions from the C.W.S., A.E.F., and had just reached quantity production when the armistice was signed. During the month of December, 1918, the rate of production would have reached 600,000 per month, and issues were to have been made to all combat units by the spring of 1919. This new "fighting" mask was more durable and easier to adjust. It had no nose clip or mouth piece, and the entering air passed over the eye pieces insuring clear vision.

Some 400,000 American gas shells were received in France prior to the signing of the armistice, the shells having been made by the Ordnance Department, and the contents by the C.W.S. Enough American-made gas to fill about 5,000,000 75mm. shells was furnished in bulk to England and France to be loaded into gas shells for use by Allied troops. In addition, the C.W.S. had on hand in the United States at the close of hostilities, enough gas to fill 4,000,000 shells of 75mm. caliber, and the daily production had reached enormous proportions—many times more than that of Germany.

There were C.W.S. depots at Montoir, St. Sulpice, Gievres, Poinson and Chateauroux. Several additional depots for the supply of troops in the army areas were also installed.

A course of gas defense training was established at the First, Second and Third Corps Schools; at the Army School at Langres; and at the Gas Field near Chaumont, where all gas officers were trained. In all, gas instruction was given at the schools to 4,000 officers and 32,000 men.

A gas officer and assistants were placed on the staff of each division, corps, and army commander. It soon became apparent that an efficient gas officer must become a versatile man. Not only had he to know the details of our own gas defense and offense, but be familiar with all the methods of the enemy. An efficient gas officer became a walking encyclopedia on the characteristics of German battle gases. He studied their methods of firing, investigated their ordnance in order to know how far behind our lines to expect their projectiles to fall. He could not forget their hand-grenades, for the Hun even filled these weapons with poisonous gases and smoke-producing materials. In short, it was his job to know everything about every piece of equipment issued in the German Army for gas warfare purpose. In all there were found and deloaded 68 different types of German shell filled with 14 different gases and having 35 different types of fuses. Other devilish devices handled and studied included 11 different kinds of explosive devices used for traps and to explode munition dumps.

And thereby hangs the tale of the "dud"! A muddy and treacherous menace,—a synonym for sudden death or mutilation—it had to be avoided by all—except the gas officer! Not only must he not avoid it, but he must actually hunt for it, because one of the best methods we had for detecting new enemy gases was to examine unexploded shells. (These shells were opened and deloaded and the gases sent to the C.W.S. Laboratory.) This treacherous missile armed with a delicate complicated and sensitive fuse, could not be carefully disposed of by gently lowering it into a hole, and burying it. It had to be carried out of the lines—often long distances by hand, and

then hurried in a jolting sidecar back to the deloading shop, a transport problem for which there was often a scarcity of motorcycle drivers. And not without a reason, for if the "dud" came to life and happened to be a gas shell, it was a question of fractions of a second in the adjustment of the gas mask provided he wasn't killed by the large fragments or stunned by the explosion. If, on the other hand, it happened to be a high-explosive shell, and something of an unfortunate nature happened to the delicate fuse,—well, there was no need for a gas mask, at least.

Not alone projectiles, but hand grenades of all characters, bombs, or anything of a suspected explosive nature, became the recognized prey of the gas officer. One instance of particular interest is the now famous delayed-action-acid fuse found first by the Yanks in the Argonne. The action of this fuse is controlled by an acid solution of various strengths so that it can be set for any time from one hour up to three days.

All of this goes to show that much of the work of the gas personnel at the front was different from that of teaching the best method of putting on a gas mask. The deloading shop, for instance, at a Division or Corps Headquarters, was an example of the work which was at times highly dangerous and which had very little in common with the issuing of anti-gas supplies.

In at least three cases, during operations, the artillery made an especially effective use of gas shell. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne operations, while the right of the Army was flanked by enemy artillery on the heights east of the Meuse, mustard gas was effectively used in counter-battery work. Not only was the gas used in counter-battery work, but it was also used very effectively against enemy units in reserve. Mustard gas was used to protect the flank of the Army again during the operation of November 1. Areas in the Bois de Bourgogne on the left flank of the 78th Division, were heavily shelled with this gas, and made untenable for enemy troops.

Chemical warfare infantry weapons (gas and smoke grenades, smoke candles, etc.) were used by our forces in the

St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations. The 2nd Battalion of the 319th Infantry used the smoke rifle grenade with great success in the attack which began November 1. Just previous to going over the top, this battalion very quickly put out of action and captured complete several machine guns which had crept up inside our barrage and were inflicting heavy damage upon our men. Again, north of Imecourt, a machine-gun nest was cleaned out by the use of phosphorus grenades, after all other means had failed. Over 200 prisoners and 8 to 10 machine guns were captured at this point.

The first battalion of gas troops arrived in France in January, 1918, and received its preliminary training with the British. It was sandwiched into the British units by platoons, and for seven weeks assisted them in launching gas attacks with Stokes mortars and projectors. The Americans participated with the British in nineteen operations which are known to have caused large casualties and destruction of morale and fighting efficiency in the enemy ranks. Among these was the largest projector operation carried out by the Allies up to that time,—an attack on Lens, when 2,500 projector drums were fired, hurling 75,000 pounds of gas on the German troops.

The regiment carried out its first independent operation on June 18, 1918, on the front held by a French division. This consisted of a projector bombardment against enemy troop concentrations, followed by shrapnel and high explosive. Eight other operations were carried out on stabilized fronts, using projectors reënforced by Stokes mortars. During the Marne-Vesle offensive, ten Stokes mortar shoots were carried out, in four cases supplemented with projector bombardments. The chemicals used were mainly smoke, and thermite (a white hot liquid metal which, exploded above the Boches, sprayed them with the so-called liquid fire).

During the St. Mihiel offensive, five companies of gas troops were used to neutralize the enemy defense, by the use of smoke, thermite, and high explosive, in assisting infantry attacks. During the progress of the battle, smoke screens were established under cover of which the assaulting infantry advanced to attack machine-gun positions. A total of twenty-

two Stokes mortar shoots and eight projector attacks were carried out by gas troops in that offensive.

For the Meuse-Argonne offensive, six companies of the 1st Gas Regiment were assigned to the First Army. These units assisted the infantry at the "jump-off" on September 26, by the use of smoke screens, of thermite on enemy machine-gun nests and by the placing of concentrations of high explosive bombs from Livens projectors on enemy strong points. On the first day of the offensive, twenty-four Stokes mortar shoots and two projector attacks were delivered. During the subsequent phases of the advance, fifty-two mortar and seven projector operations took place, including the use of gas, smoke, thermite and high explosive.

In all, 152 gas regiment operations were carried out, involving actions on the British and French fronts, in the Vosges sector, in the Marne-Vesle operations, and in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

Quartermaster Corps—Medical Department—Engineer Corps—Ordnance Department

THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS

When General Pershing landed at Liverpool, on June 8, 1917, to command the A.E.F., there accompanied him 53 officers and 146 men, of whom 16 officers and 22 men were quartermasters. These became the nucleus of the enormous quartermaster corps which fed and clothed the A.E.F., and on December 15, 1918, had a personnel of 4,229 officers and 96,541 enlisted men. In addition to these, when the motor transport corps was organized as a separate corps and no longer a part of the quartermaster corps, 600 officers and 18,000 men were transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to the Motor Transport Corps, and in much the same way, 300 officers and 13,000 men were transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to the transportation corps. Thus, at one time or another, there were in the Quartermaster Corps, A.E.F., 5,129 officers and 127,541 men.

When these quartermasters first landed in France, they were confronted with an enormous problem. Upon them fell the responsibility of feeding, clothing, and housing the Army which was to follow, and there were neither storehouse, supplies nor facilities for handling them. Everything had to be organized not for the four divisions which would arrive in the fall of 1917, but for the two million men who would be in France before 1919. Temporary measures, therefore, were from the first, discouraged, and the whole system laid out, and units begun, which were capable of expanding as the army grew.

Starting with the initial personnel of 16 officers and 22 men, and one medium-sized building, which was taken over by the Quartermaster Corps at St. Nazaire on June 26, 1917, when the first convoy arrived, the covered storage grew to more than 8,000,000 square feet, with 844 different quartermaster activities functioning in the A.E.F., and distributed over 267 localities on November 11, 1918.

The scope of the duties of the Quartermaster Corps in the A.E.F. was laid down in the General Order of July 6, 1917, wherein transportation, personnel, supplies, supply of transportation, repairs, clothing, equipment, subsistence, fuel, forage, lights, quarters, camp sites, officers' pay disbursements, laundries, baths, remounts, claims, salvage, cemeteries, burials, labor battalion, and labor troops, work shops, and store houses were assigned as the duties of the Quartermaster Corps in the A.E.F.

Subsequently, however, these duties were slightly modified when on February 16, 1918, the old "Lines of communication" became the "Services of Supply," and under this the quartermaster functions covered pay, subsistence, fuel, forage, transportation of water, remounts service, laundries, baths, disinfecting, delousing, cold storage, and refrigeration, and graves registration, and later were added commissaries, both stationary and travelling, the effects depot, the garden service, bathing and delousing, the baggage service system, the Octroi tolls, and the organization of railroad units.

Immediately upon arrival in France several big fundamental questions had to be settled.

- 1—The location of the central office.
- 2—The location of source of local supply, source of information and French assistants.
- 3—Arrangements for the reception, debarkation and care of the first American troops.
- 4—Procurement immediately of motor transportation.
- 5—A careful study of the most economical method of procuring local supplies.
- 6—The accumulation of a number of reserve supplies.

The methods of procurement of supplies were primarily from the United States by requisition. Secondly by local purchase from the French merchants, and thirdly by purchase from the Allied governments. It became apparent at once that the needs of this army which was to be enormous, could never be met unless a system of saving and restriction be at once inaugurated, and there was begun, very early in the A.E.F., the elements which later became the salvage service, which became one of the commercial features of the Quartermaster Corps activities in the A.E.F. The excellent results obtained were not only felt in the A.E.F. but will have a remarkable effect in the future upon the methods of supply for an army.

In order to coördinate and regulate the local purchase of supplies of all kinds, a purchasing office was established in Paris, and representatives of this office were located in all the large industrial centers of France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and later the activities extended to Algeria and Morocco. These offices kept in constant touch with the industrial and agricultural resources of their sections and reported to the central office the quantity, quality and availability of supplies, inspected the packing and shipment of all purchases. The supplies from the United States were discharged at the several base ports in France, depending upon their classification, facilities for handling and storing, and proximity to the main depots in France.

The warehousing of this vast daily supply and of the reserve supply necessitated a division of the amounts held in each of the three sections or zones of the S.O.S. It was decided that a ninety days' reserve should always be maintained, and of this the base section maintained forty-five days' supply, the intermediate section thirty days' supply and the advance section fifteen days' supply.

These warehouses were built in great groups, or quartermaster depots of which six became the base depots and the main system of supply for the American Army. These were Gievres, St. Sulpice, Montoir, Montierchaume, Paris, Is-sur-Tille. At all of these a general stock was carried and the space of these depots which were covered, aggregated six and one-

THE A. E. F.

total of eight and one-
November 11, 1918.

problems entered, for
from poisonous gas, rats,

American Front.

containers so that ad-
materials readily and the
materials always being
in November, 1918,

was an enormous problem. In August, 1917, 12,000 pounds of bread a day supplied the army, while in November, 1918, 1,830,000 pounds were needed every day.

The Garden Service, raised by soldier labor, 75,000,000 pounds of green vegetables. This, in order to augment and give variety to the enlisted man's bill of fare. These gardens were located at 58 different points.

On November 11, 1918, the A.E.F. had 17 cold storage plants with an aggregate capacity of 10,374 tons.

The supply of forage for the large number of animals was always a serious problem, requiring unremitting watchfulness, conservation and "push."

The local supply in France was always limited, and, under control of the French Government, afforded us but temporary relief at any time.

Gasoline and oil, including all grades of gasoline, lubricating oils, and grease, was procured and handled in bulk, so far as was possible.

The monthly consumption had grown enormously until during October, 1918, it amounted to:

Gasoline (Motor)	9,675,500	Gallons
Gasoline (Aviation)	1,458,600	"
Kerosene	374,900	"

There was a total of 27 storage and distributing stations in operation when the armistice was signed, and 66 projected.

A total of 1,016,622 tons of coal was imported from England between October 1, 1917, and October 31, 1918. There were eight storage yards in operation.

The wood supply was always serious, by reason of scarcity of forests in France.

Salvage.—This service began operation at St. Pierre-de-Corps with four officers, five enlisted men and six French women employees.

On February 18, 1919, the total Salvage Service personnel exceeded 11,000, besides a field force varying from 2,000 to 12,000 enlisted men, according to the exigency of the service.

The total value of salvaged supplies up to January 31, 1919, was \$85,469,573.41. The total value of saving to the Government by salvage in the A.E.F. from January 1, 1918, to March 31, 1919, was \$111,515,072.96.

The Salvage Service had clothed and equipped approximately 47,000 German prisoners at a saving to the Government of about \$2,820,000. The recoveries of the Kitchen Economics Branch alone up to December 31, 1918, amounted to \$474,515.12.

Bathing and Delousing.—The bathing and delousing of troops in the A.E.F. is a function of the Quartermaster Corps conducted by the Salvage Service. This section of salvage activities was accomplished by the operation of the following apparatus:

Mobile disinfectors	134
Stationary disinfectors	40
Improvised disinfectors	257
Hot air disinfectors	79
Stationary baths	545
Portable baths	517
Mobile baths	21

The personnel required in the operation of the above plants consists of:

Commissioned officers	282
Enlisted men	1,398

The bathing and delousing treatment of the A.E.F. personnel extended from the Rhine to the United States, through the advanced and intermediate sections, embarkation and leave areas, ports of embarkation and aboard the transport, homeward bound. Especially in the embarkation area and at the ports of embarkation, large plants were constructed and put in operation, whereby all returning troops embarked with bodies and clothes free from vermin. Inspection at sea, and improvised steam sterilizing chests built on all troop ships were the last parting efforts to prevent vermin from being carried into the home country.

Baggage service.—This service was responsible for all baggage from the time it came into the possession of the baggage service A.E.F. until it was delivered to the owner in France, or in the United States, or to the D.G.T. at the port of embarkation. Up to March 6, 1919, this service had found 10,125 pieces of lost baggage. This is another salvage operation.

Graves registration service.—This service has control of and is charged with the care of the graves of American dead in more than 200 military cemeteries in France, and 85 in England, Italy, and Belgium, and a few in Northern Russia on the Murmansk Coast.

Accurate and complete records as to location and identification of all known graves of officers and men of the American Expeditionary Forces is in constant process of compilation.

Isolated bodies were removed to larger groups, until such time as the policy of the Allies as to caring for their dead was definitely fixed upon.

Effects depot.—Established at St. Nazaire, April 9, 1918. Up to March 1, 1919, approximately 40,000 packages of effects of deceased officers and men were received. Approximately 37,000 final statements were prepared and forwarded to the Adjutant General, U. S. Army, and a total of \$521,079.00 received with the effects of deceased members of the American Expeditionary Force and disposed of according to orders. Approximately 1,100 letters are received daily in this division.

Octroi service.—The Octroi toll is of ancient origin and constitutes one of the principal sources of revenue for French municipal expenses. It is a toll upon commodities brought within the municipal limits for barter, exchange or consumption.

If applied to U. S. Government supplies in occupied towns, the expense would amount to large amounts. Only ten towns collected the Octroi toll from the A.E.F. Forty-three cancelled the contract or exonerated the A.E.F. from payment, while seven are still undecided.

Finance.—For the services and supplies referred to above,

the Quartermaster Corps has up to and including February 28, 1919, disbursed in the A.E.F. approximately \$568,000.00.

The bookkeeping scrutiny, close attention to law, and regulations demanded of Finance Personnel, in handling such an amount, requires no comment other than commendation.

In order to pay returning troops in U. S. currency, and exchange any French money to the U. S. currency, there was bought in France, \$11,286,983, and \$12,000.00 was sent from the United States. The estimated monthly requirements from the United States was \$10,000,000.

Major General H. L. Rogers, Quartermaster General of the Army, was made Chief Quartermaster of the A.E.F. on August 13, 1917. He was appointed Quartermaster General of the Army on July 22, 1918, but remained on duty in the A.E.F. until January 31, 1919, carrying on the work of supplying the A.E.F. until the work was practically finished, so that he was able to turn it over to a successor and return to the United States and take over his position as Quartermaster General of the Army, to which position had been added the duties of the Director of Purchase and Storage.

To his able direction and management, his skillful vision and forceful personality is the enormous success of the Quartermaster Corps in the A.E.F. due. He realized the close connection between filling the physical needs of the troops and building up of their morale and efficiency. He foresaw their needs, even to the simplest items and cut red tape wherever it was necessary to keep the army properly fed and clothed.

THE MEDICAL CORPS

By Colonels S. H. Wadhams and A. D. Tuttle, Med. Corps, U. S. A.

Armies are provided with an organized Medical Department, including all necessary personnel and *matériel*, chiefly for the purpose of combating disease agencies—keeping soldiers well through the application of the modern principles of sanitary medicine, or, failing in this, to so surround those who become sick and wounded with such aid in the form of modern hospitalization and evacuation facilities as will speedily

restore them to health and fighting efficiency, provided that happy end can possibly be accomplished.

Many other duties devolve upon the Medical Department of an army. It can safely be asserted that in no department or activity has the age of or necessity for specialism been more keenly recognized and vigorously followed. However, as above stated, the principal aim of the Medical Department is to strive to keep the soldier well, but if he does become sick or wounded to put forth every effort to make him well again.

In the World War those charged with the sanitation of our armies accomplished wonders. The deaths from disease, even under a statistical handicap of the most fatal epidemic of disease (influenza) the world has ever known, fell below the number killed in action. This is in marked contrast to our experience in all previous wars in which the United States has been engaged, when the ratio of deaths from disease greatly exceeded that of deaths in battle. No longer is typhoid fever the scourge of an army, thanks to preventive medicine. Great strides were also made in the standardization of curative methods, particularly as concerns the treatment of the wounded. Of all the men wounded in France over eighty-five per cent. of them were eventually restored to a physical condition that enabled them to again perform the full duties of a soldier. Of course fire-arms have not lost their potency. In battle immediate deaths on the field occur in the proportion of about one death to every five men hit—practically the same as has been found to be true in former wars.

The limited space assigned for this chapter will not permit the introduction of the many details so essential to give the reader a clear conception of the situation which confronted the Medical Department of the A.E.F. prior to and during hostilities. It may be helpful, however, to digress for a moment and briefly describe how it functions in the field.

To all organizations are assigned the requisite quota of Medical Department personnel and equipment, in the way of making them more or less independent of the sanitary echelons of the rear. When the troops move this personnel and equipment go with them. Broadly, we use the term "hospitaliza-

tion" as defining the shelter, care, and treatment with which a sick or wounded soldier must be provided in an effort to restore him to full health. Hospitalization was divided into "mobile" and "fixed" types. The mobile accompanied the troops in the field and changed stations with them. The fixed, or, as its name implies, stationary hospitalization was permanently established and operated on one site as long as it remained accessible to the troops it had been designated to serve. The mobile and fixed formations functioned many miles apart. They were linked up through the use of hospital trains, or in rare occasions by the use of ambulances. As a rule the distance separating them was too great to be negotiated by motor vehicles.

In order that the reader may obtain a mental picture of the aid echelons through which a sick or wounded soldier passed from front to rear, let us start with the division in line at the front as an example. The division was the great tactical and administrative unit of our army. They were designated in a consecutive numerical series, but were more familiarly known in the press under their nicknames, such as the Rainbow, the Yankee, and the Wildcat Divisions. A division numbered approximately 25,000 men. Comprising part of it was a Medical Department organization aggregating 100 officers and 1,300 enlisted men, under a supreme head known as the Division Surgeon who usually possessed the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel. (When divisions were grouped to form an army a Chief Surgeon was appointed for that army. In the latter case he had supreme charge over all medical personnel and equipment in the army and corps, as well as divisions.)

The sanitary train of a division comprised four ambulance companies, four field hospitals, a medical supply unit, and a laboratory unit. Each ambulance company had twelve ambulances, and personnel and equipment for the establishment of dressing stations. The field hospital companies were hospital formations provided with tentage and *matériel* sufficient to care for approximately 200 patients each. As mobility had to

be preserved, the equipment was limited to the barest necessities that could be easily transported on a reasonable number of trucks or wagons, and once taken down, could quickly be set up again whenever the division changed its location.

Excepting the very slightly wounded who were sometimes hospitalized in formations near the front until they could be returned to duty on the line, a soldier who fell wounded far out in No Man's Land was destined for a base hospital, perhaps hundreds of miles to the rear, at the very moment he was picked up and placed on a litter. Transporting and giving him all necessary care and treatment while en route there was one of the Medical Department's biggest problems. The gap was wide and beset with difficulties. Dependent upon the character of his injury, and the way in which he was bearing up under it, he might bridge the gap in so short a time as a day or two—or, on the other hand, a month might elapse before he reached the haven of a comfortable white bed in a busy base hospital situated perhaps in some picturesque French valley far beyond the sound of the boom of the big guns at the front. In getting there he was always under the watchful eyes of the Medical Department and passed through successive hospital echelons, or relay stations, which became more commodious and complete in equipment as the rear was approached.

Wounded, he first fell into the hands of the Medical Department personnel attached to his own unit. By them, on the field under fire or in one of the aid stations, "first aid" was rendered. Largely, this consisted in arresting hemorrhage, treating shock, applying an occlusive dressing, and, in the cases of fracture, a splint. If the wounded man was unable to walk he was carried back to the dressing or assembly station by litter where his dressings were examined and anti-tetanic serum administered, and from there quickly sent on by ambulance to the divisional field hospital. Here hasty examination of his dressings and condition were made.

In France one field hospital had to be utilized almost exclusively for the treatment of "gas" cases. One field hos-

pital had special surgical equipment added to it in order that the more severely wounded could be operated upon close to the place where they fell—this to avoid subjecting them to a long trip to the rear which probably would have robbed them of any chance they may have had to recover. Another field hospital of the division was used for ordinary sick cases and as a sorting or classification station for the steady stream of wounded coming in from the front. The other field hospital was held in reserve to meet emergencies so constantly arising. When able to withstand further transportation to the rear, as soon as they had received attention all cases were quickly passed through the field hospitals, out of divisional control to the evacuation hospitals further to the rear, which in France were under Army control. These evacuation hospitals were established on or very near railheads in order that they could be promptly evacuated by hospital trains. The allowance was two evacuation hospitals for each division at the front. In capacity they varied from 500 to 1,000 beds. If buildings were available, as they frequently were in France (particularly French hut hospital formations), they were established in them or, in the absence of such buildings, in tents which were provided these hospitals for purposes of shelter.

Very expert work on the wounded was performed in these hospitals. They had well equipped operating and X-ray rooms, good beds and messing facilities, a large staff of trained surgeons, female nurses, and enlisted men of the Medical Department. Needless to say, these, as well as all other hospitals in France during the height of our activities, worked at all hours of the day and night, the personnel as far as possible being divided into shifts for tours of duty. If need be, definite treatment might be given in these hospitals, but normally they functioned only as one of the relay stations in the hospitalization chain of an army. The wounded man's objective was still the base hospital in the rear where he would be safely out of way of war's turmoil. At times patients passed through them very quickly, in order that the evacuation stream from front to rear could be kept open.

The mobile hospitals used in France were provided with personnel and equipment similar to the evacuation hospitals, but were smaller units (about 125 beds) possessing great mobility. In intensive fighting they were established very close to the front to give expert surgical aid to the more severely wounded. For these hospitals establishment on or near a railroad was not as important as it was in the case of evacuation hospitals.

Evacuation hospitals may be characterized as the backbone of front-line hospitalization. The connecting link between the mobile formations accompanying the troops in the field and the stationary formations in the rear was large vestibuled hospital trains which the American Army purchased in England and France. To all intents and purposes these hospital trains were rolling hospitals. A patient being transported on them was provided with a comfortable bunk, good food, careful nursing, and even additional operating attention en route should an emergency arise. The standard train had a capacity of 360 lying or 600 sitting. These trains were directly under the control of General Headquarters and were operated through regulating stations or railway junctions established by those headquarters at strategic points. On these hospital trains a patient was sent to the large base hospitals in the rear, sometimes as far down as the base ports.

When it was decided to dispatch an American Expeditionary Force to Europe, what was the situation that confronted the Medical Department? For a considerable period of time prior to the entrance of the United States into the war, the government had been represented in Paris by a Military Mission, composed of seven officers from different branches of the service. Two of these officers were of the Medical Department of the United States Army. Shortly after the declaration of war between Germany and the United States, the Chief of the Military Mission received instructions from the War Department to make a survey of the different Atlantic ports with a view to reporting upon the facilities offered for debarkation of both troops and supplies. Officers

representing different services of the French Army were detailed to assist the American Military Mission in the preliminary survey.

This joint Franco-American Commission made a preliminary survey of the French ports on the west coast of France, including Bordeaux, the mouth of the Gironde, La Rochelle, St. Nazaire, Nantes, Rochefort and Brest. It was the concensus of opinion of this joint commission that the early debarkation of troops should take place at St. Nazaire; but it was also realized that La Rochelle should also be used to the maximum of its limited possibilities and that Bordeaux must be developed on a very extensive scale, if the necessary number of troops and supplies required for them were to be handled expeditiously. It was also decided that Bordeaux should not be encumbered by the passage of troops and supplies while the installation of the necessary docks and railroad facilities was in progress.

It being settled, therefore, that St. Nazaire was to be the principal port of entrance for the first phase of debarkation of American troops, it followed that the necessary arrangements should be made for the reception and shelter of arriving Americans. Work was begun immediately upon a large camp in close proximity to the port. In the limited time available this was a task of great difficulty. The engineers of the French Army, however, pushed the work rapidly and the camp was well under way when the first ships arrived. It had been necessary to lay several miles of water pipes, to increase the capacity of the St. Nazaire water plant, and to augment the local supply by placing water boats in service between Nantes and St. Nazaire.

It was foreseen that with the arrival of the first convoy, there would be immediate need for hospital facilities for the sick which would inevitably be present. The plan for the camp comprised a barrack camp hospital, which was erected and equipped by the French Service de Santé. This camp hospital was designed to care for the more trivial cases which would not need elaborate hospital facilities. To provide for

more serious cases the French also turned over to American control such of the French hospitals in the vicinity as might be required. The first hospital so placed at the disposal of the American Expeditionary Forces was one located in a school building in the city of St. Nazaire. This was vacated by the French, but all of the equipment was left in place and it remained only for the Americans to furnish the necessary personnel to carry on the hospital. This was the first A.E.F. hospital established in France, and its acquisition was the beginning of an A.E.F. hospitalization program which was well under way and aiming at a provision of over half a million beds for American sick and wounded when the armistice was signed.

As above stated, the mobile hospital formations accompanying troops during combat activities were auxiliary institutions not devised to give definitive treatment. They were provided with tentage for sheltering their patients which permitted them to be freely moved about without destroying their efficiency. For the base hospitals to be established in the rear along the lines of communication an entirely different problem was presented. To install these base hospital units, which were dispatched overseas with a personnel and sufficient equipment to care for a 1,000 bed hospital in normal times and a 2,000 bed hospital during critical periods, it became necessary to do one of two things; either find suitable buildings for them, or build new hospitals with such material as would become available. Obviously it was impossible to construct hospitals in time to meet the immediate needs. Therefore, the French were called upon and willingly relinquished hospitals such as they had, wherever needed. Many of the hospitals or buildings taken over from the French required alterations, additions, and repairs, before they could be rendered suitable for occupancy as hospitals. Before long it was realized that a limit of relinquishment would be reached beyond which the French could not safely go without seriously jeopardizing the sufficiency of their own hospital service. Available buildings in France at this time which could answer the purpose of providing hospital facilities were very limited. The French Gov-

ernment had had first choice in the early days of the war; later the British, Belgian and Italian Governments had established hospitals in France. There were also a large number of hospitals maintained by volunteer aid societies from different parts of the world. The result was that when the United States embarked on its hospitalization program the available resources had been almost completely exhausted. Hospitalization acquired through the French comprised their own hospitals taken over intact, hotels, barracks and schools.

In its construction program the A.E.F. Medical Department adopted two types of hospitals of a standard and simple design; the larger one designed for base hospital units at a normal capacity in buildings of 1,000 beds which in emergencies could be increased to 2,000 beds by erecting tents alongside the ward huts. The smaller unit was a 300-bed camp hospital designed for isolated commands and the use of divisions in training areas. Its capacity could also be doubled in emergencies without any increase in overhead personnel. These standardized units of our own construction were complete in every respect. They were grouped in units of from five to twenty, forming "Hospital Centers." Thus were created in the virgin fields of France, veritable American hospital cities with their wide streets and central water, sewage and lighting systems, the railroad sidings being laid to the very center of the hospital group.

Through the acquisition of French hospitals, the leasing of public buildings for hospital purposes, and the construction of barrack hospitals, the number of beds available for the A.E.F. increased rapidly from the small beginning detailed above. In the figures which follow only the hospitals of the interior (base and camp) are considered. The hospitals of the armies being temporary institutions are not included in any figures showing hospital resources of the A.E.F. The greatest number of patients in A.E.F. hospitals occurred in the week ending November 7, 1918, when a total of 190,888 beds were occupied. On the day the Armistice was signed, there was a total of 283,553 beds in the hospitals of the in-

terior. On the same date there were in operation 153 base hospitals, 66 camp hospitals and 12 convalescent camps.

Between November 11, 1918, and December 5, 1918, the total number of beds was increased to 296,834. Either in hospitals actually operating at the time of signing the armistice or in buildings leased for hospital purposes or provided for in new hospital buildings authorized or under construction there was an eventual normal bed capacity of 423,722, with an emergency expansion up to 541,000 beds.

When it is recalled that the number of available buildings in France suitable for hospitals had been almost exhausted in meeting the needs of the French and Allied Armies, before the entry of the United States in the war, and that by construction only could this lack be made up, the magnitude of the task confronting the Medical Department, A.E.F. can be imagined. However, it can be confidently stated that even had the war gone on into 1919 the Medical Department would have been prepared to hospitalize the very large number of casualties which might be reasonably expected from the very rapidly growing combat strength of the A.E.F.

The preceding remarks have referred entirely to hospitalization in the interior as distinguished from hospitals serving directly with combat troops. As the training of the American troops progressed and as units began to appear in the line the necessity for hospitalization in the zone of the Army became more pressing. The Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F. had been informed that when American troops took over a sector of the line all existing French formations would be placed at the disposition of the troops of the Americans. This was the theory upon which the hospitals for the accommodation of casualties were based. In practice there were certain difficulties encountered, created by the fact that owing to the enemy offensive of March, 1918, it was necessary to put American troops into line by divisions with the French at different parts of the front. It was, therefore, impossible to provide American evacuation hospitals and hospital trains for the service of isolated divisions constituting an element of a French army. Under these circumstances it was found necessary to receive

in the French evacuation hospitals the battle casualties occurring among the American troops and to evacuate them on French hospital trains to French hospitals in the interior. In order that the American soldiers might be gathered together under American control at the earliest possible moment it was mutually agreed that French hospitals receiving American patients should arrange to evacuate such patients to the nearest American hospital as early as the patient's condition would permit. The converse of this agreement was that American hospitals receiving French patients should evacuate them to French hospitals under the same conditions. (Less than 2 per cent. of all American sick and wounded were treated in French hospitals.)

Barring the minor difficulties created by the difference in language and customs and the confusion in records, the arrangement on the whole worked satisfactorily. It was desirable, however, that the Americans should begin to hospitalize and evacuate their own patients as soon as a definite sector was turned over to the A.E.F. This did not occur until the St. Mihiel offensive took place in September, 1918. From that time on the Americans hospitalized, cared for and evacuated their own sick and battle casualties, although on certain occasions it had been possible to establish A.E.F. evacuation hospitals with divisions serving under French command. This was the case at Château-Thierry, in the Champagne and later in Flanders. Owing to the very great difficulty in securing hospital trains the American Medical Department had been able to purchase only two such trains in France; and late in the summer of 1918 this number was increased by 19 trains from England. The A.E.F. hospital trains were never sufficient in number to meet the needs of the battle activities of the summer and fall. It was, therefore, necessary for the French Government to place at the disposition of the A.E.F. a very considerable number of hospital trains. In the latter period of the war the number of such French trains in the American service was 45. Of approximately 250,000 sick or wounded Americans evacuated from the front to base hospitals in the rear on these trains under American control and through regu-

lating stations manned by American personnel, over 98 per cent. passed exclusively through American hands into American hospital formations.

So much for the development of the Medical Department, A.E.F., in France. What was the situation in the United States at the time of the declaration of war with Germany? The magnitude of the task which confronted the Medical Department of the U. S. Army when war was declared is difficult to conceive. The entire Department at that time comprised 444 medical officers and approximately 4,300 nurses and soldiers. At the time of the armistice this organization had grown so that in France with the A.E.F. alone there were 16,407 medical officers, 8,593 nurses, and 126,231 soldiers of the Medical Department. Moreover there were in addition nearly as many more in the United States caring for the sick and wounded there or awaiting transportation to France. There being no compulsory military training in the United States, every one of these officers and men had to pass through a training camp or school prior to being sent overseas.

The equipment for hospitals and other sanitary units not being on hand had to be purchased and much of it manufactured. The more bulky classes of equipment, in fact all classes which could be purchased in Europe, was necessarily so purchased in order to reduce to the minimum the demands on the limited amount of tonnage available. The one item of hospital trains may be cited as an example of the difficulty of supply. These sanitary formations could have been procured without difficulty in the U. S. but because of the amount of ship space they would require it was decided to attempt to purchase them in Europe. Fifty complete trains were ordered in France and England, but only 21 had been delivered up to the cessation of hostilities.

Property aggregating many millions of francs in value was purchased in France. The markets of every Allied and neutral country in Europe were investigated in this effort to economize shipping space by purchasing in Europe. This necessity of procuring equipment in Europe added to the difficulties of the Medical Department, but it was more than

justified by the relief afforded to the shipping situation. Where purchase of the finished product was impossible it was necessary to erect factories and manufacture it. Take for instance the thousands of bulky leg and arm splints required for immobilizing leg and arm fractures. These could not be purchased and it was, therefore, necessary either to ship them from the United States, or manufacture them in France. The latter procedure was decided upon and through the American Red Cross the manufacture of this class of apparatus was undertaken and successfully carried out.

Modern warfare requires immense quantities of oxygen and nitrous oxide gases. The tanks are very bulky and therefore difficult to transport. Consequently the machinery was purchased and a factory for the manufacture of the gases installed in France.

It is not necessary to go into detail further to set forth the difficulties to be surmounted by a country which goes to war without adequate preparation and separated by 3,000 miles of ocean from its scene of active operations. Suffice it to say that, in spite of the many difficulties created by the necessity of organizing a medical service and transporting both personnel and material to Europe, the character of aid rendered to battle casualties, the rapidity and comfort of transportation to hospital and the quality of surgical work done compares favorably with the results obtained by our Allies. Of the 195,000 Americans wounded, the lives of 182,000 were saved. Ninety-four per cent. of the A.E.F. were effective for duty at all times and of the 5.7 per cent. of the non-effective list only 3.4 per cent. were so incapacitated by sickness. Our army was the healthiest in the history of the war. It had the lowest venereal rate of any of the Allied or enemy Armies.

The above sketches very briefly the development of the American medical service. It does not mention the volunteer organizations such as the American Ambulance at Neuilly and the generous assistance given it by the late Colonel Robert Bacon and other eminent Americans; or the Morgan-Harjes Ambulance Service; or the United States Army Ambulance Service under Colonel Percy L. Jones of the Medical Corps,

U.S.A., or the American Surgical Dressings Association under the able guidance of Mrs. C. J. Austin of Paris—all of which were so efficiently maintained for the assistance of either the French or American Armies or for use by them jointly. Also no mention is made of the excellent work performed by the American Red Cross which is an intimate part of the Medical Department in time of war, and is so well known by the American public as not to need recital here. The fact that the “cream” of the civil medical profession donned their uniforms at the outbreak of the war and went overseas with the troops should also not be lost sight of in this brief narrative. Leaving to one side the question as to how much real help this volunteer American assistance constituted in the early period of the war, it was nevertheless a real and tangible evidence that the great majority of the Americans were in the fullest sympathy with the Allied cause. When America did come in, the condition was reversed and it was largely due to the hearty coöperation of the French that the American Medical Department was enabled to meet its responsibilities. No reasonable request was ever refused. The two services have worked from the beginning in the most complete harmony. The war offers no finer example of the subordination of personal or even national aims and ambitions than has been produced by these two services working together in an effort to mitigate the sufferings of the wounded and to preserve the health of the well.

With the stage set up and events well under way in the theater of operations, the following is the scheme of organization under which the Medical Department functioned in France: When the first elements of the American Expeditionary Forces arrived General Headquarters were established in Paris. The Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, immediately announced his Staff, among which as Chief Surgeon he appointed Colonel (later Brigadier General) Alfred E. Bradley, Medical Corps.


In August, 1917, the organization known as the Lines of Communication was formed with Headquarters at Paris. These headquarters were subsequently moved to Tours, and

with the formation of the advance, intermediate and base sections, the Chief Surgeon of the L.O.C. and surgeons of the various sub-divisions of the L.O.C. were announced.

In September, 1917, G.H.Q., with the Chief of the Administrative and Technical Services, including the Chief Surgeon (General Bradley), moved to Chaumont from Paris.

In February, 1918, the reorganization of the General Staff of the A.E.F. transferred the Chief of the Administrative and Technical Staff Services to the newly created Headquarters of the Services of Supply, at Tours. Headquarters S.O.S. absorbed the duties then devolving upon the Headquarters L.O.C. When the Chief Surgeon of the American Expeditionary Forces established in Tours, where he continued to function throughout the war, he left behind at G.H.Q. a Deputy and Assistant Deputy (Colonels S. H. Wadhams and A. D. Tuttle, Medical Corps), both of whom were eventually detailed as General Staff officers, and functioned under G-4, G.H.Q., which had supervision over and coördinated all hospitalization and evacuation. Thus was created the organization under which the combat operations of the American Expeditionary Forces were conducted.

To recapitulate, Medical Department activities were supervised by the following officers: At Headquarters, S.O.S., Tours, Major General M. W. Ireland, Medical Corps, subsequently appointed Surgeon General, United States Army, and succeeded as Chief Surgeon by Brigadier General Walter D. McCaw, Medical Corps—conducted broad executive and supply functions of his department from that busy center. His principal efforts were of course directed toward the procurement of personnel and supplies and the establishment of fixed hospitalization for the sick and wounded received from the front and from all points throughout Europe. In each base, intermediate and advance section, was stationed a medical officer who represented him and had immediate supervision over all medical department matters within his area. While the Chief Surgeon of the A.E.F. at Tours had control over all Medical Department formations in Europe his great dis-






 road was being shelled.



ATTLE



ransport patients from


APRIL 26, 1918.

ang transported



THE FRONT





BASE HOSPITAL NO 58 AND NO. 69 AT LAMORE, LAUTE MARNE, FRANCE
This was one of the smaller hospital units in this picture is purposely shown in order that the reader
may visualize one of the largest A. I. hospital centers which was in action the size of that shown here

ANS
18 at Mars,

Victory, at American
States. Note the

A FIELD HOSPITAL

(tents center of picture) established on the battle field at Cuisey, Meuse, France Oct. 1, 1918. Note the canvas Red Cross on the ground to the left of the hospital to serve notice on enemy airmen that these tents sheltered a hospital. Careful inspection of this picture also shows other battle field details.

tance from the front necessitated the placing of the conduct of the hospitalization and evacuation of battle casualties in the hands of his deputy, Colonel S. H. Wadhams, Medical Corps at G.H.Q. This Deputy being a General Staff officer and a member of G-4, at G.H.Q., coördinated all the medical activities at the front in the name of the C.-in-C. through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

The first A.E.F. attempt at an organization larger than the division was during the Marne operations in June, when what was known as the "Paris Group" was established. There in supreme control of the Medical Department was the "Chief Surgeon of the Paris Group," Colonel P. C. Hutton, M.C. Later that group was dissolved and the First American Army, in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive, was formed with Colonel Alexander N. Stark, M.C., as Chief Surgeon. Following our success at St. Mihiel, the First American Army was greatly augmented and prepared for the final Meuse-Argonne offensive with Colonel Stark still continuing to function as Chief Surgeon of that Army—in strength of numbers the largest ever formed in history. Later there were formed the Second and Third American Armies, the latter for occupation duty in Germany. A Chief Surgeon was appointed for each—Colonel C. R. Reynolds, M.C., being assigned to the former, and Colonel J. W. Grissinger, M.C., to the latter.

The following will illustrate the diversity of Medical Department activities in the A.E.F. The Chief Surgeon, in supreme control of all Medical Department activities, had at his disposition in the rear: base hospitals, camp hospitals, American Red Cross military hospitals, convalescent camps, medical supply depots and storage stations, sanitary squads, medical laboratories, sanitary inspectors, casual camps for sanitary troops, sanitary schools for medical officers, surgical repair shops, orthopedic training camps, voluntary aid societies, specialists in the professional services, dental schools, hospital trains, motor ambulance assembly parks, and the veterinary service.

His deputy at General Headquarters, in coöperation with

the Army Surgeon at the front, had at their disposition all corps, division, and regimental personnel and equipment, medical groups at regulating stations, department of specialists, Medical Department concentration area, evacuation hospitals, mobile hospitals, mobile surgical units, evacuation ambulance companies, sections of the U.S.A.A.S., convalescent depots, medical supply parks and dumps, field medical laboratories, sanitary squads, specialists' operating shock and gas "teams," mobile degassing units, hospital trains, sanitary inspectors, etc.

It seems eminently fitting that this chapter be concluded by quoting a commendation from the C.-in-C., A.E.F., on the work performed by the Medical Department.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
France, February 20, 1919.

Colonel Walter D. McCaw, M.C.,
Chief Surgeon, A.E.F.

My dear Colonel McCaw:

Now that active operations are at an end, and many officers and enlisted personnel are preparing to sever their connection with the military forces and return to civil life, I desire to express my personal appreciation and thanks and that of your fellow-members of the American Expeditionary Forces to you, and through you to the members of your department, for the splendid services they have rendered.

At the front and in long chain of hospitals extending down to the base ports, I have watched the fine and unselfish character of their work, and the achievements which have added new glory to the noble professions they have so ably represented. Many of them have shared with the line troops the hardships of campaign conditions and have sustained casualties and privations with fortitude that is beyond praise. No labor has been too exhausting and no danger too great to prevent their full discharge of duty.

A special word of thanks is due to those members who were attached to and served continuously with the Armies of our Allies. Their efficiency and high ideals have called for the highest praise of the Allied Governments under whom they have served.

Before they leave France, will you convey to all ranks under your command the deep sense of my personal appreciation of

their splendid services and my regret at the impracticability of sending each and every one of them a letter of thanks.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) JOHN J. PERSHING.

THE ENGINEERS

The Engineer organization, in the form it had assumed when hostilities ceased, consisted essentially of the following four main branches or divisions under the Chief Engineer, A.E.F., whose headquarters were at Headquarters, S.O.S., Tours:

1. Assistant to the Chief Engineer, A.E.F., at G.H.Q.
2. Division of Construction and Forestry.
3. Division of Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies.
4. Division of Light Railways and Roads.

Of all the technical services of the American Expeditionary Forces, the Engineer Department was the largest. On November 11, 1918, there were under the direct command or the technical supervision of the Chief Engineer, A.E.F., 174,000 engineer troops which were distributed as follows: With the armies 86,400; miscellaneous, including troops in training, at schools, shops, etc., 18,500; construction, in the Service of Supply under the Division of Construction and Forestry, 43,000; Forestry, 18,500; Supplies, 7,600, and with the additional engineer troops in the A.E.F. mainly under the supervision of the Division of Construction and Forestry about 34,500 troops of other armies in the service; 34,000 civilians, and 15,000 German prisoners.

In addition to the work of the engineer troops operating with the armies which maintained lines of communication, built bridges, fought as infantry, conducted camouflage, searchlight, flash and sound ranging, water supply activities, and many other special functions, the Engineers up to the end of the year 1918, accomplished the following results in the A.E.F.:

Division of Construction and Forestry

This division provided shelter for the troops, and by the close of the year 1918, it had constructed a total of 17,120 barracks which, if placed end to end would stretch out over 324 miles. This division also had charge of the building of new hospitals, and of the revising of old buildings for this same purpose. In doing this space was provided for 28,000 beds, of which 141,000 beds were put in buildings of new construction. In other words, this new construction was equivalent to 7,700 hospital barracks, 20x100 feet, which represented 146 miles in wards.

In the various ports which were used by the A.E.F., this department did the construction. At Bassens, docks were made for ten vessels. These were 4,100 feet long, and were equipped with switching facilities, warehouses, etc., and for three months the average daily tonnage discharged here was 3,700 tons. This is just one example of the work done at many ports. Docks at the other ports for use of sea-going ships were completed or partially completed when the work was stopped by the armistice. Eighty-nine berths, totaling seven miles, were either built or acquired from the French. At St. Loubes a dock 750 feet long was completed, and eighty-four lighters and seven derrick barges were constructed.

Railroad construction also came under this department, and in the A.E.F. 1,035 miles of standard gauge railroad was completed. This is approximately the distance between Chicago and New York, but in the A.E.F., most of this construction was put in the yards. However, at Nevers a six-mile cut-off was built, which requires a bridge across the river Loire, 2,190 feet in length. Storage depot warehouses were built for quartermaster corps, which covered storage space of 500 acres, and provided a covered storage for 90 days' reserve supplies for an army of over two million men.

Remount Depots and Veterinary Hospitals were constructed, in the remount depots for 39,000 animals, and in the veterinary hospitals for 23,000 animals. This division also had charge of water supply and sewerage. Great efforts were

made to give pure water to the troops. The entire water supply of many large cities was chlorinated under the direction of the engineers. In the Bordeaux region, it was found necessary to sink artesian wells, and four million gallons per day were developed here. Sewerage pipe and sewerage systems, especially in the hospitals and hospital areas was a big problem. In the Mesyes hospital group alone, 28 miles of water pipe were laid, while at Brest and at St. Nazaire a municipal water supply was put in and developed. At Gievres a refrigeration plant was built with a capacity of 7,000 tons of meat, and 375 tons of ice daily. This was one of the four plants in the A.E.F.

This department also built the great mechanical bakeries for the quartermaster corps, capable of producing 500,000 pounds of bread every twenty-four hours. This group of bakeries was constructed at Is-sur-Tille, and the construction of bakeries in three other cities was stopped by the armistice.

Electric power plants were built wherever the local plant of the French was unable to meet the American demands, and central stations and transmission lines put in to connect the whole into one great system. By the construction of tanks on the sea-coast, storage was provided for 150,000 barrels of oil and gasoline. Sixty-nine 300-barrel tanks, and one hundred and fifty 150-barrel tanks were manufactured for the distributing stations. Seventeen complete oil and gasoline storage stations, including pumps, were put into operation.

In the forestry division, 81 mills were put into operation by October, 1918. The total production to June 25, 1919, was 218 million feet of lumber, three million standard gauge railroad ties, one million narrow gauge ties, and the fuel wood, if corded, would extend 375 miles. In the S.O.S., from January 1, 1919 to June 1, 1919, 4,750 miles of road were maintained and repaired, and 90 miles of new road completed. This is exclusive of the work done in the Advance Section of the S.O.S. and of the roads built and repaired with combat troops, and the roads worked in Luxembourg and the occupied territory.

Division of Military Engineering and Engineer Supplies

During 1918 almost a million and a half tons of engineer supplies were received from the United States, and the total received from all sources was over three million tons. Repair shops were operated to care for engineer supplies, and other shops were created which made firing platforms for seventy-five millimeter guns, pontoon wagons and water tanks. Seven cement mills were operated by engineer troops, and produced 55,000 tons or 315,000 barrels of cement during the five months of operation, and the cement section made more than 100 miles of sewerage pipe for use in the A.E.F.

Division of Light Railways and Roads

The light railways of the A.E.F. were chiefly used at the front for handling food and artillery ammunition in the advances, as they could be laid very quickly and thereby move those requisites up closer to the advance troops. In one week on these light railways over 10,000 tons of ammunition were handled, and in six nights 23,135 soldiers were carried. In one week 10,700 tons of rations were handled and at the time of the Armistice 1,400 miles of light railway were in operation. Not all of this had been built by the Americans, however, as 1,090 miles had been taken from the Germans in the swift advances, and, being the same gauge, was connected on the existing lines and used. The balance, however, was constructed or rebuilt. At the signing of the Armistice there were 165 locomotives, an average of about ten cars to every locomotive, available for use. As these narrow gauge lines ran close to the front, they were greatly damaged by shell fire, and at Abainville, near Gondrecourt, ten shop buildings were erected, covering 125 acres, to take care of the damage done to these light railways in the A.E.F.

This is the summary of the work done by the engineer troops, and the corps of engineers chiefly in the service of the supply. The 86,400 officers and men of the engineer corps, who were serving with combat divisions and with the corps

and armies, performed all the duties of engineer troops in the field. With every combat division there was one regiment of sapper engineers, who maintained roads, dug trenches, put up barbed wire, built bridges, and fought as infantry.

The Second Regiment of Engineers, with the Second Division, on the night of November 10, in the face of heavy artillery and withering machine-gun fire, threw two foot-bridges across the Meuse, which permitted the 5th Marines to cross to the east bank. On the 11th of November, 1918, 54 per cent. of the U. S. Army was in the American Expeditionary Forces, whereas on the same date, 80 per cent. of the Engineer Corps of the American Army were in the American Expeditionary Forces.

An appreciation of the services of the Engineers is contained in the following letters from the Commander-in-Chief:

February 20, 1919.

Major General Wm. C. Langfitt,
Chief Engineer, A.E.F.

My Dear General Langfitt:

As the activities of our army in France draw to a close, I desire to express to you, and through you to the officers, enlisted men and civilian personnel of the Engineer Department, my appreciation of their loyal and energetic work, which contributed so greatly to our success.

The various units attached to combat troops distinguished themselves at all times in the assistance which they rendered. The Division of Construction and Forestry, with limited resources at its disposal and under conditions of extreme severity, more than met the many demands made upon it. The Department of Light Railways and Roads furnished the indispensable link between the railroads and the front lines for the transportation of troops and supplies, and for the evacuation of sick and wounded. Its record in the construction and operation of light railway and roads has seldom been equaled.

In many other services of the Engineer Department, connected with the acquisition and distribution of engineer supplies, particularly those needed for combat operations, were so conducted that our forces never lacked for any essential.

The Engineer Department has made a proud record for itself,

which might have disastrous results in a fast-moving operation.

The British and French, in the spring of 1917, were making guns and ammunition faster than their armies could use them. The one great cry was for men. And, to solve the three great difficulties enumerated above, the British and French offered to supply all American divisions which arrived in France prior to 1919 with the best British and French artillery and ammunition. All available shipping would therefore be used for men, raw materials, and food. This was agreed upon in the fall of 1917 by the mission headed by Colonel House and General Bliss and Admiral Benson. This was of great value in speedily putting American troops into the line in France; and as, in America, large amounts of French and British artillery ammunition had been made in 1915 and 1916, there was available to the United States Government a large field of trained experts in the manufacture of the ammunition which the United States Army was to use in France.

The adoption of the French 75 millimeter gun, 155 millimeter howitzer, and British 8-inch howitzer by the United States Army was one of the most brilliant feats of the war, for it enabled the Americans to be thrown in on any front at a moment's notice and gave a fighting army of two million men in the field eighteen months after war had been declared. An unprecedented record for a country so ill prepared as was the United States at the declaration of war.

In accordance with much the same principles, aeroplanes, grenades and tanks, as well as many other kinds of supplies were purchased from the Allies. As a general policy the United States shipped raw material in great bulk, because it could be handled in much smaller spaces than the finished products; the question of available space on ships and that of speed were the two greatest problems of the United States in the war.

The Ordnance Department of the Army is charged with supplying all the fighting equipment; and in the A.E.F. this department had an enormous problem, for it had to keep supplied, by purchase from the Allies or Neutrals as well as by shipment from the United States, an enormous and ever

growing American Army in France. This meant the procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance, and repair of thousands of different classes of articles, ranging all the way from the great lumbering caterpillar tank to the well-known mess kit, and including all offensive and defensive arms and ammunition, from the great guns and howitzers hurling shells of nearly a ton in weight down to the small trench knife.

Modern warfare called not only for machine guns, automatic rifles, and small arms, but for tanks, tractors, and mobile repair shops, and a new list of unfamiliar ordnance devices such as aeroplane bombs, incendiary darts, grenades, and fireworks.

The Ordnance Department in France had one other problem which was not apparent at first, but soon became so when American troops began holding sectors on the front, namely, that the American troops expended ammunition much more freely than the French and British had done; and this made useless the tables of ammunition supply on which the Ordnance Department was working.

On November 11 the Ordnance Department had actually placed on the American lines, 3,500 cannon of all caliber, which during periods of great artillery activity fired on an average of 6,000 tons of projectiles every 24 hours. These guns fired 7,000,000 shots at the enemy. There were also on that day, 2,000 trench mortars, 2,000,000 hand grenades, and 100,000 machine guns and automatic rifles ready on the front, while in the store-houses along the lines of communication and back to the base ports were 4,500,000 shells for the guns, and 640,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.

To keep the artillery moving in the advance of the Army during the last two months of the war, 7,000 tractors and artillery repair and supply trucks were put into service. By motorizing the 75's and 155 millimeter howitzers the artillery was able to keep apace with the infantry. This, however, was scarcely accomplished at the time of the Armistice. Fourteen-inch naval rifles, mounted on railroad cars, one to a train, were able to shoot up the enemy's rear areas and railroad

junctions. The Ordnance Department also put into operation on the front 3,000 armored tanks.

These are a few of the activities of the Ordnance Department, but the outstanding accomplishment of this department was the motorizing of the artillery, the system of mobile repair shops maintained with divisions and armies, and the keeping of the guns at the front in perfect condition.

At the time of the armistice there were 25 mobile repair shops operating with the Armies. They rendered first aid to the guns. On the Soissons front the second mobile ordnance repair shop, in addition to their other duties, put into action against the retreating Germans, 28 pieces of their own artillery. These repair shops took care of all ordnance material and many other things besides, such as water carts, rolling kitchens, bicycles, typewriters, shower-baths, watches, meat grinders, steam rollers, trench pumps, captured German baths, and de-lousing plants.

Back of the lines, the other great problem that confronted the Ordnance Department was the storage and heavy repair in the S.O.S. The base section of the A.E.F. was the great reservoir of ordnance materials; the intermediate section was the regulating mechanism which took up fluctuation of supply and demand, while the advance section supplied the Armies from day to day. For the purpose of maintaining service it was planned to keep 45 days' supply in the base section, 30 days' supply in the intermediate, and 15 days' supply in the advanced section. Thus, at the coast were the great general storage depots of St. Sulpice and Montoir; in the intermediate section, Gievres, with its greatest of buildings; and in the advance zone, Is-sur-Tille became the great basis of Ordnance for the A.E.F.

The ammunition storage loaned for the A.E.F. covered enough of France to make a good sized county in New England. To make the repairs for guns and ordnance, great workshops were established throughout S.O.S. The greatest of these was at Mehun. It was so designed as to handle repairs of all artillery and ordnance equipment for an army of two million men. It covered 50 acres of ground, was manned by

6,000 technically trained soldiers, and could remake anything from a tank or a piece of heavy artillery to a mess kit.

In addition to their work in supplying the fighting weapons for the A.E.F., the Ordnance Department operated six great schools, and in these trained 5,000 men for ordnance work.

Some idea of the extent of the Ordnance Department in the A.E.F. can be gained from the fact that it handled more than one-half million tons of material at a cost of \$50,000,000. There were in France, 1,803 officers and 12,205 enlisted men; and the history of the Ordnance Department is the history of success in the race between the brains of supply and the knowledge of expenditure in the American Army.

The highest praise for the officers and enlisted men of the Ordnance Department of the American Expeditionary Forces is expressed in a letter from General Pershing to Brigadier General John H. Rice, Chief Ordnance Officer of the A.E.F.

General Pershing stated that "during the active operations extending from January, 1918, when our 1st Division entered the line, until the close of hostilities on November 11, our troops were supplied with the equipment and ammunition necessary to carry their work to a successful conclusion.

"I realize the tremendous difficulties of organization and administration which had to be overcome for your department to properly fulfill the functions in this respect," says Pershing. "The repair and maintenance system that you established was a great success, and the results obtained under existing circumstances reflect great credit upon the officers and enlisted men of your department."

MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS

When the United States entered the war the Army Regulations prescribed that all means of transportation were supplied by the Quartermaster Corps. But as soon as the emergency arose, and the Army commenced to expand, the time-honored custom of ignoring the regulations went into effect, authority being sought and obtained for the various departments to go into the market and obtain by purchase the much

needed truck trains and motor transportation. The 1st Division when it was organized in France had to obtain immediately motor trucks to feed the troops; these the British were able to supply. It was soon found, however, that there were five different departments of the Army bidding against each other in the market for trucks; so once more it was put under one head.

By this time the experience of the British and French was taken into account. In the United States distances are great and the experience with truck trains in the punitive expedition into Mexico gave but little basis for the organization of a system which could cope with all the problems arising in an army of millions, in a country of comparatively short hauls. Placing this all under one head did not solve the problem. A general would requisition a car, it would be sent him, and from that time on it was his car. It was his lookout to find a trained driver, to keep the car in repair, to get spare parts; in the same way the division had its motor transport assigned to it, and, as soon as it was turned over, the burden of responsibility for keeping it in repair and always ready was shifted from the supplying agency to the division or other unit. This caused endless trouble until the solution was found.

On July 11 the Motor Transport Corps was created by general order, and all motor transportation, with the exception of artillery tractors, etc., was placed under the control of this Corps. The Motor Transport Corps did not furnish transportation, but it furnished a delivery service. All motor transportation and all drivers were a part now of the Corps and no longer belonged to the unit with which they were serving. It was its duty to see that all motor vehicles were kept in the best condition, to furnish the required amount of delivery service to whosoever needed it. The general no longer owned his car, the M.T.C. furnished him the service, car and driver and kept the car going all the time. The division no longer owned its trucks and wondered when and where it would get spare parts; the M.T.C. was charged with furnishing so much service, so many trucks, drivers, and officers. This placed all the responsibility under one head and made possible the

handling of almost 2,000,000 motor vehicles of 27 different makes. Drivers and mechanics were trained; and, taking into consideration the peculiar temperament of truck drivers, with the aid of the border experience—for many of the truck drivers of the punitive expedition were now officers in the M.T.C.—a transport discipline was evolved, which, while very different from the usual army discipline, produced results comparable to that of a Cadet Corps.

Spare parts was the great cry of the A.E.F., and yet apparently every precaution was taken to insure an ample supply. The manufacturers made up a list of the spare parts needed for six months' hard service and these were purchased with the shipment; but the manufacturers did not know what hard service was. Driving at night, without lights, over shell-torn roads, now running at top speed, then suddenly stopping, bouncing in and out of unseen shell holes, sliding into hub-deep ditches of mud, pulling the next truck out, the engine idling in congested traffic—all this and much more, day in and day out, put a test to these trucks to which they had never been put before—in a word, the maximum endurance. The experience gained was quickly utilized. An Experience Table was organized in which careful record was kept of the 274 different kinds of vehicles, with their 7,500 parts, and charts made of the military machine under maximum strain. In France the M.T.C. operated almost 110,000 motor vehicles; thousands of repair shops, from the little shop with the division down to the great machine shops in the rear, and schools of instruction where the great lesson of the war in motor transport was taught.

CHAPTER XVIII

DIVISION HISTORIES

Composition of a typical Division—The History of Twenty-nine Combat and Thirteen Depot and Replacement Divisions—Pershing's Message to His Victorious Army.¹

The Division was the unit of the war. Its numerical strength varied with the various armies, and of these, the American Division was the largest with 1,000 officers and 27,000 men. When the United States entered the war, the grouping of the various arms and types of troops into divisions was announced. There were to be eventually 25 divisions made up from the old "Regular Army." These were to be numbered consecutively from 1 to 25. There were to be organized 50 divisions from the National Guard (Militia) of the various States. These were to be numbered consecutively from 26 to 75. Finally there were to be "National Army" Divisions made up from drafted men, and these were to be numbered consecutively beginning with 76.

The Division was established as the smallest self-contained and entirely independent unit which comprised practically all arms of the service, with the exception of Tanks and Aviation. Its numerical strength was placed at 28,000, and it was composed of the following units: Four regiments of Infantry, three regiments of Artillery, one regiment of Engineers, three machine-gun battalions, one Field Signal Battalion, one Trench Mortar Battery, four Field Hospitals, four Ambulance Companies, one Ammunition Train, one Supply Train, one Headquarters Troop, a detachment of Military Police, a detach-

¹ The military activities of the combat divisions after their arrival in the fighting zone are dealt with in the general account of the Expeditionary Forces elsewhere in this volume.

ment of Quartermasters, a detachment of Ordnance troops, a Bakery Unit, a Bathing and Delousing Unit, and a Field Post Office. These were all under the direct command of the Major General commanding the Division, but for tactical purposes of command, these units were divided into four groups: namely, two Brigades of Infantry, one Brigade of Artillery, and the Divisional Troops which remained directly under the Division Commander.

Each Infantry Brigade was commanded by a Brigadier General and was composed of the following units: Two Regiments of Infantry and one Machine-gun Battalion. A Regiment of Infantry, commanded by a Colonel, consisted of about 100 officers and 3,000 men. It was made up of three Battalions, commanded by a Major, and these in turn were made up of four rifle companies of 250 men each. Besides these 12 rifle companies, each Regiment had a Machine-gun Company, a Supply Company, and a Headquarters Company. The Machine-gun Battalions, commanded by a Major, consisted of four Companies. These companies were armed with heavy machine-guns which were carried on one-mule carts.

The Artillery Brigade, commanded by a Brigadier General, consisted of three regiments two of which were armed with French 75mm (3-inch) guns, while the third regiment had French 155mm (5-inch) howitzers. The 75mm regiments consisted of two Battalions of three batteries each, and each battery had four guns. The howitzer regiment had three Battalions of two batteries, each of which had four guns. This gave each Division an artillery strength of forty-eight 75mm guns and twenty-four 155mm howitzers. The Trench Mortar Battery and the Ammunition Train were generally put under the command of the Artillery Brigade Commander.

The remaining units of the Division stayed under the direct tactical control of the Division Commander. Of these, the only combat troops were the regiment of Engineers and the motorized Machine-gun Battalion. These, in the majority of instances, constituted the Division Reserve.

COMBAT DIVISIONS OF THE A. E. F.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Name</i>
1st.	Regular Army.	"The First"
2nd.	Regular Army and Marines.	"The Second"
3rd.	Regular Army.	"The Marne"
4th.	Regular Army.	"The Fourth"
5th.	Regular Army.	"Red Diamond"
6th.	Regular Army.	"Sight-Seeing Sixth"
7th.	Regular Army.	"The Seventh"
26th.	New England National Guard.	"Yankee"
27th.	New York National Guard.	"New York"
28th.	Pennsylvania National Guard.	"Keystone"
29th.	New Jersey } National Guard.	"Blue and Gray"
	Virginia }	
30th.	North Carolina } National Guard.	"Old Hickory"
	South Carolina }	
	Tennessee }	
32nd.	Michigan } National Guard.	"Red Arrow"
	Wisconsin }	
33rd.	Illinois National Guard.	"Yellow Cross"
35th.	Kansas } National Guard.	"Santa Fe Cross"
	Missouri }	
36th.	Texas } National Army.	"Lone Star"
	Oklahoma }	
37th.	Ohio National Guard.	"Buckeye"
42nd.	National Guard from all States.	"Rainbow"
77th.	New York City National Army.	"Metropolitan"
78th.	New Jersey } National Army.	"Lightning"
	New York }	
79th.	Pennsylvania National Army.	"Liberty"
80th.	Blue Ridge Mts. National Army.	"Blue Ridge"
81st.	North Carolina } National Army.	"Wildcat"
	South Carolina }	
	Tennessee }	
82nd.	All American National Army.	"All American"
88th.	North Dakota } National Army.	
	South Dakota }	
	Minnesota }	
	Nebraska }	
	Iowa }	
	Illinois }	
89th.	Middle West National Army.	"Middle West"

<i>No.</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Name</i>
90th.	Texas } Oklahoma }	National Guard.
91st.	West Coast National Army.	"T. O."
92nd.	Colored National Army.	"Wild West"
		"Buffaloes"

DEPOT, REPLACEMENT, AND LABOR DIVISIONS

- 8th. Regular Army.
- 31st. National Guard of Georgia, Alabama, Florida.
- 34th. National Guard of Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska.
- 38th. National Guard of Kentucky, West Virginia, Indiana.
- 39th. National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas.
- 40th. National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico.
- 41st. National Guard of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming.
- 76th. National Army Drafts—New England States.
- 83rd. National Army Drafts—Ohio and West Virginia.
- 84th. National Army Drafts—Indiana and Kentucky.
- 85th. National Army Drafts—Michigan and Wisconsin.
- 86th. National Army Drafts—Illinois.
- 87th. National Army Drafts—Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi.

THE 1ST DIVISION

The 1st Division was organized from troops of the United States Regular Army in France. The first of these units left the United States on June 14, 1917, and the last arrived in France on July 2, 1917. The division was assembled in the Gondrecourt training area in July, 1917, and trained with a division of French Chasseurs Alpins.

The division insignia is a crimson figure "1" on a khaki background. This insignia not only represents the number of the division, and many of its subsidiary organizations, but it is further appropriate in that this was the first division in France, the first in a sector, the first to fire a shot at the Germans, the first to attack, the first to attempt a raid, the first to be raided, the first to capture prisoners, the first to inflict and

to suffer casualties, the first to be cited singly in general orders, and first in the number of division corps and army commanders and general staff officers produced from its personnel.

The command of the division changed on December 12 from Major General William L. Sibert to Major General Robert L. Bullard. On the night of July 17, just before it entered the line for the Allied counter-attack southwest of Soissons, General Bullard was promoted to the command of the Third Army Corps, and Brigadier General Charles P. Summerall, who until that time had commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, took command of the division. On October 14, 1918, General Summerall was made Corps Commander; General Bamford was in command of the division until ordered to command the 26th Division, when Brigadier General Frank Parker, commander of the 1st Brigade, took command of the division.

To include May 10, 1919, the total casualties of the 1st Division reached 25,076, of whom 4,419 were killed in action, and 20,657 were wounded in action; 151 men of the 1st Division were taken prisoner by the enemy, bringing the total of the major casualties of the division to 5,248. The 1st captured 6,469 prisoners of war, advanced against resistance 51 kilometers, and received 30,206 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 1st Division:

1st Infantry Brigade—the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments.

2nd Infantry Brigade—the 26th and 28th Infantry Regiments.

1st, 2nd, 3rd Machine-Gun Battalions.

1st Field Artillery Brigade—the 5th, 6th and 7th Field Artillery Regiments.

The 1st Regiment U. S. Engineers and train.

2nd Field Signal Battalion.

1st Ammunition Train.

1st Sanitary Train—2nd, 3rd, 12th and 13th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

1st Headquarters Train and Military Police.

1st Supply Train.

THE 2ND DIVISION

The 2nd Division was organized in France from elements of the Regular Army and the U. S. Marine Corps during the latter months of 1917. The division insignia is an Indian head on a star background, superimposed upon a shield with various colors and shapes to designate the various units. Brigadier General Charles A. Doyon, U. S. Marine Corps, was in command of the division until November 7, 1917, when Major General Omar Bundy took command. On July 14, 1918, Major General Omar Bundy relinquished command of the 2nd Division to assume command of an Army Corps, his successor being General J. G. Harbord. Major General J. E. LeJeune, U. S. Marine Corps, took command of the division when General Harbord was placed in command of the Service of Supply.

The division captured 228 officers, 11,738 men, 343 pieces of artillery, 1,350 machine guns, and made a total advance of 60 kilometers against resistance. To include May 10, 1919, the casualties of the 2nd Division were the highest of any division in the whole army; 4,742 battle deaths, 27,872 wounded, or total battle casualties of 25,989. This division received 35,343 replacements, and lost, captured by the enemy, 4 officers and 152 enlisted men, a total of 156.

The 2nd Division was composed of the:

- 3rd Infantry Brigade, 9th and 23rd Regiments, U. S. Infantry.
- 4th Marine Brigade, 5th and 6th Regiments, U. S. Marine Corps.
- 4th & 5th Machine Gun Battalions, U. S. Army.
- 6th Machine Gun Battalion, U. S. Marine Corps.
- 2nd Artillery Brigade, 12th, 15th and 17th Artillery Regiments.
- Second Regiment U. S. Engineers.
- 2nd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 1st Field Signal Battalion.
- 2nd Supply and Second Ammunition trains.
- 2nd Sanitary Train—1st, 15th, 16th and 23rd Field Hospitals and Ambulance Companies.
- 2nd Headquarters Train & Military Police.

THE 3RD DIVISION

The 3rd Division was organized at Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina, from units of the Regular Army. The division insignia consists of three white stripes, diagonally on a blue field, which stand for the three operations in which the 3rd Division took part, the Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne. The blue field stands for the loyalty of those who placed their lives on the altar of self-sacrifice in defense of American ideals of liberty and democracy. This division is known as the "Marne Division." Major General Joseph F. Dickman commanded the division from its organization until August 31, 1918, when he became a corps commander, and Major General Beaumont B. Buck, who commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division at Soissons took command of the 3rd until October 17, when Brigadier General Preston Brown from the 2nd Division was placed in command of the division. The overseas movement began April 4, 1918, and the last units arrived in France May 30, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the total casualties of the 3rd Division were 18,154, of whom 3,102 were killed in action. Eight officers and 306 men were taken prisoner by the enemy. The 3rd Division received 24,033 replacements. The division captured 2,240 prisoners, and 51 pieces of artillery. It advanced against resistance, 41 kilometers (25 miles).

The following organizations comprise the 3rd Division:

- 5th Infantry Brigade—4th and 7th Regiments.
- 6th Infantry Brigade—30th and 38th Regiments.
- 7th, 8th and 9th Machine-Gun Battalions.
- 3rd Field Artillery Brigade—10th, 76th, 18th Artillery Regiments.
- 3rd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 6th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 5th Field Signal Battalion.
- 3rd Train Headquarters and Military police.
- 3rd Ammunition Train.
- 3rd Supply Train.
- 3rd Sanitary Train—5th, 7th, 26th and 27th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 4TH DIVISION

The 4th Division was organized at Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina, on December 10, 1917, by Major General George H. Cameron. It was made up of units of the old Regular Army, which was brought up to strength by drafted men. Its shoulder insignia is a green four leaf ivy about a circle in cross shape, superimposed upon a square olive drab diamond. The division left Camp Greene April 18, 1918, and the overseas movement was begun May 1. The majority of the division landed in England and proceeded to Calais, and by June 3, all organizations, with the exception of the 4th Artillery Brigade, were sent to the Sammer area for training with the British. The 4th Field Artillery Brigade was sent to Camp De Souge.

General Cameron, who had organized and originally commanded the division up to this time, was placed in command of the Fifth American Army Corps. Brigadier General B. A. Poore was in temporary command of the division until Major General John L. Hines arrived to take command. On October 11 General Cameron resumed command of the 4th Division, while General Hines went to command the Third Army Corps.

To include May 15, 1919, the division had suffered 2,986 major casualties, had captured 2,756 prisoners, 44 field pieces, and had advanced, in the face of resistance, 24½ kilometers (15 miles). The division received, during this period, 19,599 replacements, and had total casualties (killed, wounded and missing) of 14,183, of whom two officers and 68 men were captured by the Germans.

The 4th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 7th Infantry Brigade—39th and 47th Regiments.
- 8th Infantry Brigade—58th and 59th Regiments.
- 10th, 11th and 12th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 4th Field Artillery Brigade—13th, 16th and 17th Artillery Regiments.
- 4th Regiment of Engineers.

4th Field Signal Battalion.
 4th Sanitary Train.
 4th Ammunition and Supply Train.
 4th Sanitary Train. 19th, 21st, 28th and 33rd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 5TH DIVISION

The 5th Division was organized at Camp Logan, Texas, from units of the Regular Army, under command of Major General James E. McMann, who commanded the division until October 24, 1918, when he was succeeded by Major General Hanson E. Ely, formerly of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. The 5th Division insignia is a red diamond. The overseas movement began on March 1, and the last unit arrived in France in May, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the 5th Division suffered a total of 9,883 casualties, of whom 1,908 were battle deaths; 98 men were captured by the enemy. The division captured from the enemy 2,405 men, and 98 pieces of artillery. It advanced 29 kilometers (18½ miles); 12,611 replacements were received by the division.

The following organizations composed the 5th Division:

9th Infantry Brigade—6th and 11th Regiments.
 10th Infantry Brigade—60th and 61st Regiments.
 13th, 14th and 15th Machine Gun Battalions.
 5th Field Artillery Brigade—19th, 20th and 21st Artillery Regiments.
 7th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 9th Field Signal Battalion.
 5th Trench Mortar Battery.
 5th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 5th Ammunition Train.
 5th Supply Train.
 5th Sanitary Train. 17th, 25th, 29th and 30th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 6TH DIVISION

The 6th Division was organized at Camp Forrest, Georgia, and Camp McClellan, Alabama, from units of the Regular

Army. The division insignia is a six-pointed red star, with the numeral six in blue, superimposed. The division is generally known as the "Sight-Seeing Sixth," inasmuch as it marched in reserve of the First Army for one month without going into the line. The overseas movement began on May 8, and the last units arrived in France on August 28, 1918. Many of the units arrived and were trained in England. Preceding the division, the 318th Engineer Regiment arrived at Brest in May, and were engaged in construction work. The artillery landed at La Havre and went to Valdahon for its training.

Brigadier General James B. Erwin commanded the division until August 31, 1918, when Major General Walter P. Gordon assumed command.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered a total of 576 casualties, of whom 97 were killed in action, and three were taken prisoner by the enemy. The division received a total of 2,784 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 6th Division:

- 11th Infantry Brigade—51st and 52nd Regiments.
- 12th Infantry Brigade—53rd and 54th Regiments.
- 16th, 17th and 18th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 6th Field Artillery Brigade—3rd, 11th and 78th Artillery Regiments.
- 318th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 6th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 6th Field Signal Battalion.
- 6th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 6th Supply Train.
- 6th Ammunition Train.
- 6th Sanitary Train—20th, 37th, 38th and 40th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 7TH DIVISION

The 7th Division was organized January 1, 1918, at Chickamauga Park, Georgia. The divisional insignia consists of two triangles, with apexes touching, in black, on a red circular base. The division was trained at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, beginning February 5, 1918. The overseas

movement began on July 31, and the last units arrived in France September 3. On August 19 the division arrived in the 15th training area with headquarters at Ancy-le-Franc. Here the entire division, less the 7th Artillery Brigade, continued its preliminary training until September 30, when the division moved to the Toul area, with headquarters at Gondreville. The 7th Field Artillery Brigade which trained at Camp Meucon did not join the division until February, 1919.

To include May 15, 1919, the 7th Division lost a total of 1,818 casualties, of whom 302 were battle deaths, and one officer and 19 men were taken prisoners by the enemy. The division captured from the enemy 68 prisoners, and advanced $\frac{3}{4}$ kilometer ($\frac{1}{2}$ mile). The division received 4,112 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 7th Division:

13th Infantry Brigade—55th and 56th Regiments.

14th Infantry Brigade—34th and 64th Regiments.

19th, 20th and 21st Machine Gun Battalions.

7th Artillery Brigade—8th, 79th and 80th Artillery Regiments.

7th Trench Mortar Battery.

5th Engineer Regiment and Train.

10th Field Signal Battalion.

7th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

7th Supply Train.

7th Ammunition Train.

7th Sanitary Train—22nd, 34th, 35th and 36th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 26TH DIVISION

The 26th Division was organized in Boston, Massachusetts, from units of the New England National Guard, and filled to strength by a contingent of National Army troops from Camp Devens. Its shoulder insignia is a blue monogram of the letters "Y. D." (Yankee Division) superimposed upon a khaki diamond. The overseas movement began September 7, 1917, and headquarters were established at Neufchateau, France, October 31, 1917.

Major General Clarence R. Edward commanded the 26th Division until October 24, 1918, when Brigadier General Frank E. Bamford (formerly of the 1st Division) was placed in command.

To include May 15, 1919, the 26th Division lost a total of 15,168 casualties, of whom 2,168 were killed in action and 19 officers and 432 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 14,411 replacements; captured from the enemy 3,148 prisoners and 16 pieces of artillery, and advanced a total of 37 kilometers (23 miles).

The following organizations composed the 26th Division:

- 51st Infantry Brigade—101st and 102nd Regiments.
- 52nd Infantry Brigade—103rd and 104th Regiments.
- 101st, 102nd and 103rd Machine Gun Battalions.
- 51st Field Artillery Brigade—101st, 102nd and 103rd Artillery Regiments.
- 101st Trench Mortar Battery.
- 101st Field Signal Battalion.
- 101st Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 101st Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 101st Supply Train.
- 101st Ammunition Train.
- 101st Sanitary Train—101st, 102nd, 103rd and 104th, Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 27TH DIVISION

The 27th Division was organized at Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina, from the New York National Guard. The divisional insignia is a black circle with a red arrowhead, in which are the letters "N. Y. D." in monogram, surrounded by seven stars of the constellation "Orion." Major General John O'Ryan, of the New York National Guard, commanded the division from its organization until it was mustered out. General O'Ryan is the only National Guard Division Commander who retained the command of his division, and fought with it throughout the action. The overseas movement began on May 8, 1918, and the last unit arrived in France on July 7, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered a total of 11,218 casualties, of whom 1,791 were killed in action, and three officers and 225 men were captured by the enemy. The 27th Division captured from the enemy 2,358 prisoners, and advanced against resistance 11 kilometers (7 miles). The division received 5,355 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 27th Division:

- 53rd Infantry Brigade—105th and 106th Regiments.
- 54th Infantry Brigade—107th and 108th Regiments.
- 104th, 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 52nd Artillery Brigade—104th, 105th and 106th Artillery Regiments.
- 102nd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 102nd Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 102nd Field Signal Battalion.
- 102nd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 102nd Ammunition Train.
- 102nd Supply Train.
- 102nd Sanitary Train—105th, 106th, 107th and 108th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 28TH DIVISION

The 28th Division was organized at Camp Hancock, Georgia, from the Pennsylvania National Guard. The division is known as the "Keystone Division," and has for its shoulder insignia a red keystone. The overseas movement began April 21, 1918. On May 18 the division landed at Calais.

The commanding generals of the division were: Major General C. M. Clement, until December 11, 1917; Major General Charles H. Muir, until October 24, 1918; Major General William H. Hay, until the signing of the armistice.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered 2,531 battle deaths, a total of 16,277 battle casualties. Nine hundred and twenty-one officers and men were captured from the enemy; 16 cannon were also captured, and the division advanced 10 kilometers (6¼ miles), in the face of the most bitter resistance. The division lost, taken prisoner by the enemy, 18 officers and 708 men.

The following units composed the 28th Division:

- 55th Infantry Brigade—109th and 110th Regiments.
- 56th Infantry Brigade—111th and 112th Regiments.
- 107th, 108th and 109th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 53rd Artillery Brigade—107th, 108th and 109th Artillery Regiments.
- 103rd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 103rd Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 103rd Field Signal Battalion.
- 103rd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 103rd Supply Train.
- 103rd Ammunition Train.
- 103rd Sanitary Train—109th, 110th, 111th and 112th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 29TH DIVISION

The 29th Division was organized at Camp McClellan, Alabama, and originally consisted of men from the National Guard of New Jersey, Virginia and Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Due to the fact that the North and the South were both represented in this division, the name "Blue and Gray Division" was adopted, and came into general use. The divisional insignia is the Korean symbol of good luck in blue and gray.

The overseas movement began in June, 1918, and the units arrived at Brest and St. Nazaire at the end of June, 1918. Major General Charles G. Morton commanded the division.

To include May 15, 1919, the 29th Division suffered 6,159 casualties, of whom 940 were killed in action and four officers and 63 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 4,977 replacements. It captured from the enemy 2,148 prisoners, and 21 pieces of artillery; the division advanced 7 kilometers (4½ miles).

The following organizations composed the 29th Division:

- 57th Infantry Brigade—113th and 114th Regiments.
- 58th Infantry Brigade—115th and 116th Regiments.
- 110th, 111th and 112th Machine Gun Battalions.

54th Field Artillery Brigade—110th, 111th and 112th Artillery Regiments.

104th Trench Mortar Battery.

104th Field Signal Battalion.

104th Engineer Regiment and Train.

104th Supply Train.

104th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

104th Ammunition Train.

104th Sanitary Train—113th, 114th, 115th and 116th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 30TH DIVISION

The 30th Division was organized at Camp Sevier, South Carolina, from the old 9th National Guard Division (National Guard of Tennessee, North and South Carolina), and was augmented by men drawn from North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota. The divisional insignia is a monogram in blue of the letters "O. H." standing for Old Hickory, the nickname of Andrew Jackson. The cross bar of the "H" contains a triple "X," the Roman numerals for thirty. The whole is on a maroon background.

Major General George W. Read commanded the division from April 27, 1918, until August 10, 1918, when he assumed command of the Second U. S. Army Corps, and command of the division passed to General Edward M. Lewis, who retained command until the armistice. The overseas movement began on May 7, 1918, and the last units landed at Calais, France, on June 24, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the 30th Division suffered a total of 11,081 battle casualties, of whom 1,652 were killed, six officers and 71 men were taken prisoner by the Germans. The division received 2,384 replacements; it captured from the enemy 3,848 prisoners, 81 pieces of artillery, and made a total advance of 29½ kilometers (18½ miles) against resistance.

The following organizations composed the 30th Division:

59th Infantry Brigade—117th and 118th Regiments.

60th Infantry Brigade—119th and 120th Regiments.

113th, 114th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions.
 53rd Artillery Brigade—113th, 114th and 115th Artillery Regiments.
 105th Trench Mortar Battery.
 105th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 105th Field Signal Battalion.
 105th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 105th Supply Train.
 105th Ammunition Train.
 105th Sanitary Train—117th, 118th, 119th and 120th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 32ND DIVISION

The 32nd Division was organized at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, from the National Guard of Wisconsin and Michigan. The division insignia is a flying red arrow with a red cross bar in the middle. Major General James Parker commanded the division until September 19, 1917, when Brigadier General W. G. Haan, afterwards Major General, took command of the division and remained in command until the signing of the armistice.

The division remained in training at Camp MacArthur until January, 1918, and on January 19 the first units of the division embarked for overseas. The last units of this division reached France on March 12, 1918. The division was sent to the 10th training area, with headquarters at Prauthoy, Haute-Marne, and was designated as a replacement division. For two months it functioned as such, one regiment of infantry being sent as labor troops to the S.O.S., while the others lost over 50 per cent. of the officers and men as replacements to the combat divisions. On May 15, 1918, the status of the division was changed to a combat division, and after a brief period of training, the division moved into a sector in Alsace, near Belfort.

For its gallant record, the 32nd Division was chosen, with the 1st (Regular) and 2nd (Regular and Marine) Divisions, to occupy the bridgehead across the Rhine in the Army of

Occupation. This was the only National Guard Division to receive this great honor.

To include May 15, 1919, the 32nd Division suffered 2,898 battle deaths, and a total of 13,884 battle casualties. It received 20,140 replacements, captured from the enemy a total of 2,153 men and 21 cannon, and advanced 36 kilometers (21 miles.) It lost one officer and 155 men taken prisoner by the enemy.

The 32nd Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 63rd Infantry Brigade—125th and 126th Regiments.
- 64th Infantry Brigade—127th and 128th Regiments.
- 119th, 120th and 121st Machine Gun Battalions.
- 57th Field Artillery Brigade—119th, 120th and 121st Artillery Regiments.
- 107th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 107th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 107th Field Signal Battalion.
- 107th Headquarters Train and Military Police.
- 107th Ammunition Train.
- 107th Supply Train.
- 107th Sanitary Train—125th, 126th, 127th and 128th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 33RD DIVISION

The 33rd Division (Illinois National Guard) was organized at Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, in August, 1917, by Major General Bell, Jr. The shoulder insignia of this division is a yellow cross on a round black patch. The first organization to start for France was the 108th Engineers and the last units arrived in France June 11, 1918.

To include May 15th, the 33rd Division suffered a total of 9,253 casualties, of whom 1,002 were battle deaths, and one officer and 125 men were taken prisoner by the Germans. This division captured 2,153 prisoners and 21 pieces of field artillery and advanced 36 kilometers (22½ miles) during this time. The division received 20,140 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 33rd Division:

- 65th Infantry Brigade—129th and 130th Regiments.
- 66th Infantry Brigade—131st and 132nd Regiments.
- 122nd, 123rd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 58th Artillery Brigade—122nd, 123rd and 124th Artillery Regiments.
- 108th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 108th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 108th Field Signal Battalion.
- 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 108th Supply Train.
- 108th Ammunition Train.
- 108th Sanitary Train—129th, 130th, 131st and 132nd Ambulance Corps and Field Hospitals.

THE 35TH DIVISION

The 35th Division was organized at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from the National Guard of Missouri and Kansas. The shoulder insignia of this division is the Santa Fe Cross. Major General William M. Wright commanded the division from the time of organization until June 15, 1918, when Major General Peter M. Traub took command, General Wright going to command the Army Corps.

The overseas movement began April 25, 1918, and the division arrived in France *via* Liverpool and West Winchester, England, on May 11.

To include May 15, 1919, the 35th Division lost a total of 7,854 battle casualties, of whom 960 officers and men were killed. It received 10,605 replacements, captured 781 prisoners, 24 pieces of artillery and 85 machine guns, and advanced 12½ kilometers (7½ miles) in the face of resistance. It lost, captured by the enemy, four officers and 165 men.

The 35th Division was composed of the following organizations.

- 69th Infantry Brigade—137th and 138th Regiments.
- 70th Infantry Brigade—139th and 140th Regiments.
- 128th, 129th and 130th Machine Gun Battalion.

- 60th Artillery Brigade—128th, 129th and 130th Artillery Regiments.
- 110th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 110th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 110th Field Signal Battalion.
- 110th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 110th Supply Train.
- 110th Ammunition Train.
- 110th Sanitary Train—137th, 138th, 139th and 140th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 36TH DIVISION

The 36th Division was organized at Camp Bowie, Texas, from the National Guard of the states of Texas and Oklahoma. The divisional insignia is a light blue Indian arrow head on a round khaki patch, with a khaki "T" superimposed. The division is sometimes popularly known as the "Lone Star," or "Panther" Division. Major General John E. St. John Greble organized and commanded the division for some time. Major General W. R. Smith was in command of the division during its active operations, including the armistice.

The overseas movement began on July 18, 1918, and the division landed in France on July 30, and was immediately ordered to the 13th training area in the vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube.

To include May 15, 1919, the 36th Division suffered a total of 2,710 casualties, of whom 1,591 were killed in action, and one officer and 24 men were captured by the enemy. The division captured from the enemy 549 prisoners and 9 pieces of artillery, and advanced 31 kilometers (13 miles). The division received 3,397 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 36th Division:

- 71st Infantry Brigade—141st and 143rd Regiments.
- 72nd Infantry Brigade—143rd and 144th Regiments.
- 131st, 132nd and 133rd Machine Gun Battalions.
- 61st Artillery Brigade—131st, 132nd and 133rd Artillery Regiments.
- 111th Trench Mortar Battery.

- 111th Engineer Regiment and Train.**
- 111th Field Signal Battalion.**
- 111th Train Headquarters and Military Police.**
- 111th Ammunition Train.**
- 111th Supply Train.**
- 111th Sanitary Train—141st, 142nd, 143rd and 144th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.**

THE 37TH DIVISION

The 37th Division was organized at Camp Sheridan, Montgomery, Alabama, from the Ohio National Guard. The division insignia is a red circle, superimposed upon a circle of white, forming a "Buckeye," the name of the division.

The division was built around the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th Ohio Infantry Regiments, the 1st Ohio Field Artillery, 1st Ohio Cavalry, 1st Ohio Engineers, 1st Ohio Field Signal Battalion.

On May 20 the division, less the artillery, was sent to Camp Lee, Virginia, where it was filled to war strength, and began overseas movement on June 15.

To include May 15, 1919, the 37th Division suffered a total of 5,923 casualties, of whom 992 were battle deaths. It captured 1,495 prisoners, 34 pieces of artillery, and advanced 30¾ kilometers (19¼ miles). The division received 6,282 replacements, and lost, captured by the enemy, 23 men.

The following organizations composed the 37th Division:

- 73rd Infantry Brigade—145th and 146th Regiments.**
- 74th Infantry Brigade—147th and 148th Regiments.**
- 134th, 135th and 136th Machine Gun Battalions.**
- 62nd Artillery Brigade—134th, 135th and 136th Artillery Regiments.**
- 112th Trench Mortar Battery.**
- 112th Engineer Regiment and Train.**
- 112th Field Signal Battalion.**
- 112th Train Headquarters and Military Police.**
- 112th Supply Train.**
- 112th Ammunition Train.**
- 112th Sanitary Train—145th, 146th, 147th and 148th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.**

THE 42ND DIVISION

The 42nd Division was organized at Camp Mills from the National Guard of every section of the United States. The following states were represented as shown:

New York (69th Infantry); Iowa (3rd Infantry); Wisconsin (Companies E, F, & G, 2nd Infantry); Indiana (1st Field Artillery); Maryland (3rd & 4th Companies C. A. C.); Kansas (1st Ammunition Train); Oklahoma (Ambulance Company No. 1); District of Columbia (Field Hospital No. 1); Ohio (4th Infantry); Pennsylvania (3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry); Illinois (1st Field Artillery); Minnesota (1st Field Artillery); California (1st Battalion of Engineers); New Jersey (Ambulance Co. No. 1); Michigan (1st Ambulance Company); Nebraska (Field Hospital No. 1); Colorado (Field Hospital No. 1); Oregon (Field Hospital No. 1); Alabama (Fourth Infantry); Georgia (Companies B, C, & F, 2nd Infantry); Louisiana (1st Separate Troop of Cavalry); South Carolina (1st Battalion of Engineers); North Carolina (Engineer Train); Texas (Supply Train); Virginia (1st and 2nd C. A. C.); Tennessee (Ambulance Company No. 1); Missouri (First Battalion Signal Corps).

The division is known as the "Rainbow Division," and the shoulder insignia is a rainbow on a field of black. General William A. Mann organized the division and commanded it until December 14, 1917, when Major General Charles T. Menoher took command of the division, until November 7, 1918, when Major General Charles D. Rhodes succeeded him. The overseas movement began on October 18, 1917, and the last units arrived in France December 7, 1917.

To include May 15, 1919, the 42nd Division suffered a total of 16,005 casualties, of whom 2,713 were battle deaths, and three officers and 99 men were taken prisoners by the Germans. The division received a total of 17,253 replacements. It captured from the enemy 1,317 prisoners, and 25 pieces artillery; it advanced 55 kilometers (35 miles).

The following organizations composed the 42nd Division:

83rd Infantry Brigade—165th and 166th Regiments.

84th Infantry Brigade—167th, 168th Regiments.

149th, 150th and 151st Machine Gun Battalions.

67th Artillery Brigade—149th, 150th, 151st Artillery Regiments.

117th Trench Mortar Battery.

117th Field Signal Battalion.

117th Engineer Regiment and Train.

117th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

117th Supply Train.

117th Ammunition Train.

117th Sanitary Train—165th, 166th, 167th and 168th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 77TH DIVISION

The 77th Division was organized at Camp Upton, New York, with officers and men chiefly from New York City. The division was popularly known as the "Metropolitan Division," and has for its insignia a gold Statue of Liberty on a truncated triangle of flag blue.

The overseas movement began on March 28, 1918, and, with the exception of the artillery, all units proceeded through Liverpool across England and landed at Calais. The artillery sailed from New York in April and went direct to Brest. Major General J. Franklin Bell was relieved of command of the division on May 18, 1918, and Major General G. B. Duncan, formerly of the 1st Division, took command of the division until August 24, 1918. Major General Robert Alexander was in command of the division from August 31, 1918, until the armistice.

To include May 15, 1919, the 77th Division suffered 11,956 casualties, of whom 1,990 were battle deaths, 11 officers and 394 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 12,728 replacements, and captured from the enemy 750 men, and 44 pieces of artillery; it advanced a total of 71.5 kilometers (44½ miles). The famous "Lost Battalion" consisted of six companies of the 308th Infantry, commanded by Major Charles Whittlesey (now Lieutenant Colonel).

The following organizations composed the 77th Division:

470 THE HISTORY OF THE A. E. F.

153rd Infantry Brigade—305th and 306th Regiments.

154th Infantry Brigade—307th and 308th Regiments.

304th, 305th and 306th Machine Gun Battalions.

152nd Artillery Brigade—304th, 305th and 306th Artillery Regiments.

302nd Trench Mortar Battery.

302nd Engineer Regiment and Train.

302nd Field Signal Battalion.

302nd Train Headquarters and Military Police.

302nd Supply Train.

302nd Ammunition Train.

302nd Sanitary Train—305th, 306th, 307th and 308th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 78TH DIVISION

The 78th Division was organized at Camp Dix, New Jersey, with men drawn from Northern New York State, New Jersey and Delaware. The shoulder insignia consists of a red semi-circle, with a flash of lightning in white. The overseas movement began on May 8, 1918. The last unit of the division arrived in France June 11.

Major General Charles W. Kennedy organized the division and Major General James H. McRae commanded it from April 20, 1918, throughout its actions until the armistice.

To include May 15, 1919, the 78th Division suffered 8,159 total casualties, of whom 1,359 were killed in action, and three officers and 120 men were captured by the Germans. The division received 3,190 replacements, and captured from the enemy, 398 prisoners, and four pieces of artillery. It advanced through the Argonne forest 21 kilometers (13 miles).

The following organizations composed the 78th Division:

155th Infantry Brigade—309th and 310th Regiments.

156th Infantry Brigade—311th and 312th Regiments.

307th, 308th and 309th Machine Gun Battalions.

153rd Artillery Brigade—307th, 308th and 309th Artillery Regiments.

303rd Trench Mortar Battery.

303rd Engineer Regiment and Train.

- 303rd Field Signal Battalion.
- 303rd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 303rd Supply Train.
- 303rd Ammunition Train.
- 303rd Sanitary Train—309th, 310th, 311th and 312th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 79TH DIVISION

The 79th Division was organized at Camp Meade, Maryland, from men from Pennsylvania, Maryland and District of Columbia. As soon as the division was organized, large numbers of the men were transferred to southern divisions and to special units throughout the United States. This continued until June, 1918. Approximately 80,000 men were trained in this division, and only about 25,000 retained. The increments came from New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, West Virginia. The division is known as the "Liberty Division," and has for its shoulder insignia a gray Lorraine cross on a blue shaped field, outlined in gray. Major General J. E. Kuhn commanded the division until the date of the armistice. The overseas movement began July 9, 1918. The last unit arrived in France August 3.

To include May 15, 1919, the 79th Division lost a total of 7,590 casualties, of whom 1,396 were battle deaths, and two officers and 78 men captured by the enemy. The division received 6,246 replacements. It captured from the enemy 392 men, 32 pieces of artillery and advanced 19½ kilometers (12 miles).

The following organizations composed the 79th Division:

- 157th Infantry Brigade—313th and 314th Regiments.
- 158th Infantry Brigade—315th and 316th Regiments.
- 310th, 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 154th Field Artillery Brigade—310th, 311th and 312th Artillery Regiments.
- 304th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 304th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 304th Field Signal Battalion.
- 304th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

304th Supply Train.

304th Ammunition Train.

304th Sanitary Train—313th, 314th, 315th and 316th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 80TH DIVISION

The 80th Division was organized at Camp Lee, Virginia. The majority of the officers were from New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia, and the enlisted men from Western Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia. The division is named the "Blue Ridge Division," and has for its shoulder insignia a shield outlined in white on a khaki background with three blue mountains superimposed.

Major General Adelbert Cronkhite was assigned to the command of the division on September 9, 1917, and remained in command until the armistice. The division began leaving Camp Lee May 17, 1918, and was embarked at Newport News for France, where it arrived through St. Nazaire, Bordeaux and Brest. The last of the division arrived in France on the 19th of June, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the total casualties of the 80th Division were 6,763, of whom 1,141 were battle deaths; it captured from the enemy 1,813 men. It also took 88 pieces of artillery, and made a total advance of 37 kilometers (24 miles). It received 4,495 replacements, and lost, captured by the enemy, one officer and 100 men.

The 80th Division was composed of the following organizations:

159th Infantry Brigade—317th and 318th Regiments.

160th Infantry Brigade—319th and 320th Regiments.

155th Field Artillery Brigade—313th, 314th and 315th Artillery Regiments.

313th, 314th and 315th Machine Gun Battalions.

305th Engineer Regiment.

305th Field Signal Battalion.

305th Trench Mortar Battery.

305th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

305th Supply Train.

305th Ammunition Train.

305th Sanitary Train—317th, 318th, 319th and 320th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 81ST DIVISION

The 81st Division was organized at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, from men drawn from North and South Carolina and Tennessee. The shoulder insignia of this division is a wild cat on a khaki circle. The color of the wild cat varies according to the different arms of the service. The division is better known as the "Wild Cat Division." Brigadier General Charles H. Barth organized the division and remained in command until October 8, 1917, when Major General Charles J. Bailey assumed command. The overseas movement began July 30, 1918. The last units arrived in France *via* England, August 26, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered a total of 1,051 casualties, of whom 250 were killed in action, and 51 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 1,984 replacements, and captured from the enemy five officers and 96 men, and advanced, against resistance, 5½ kilometers (3½ miles).

The following organizations composed the 81st Division:

161st Infantry Brigade—321st and 322nd Regiments.

162nd Infantry Brigade—323rd and 324th Regiments.

316th, 317th and 318th Machine Gun Battalions.

156th Field Artillery Brigade—916th, 317th and 318th Artillery Regiments.

306th Trench Mortar Battery.

306th Field Signal Battalion.

306th Engineer Regiment and Train.

306th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

306th Supply Train.

306th Ammunition Train.

306th Sanitary Train—321st, 322nd, 323rd and 324th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 82ND DIVISION

The 82nd Division was organized at Camp Gordon, Georgia, from men drawn from Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee. On October 10, 1917, however, the majority of the men were transferred out of this division to other divisions, and newly drafted men were sent from Camps Devens, Upton, Dix, Meade and Lee. In this division there were men from every state in the Union, but principally from the Eastern States. The division is known as the "All American Division." Its shoulder insignia consists of the letters "A.A." in gold on a circle of blue, the whole superimposed upon a red square. The overseas movement began April 25 and the last units arrived in France June 1.

Major General Eben Swift commanded the Division from its organization until May, 1918, when Brigadier General William P. Burnham took command, and remained in command until October 10, 1918, when Major General George B. Duncan succeeded him. On October 17, Major General William P. Burnham again took command until November 7, when Major General G. B. Duncan returned to command it.

To include May 15, 1919, the 82nd Division suffered a total of 8,228 casualties, of whom 1,338 were killed in action and seven officers and 232 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 8,402 replacements. It captured from the enemy 845 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery and advanced 17 kilometers (10½ miles).

The following units composed the 82nd Division:

- 163rd Infantry Brigade—325th and 326th Regiments.
- 164th Infantry Brigade—327th and 328th Regiments.
- 319th, 320th and 321st Machine Gun Battalions.
- 157th Artillery Brigade—319th, 320th and 321st Artillery Regiments.
- 307th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 307th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 307th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 307th Field Signal Battalion.
- 307th Supply Train.

307th Ammunition Train.

307th Sanitary Train—325th, 326th, 327th and 328th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 88TH DIVISION

The 88th Division was organized at Camp Dodge, Iowa, from men drawn from North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois. The divisional insignia is two figures "8" in blue, crossed at right angles. The overseas movement began August 8, 1918, and the last units arrived in France September 9. Major General Edward H. Plummer organized the division and Major General William Weigel commanded the division in action.

To include May 15, 1919, the 88th Division suffered a total of 90 casualties, of whom 27 were killed and two officers and seven men were taken prisoner by the enemy. The division received 731 replacements.

The 88th Division is composed of the following organizations:

156th Infantry Brigade—349th and 350th Regiments.

157th Infantry Brigade—351st and 352nd Regiments.

337th, 338th and 339th Machine Gun Battalions.

163rd Artillery Brigade—337th, 338th and 339th Artillery Regiments.

313th Trench Mortar Battery.

313th Engineer Regiment and Train.

313th Field Signal Battalion.

313th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

313th Supply Train.

313th Ammunition Train.

313th Sanitary Train—349th, 350th, 351st and 352nd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 89TH DIVISION

The 89th Division was organized at Camp Funston, Kansas, from men drawn from Missouri, Kansas, South Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico and Arizona. The

division is called the "Middle West Division." The shoulder insignia is a black "M, W" monogram in a black circle. The division was organized and trained by Major General Leonard Wood, who remained in command until the division was embarked for overseas, when Brigadier General Frank L. Winn took command. The overseas movement began on May 24 and in June the division arrived in France. On October 24 Major General William M. Wright was placed in command of the division.

As a reward for its work during the Meuse-Argonne offensive the 89th Division was chosen to become a part of the Army of Occupation.

To include May 15, 1919, the 89th Division suffered total casualties of 8,813, of whom 1,419 were killed and one officer and 24 men captured by the enemy. The division received 7,669 replacements. It captured from the enemy 5,061 prisoners, and 127 pieces of artillery. It advanced a total of 36 kilometers (22½ miles).

The following organizations composed the 89th Division:

- 177th Infantry Brigade—353rd and 354th Regiments.
- 178th Infantry Brigade—355th and 356th Regiments.
- 340th, 341st and 342nd Machine Gun Battalions.
- 164th Artillery Brigade—340th, 341st, 342nd and 343rd Artillery Regiments.
- 314th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 314th Field Signal Battalion.
- 314th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 314th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 314th Supply Train.
- 314th Ammunition Train.
- 314th Sanitary Train—353rd, 354th, 355th and 356th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 90TH DIVISION

The 90th Division was organized at Camp Travis, Texas, under command of Major General Henry T. Allen, from men drawn from Texas and Oklahoma. The men from Texas were put into the 180th Brigade, and the men from Oklahoma

in the 179th Brigade. The divisional insignia is a monogram "T.O." in red.

The overseas movement began in June, 1918. The 358th Infantry landed in England, and on July 4, paraded before the Lord Mayor of Liverpool.

On August 27 Brigadier General Johnston was promoted to Major General, and took command of the 91st Division, and Brigadier General U. G. McAlexander, who so gallantly commanded the 38th Infantry of the 3rd Division on the Marne, took command of the 180th Brigade.

As a reward for its brilliant work in the St. Mihiel offensive and in the Argonne, the 90th Division was chosen as one of the nine divisions of the Army of Occupation, of which only one other, the 89th, was a National Army Division. The division moved to Rhenish Prussia, and took up its position along the Moselle River. Here it was joined by the 165th Field Artillery Brigade, which had just completed its training.

To include May 15, 1919, the 90th Division suffered a total of 8,010 casualties, of whom 1,387 were killed in action, and four officers and 76 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 4,437 replacements. The division captured from the enemy 32 officers and 1,844 men, and 42 pieces of artillery; it advanced a total of 28½ kilometers (18 miles).

The following organizations composed the 90th Division:

179th (Oklahoma) Infantry Brigade—357th and 358th Regiments.

180th (Texas) Infantry Brigade—359th and 360th Regiments.
343rd, 344th and 345th Machine Gun Battalions.

165th Field Artillery Brigade—343rd, 344th and 345th Artillery Regiments.

315th Trench Mortar Battery.

315th Field Signal Battalion.

315th Engineer Regiment and Train.

315th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

315th Supply Train.

315th Ammunition Train.

315th Sanitary Train—357th, 358th, 359th and 360th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 91ST DIVISION

The 91st Division was organized at Camp Lewis, Washington. The majority of the officers were from California, Washington, Oregon, and the enlisted men from California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, and Alaska. The shoulder insignia of this division is the green fir tree of the Far West. The division is known as the "Wild West Division."

The overseas movement began early in July, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on July 26, 1918. With the exception of the artillery brigade, the division was concentrated in the eighth training area, with the division headquarters at Montigny-le-Roi, Haute-Marne. The artillery brigade was trained at Clermont-Ferrand.

The commanding generals of this division from its organization until the armistice were as follows: Major General Harry A. Greene, August 25, 1917, to November 24, 1917; Brigadier General James A. Irons, until December 23, 1917; Brigadier General Frederick S. Foltz, until March 2, 1918; Major General Harry A. Greene, until June 19, 1918; Brigadier General Frederick S. Foltz until August 31, 1918; Major General William H. Johnston, until November 11, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the 91st Division suffered 1,390 battle deaths, 6,496 battle casualties, and received 12,530 replacements. The division captured 2,412 German prisoners and 33 German cannon; it advanced a total of 34 kilometers (21½ miles). The division lost, captured by the enemy, 28 men.

The 91st Division was composed of the following organizations:

181st Infantry Brigade—361st and 362nd Regiments.

182nd Infantry Brigade—363rd and 364th Regiments.

346th, 347th and 348th Machine Gun Battalions.

166th Artillery Brigade—346th, 347th and 348th Artillery Regiments.

316th Trench Mortar Battery.
316th Engineer Regiment and Train.
316th Field Signal Battalion.
316th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
316th Supply Train.
316th Ammunition Train.
316th Sanitary Train—361st, 362nd, and 363rd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 92ND DIVISION

The 92nd Division was organized at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton, Mead, and Dix, from colored National Army officers and men from all parts of the United States. The division is known as the "Buffalo Division," and the shoulder insignia is a buffalo in black on a khaki patch. On August 29, after a period of training, the division entered the line in the St. Die sector, in the Vosges mountains. Brigadier General, afterwards Major General Charles C. Ballou, commanded the division during most of its career.

To include May 15, 1919, the 92nd Division suffered a total of 1,680 casualties, of whom 185 were battle deaths and 17 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 2,920 replacements. It advanced 3 kilometers (2 miles).

The following organizations composed the 92nd Division:

183rd Infantry Brigade—365th and 366th Regiments.
184th Infantry Brigade—367th and 368th Regiments.
349th, 350th and 351st Machine Gun Battalions.
167th Field Artillery Brigade—349th, 350th and 351st Artillery Regiments.
317th Trench Mortar Battery.
317th Field Signal Battalion.
317th Engineer Regiment and Train.
317th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
317th Supply Train.
317th Ammunition Train.
317th Sanitary Train—365th, 366th, 367th and 368th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 93RD DIVISION

This, the 30th (combat) Division of the A.E.F., never functioned as a division, but as four separate infantry regiments; it saw much service with various French armies. As the 93rd Division (Colored National Guard) it was filled to strength from National Army drafts. The overseas movement began on April 7, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on April 22. Upon arrival in France the two infantry brigades were broken up, and the 369th, 370th, 371st, and 372nd Infantry Regiments were brigaded with the French, and served as parts of French armies as follows:

July 1 to July 21—369th Infantry, with the Fourth French Army in the line between Aisne and Ville-sur-Tourbe; 370th Infantry, with the Second French Army; 371st Infantry, with Thirteenth French Army Corps in the line west of Avocourt; 372nd Infantry, with the Thirteenth French Army Corps in the line east of Four-de-Taris.

August 1st—369th Infantry, with the Eighth French Corps in the Cienne la Ville region; 370th Infantry, with the 36th French Division; 371st Infantry, with the 156th French Division; 372nd Infantry, with the 157th French Division.

On September 28, the 370th Infantry advanced across the Chemin des Dames.

On October 24—369th Infantry, with the Fourth French Army at Wesserling; 370th Infantry, with the Tenth French Army at Euly; 371st Infantry and 372nd, with the Second French Army at Tlainfaing.

The division suffered 2,587 casualties during these operations, of whom 574 were killed. One officer and three men were captured by the enemy.

The division shoulder insignia is a French helmet in blue, superimposed on a black disc.

DEPOT, REPLACEMENT, AND LABOR DIVISIONS

THE 8TH DIVISION

The 8th Division was organized from elements of the Regular Army at Camp Fremont, California. On August 3, 1918, this division received its most serious loss when Major General Graves, his staff, 5,000 men and 100 officers were transferred to the A.E.F. in Siberia. Major General Eli A. Holmick succeeded General Graves in command of the division.

The overseas movement began October 30, 1918. The 8th Artillery Brigade and the 8th Infantry Brigade, with the 16th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, and the 319th Engineers, were the only organizations of this division that crossed overseas.

These troops became the garrison of Brest, and assisted in maintaining the huge camp where troops were embarked, after the armistice, for the United States. Later, the 8th Infantry, along with the 2nd Battalion of the 67th Field Artillery of the 1st Division, took over the Coblenz bridgehead and became the "American Forces in Germany," under General Allen.

The following units composed the 8th Division:

15th Infantry Brigade—12th and 62nd Regiments.

16th Infantry Brigade—8th and 13th Regiments.

22nd, 23rd and 24th Machine Gun Battalions.

8th Field Artillery Brigade—2nd, 81st and 83rd Artillery Regiments.

8th Trench Mortar Battery.

319th Engineer Regiment and Train.

320th Field Signal Battalion.

8th Ammunition Train.

8th Supply Train.

8th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

8th Sanitary Train—11th, 31st, 32nd and 43rd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 31ST DIVISION

The 31st Division was made up from National Guard of Georgia, Alabama, Florida at Camp Walter, Georgia. The overseas movement began September 16, 1918, and the last units arrived in France November 9, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was designated as a replacement division, and ordered to Le Mans area. The personnel of most of the units were withdrawn from the division and sent to other divisions as replacements, and the 31st Division existed only as a skeleton division.

The commanding generals of the division were Major General Francis J. Kernan, Brigadier General John L. Hayden, Major General Francis H. French, Major General Le Roy S. Lyon. The divisional insignia is the letters "D.D." back to back embroidered in red on a khaki circle. It was known as the "Dixie Division."

The following units composed the 31st Division:

- 61st Infantry Brigade—121st and 122nd Regiments.
- 62nd Infantry Brigade—123rd and 124th Regiments.
- 116th, 117th and 118th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 56th Field Artillery Brigade—116th, 117th and 118th Artillery Regiments.
- 106th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 106th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 106th Field Signal Battalion.
- 106th Ammunition Train.
- 106th Supply Train.
- 106th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 106th Sanitary Train—121st, 122nd, 123rd and 124th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 34TH DIVISION

The 34th Division was made up of National Guard of Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota at Camp Cody, New Mexico. The overseas movement began September 16, 1918, and the last unit arrived in France October 24, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was

ordered to Le Mans area, where it was broken up and ceased to function as a division.

The commanding generals of the division were Major General A. P. Blocksom, Major General William R. Smith, Major General Beaumont B. Buck, and Brigadier General John A. Johnson. The divisional insignia is a black wolf encircling a bovine skull.

The 34th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 67th Infantry Brigade—133rd and 134th Regiments.
- 68th Infantry Brigade—135th and 136th Regiments
Machine Gun Battalion.
- 69th Field Artillery Brigade—125th, 126th and 127th Artillery Regiments.
- 109th Trench Mortary Battery.
- 109th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 109th Field Signal Battalion.
- 109th Ammunition Train.
- 109th Supply Train.
- 109th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 109th Sanitary Train—133rd, 134th, 135th and 136th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 38TH DIVISION

The 38th Division was made up from National Guard of Kentucky, West Virginia and Indiana, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The overseas movement was completed about the middle of October, 1918. The division was ordered to Le Mans area, where it was broken up and ceased to function further as a combat division. The division was commanded successively by Major General William H. Sage, Brigadier General Edward M. Lewis, Brigadier General Henry H. Whitney, and Brigadier General William V. Judson. The divisional insignia is a shield, the right half of which is blue, the left half red, the "C.Y." in which superimposed on the shield, standing for "Cyclone Division."

The following organizations composed the 38th Division:

- 75th Infantry Brigade—149th and 150th Regiments.**
- 76th Infantry Brigade—151st and 152nd Regiments.**
- 137th, 138th and 139th Machine Gun Battalions.**
- 63rd Field Artillery Brigade—137th, 138th and 139th Artillery Regiments.**
- 113th Trench Mortar Battery.**
- 113th Engineer Regiment and Train.**
- 113th Field Signal Battalion.**
- 113th Ammunition Train.**
- 113th Supply Train.**
- 113th Train Headquarters and Military Police.**
- 113th Sanitary Train—149th, 150th, 151st and 152nd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.**

THE 39TH DIVISION

The 39th Division was made up from the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. The overseas movement was completed on September 7, 1918, and upon arrival in France, the division was ordered to the St. Florent area (Sur-Cher) and was designated as the 5th Depot Division.

The division remained in this area, training a personnel to be used as replacements until about November 1. The training cadres were then transferred to the 1st Depot Division at St. Aignan. The division was commanded by Major General Henry C. Hodges. The divisional insignia is a bull's eye on a khaki square. The inner circle is red, the middle is white, and the outer circle black.

The 39th Division was composed of the following organizations :

- 77th Infantry Brigade—153rd and 154th Regiments.**
- 78th Infantry Brigade—155th and 156th Regiments.**
- 140th, 141st and 142nd Machine Gun Battalions.**
- 64th Field Artillery Brigade—140th, 141st and 142nd Artillery Regiments.**
- 114th Trench Mortar Battery.**
- 114th Engineer Regiment and Train.**
- 114th Field Signal Battalion.**

- 114th Ammunition Train.
- 114th Supply Train.
- 114th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 114th Sanitary Train—153rd, 154th, 155th and 156th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 40TH DIVISION

The 40th Division was made up from the National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico, at Camp Kearny, California. The overseas movement began August 7. The last units arrived in France August 28, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was made a replacement division, and was ordered to the La Querche (Cher) area, and became the 6th Depot Division. The division was then broken up and its personnel was used as replacements for the combat divisions at the front. Major General Frederick S. Strong commanded the division. The division is popularly known as the "Sunshine Division," and its insignia is a golden sun superimposed upon a blue square.

The 40th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 79th Infantry Brigade—157th and 158th Regiments.
- 80th Infantry Brigade—159th and 160th Regiments.
- 143rd, 144th and 145th Machine Gun Battalions
- 65th Field Artillery Brigade—143rd, 144th and 145th Artillery Regiments.
- 115th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 115th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 115th Field Signal Battalion.
- 115th Ammunition Train.
- 115th Supply Train.
- 115th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 115th Sanitary Train—157th, 158th, 159th and 160th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 41ST DIVISION

The 41st Division was made up from the National Guard of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Utah and Wyoming at

Camp Greene, North Carolina. The overseas movement began October 18, 1917, and the last units arrived in France December 7, 1917. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as the 1st Depot Division, and ordered to the St. Aignan training area. The division was then broken up and formed into training cadres for the instruction of replacements of combat divisions at the front. The 66th Artillery Brigade was left intact, and after a period of training was attached to the First Corps on July 1 as corps artillery. This brigade served as corps and army artillery throughout its service in France, and was engaged in active operations in the Marne-Aisne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. The 41st Division while serving as the 1st Depot Division from January 1, 1918, to December 31, 1918, forwarded from its area 263,395 replacements and casualties.

The general officers who commanded this division were Major General Hunter Liggett, Brigadier General Henry Jervey, Brigadier Général George LeRoy Irwin, Brigadier General Richard Coulter, Brigadier General Robert Alexander, Brigadier General William S. Scott, Major General J. E. McMann and Brigadier General Eli Cole.

The division is popularly known as the "Sunset Division," and the shoulder insignia is a setting sun in red, blue and gold.

The following organizations compose the 41st Division:

- 81st Infantry Brigade—161st and 162nd Regiments.
- 82nd Infantry Brigade—163rd and 164th Regiments.
- 146th, 147th and 148th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 66th Field Artillery Brigade—146th, 147th and 148th Artillery Regiments.
- 116th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 116th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 116th Field Signal Battalion.
- 116th Ammunition Train.
- 116th Supply Train.
- 116th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 116th Sanitary Train—161st, 162nd, 163rd and 164th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 76TH DIVISION

The 76th Division was made up from National Army drafts from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut, at Camp Devons, Massachusetts. The overseas movement began July 5, 1918, and the last units arrived in France July 31, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was designated as a depot division, and ordered to St. Aignan area. Here the division was broken up and training cadres were formed, the personnel being used as replacements for the combat divisions at the front. The specialized units were sent forward as Corps and Army troops. Major General Henry F. Hodges and Brigadier General William Wiegel commanded the division. The division is popularly known as the "Liberty Bell Division," and its shoulder insignia is a blue liberty bell superimposed upon a khaki square.

The 76th Division was composed of the following units:

- 151st Infantry Brigade—301st and 302nd Regiments.
- 152nd Infantry Brigade—303rd and 304th Regiments.
- 301st, 302nd and 303rd Machine Gun Battalions.
- 151st Artillery Brigade—301st, 302nd and 303rd Artillery Regiments.
- 301st Trench Mortar Battery.
- 301st Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 301st Field Signal Battalion.
- 301st Ammunition Train.
- 301st Supply Train.
- 301st Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 301st Sanitary Train—301st, 302nd, 303rd and 304th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 83RD DIVISION

The 83rd Division was made up of National Army drafts from Ohio and West Virginia, at Camp Sherman, Ohio. The overseas movement began June 4, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on June 21. Upon arrival in France, the division was designated as a depot division and ordered to Le

Mans area. Here the division was broken up and artillery brigades and special units, such as engineer and signal troops, were sent forward as corps and army charges.

The other organizations of the division were held in the area, and trained as replacements for the combat divisions at the front. Major General Edwin F. Glenn commanded the division. The divisional insignia is a black triangle on which is superimposed a black monogram of the letters "OHIO."

The 83rd Division was composed of the following organizations:

155th Infantry Brigade—329th and 330th Regiments.

156th Infantry Brigade—331st and 332nd Regiments.

322nd, 323rd and 324th Machine Gun Battalions.

158th Artillery Brigade—322nd, 323rd and 324th Artillery Regiments.

308th Trench Mortar Battery.

308th Engineer Regiment and Train.

308th Field Signal Battalion.

308th Ammunition Train.

308th Supply Train.

308th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

308th Sanitary Train—329th, 330th, 331st and 332nd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 84TH DIVISION

The 84th Division was made up of National Army drafts from Indiana and Kentucky. The overseas movement was completed in September, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as a Depot Division, and ordered to Le Mans area. Here the division was broken up and cadres were formed for training the personnel as replacements for combat divisions at the front.

The commanding generals of the division were Brigadier General Wilbur E. Wilder and Major General Harry C. Hall. The division is popularly known as the "Lincoln Division," and its shoulder insignia is a white disc surrounded by red circle on which is superimposed "Lincoln 84" in blue, and an axe with a red head, and blue handle.

The 84th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 167th Infantry Brigade—333rd and 334th Regiments.
- 168th Infantry Brigade—335th and 336th Regiments.
- 325th, 326th and 327th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 159th Field Artillery Brigade—325th, 326th and 327th Artillery Regiments.
- 309th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 309th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 309th Field Signal Battalion.
- 309th Ammunition Train.
- 309th Supply Train.
- 309th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 309th Sanitary Train—333rd, 334th, 335th and 336th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 85TH DIVISION

The 85th Division was composed of National Army drafts from Michigan and Wisconsin at Camp Custer, Michigan. The first units embarked for overseas on July 21, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on August 12, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as a depot division and ordered to Ponilly (Nievre). The division was then broken up and special units were sent forward as corps and army troops. The infantry units were formed into cadres for training, and sending forward of replacements for combat divisions at the front. The commanding generals of this division were Major General J. T. Dickman, Brigadier General S. Miller, Major General James Parker and Brigadier General Benjamin C. Morse, Major General C. W. Kennedy.

The division is popularly known as the "Custer Division," and its insignia is a khaki circle on which is superimposed the letter "C.D." in red.

The 85th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 169th Infantry Brigade—337th and 338th Regiments.
- 170th Infantry Brigade—339th and 340th Regiments.

328th, 329th and 330th Machine Gun Battalions.
 160th Field Artillery Brigade—328th, 329th and 330th Artillery Regiments.
 310th Trench Mortar Battery.
 310th Engineer Train and Regiment.
 310th Field Signal Battalion.
 410th Ammunition Train.
 310th Supply Train.
 310th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 310th Sanitary Train—337th, 338th, 339th and 340th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 86TH DIVISION

The 86th Division was composed of National Army drafts from Illinois, and was organized at Camp Grant, Illinois. The first units embarked for overseas on September 8, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was ordered to the Le Mans area, where it was broken up and cadres formed for training replacements for combat divisions at the front. The commanding generals of the division were Major General Thomas H. Barry, Brigadier General L. W. V. Kennon and Major General Charles H. Martin. This division is popularly known as the "Black Hawk Division." Its shoulder insignia is a black hawk and monogram "B.H." superimposed on a red shield.

The division was composed of the following organizations:

171st Infantry Brigade—341st and 342nd Regiments.
 172nd Infantry Brigade—343rd and 344th Regiments.
 341st, 342nd and 343rd Machine Gun Battalions.
 161st Artillery Brigade—331st, 332nd and 333rd Artillery Regiments.
 311th Trench Mortar Battery.
 311th Engineer Train and Regiment.
 311th Field Signal Battalion.
 311th Ammunition Train.
 311th Supply Train.
 311th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 311th Sanitary Train—341st, 342nd, 343rd and 344th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 87TH DIVISION

The 87th Division was made up of National Army drafts from Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi. It was organized at Camp Pike, Arkansas. The overseas movement began August 23, and the last units arrived in France September 13, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was turned over to the Service of Supply and ordered to Pons (Charente-Inferieure), where it was broken up and units placed in the intermediate section. The commanding general of this division was Major General Samuel D. Sturgis. The division is popularly known as the "Acorn Division," and the shoulder insignia is a brown acorn on a green circle.

The 87th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 173rd Infantry Brigade—345th and 346th Regiments.
- 174th Infantry Brigade—347th and 348th Regiments.
- 334th, 335th and 336th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 162nd Field Artillery Brigade—334th, 335th and 346th Field Regiments.
- 312th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 312th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 312th Field Signal Battalion.
- 312th Ammunition Train.
- 312th Supply Train.
- 312th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 312th Sanitary Train—345th, 346th, 347th and 348th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

* * * * *

PERSHING'S MESSAGE TO HIS ARMY

Every soldier in the A. E. F.—combatants and non-combatants—received, duly signed by his company commander the following personal message from the Commander-in-Chief:

G. H. Q.
American Expeditionary Forces,

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 38-A.

France, February 28, 1919.

My Fellow Soldiers:

Now that your service with the American Expeditionary Forces is about to terminate, I can not let you go without a personal word. At the call to arms, the patriotic young manhood of America eagerly responded and became the formidable army whose decisive victories testify to its efficiency and its valor. With the support of the nation firmly united to defend the cause of liberty, our army has executed the will of the people with resolute purpose. Our democracy has been tested, and the forces of autocracy have been defeated. To the glory of the citizen-soldier, our troops have faithfully fulfilled their trust, and in a succession of brilliant offensives have overcome the menace to our civilization.

As an individual, your part in the world war has been an important one in the sum total of our achievements. Whether keeping lonely vigil in the trenches, or gallantly storming the enemy's stronghold; whether enduring monotonous drudgery at the rear, or sustaining the fighting line at the front, each has bravely and efficiently played his part. By willing sacrifice of personal rights; by cheerful endurance of hardship and privation; by vigor, strength and indomitable will, made effective by thorough organization and cordial coöperation, you inspired the war-worn Allies with new life and turned the tide of threatened defeat into overwhelming victory.

With a consecrated devotion to duty and a will to conquer, you have loyally served your country. By your exemplary conduct a standard has been established and maintained never before attained by any army. With mind and body as clean and strong

as the decisive blows you delivered against the foe, you are soon to return to the pursuits of peace. In leaving the scenes of your victories, may I ask that you carry home your high ideals and continue to live as you have served—an honor to the principles for which you have fought and to the fallen comrades you leave behind.

It is with pride in our success that I extend to you my sincere thanks for your splendid service to the army and to the nation.

Faithfully,
JOHN J. PERSHING,
Commander-in-Chief.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Copy furnished to.....
.....
.....
Commanding.

CHAPTER XIX: A VISITOR'S GUIDE TO THE PLACES OF HISTORIC INTEREST ON THE WESTERN FRONT

**With Special Reference to the Scenes
of Action of American Troops, American
Burial Grounds, Headquarters, etc.**

**In Three Short Trips from Paris With
Full Directions as to Routes.**

**To Which Has Been Added a Brief
Summary of the Major Actions of the
War Prior to the Entrance of the United
States.**

CHAPTER XIX

A VISITOR'S GUIDE TO THE WESTERN FRONT

The traveler, who wishes to visit the scenes of the more important battles of the war, and especially those in which American troops participated, soon finds himself bewildered as to where to begin. There were but few portions of the Western Front which were not the scenes of bitter fighting, but in most cases this fighting occurred in 1914. During the years of 1915, 1916, and 1917, a few sectors of the Western Front were the field of all the actions which occurred. These were chiefly the area about Ypres (in Belgium), **Famous Battles** the Somme valley (west of Amiens), the Chemin des Dames (north of Soissons), the Champagne (from Reims east towards the Argonne Forest), and Verdun. On the remainder of the front, during this period, there were practically no great battles; and the battle-line, once established, remained the same. The activities died down on these "quiet fronts," and No-man's-land soon became a sea of barbed wire. Even the artillery was curtailed in these sectors, so as **Quiet Sectors** to give the maximum effort where it would do the most good.

The reason for "quiet sectors" and "active sectors" was more or less determined by the geography of the Western Front. Paris, the center of French industrial and commercial life, lies in a shallow basin which rises gradually **Geography** toward the east. This gradual rise in elevation of the "Field of France" is interrupted by several abrupt breaks, which become more and more severe as the border between France and Germany is approached. These are in effect a series of concentric hills and small mountain ranges which present their steep side toward Germany, while the gradual slope

faces Paris. From time immemorial these hills, which have their beginning in the Swiss Alps and stretch in a northeasterly direction into Belgium, have been the bulwark of France against the invasion of the barbarian hordes from across the Rhine.

This line of concentric hills, the center of which is Paris, is not without occasional gaps. The first of these is at the Swiss border. This the French had fortified with a series of forts and garrison cities stretching from Belfort to Épinal. The second and largest gap, the Meuse Valley, the French had fortified by a chain of fortifications reaching from Verdun to Toul. Between these two gaps lay the impassable Vosges Mountains. Northwest of Verdun lay the Argonne and the Ardennes through which the movement of great bodies of troops was impossible. On the other side of the Ardennes, the Belgian border was protected by a fortified line stretching from Maubeuge, and Valenciennes to Lille. An inner circle of defense was laid out. This consisted chiefly of two triangular fortified areas, namely: Langres-Dijon-Besançon, and LaFère-Reims-Laon. France had, at the outbreak of the war, an active army of about one million men in these areas, and by mobilization could increase this to about five millions inside of four weeks.

To attack France in 1914, the German Army was forced to choose between the southern, central, and northern routes of attack. Much publicity had been given prior to that time, by the Germans, to the ease with which they could march through Belgium. Immediately upon the declaration of war, the First and Second German Armies, with great furore, began the assault on the Belgian fortress of Liège. Meanwhile, the main body of the German Army moved in two great groups against the central gap in the French hills, and formed for assault on Verdun and Nancy. The German Crown Prince was given Verdun and the Crown Prince of Bavaria was given Nancy as an objective, and the Kaiser came thither to witness the break through.

On August 7, 1914, Liège fell, and it seemed apparent that Germany had committed herself to attack by the northern

route. But the German advance through Belgium was very slow. This was not entirely due to the resistance of the Belgian Army, but chiefly to the fact that the attack in Belgium was merely a demonstration to draw thither the bulk of the French Army. If this had been accomplished, a speedy end would have been made of it, for, during all this time, the Germans had concentrated north of Verdun one million men, the flower of their army, under the German Crown Prince. This group was skillfully concealed in the Ardennes and Argonne, while south of it lay another enormous concentration under the Crown Prince of Bavaria, ready to assault the commanding ridge of Nancy. Obviously the German strategy was to make a feint in Belgium, attract thither the French reserves, and then to smash down the weakened defenses of Verdun and Nancy.

**The Feint
in Belgium**

**The Main
Attack**

After that, all would be easy. The French Army split, would be a simple task for the united German Army, and then the two Crown Princes would march arm in arm down the valley of the Marne to Paris.

Marshal Joffre, realizing this, refused to be drawn, and instead aimed a heavy attack through the gap at Belfort toward Mühlhausen, to draw off the pressure from Nancy, and fool the Germans into thinking that he hoped to retake the lost provinces. The Germans reacted at once, and the outnumbered French were driven back. Meanwhile, the British under Sir John French had placed six divisions in France. These Joffre placed on the continuation of his left flank along the Belgian Frontier of France, in front of Mons. The Germans began hunting all over Belgium for the French Army. Attack after attack only proved that the line was held by Belgian rearguards. Brussels was entered, Namur was assaulted, and still no French were found, and the Belgians inflicted heavy casualties upon the advancing Germans. Meanwhile, Joffre made a second great advance into Alsace. This also was a feint, made by a small body again to relieve the ever-increasing pressure around Verdun and Nancy, and to fool the Germans. Again the Ger-

**Joffre's
Strategy**

**The
British
at Mons**

**The Attack
in Alsace**

mans sent a large force to stop the advance. This proved, without a doubt, where the German strength lay. The army which tried to advance from in front of Nancy was smothered.

**To Out Of
Von Kluck**

Immediately Joffre decided to send an army up to Charleroi which would cut off the two German armies in Belgium. Something happened to this army under Lanrezac, and Von Kluck and Bülow managed to extricate themselves. Meanwhile, the Third German Army

Charleroi

under Hausen joined in the attack. This put the left of the Allied line in great danger, for Hausen had crossed the Meuse, and threatened to envelop the British and French to the west of the river. On August 24, 1914, Joffre

**The
Retreat
from Mons**

ordered the great retreat of the left wing of his army. This retreat was to pivot on Verdun, and was to continue until a line had been reached on which a favorable battle could be fought. The British were the marching flank in this retreat, and to them fell the most difficult task. The retreat was one of the most skillfully executed actions of the war. Giving constant rearguard actions, the line gradually dropped back past the Aisne, to the Marne, and Paris was almost in sight of the troops of Von Kluck's extreme right, at Meaux, 28 miles from Paris. In twelve days, the British Army covered 125 miles, from Mons to the river Marne. This, in itself, was one of the most remarkable feats of the war, but the fact which makes it one of the most famous military actions is frequently overlooked. The British Base on August 24, 1914, was Le Havre. The direction of the retreat was such as to cut the British Army off from this base. Le Havre was full of stores and replacement troops. Immediately, the British Base was moved to St. Nazaire and the Loire valley, and, by September 2, everything was moving along the new lines of communications, and replacements were being rushed to the British Army south of Meaux, on the Marne.

Meanwhile, the German forces which had lain concealed in the Ardennes moved down in conformity with the swift advance of Von Kluck and Bülow from Mons. At the same time the German Crown Prince began the assault on Verdun,

and the Crown Prince of Bavaria launched the great attack on Nancy. Throughout the length of the line the Germans were advancing in what they confidently expected would be the last great battle against the French. By September 5, 1914, the Germans were progressing well. The attacks at Verdun and Nancy showed slight gains, while, the right and center had crossed the Marne. In fact, in the center, the point of greatest advance had reached Vitry-le-François, and it seemed as though the French Army was almost surrounded about Verdun. The French still held the two fortresses on either end of the line, Paris and Verdun, but between these two points the Germans had advanced without meeting much opposition until the line ran roughly from Meaux to Montmirail, to Fere-en-Champenoise, to Vitry-le-François, and from there bent sharply back to Verdun. From Verdun, the line was on the far side of the Hauts de Meuse and the French held the crown of hills immediately outside of Nancy. From Nancy south, as far as the Swiss border, the French garrisons of the mountains were adequate to hold off any attack, and from this time, until the end of the war, the line from Nancy to Switzerland can be forgotten, for there was practically no fighting there.

On September 6, 1914, the Germans began the attack upon the French lines in what they expected to be the culminating battle of the war. Von Kluck, on the German right, began to cross the Marne at Meaux. In the center, Hausen was given the mission of piercing the French line at Fere-en-Champenoise, while, on the left, a huge concentration began the long threatened attack on the crown north of Nancy. But it was on this day also, that Joffre issued his famous order for the Allies to cease the retreat and stand their ground. Then suddenly, from nowhere, a fresh French Army, under Maunoury, appeared on Von Kluck's right rear, stretching from Meaux due north to Betz. With rare skill, Von Kluck left a screen in front of the British south of the Marne, and threw his army across at right angles to destroy Maunoury. Maunoury's position was precarious, for Von Kluck and Bülow had two

**German
Army
Begins
Assault**

**The First
Battle of
the Marne**

huge armies on that flank of the line. On the following day, Gallieni, the Governor of Paris, sent out a division in motor cars of all kinds, along the Paris-Soissons road, to support the hard-pressed left flank. Immediately the British attacked towards Meaux, while d'Esperey, on their right, struck the Germans in Montmirail, and drove them back to Château-Thierry and across the Marne. But the main German attack was in the center, on a front stretching from Fere-en-Champenoise to Vitry-la-François, and here, Hausen and the Duke of Würtemberg struck Foch and de Carey, and it was here that Foch, after two days' bitter fighting, discovered a gap between the Prussians and Saxons. Knowing that the British and d'Esperey on his left, were pushing forward so as to menace Hausen's rear, Foch hurled his reserve division into this gap; and by the morning of the 10th of September, Hausen's army was shattered and fell back in confusion to the Marne. The defeat of Von Kluck and Hausen put the entire German army in retreat from Paris to Verdun.

But there were also two other great battles going on at the same time and upon them, as much as upon the actions on the Marne, did the defeat of the Germans lie. The German Crown Prince made a furious attack upon Sarraill's Third French Army at Verdun. The losses were terrific, but the French held their ground. The most terrific battle of all, however, was the attack by the Bavarian Crown Prince upon Castelneau, who, with a thinned army, was holding the ridge at Nancy. This was the right pivot of the French Line, and charge after charge up those slopes proved of no avail to the Germans. Castelneau's army was small, but it fought from behind its entanglements, and the heroism of the garrison will live forever.

Defeated on every front, the Germans pulled back their troops to the line of the Aisne, where a natural line, easy of defense, was laid out. This was almost a straight line from Verdun, north of Reims, to Compiègne.



WESTERN FRONT

Showing, dotted, the German advance in the First Battle of the Marne. The solid line shows the race to the sea.

After their bitter defeat on the Marne, and their retreat to the Aisne, the Germans regained their equilibrium sufficiently to resume the offensive to better their lines. North of Soissons and Reims, and in the Argonne they made slight advances, and a force from Metz pushed their way over the "Hauts de Meuse," seized St. Mihiel, and formed the St. Mihiel salient. During these operations in September, 1914, Joffre began extending the Allied left flank to the Somme valley in order to envelop the German right wing which was "in the air." By so doing, he hoped to force the Germans out of the French industrial center about Lille. The securing of the channel ports was another point which forced this decision. The Germans reacted immediately, and there followed the overlapping race for the sea. One by one the armies were brought up from Alsace and placed in the continuation of this line. Finally, on October 19, 1914, the British Army completed its move from the Aisne front, and took over the Lys front facing Bethune. The Germans were making a desperate effort to capture Dunkirk and Calais. They were pursuing the retreating Belgians, and had reached the Lys valley where they were massing in strength for the drive through Ypres to the coast.

The battle of Ypres began on October 28, 1914, and reached the crisis on November 1, when the Germans broke through the British line and took Messines Ridge, Wytschaete Wood, and were only stopped before Mount Kemmel by the timely arrival of French reënforcements. The battle continued with great force, and the British losses were so great that on November 21 the French relieved them on this front. It soon became evident that the Germans had failed to break through, and the British, reënforced with fresh troops, took over the line once more.

The Western Front then settled into the deadlock of trench warfare. The Allies lacked artillery and the Germans were busy in Russia. During the year 1915 there were no battles of great consequence on the Western Front. The Allies tried vainly to attack entrenched positions without artillery, and the Germans were content to

**The Race
for the
Sea**

**First
Battle
of Ypres**

1915

shatter these with artillery and win back the ground with counter-attacks. The first of these attacks was **Allied Attacks** at Soissons in January, 1915. The second was in the Champagne in February. The third attempt was more successful, for the French took Vauquois in the Argonne in February; and in the same month a successful French attack captured Les Eparges, but failed to reduce the St. Mihiel salient. Meanwhile a bloody battle was fought in Alsace. Then in March the British attacked Neuve Chapelle without success. On April 22, the Germans launched their famous "Gas Attack" on Ypres. It fell on French **First Gas Attack** Colonials and Canadians, but, as the Germans did not continue their initial success, it soon became evident that this was merely to test out the effect of gas. In May, Foch attacked with 280,000 men in the Artois toward Lens, but failed to gain, due to lack of reserves and artillery. In September the French attacked in the Champagne, while the British assaulted Loos, but little gain was made. On December 15, Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French to the command of the British Army. Meanwhile, Germany had been busy. Russia had been beaten, Serbia and **Germany in Russia** Montenegro wiped out, and the Teuton Empires stretched from the Baltic to the Bosphorus and as far into Russia as one cared to go.

The year 1916, however, witnessed a resumption by both sides of major offensives on the Western Front. The Allies had by this time the artillery, the reserves, and **1916** the experience of the failures of 1915; while the Germans were flushed with victory in the East. Falkenhayn immediately attempted to add the name of Verdun to his list of eastern victories. The front selected was the six miles east of the Meuse from Brabant. **2,000** **Second Battle of Verdun** Guns bombarded this for 24 hours and then, on February 24, 1916, the German assault carried the French front line taking Samogneux and Ornes, and finally Douaumont was taken. De Castleneau, then Chief of Staff, brought Petain to relieve General Herr, and the crisis was passed. On March 2, the Germans took Vaux, but it was evident that

there must also be an advance on the West bank of the Meuse. On March 6, the Germans took the French front lines on that side from Forges to Malancourt, and advanced to Regneville. Having broken through nowhere, Falkenhayn, despite his great losses, decided to try once more. The result was the bitter struggle for Dead Man's Hill south of Bethincourt, which lasted until June 2, when the fort of Vaux surrendered. This cost Falkenhayn his position and Hindenburg became Chief of Staff.

France, Great Britain and Russia had decided to make an offensive on July 1, 1916. Russia attacked one month sooner, however, to relieve the pressure on Italy. The

The Somme

plan of the Franco-British drive was to reduce the Noyon salient, which stretched from Arras, through Lassigny, to La Fere. The objective of the British (on the west) was Bapaume, while the French (on the south) were to take Peronne. For one week the artillery pounded the German lines, and then on July 1, the Allies attacked. The British advanced one mile on a six mile front, while the French broke completely through, for six miles on a front of eleven miles. By July 14, the Allies had reached the third German line. From July 18 to September 1, the Germans counter-attacked the Allied line. Then, on September 4, the Allies

First Tanks

renewed the advance, and the British used tanks for the first time. On November 18, the battle closed without a victory for either side. The Germans had not halted their advance in Roumania, but the Allies had so weakened the Noyon salient, that during the winter and spring, the Germans were forced to pull back to the "Hindenburg Line." The British lost in this action 450,000 and the French about 250,000, while the Germans lost in prisoners alone, 65,000.

Later in October, 1916, Nivelle at Verdun retook Douamont, Vaux, and many of the villages which the Germans had captured in the Spring.

Verdun

The year 1917 started well for the Allies. The Russian

1917

revolution deposed the pro-German element there, and Kerensky appeared as the leader of an active cam-

paign. On April 9, the British began the Arras offensive between Lens and St. Quentin. This lasted for twenty days, and Vimy Ridge, Monchy and Bullecourt were taken and the suburbs of Lens were entered. Then on April 16, the French began their attack on the German lines on the Aisne. On a front of 25 miles, from north of Soissons to north of Reims, they began a steady forward movement which gradually approached the Chemin des Dames, when the attack was suddenly ordered stopped. The reason given was the heavy French casualties. France, both the military and civil population, became terribly depressed by this action, and it was at this time that the first Americans arrived in southern France. The defeatist party in the French Chamber of Deputies was almost in power and ready to make a separate peace. Then, slowly, the war party emerged with Clemenceau in power, and he prosecuted the leaders of the defeatist party. Then followed a series of small local advances by the Allies, which, by their brilliance, promised well for the future. On June 7, the British took Messines Ridge, and from July 31 to October 14 the British, French and Belgians took Paschendaele Ridge. On August 20, the French in four days reconquered all the territory the Germans had taken at Verdun, and on October 23, the French took the Chemin des Dames. Finally, on November 20, the British attack reached Cambrai. Here the Germans reacted, and forced the British back to the original line. This brought to a close the year 1917.

The year 1918 saw the breakdown of Russia and the launching by the Germans of their great "Spring Offensive" between St. Quentin and Cambrai, at the juncture of the British and French Armies. From this point in the conflict, American troops fought on every field, and the history of their actions completes the outline of the war.

This resumé of the war on the Western Front shows clearly that all the battles were fought on comparatively few battle-

Russia

Arras
OffensiveChemin
Des Dames

Defeatists

Clemenceau

Messines
Paschendaele
Verdun
Chemin
Des Dames
Cambrai

1918

Americans
on Every
Front

fields, while the remainder of the Western Front remained in stationary trench warfare. These latter were called the quiet sectors. The reason that the actions of the war were concentrated in a few points was due to the geography of France. The traveler, therefore, has merely to select the battle-fields, and omit the quiet sectors, and the tour of the battle-fields at once becomes simple. The Western Front presents too great a problem for the visitor to cover in its entirety, and for this reason, a tour has been outlined which will show the traveler all the important battle-fields of the war, and covers all the points where Americans were engaged with the exception of those sectors in the Vosges Mountains where divisions were sent for line experience, the quietest sectors on the Western Front.

To visit all the important points of the Western Front and especially those on which American troops were engaged, the following outlines in skeleton from the route to
Outline be followed. From Paris to Château-Thierry, through the Marne Salient to the Aisne, along the Aisne to the Chemin des Dames and Soissons, back to Château-Thierry, to Chalons-sur-Marne, to Reims, to the Champagne, to Toul, through the St. Mihiel salient to Nancy, to Verdun, through the Meuse Argonne to Sedan, and along the route of the Army of Occupation to Coblenz.

The return takes in the city of Cologne, and from there follows the route of the German invasion of Belgium, through such places as Liège, Louvain, Brussels, Namur, Mons and so on to where the American divisions in the Belgian Army fought at the time of the Armistice. From there, the route leads to Ypres, and thence down the Hindenburg Line to where the Second American Army Corps assisted the British in the taking of the canal tunnel. The next point of interest is Cantigny; and, with this seen, the trip is over, and there remain but a few miles to return to Paris.

The trip may, of course, be shortened, or other points of
Railroads interest may be added; but it is a safe rule to return to Paris and make a fresh start, rather than attempt to cross from one part of France to another. The

reason for this is that the French railroad system is laid out like the spokes of a great wheel whose hub is Paris. True, there are connecting railways, but these are so slow and uncertain that it is best to return to Paris on a fast train and take another fast train out in the other direction. For this reason, this trip is laid out to follow, for the most part, one line of railways to the Rhine, and to return on a second line to Paris.

Relatives of American soldiers killed in France, who desire to visit the graves, will find in Paris the central office of the Graves Registration Service, located at No. 8 Avenue d' Iena. Here full information may be ^{Graves} obtained regarding any particular cemetery. In the larger cemeteries, there are American caretakers; and in the smaller ones, there are French caretakers. The caretakers are equipped to furnish information to visitors and to assist them in locating graves. At the present time, the bodies of the American soldiers who fell in France, have been gathered into 600 cemeteries each adjacent to one of the great battlefields or points of American concentration in the S.O.S. There is, however, a strong feeling that it might be best to move all the graves to the three largest of these cemeteries, namely: Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, Belleau Wood, and Suresnes. The American Legion has requested this, and the Republic of France, through Marshal Petain, has offered the cemeterial sites. Several parents of deceased soldiers have requested the War Department that the bodies of their sons be returned to the United States. This the War Department has agreed to do at the expense of the government, but the feeling is strong throughout the Army, the American Legion, and among the vast majority of those who fought in France, that it would be best to have the bodies of the American soldiers rest forever in France well cared for in one or two great American Military Cemeteries on the battlefields where these gallant men made the supreme sacrifice. Mr. Ralph Hayes, Assistant Secretary of War, in his report on "American Military Dead Overseas," says:

"I do not hesitate to say that the sight of actual disinterments, however reverently made, and the vision of the Fields

of Honor have left with me the fervent hope that the proportion of parents preferring to have their sons rest overseas will be large."

Paris itself is well worthy of a long visit. In addition to the more familiar places of interest which have attracted visitors from all parts of the world, there have been created, by reason of the War, many new things to be seen. Among these, the Hôtel des Invalides, famous as the tomb of Napoleon, has gathered in its courtyard a well-selected assortment of captured German material of war. Here one may see almost every type of German cannon, aeroplane, and the German's greatest failure, their tank. Number 12 Rue St. Anne, just off the Avenue de l'Opera, has unpleasant memories for the majority of the A.E.F., for this was the headquarters of the American Military Police force in Paris; and this was the prison where unauthorized visitors to the city, when caught, received their punishment. The American headquarters for the district of Paris was at No. 12 Rue Tilsit, near the Arc de Triomphe, through which the victorious Allies marched at the conclusion of the War. There are many more places of similar interest, such as the Hôtel Crillon, Pershing's first Headquarters, and President Wilson's abode while in Paris; and, finally, the Quai D'Orsay Palais, where the Peace Treaty was written.

In the immediate vicinity of Paris is the American Military Cemetery of Suresnes in which are buried the bodies of 1,001 Americans who died in this area. The majority of these died of wounds in the big hospital center of Paris.

The battle-field nearest to Paris and one which is full of interest to every traveler, but especially to Americans, is the Marne salient. This triangle of rolling country which stretches from a line between Soissons and Reims, and extends down to the apex a few miles south of Château-Thierry, was the scene of the two great German defeats of the war: The First Battle of the Marne in 1914, and the Second Battle of the Marne in 1918. The actions of the First Battle are outlined in this chapter, while those of the Second Bat-

**The Marne
Salient**

**First and
Second
Battles**

tle are described in Chapters IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. In this latter action, or series of actions, which covered a period of 72 days of fighting, nine American Divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, 42nd, and 77th) participated as parts of various French Armies. There seldom was a time when more than three or four of these divisions were engaged in the actual battle, but from June 1, to August 4, 1918, these nine American Divisions assisted the Allies in stopping the last German Drive, and then took up with them the offensive. This was the first offensive action of any great magnitude in which American troops participated.

The route from Paris leaves the city through the suburb of Pantin and follows the road through Noisy-le-Sec, Bondy, Livry, and Clay as far as Meaux, where the road begins the gradual ascent of the Valley of **Meaux** the Marne. Meaux is memorable in being the point of extreme advance of the German Army. In 1914, Von Kluck reached Meaux and began the crossing of the river, when Maunoury attacked him on his right flank, and immediately Sir John French attacked northward, toward Meaux, with his small British Army. Von Kluck was forced to retire back of the Marne, and finally to leave the line altogether and retire towards Compeigne.

From Meaux the road follows the Marne through Trilport, St. Jean, Sammeron, La Ferte, Bussieres, Viels, to Montmirail. It was in this town on September 7, 1914, that **Montmirail** d'Esperey routed the Germans, and drove them in confusion down the valley of the Surmelin to Château-Thierry. This is the same Surmelin Valley which McAlexander, with the 38th U. S. Infantry **Surmelin** Regiment, held so gallantly on July 15, 1918.

A good road leads across country, to Château-Thierry, which name has become synonymous with the American participation in the war, although, oddly enough, **Château-Thierry** there was practically no fighting of any consequence in or about the city. The fighting all occurred on either side. The 2nd Division (Regulars & Marines) fought a bitter action in Belleau Wood in June, 1918, and the 3rd

and 28th Divisions fought a victoriously defensive action on July 15, 1918. Château-Thierry is merely the large town which lay between these two battle-fields, and its name was used to designate the area. Château-Thierry may be reached by railroad direct from Paris (Gare de l'Est).

From Château-Thierry the traveler should visit first the famous Belleau Wood battle-field. To do so, the road lead-

**Belleau
Wood**

ing southwest, along the north bank of the Marne, should be followed as far as Essomes. This was the German front line until Hill 204, on the right, was captured by the French. Turning to the right in Essomes, the road ascends the valley of the Rochetes creek through

Vaux

Monneaux to Vaux. This town lies across the main road from Château-Thierry to Paris, and its importance was very great. With great dash the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments of the 2nd Division captured this town and assisted the French in the capture of Hill 204, thereby preventing the Germans from using the road for transport.

**Lucy-le-
Bocage**

From Vaux the traveler should follow the Paris road as far as Lucy-le-Bocage, which was the front line of the Marine Brigade of the 2nd Division on June 6, 1918, when they began their memorable attack on Belleau Wood. Belleau Wood, or, as it has been renamed

**"Bois de la
Brigade
Marine"**

by the French "BOIS DE LA BRIGADE MARINE," lies northeast of Lucy. Two roads lead north from the town, one going either side of the wood, but it was necessary for the Marines to take the wood by frontal attack in order to clear the way. Beside this wood is the American Military Cemetery in which lie buried the 2,045 Americans who were killed in action in this sector. They represent the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 26th Divisions, all of which fought here, but chiefly do they represent the 2nd Division,

Bouresches

which captured the wood and the neighboring towns. From Lucy the road to Bouresches passes by the southern edge of Belleau Wood. Bouresches

Belleau

Wood was captured by the 2nd Division when Belleau Wood was taken by the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments, and the whole line was advanced to make the

towns of Belleau, Torcy, and Bussiares the front line. These towns lie farther along the road which follows down the valley of the Vingt. This completes the survey of the Belleau Wood area, and it is necessary to return to Château-Thierry, in order to see the fields of the battles which followed immediately after this action of the 2nd Division in June, 1918.

The defeat of the last German attack, or rather, the American participation in the battle which stopped the last German attack, was east of Château-Thierry, along the Marne (Chapter VIII). To see this battle-field one has merely to follow the road leading east through Château-Thierry, through the little hamlets of Blesmes, Fossoy, and Crezancy, and turn to the left in the latter towards Mezy. These tiny towns are now deeply woven into American history. It was from Mezy toward the east, that the 38th Infantry held its position along the bank of the river and prevented a single uncaptured German from setting foot on either of the two roads leading up the Surmelin valley to Montmirail. From Mezy the road follows the south bank to Varennes, where there is a bridge across the Marne to Jaulgonne. This is the famous "Jaulgonne Bend" where the 28th Division made its stand.

From Jaulgonne, the road follows the main line of retreat of the German Army after the Second Battle of the Marne. The first town is Le Charmel, which was captured by the 3rd Division on July 27, 1918. The road leads from there to Croix Rouge Farm, which the 42nd Division took on the same day. Following the road for about a mile to the north, one comes to a sharp turn to the right, which leads to Fresnes, Courmont, and Roncheres. The latter town marks the watershed between the Marne and the Ourcq, and it was seized by the 3rd Division on July 28. From here the road to Cierges marks the point of convergance of the two groups of Americans making this attack. Here the 32nd Division relieved the 3rd Division,

and continued the attack from the south. The 28th Division relieved the French Division which lay between the 3rd and the 42nd Divisions. The latter was attacking from the west. Cierges was taken by troops of all the divisions because of this converging movement. The line then moved forward, following the road to Sergy, which town was taken by elements of the 4th and 42nd Divisions, on July 28. From there the road leads to Fere-en-Tardenois, which was captured by the French on the same day. This city is famous for the battles fought near it both in 1914 and 1918. From there the road to Seringes et Nesles, the capture of which, on July 28, by the 42nd Division completed the outflanking of Fere-en-Tardenois. In Seringes et Nesles is the American Military Cemetery of the lower part of the Marne Salient. There have been gathered there the bodies of the 3,792 American soldiers who were killed in the battles in the lower Marne Salient.

From here one follows the road through the towns of Coulonges, Cohan, Dravegny, and Chery-Chartreuve, which towns formed the path of the pursuit by the 42nd and 32nd Divisions, and it was in the latter town that the 42nd Division was relieved by the 4th Division. Finally the 32nd Division pushed on and captured Fismes on the Vesle River, which completed the wiping out of the Marne Salient. Here the 28th Division relieved the 32nd, and stabilized the line. The 77th Division was then sent up and relieved the 4th Division along the Vesle. The casualties in holding this line, dominated as it was by the hills north of the Vesle, were very heavy, as is evidenced by the American Military Cemetery at Fismes, which has in it the graves of 1,712 American Soldiers.

From Fismes the road crosses the Vesle to Fismettes, which was held as the outpost line, and then turns to the left and follows the Vesle through Bazoches, Courcelles, Braine, and Sermoise to Soissons. This city was never actually captured by the Americans, but, by the swift advance of the 1st Division from July 18 to July

22, and the capture of Berzy-le-Sec, the military importance of Soissons was lost to the Germans, and the French entered the city on August 2, 1918. **Soissons**

Soissons also figured prominently in the First Battle of the Marne, for it is a rail and highway center of great importance.

From Soissons a detour should be made to the north to see the difficult terrain of the battle-field of Juvigny. The road leads through Cuiffes and Chavigny to the town, where the 32nd Division, fighting as a part **Juvigny** of Mangin's Tenth French Army, made its memorable attack in August, 1918. In the American Cemetery here are the graves of 411 Americans. Continuing north from Juvigny the road leads to Laffaux, near Vauxaillon. From this town to Fort Malmaison was the jump-off line of the 1917 attack which took for the last time the famous Chemin **Chemin** des Dames. This sector takes its name from **des Dames** the road which Louis XV built as a promenade for his daughters, and the capture of the road by the French gave them the control of the Ailette valley.

The next battlefield to be seen is perhaps the most famous of the whole war. It is the scene of Marshal Foch's surprise attack which wrested forever the initiative from **Foch's Great** the Germans. It must be borne in mind that the **Stroke** **Stroke** Germans, on July 15, 1918, had begun the final assault to cross the Marne and march on Paris. To all outward appearances, they were at the height of their power. Suddenly, however, the Allies stopped the drive, and then, on the morning of July 18, three divisions, the 1st and 2nd American and the 1st Moroccan Division, marched through the forest of Retz, and, without any preparation, struck at the German line in an assault which carried them up to the outskirts of Soissons. To see this battle-field the traveler should take the Paris-Soissons road, out of Soissons. This road traverses the plateau over which the three divisions fought their way. The first town of importance is Missy aux Bois, **Missy aux** which was captured by the left of the 1st Divi- **Bois** sion, after the most bitter fighting, on the evening of July 18. Turning sharply to the left, a road leads across the plateau

to Ploisy. Here is the American Cemetery which contains the graves of the 1,954 Americans who were killed on the field in this action. The large percentage of field and company officers tells its own grim story of the fighting and the high morale of the troops. From Ploisy a road to the right leads to Chaudun, while one to the left leads to Berzy-le-Sec, the capture of which, despite the decimated ranks of the 1st Division, forced the Germans to withdraw from the Marne Salient. Crossing the Soissons-Château-Thierry road, one comes to Buzancy, the farthest point of advance of the Americans on this front. Following up the Château-Thierry road, one comes to Tigny, which was assaulted by the 6th Marines of the 2nd Division, and marked the farther limit of this Division's advance. The road from here, up over the hill, leads to Vierzy, and the tunnel mouth, the scene of desperate fighting by the 2nd Division on July 18, 1918. From here the road goes back through the Forest of Retz, through which the three Divisions were rushed on the morning of the attack.

Once more the Paris-Soissons road is reached, and the route turns back toward the Capital. Villers Cotterets is passed, and the traveler finds himself on the famous road over which, by motor busses, taxis, and every possible means of conveyance, Gallieni sent out the Division from Paris to turn Von Kluck's right in the First Battle of the Marne. This completes the tour of the Marne Salient, covering every important battlefield, and once more, the traveler is back in Paris, ready to start on the great circle to Reims, the Champagne, St. Mihiel, the Argonne, the Army of Occupation, and returning by the German route through Belgium, over the British battlefields whereon American troops fought.

Once more the start is made from Paris along the road to Château-Thierry, but this time the traveler does not stop in the town but continues up the Marne valley until Chalons-sur-Marne is reached. This town

was the base of the line of supplies for Reims, and that famous fortress city is best approached from Chalons. Reims itself needs little introduction. Photographs of its ruined cathedral have been reproduced in every country, while the story of its four years of heroic defense, even when surrounded on three sides, has been told in every Allied country.

Eastward from Reims lies the battle-field of Champagne. On this broad plateau the activity of both sides was constant. The plateau stretches toward the east as far as the Argonne Forest, a distance of thirty-five miles. It was in the center of this plateau that the 2nd American Division was placed on October 2, 1918, to break through the center for the Fourth French Army. To see this section, the best road is the one from Reims to Suippes. From there the route follows the line of march of the 2nd Division through Souain to Somme-Py. This latter town was the jump-off line of the attack. The road continues north from Somme-Py and from it can be seen the battlefield. St. Etienne on the left marks the limit of the advance, while Medeah Farm, on the road, marks the right, but in this triangle was some of the most difficult fighting of the war, and the action of the 2nd Division here was perhaps the most brilliant action of the American Expeditionary forces. The capture of Blanc Mont, at the point of the bayonet crowned the action with victory. From this point the 36th Division went through the 2nd Division, and continued the pursuit of the fleeing Germans until the new line on the Aisne had been reached. Returning by Somme-Py, Souain, and Suippes, the traveler recrosses the most bitterly contested No-man's-land of the war. From Suippes the road leads to Chalons-sur-Marne.

Turning once more up the Marne valley, the traveler is now following the route of the concentration of the First American Army, in September, 1918, as well as following the route of the first American troops in France on their way

from the sea ports, to the training area, and finally to the front line, in the fall of 1917. From Chalons, the road follows the Marne as far as Vitry-le-François, which figured largely in the First Battle of the Marne. From here it turns to the east, through Revigny, to Bar-le-Duc, and from there the road to Commercy passes through Nançois Tronville.

It is worth while to quit the main route for a few miles to visit Ligny-en-Barrois, the headquarters of the First American Army during the St. Mihiel Attack. Between Ligny and Gondrecourt was the first training area. Here it was that the 1st Division was concentrated upon its arrival in France, and spent the bitter winter of 1917-1918 in open warfare maneuvers. Each town in the valley was the home of a battalion.

From Nançois Tronville, the road through Commercy leads to Toul. From here the Toul sector and the Field of the St. Mihiel Offensive, and that of the Second Army on the eve of the Armistice, can be best visited. The road to Menil-la-Tour, the Division Headquarters of the Toul sector, leads directly to the front. From there the road through Ansauville leads past "Dead Man's Curve" to the Beaumont, Flirey, Limy road. In the depression to the north is the Rupt de Mad. Beaumont was Infantry Regimental Headquarters, the front lines were just beyond Xivray and Seicheprey, while the Germans held Mont Sec. This was the jump-off line for the St. Mihiel offensive, on September 12, 1918. The attack was pushed in one day past Thiaucourt, Vigneulles, and Hattonchattel, and it was in the latter town that the two attacking armies, one from the south and one from the west, joined together.

The St. Mihiel offensive was brought to a close on the line stretching from Fresnes-en-Woevre, on the left, to Clemery, just north of Nancy, and this became the jump-off line of the Second American Army in their attack of November 11, 1918, the morning of the Armistice.

The 81st, 33rd, 28th, 7th, and 92nd Divisions began this attack which was to encircle Metz. The latter city is best reached by continuing from ^{Metz} Thiacourt to Pagny, and thence down the valley of the Moselle.

Returning from Metz, the ascent of the Moselle, follows the path of the attack on Nancy by the Bavarian Crown Prince in 1914, and it was on the crown, immediately outside of Nancy, that Castelneau defeated this ^{Pont-a-Mousson} attack. Pont-a-Mousson lies on the line of this attack, while directly across the river is the Bois-le-Prete, ^{Bois-le-Prete} where the fighting was very sanguinary. This wood was cleared by the 90th American Division during the St. Mihiel drive. Nancy itself is well worth a ^{Nancy} visit, for everything about the city is typical of the strength and character of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

From Nancy the road leads south to Luneville, in the Vosges Mountains, and by taking the road to Sarrelbourg as far as Reichcourt, one of the Vosges Mountain sectors may be seen. This one, however, is quite famous for it was here, on October 21, 1917, that the First ^{First Americans in the Line} American troops appeared in the battle line of the Western Front. The 1st Division lost here the first men of the A.E.F. killed in action, and, in the little town of Bathlemont are the graves of the first 12 Americans to be killed in action in France.

It is now necessary to retrace our steps through Luneville, Nancy, and Toul, as far as Commercy, where a turn to the right brings one to the town of St. Mihiel. From here the road continues down the valley of the Meuse river, to the city of Verdun.

Little can be said to give further praise to the fair name of the little garrison city of Verdun. The desperate defense of the Third French Army under Sarrail in ^{Verdun} 1914, when every effort of the German Crown Prince was turned to defeat, stands alone in the annals of the war. The city itself, however, has few points of actual interest to the traveler. It is the battlefields north, east and

west of the city which will be visited in the years to come. The forts of Duamont and Vaux and Le Cote de Morte Homme (Dead Man's Hill) as well as the many other bitterly held, lost and retaken stretches of trenches in that semi-circle four miles outside the city, form the battlefield of Verdun. This was never a quiet sector, but there were frequent and long lulls between the attacks. During these times the front was always active and the troops were kept ever on the alert.

Fifteen miles west of Verdun rises the abrupt slope of the Argonne Forest, and, on the 26th of September, 1918, the first American Army, taking the place of the Second French Army, began the long series of continued attacks down the broad valley of the Meuse to Sedan. There is no one road which will show the entire battlefield, for this one battlefield covered a front of seventy-two miles from La Harazee (in the Argonne) to Clemery (north of Nancy), and averaged fifteen miles in depth. There is one road, however, which seems to have along it more points of interest than other roads which lead through the battlefield. This road runs west from Verdun through Nixeville, Blercourt, Dombasle, Recicourt, and Parois, to Aubreville.

**Verdun
Railroad**

This road parallels the only railroad which supplied Verdun during the War. The railroad practically ran parallel to, and about four miles behind, the battle line. Frequently cut by artillery fire, it took courage of a high order to man those trains of ammunition which slipped into Verdun each night. At Aubreville the road leaves the railroad and turns north through Neuville towards the battle line. Between Neuville and Boureilles the road begins the descent of the Aire valley, while on the left rises the Argonne

**No-Mans-
Land**

Forest and plateau. Boureilles was the German front line until it was captured by the 28th Division on September 26, the first day of the Meuse-Argonne Attack. Continuing along the creek, the road leads to Varennes, and thence across the Aire to Cheppy. These two towns were the scenes of bitter fighting by the 28th and 35th Divisions, and were also captured on the first day. From here, the road runs north again and forks. The left-hand

road runs down the Aire valley through Montblainville, Baulny, Aptemont, Chehery, Fleville, St. Juvin, to Grand-Pre, and from there it goes westward following the Aire river through the gap in the Forest. This **Aire Valley to Grand-Pre** is the route principally of the attack of the 35th, and then of the 1st Divisions, but the 28th, 82nd, 77th, and 42nd Divisions also figure in the fighting in the Aire valley.

The right-hand fork of the road from Varennes leads through Charpentry to Romagne. On either side of this road lie the villages of Epinonville, Ivory, Montfaucon, Nantillois, Cierges, Gesnes, Exermont, and Sommerance. Between these three latter towns lies the most bitterly contested triangle of woods of the whole battlefield. To commemorate the taking of this small group of wooded hills General Pershing issued General Order No. 201 (Chapter XIV), citing a Division (the 1st) singly, for **The Key to the Meuse-Argonne** its gallantry in taking these hills which were held by eight German Divisions. To form a real idea of this one action, it is best to walk from Eclisfontaine (west of Epinonville) northwest to Exermont, and from there north to Arietal Farm, and from there to Sommerance. By this alone will the traveler be able to visualize to some measure the terrible fighting which was necessary to win this key position from eight entrenched German Divisions, by the 1st Regular U. S. Division, in the early days of October, 1918.

At Romagne-sous-Montfaucon there have been gathered the bodies of the majority of the men who fell, **Romagne** killed in action in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

This became, after the Armistice, the largest American Military Cemetery in France, and contains 23,061 graves. In this one cemetery alone lie one-third of the total fatal casualties of the A.E.F., **Largest American Cemetery** and one-half of the men who were killed in action are buried here.

From Romagne, the road leads to Bantheville, and from there follows the valley of the Andon through Aincreville and Dulcon, to Dun-sur-Meuse. It **Dun-sur-Meuse** was at this point that the 5th Division, on November 2, 1918,

began the famous crossing of the Meuse. Three days later they completed the crossing and established the bridgehead at Dun.

From Dun a detour may profitably be made to cover the battle-field east of the Meuse. The best road to take is that leading south out of Dun along the river as far as Liny-devant-Dun. This town was also a part of the 5th Division's bridgehead. From there the road continues along the river to Vilosnes and Liny Sivry-sur-Meuse. From there the road to Reville and Damvillers crosses the backbone of the ridge which the Germans held until just before the Armistice. From here, looking back over the Meuse valley, and remembering that the Germans held this ridge with a great strength of artillery, it can be more easily understood why the First American Army had such great difficulty in making headway down the Meuse valley. The last ridge, before reaching Damvillers, is Etrayes Ridge. Here it was that the 26th Division cleared the last of the Germans from this section, and began the descent into the valley of the Thinte and the marshy plain of the Woevre.

Returning to Dun-sur-Meuse, the road down the river leads through Mouzay to Stenay, where the 90th Division made its crossing of the Meuse. Passing over the river here, the road to Beaumont crosses the path of the 89th Division in its famous drive to the Meuse, and it was at Beaumont that the 2nd Division broke the whole system of German defense by slipping silently through the German lines during the night. It was from the Beaumont-Stonne road that the 1st and 2nd Divisions attacked abreast on November 7, 1918. This was the first time that those two famous American divisions had been side by side in an assault. In a few hours they had cleared the south bank of the Meuse, and then it was that the 1st Division was ordered to take Sedan. During the night, one of the columns marched

down the road through Beaumont, Yoncq, Autrecourt, Villers, Remilly, and had passed beyond Wadelincourt and were ready to assault Sedan, when the order was given ^{Autrecourt} to allow the French to take the city. During that ^{Wadelin-} long march, the 1st Division had cut across the front of the 77th and 42nd American Divisions, which were attacking to reach the Meuse just east of Sedan. This ^{Sedan} city, so famous in the war of 1870, was occupied by the French on the eve of the Armistice.

This completes the tour of the Meuse Argonne battlefield, on which the American Army fought the greatest engagement, or series of engagements, in the history of our country. From here the tour, as outlined, includes a visit to the Army of Occupation in Germany, but, if it is desired to shorten the itinerary, the traveler can proceed to Mezieres and from there the entry into Belgium is easy; or else one may return to Paris.

From Sedan, either by rail or motor, the route through Montmedy and Longuyon to Luxembourg follows that of the American Army of Occupation on its long ^{Luxembourg} march to the Rhine. After leaving Luxembourg, the route follows down the narrow valley of the Moselle through Trier to the city of Coblenz. This was ^{Trier} the headquarters of the Third American Army, ^{Coblenz} better known as the Army of Occupation, and later known as the American Forces in Germany. The 1st, 2nd, and 32nd Divisions crossed the Rhine at this point and established a bridgehead forming a semicircle 30 miles in radius. Supporting these divisions were the 3rd, 4th and 42nd Divisions along the Rhine, while, in reserve, the 89th and 90th Divisions garrisoned the Moselle valley. Behind these the 5th, 7th and 28th Divisions formed the garrison of the lines of communication.

From Coblenz, a steamer descends the Rhine to Cologne, which was the Headquarters of the British Bridgehead. From this city the route is so laid out as to follow ^{Cologne} the line of march of Von Kluck's First Army, and Von Bülow's Second Army through Belgium in August,

1914. This was the northern group of Armies which was sent through Belgium in order to divert the French from the main attack which was planned for Verdun. The

Liege route passes through Liege, where one of the first battles of the war was fought. It was here that Belgium demonstrated to the world that Germany's way would be contested to the end. From there the road to

Louvain Louvain brings the traveler to the scene of the most wanton pillage of the war. From here the road leads to Brussels, the capital of Belgium, which the

Brussels Germans occupied without resistance from the city itself. Brussels was recaptured by the Belgian Army on the Armistice. From Brussels a short journey

Namur brings one to Namur, which fortified city held up the Germans until the 42 Centimeter Austrian Skodas were brought up to reduce the defenses. From

Mons Namur the road leads to Mons, famous forevermore in the history of the British Army. It was here in August, 1914, that Sir John French, with the six hastily gathered Divisions of British Regulars, met the Germans for the first time. And, oddly enough, on the morning of November 11, 1918, the British Army, after four years of furious fighting found itself once more in Mons, and, as its final act in the war, captured the city. The story of the "Angel of Mons," which, according to tradition, appeared to the Tommies in 1914, when they entered the war, gave rise to the belief in the ranks that the war would not be over until Mons was recaptured by the British. Like many of the odd legends

Valenciennes of the war, it was borne out by the fulfillment. From Mons the road leads to Valenciennes, which city lay for four years within the German lines. From here

Courtrai the road lies north through Courtrai, on the Lys river, to Gand. It was from this road that the 37th and 91st American Divisions attacked on October 31, 1918, and the attack was pushed southeast across the divide between the Lys and the Scheldt toward the city of Audenard, where, on November 11, the assault was halted.

From Courtrai the road to Ypres brings the traveler to

the scene of the British Army's desperate stand against repeated furious German attacks. Here the British clung despite everything, for four years. **Ypres**

From Ypres the tour of the British Front zig-zags southward through cities and towns famous through their misfortune in lying in one of the hottest battlefields of the war.

Armentieres, Lille, La Bassée, Bethune, Lens, is the route which covers the quietest portion of this front. Then the traveler finds before him the city of Arras, which is surrounded by a wealth of famous places. From Arras the road to Cambrai, and thence to Baupaume, Albert, and Amiens covers the desolate Somme valley, the scene of one of the greatest battles of the war. Here, the 27th and 30th American Divisions assaulted the Hindenburg Line. **Lens**
Arras
Cambrai
Amiens

From Amiens the road to Montdidier, brings the traveler along the line of the German advance of 1918, to Cantigny, where the 1st American Division, on May 27, 1918, delivered the first American attack of the war. **Montdidier**
Cantigny

From there, the road leads through Compeigne and thence, back to Paris. Every famous battlefield, save that of the French attack in Alsace in 1914, has been covered. The trenches, which survived the final leveling bombardment, will soon be leveled by nature or the tiller's plow. The cities may be rebuilt, but there will forever remain on these fields the memories of those bitter struggles which finally brought victory to the Allied Arms. **Paris**

INDEX

Abainville, 438
 Abaucourt, 366
 Abbatial Farm, 297
 Abbeville, 78, 108
 Adams, Colonel F. L., 122
 Aignay-le-Duc, 187
 Aincreville, 330, 335
 Air Service, 385
 Air Service, Pursuit Squadrons, 94th
 and 103rd, 387
 Air Service, Squadron, 90th, 389
 Air Service, Squadron, 91st, 388
 Air Service, Squadrons, 1st, 8th,
 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 20th,
 22nd, 24th, 25th, 27th, 28th,
 35th, 41st, 49th, 50th, 88th,
 90th, 91st, 93rd, 94th, 95th,
 96th, 99th, 100th, 103rd, 104th,
 135th, 138th, 139th, 141st, 147th,
 148th, 155th, 163rd, 166th,
 168th, 185th, 186th, 213th,
 258th, 278th, 354th, 393rd, 638th.
 Air Squadron, 3rd Australian, 268
 Aire River, 240, 246, 249, 253, 290,
 297, 302, 305, 336.
 Aisne Defensive, 83
 Aisne-Marne Offensive, 83
 Aisne River, 134, 143, 146, 163, 197,
 237, 284-286, 295, 302, 316, 336.
 Albert 109
 Albert, King of the Belgians, 309
 Alexander, General R., 198, 239,
 326, 339, 362, 469, 486
 Allen, General H. T., 187, 192, 204,
 329, 338, 361, 476
 Allenby, General, 228
 Alliepont, 339
 Alsace, 188
 American Ambulance, 430
 American Sector, 190
 American Surgical Dressings Asso-
 ciation, 431
 American University, 40
 American Zone, 48, 203
 American Zone of Operations, 191
 Amiens, 67, 85, 102, 108, 185, 192,
 275

Ancervilles, 62
 Ancy-le-Franc, 286
 Andon River, 320, 330, 335
 Andrews, General A. D., 35
 Antwerp, 400
 Apremont, 190, 206, 253, 290, 292
 Arbre de Guise, 274
 Arches, 79
 Ardennes Canal, 284
 Ardennes Mountains, 230, 232
 Argonne Forest, 127, 198, 203, 229,
 234, 236, 241, 253, 257, 261,
 276-278, 284, 295, 297, 301, 304,
 308, 319, 326, 330, 333, 335,
 346, 362
 Arietal Farm, 301, 305
 Ariti-aircraft Batteries, 384
 Armentieres, 288
ARMIES
AMERICAN
 1st, 186, 192, 198, 200, 208, 217,
 227, 232, 234, 237, 240, 242,
 256, 260, 276, 284, 288, 292,
 295, 308, 311, 319, 322, 328-330,
 332, 334-336, 338, 346, 359, 362,
 364, 367, 382, 398, 410, 433
 2nd, 320, 346, 362-364, 364-367,
 369, 433
 3rd, 372, 433
BELGIAN,
 1st, 230
BRITISH,
 1st, 229, 266, 268
 2nd, 194, 230
 3rd, 229, 266, 268
 4th, 264, 266, 269, 273, 396
FRENCH,
 1st, 230, 266
 4th, 105, 127, 228, 235, 237, 247,
 258, 264, 276, 283, 287, 291,
 295, 302, 304, 311, 316, 336,
 354, 387
 5th, 105, 118
 6th, 118, 183, 369
 8th, 192, 364
 10th, 103, 134, 139, 195, 363, 367

ARMY CORPS**AMERICAN**

1st, 48, 119, 148, 171, 176, 183,
192, 198, 199, 209, 218, 220,
222, 239, 320, 362, 387

2nd, 203, 266, 268-271, 275, 396

3rd, 144, 171, 181, 183, 197, 239,
320, 362, 372, 387

4th, 178, 192, 198, 209, 215, 218,
222-224, 241, 311, 320, 364,
372

5th, 182, 198, 209, 218, 224, 226,
239, 319, 327

6th, 354, 364

7th, 372

BRITISH,

2nd, 110

3rd, 266

9th, 266

13th, 274

AUSTRALIAN,

1st, 266

FRENCH,

7th, 61, 148, 173

11th, 60, 278, 284

17th, 241, 309, 311, 316, 364

20th, 139

21st, 92, 105, 129

24th, 278

30th, 369

33rd, 201

38th, 90

FRENCH COLONIAL,

2nd, 209, 241, 364

Army of Occupation, 372, 400

Arras, 108, 234

Attiguy, 285

Audenaerde, 370

Austin, Mrs. C. J., 431

Authe, 346

Autrecourt, 351

Baalon, 360

Bacarat, 61, 65, 72, 182

Bacarat, Sector, 104

Bacon, Colonel R., 430

Badonviller, 62

Bailey, General C. J., 202, 364, 473

Ballou, General, 110, 364, 479

Ballon Section, 385

Ballon Service, 391

Baltic, S. S., 27

Bamford, General, 169, 319, 331,
360, 452, 459

Bantheville, 327, 329

Bantouzelle, 267

Bapaume, 67, 85

Bar-le-Duc, 42

Barricourt, 338

Bar River, 347

Barry, General, T. H., 490

Bar-sur-Aube, 61, 78, 188

Barth, General C. H., 202

Barth, General C. J., 473

Bartlett, General, 380

Bassens, 436

Baulny, 249

Bayonville, 339

BeaCLAIRE, 344

Beaufort, 347

Beaumont, 57, 212, 309, 335, 344,
348, 350, 353, 358

Beaunne, 40

Beaurevoir, 268

Beauvais, 68, 103, 139

Beffu, 342

Belfort, 230

Bell, General G., Jr., 108, 239, 308,
330, 364, 464

Belleau, 88, 92, 127, 148

Belleau Wood, 82, 84, 87, 92, 95,
102, 106, 117, 135, 144, 148,
172, 184

Belleau Wood, Sector, 103

Bellicourt, 267, 269

Bellinglise, 267

Belval, 344

Beney, 222

Benson, Admiral, 51, 442

Berzy-le-Sec, 164, 166

Bethmann-Hollweg, 53

Billets, 43

Binarville, 258, 261, 288, 292, 298,
302, 305

Bjornstad, General, 38

Blanc Mont, 276-278, 280, 282, 295,
302, 327

Blenod-les-Toul, 189

Bliss, General T. H., 51, 442

Blocksom, General A. P., 483

Blondelat, General, 209

Bohain, 272

Bois Banal, 62

Bois Bouleau, 253

Bois Communal de la Woivre, 62

Bois d'Emont, 252, 255

Bois d'Ormont, 358

Bois de Babiement, 338

Bois de Bantheville, 327, 329

Bois de Barricourt, 338

Bois de Baulny, 253, 292
 Bois de Belleu, 331
 Bois de Belval, 344, 346, 348
 Bois de Beuge, 249, 252, 255, 292
 Bois de Bonseil, 368
 Bois de Bourgogne, 408
 Bois de Boyon, 301
 Bois de Brioules, 248, 255
 Bois de Chatelet, 173
 Bois de Chatillon, 357
 Bois de Cheminot, 367
 Bois de Cheppy, 246
 Bois de Cierges, 252, 255, 292
 Bois de Clairs Chenes, 328
 Bois-de-Clerembanta, 93
 Boise de Condé, 126
 Boise de Consevoie, 310
 Bois de Corteau, 93
 Bois de Cuisy, 245
 Boise de Cunel, 300, 312
 Bois de Dombras, 360
 Bois de Dommartin, 366
 Bois de Fays, 295, 299, 302
 Bois de Forêt, 315, 317, 322
 Bois de Four, 347
 Bois de Gerache, 347
 Boise de Grande Fontaine, 365
 Bois de Harville, 366
 Bois de Hazois, 338
 Boise de la Brigade de Marne, 96, 127
 Bois-de-la-Marette, 93
 Bois de la Morine, 296, 300
 Bois de la Pultiere, 323, 326
 Bois-de-la-Roche, 95
 Bois de Loges, 341
 Bois de Manheulles, 367
 Bois de Moncy, 301, 303, 314
 Bois de Montfaucon, 246
 Bois de Montrebeau, 253, 256, 260, 296
 Boise de Mort Mare, 222
 Bois de Naza, 258, 261, 302
 Bois de Nonsard, 215, 225
 Bois de Romagne, 312, 317
 Bois de Septsarges, 245
 Boise de Somme Py, 278
 Boise de Sonnard, 223
 Bois de Sty, 347, 350
 Bois de Taille l'Abbé, 306
 Bois de Thiacourt, 215
 Bois de Very, 246
 Bois de Villeres, 219
 Boise des Epinettes, 252
 Boise des Estrayes, 331
 Boise des Gesnes, 314, 324

Bois des Haies, 62
 Boise des Ogons, 255, 295, 299, 300, 302, 321
 Bois des Rappes, 219, 323, 325, 327
 Bois des Chaume, 312
 Bois-du-Chene-Sec, 300, 302
 Bois-du-Loup, 92
 Bois du Mont, 341
 Bois Frehaut, 367
 Boise l'Eveque, 69
 Bois la Dame, 344
 Bois-le-Prete, 189, 206, 219
 Bois Voivrette, 367
 Bony, 269, 271
 Bordeaux, 50, 109, 187, 192, 424, 437
 Bouconville, 57, 212
 Boulogne (S. M.), 28
 Bouresches, 88, 92-95, 102, 127
 Bourges, 35, 50
 Bourmont, 110
 Bourmont (Haute Marne), 46
 Bovington, 395
 Brabant, 309
 Bradley, General A. E., 431
 Brancourt, 272
 Brandeville, 358
 Brecquigny, 272
 Breheville, 359
 Brest, 46, 50, 108-111, 372, 424, 437
 Brie, 360
 Brioul, 158
 Brioules, 237, 290, 292, 295, 302, 308, 310-312, 317, 322, 328, 330, 356
 Brioules-ser-Bar, 347
 Brioules-sur-Meuse, 248, 251
 Briey, 208, 232, 363, 365

BRIGADES

ARTILLERY,

1st, 53, 57, 59, 192, 352
 2nd, 46, 283, 338
 4th, 173, 329
 6th, 202
 8th, 372
 26th, 60
 53rd, 105
 55th, 252, 303
 66th, 47
 67th, 338
 90th, 187, 192
 91st, 187
 152nd, 320

BRIGADES

ARTILLERY

- 153rd, 219
- 155th, 329
- 158th, 111
- Briquenay, 342
- Brittany, 108
- Brown, General P., 327, 454
- Bruges, 332
- Brussels, 230, 370
- Buck, General B. B., 166, 169, 178, 209, 260, 327, 454, 483
- Bullard, General R. L., 57, 144, 171, 181, 239, 320, 362, 452
- Bulson, 351
- Bundy, General O., 46, 87, 94, 144, 453
- Burnham, General, 209, 302, 474
- Busigny, 272
- Bussiares, 88, 92, 127
- Butgneville, 367
- Buzancy, 168, 236, 341
- Byng, General, 229
- Calais, 79, 108-110
- Cambrai, 54, 67, 185, 230, 266, 272, 316, 394
- Cameron, General G. H., 79, 106, 182, 209, 239, 320, 328, 455
- Camp de Chalons, 106
- Camp de Souge, 79, 106, 173
- Camp Meucon, 111
- Cantigny, 70-73, 75-78, 87, 98, 101, 135, 139, 327
- Cantigny, Sector, 103
- Carey, General Sanderson, 73
- Castner, General, 325
- Cavalry, French, 154, 180
- Chalons, 131
- Châlons-sur-Marne, 105, 127, 277
- Chamberlaine, General W., 380
- Chamblay, 365
- Champagne, 83, 105, 114, 117, 127, 137, 206, 231, 234, 237, 244, 247, 277, 286, 288, 428
- Champagne-Marne Defensive, 82
- Champagne (plateau), 97
- Champigneulle, 237, 320, 336, 339, 342
- Champilite, 201
- Champillon, 92
- Charey, 366
- Charleveux, 298
- Charpentry, 249
- Châteaureux, 50, 406
- Château-Salins, 363
- Château-Thierry, 82, 84, 87-92, 95, 97, 102, 106, 114, 116, 119, 123, 127, 132, 134, 143, 162, 171, 173, 387, 428
- Château Villain, 79, 87, 202
- Chatel Chehery, 253, 297, 303, 305, 307, 311
- Chatillon, 274
- Chaudron Farm, 253, 256, 260
- Chaudron Farm (Argonne), 292
- Chaudun, 146, 158
- Chaumont, 48, 79, 400, 405, 432
- Chaumont-devant-Damvillers, 360
- Chaumont-en-Vixen, 68, 72, 87, 91
- Chaumont (Haute Marne), 35
- Chazelle, 162
- Chemical Warfare Service, 401, 405
- Chemin des Dames, 41, 54, 60, 82, 86, 97, 196, 218
- Chennery, 339
- Cheppy, 246, 260
- Chery-Chartreuve, 180
- Chevenges, 353
- Chevieres, 315
- Chevillion, 173
- Chezy, 124
- Chiers River, 361
- Chipilly Ridge, 193
- Cierges, 177, 179, 252, 292
- Clemenceau, 55, 95
- Clement, General C. M., 460
- Clemency, 209
- Clemery, 236, 319, 350, 352, 362
- Clermont-Ferrand, 187, 201, 391
- Clery-le-Grand, 330, 335
- Clery-le-Petit, 330, 335, 341, 357
- Coast Artillery Corps, 378
- Coblentz, 373
- Coe, General, 380
- Cole, General E., 148, 486
- College, General Staff, 33
- Colmar, 78
- Cologne, 234
- Colombey-les-Belles, 392
- Compeigne, 86
- Compeigne, Forest, 97
- Condé-au-Brie, 123
- Condé-les-Autry, 288
- Conflans, 363, 365
- Conflans, en Jarny, 382
- Conner, General F., 35
- Connesse, 79
- Consevoie, 309
- Cornay, 311, 314
- Cornay-Chatel-Chehery Road, 305
- Côte de Chatillon, 323-326

Cote de Maldah, 312
 Cote-de-Moirmont, 361
 Coulter, General R., 486
 Courehamps, 387
 Courmont, 179
 Courtemont-Varennas, 124
 Coutrai, 369
 Craonne, 53
 Crepion, 331
 Crezancy, 126
 Crise River, 156, 160, 163, 167
 Crogis, 93
 Croix Rouge Farm, 175
 Cronkhite, General, 109, 239, 251, 317, 339, 350, 472
 Crouttes, 106
 Cruyshautern, 370
 Cuirassiers, 154
 Cunel, 295, 315, 317, 321, 323, 325
 Cutry, 146

 Dammartin, 106, 139
 Dammartin en Goele, 103
 Damvillers, 346, 358, 360
 Dannevoux, 245, 311
 Dead Mans Hill, 236
 Debeney, General, 230
 De Galbert, 79
 Degoutte, General, 183, 369
 Derby, Lord, 27
 d'Esperey, General Franchet, 228
 Dickebush, 187, 194
 Dickman, General Joseph T., 79, 88, 115, 178, 192, 209, 241, 320, 372, 454, 489

DIVISIONS

—Combat, 43, 450

1st, 29, 38, 44, 45-48, 51, 53, 56, 59, 65, 68-70, 72, 78, 82, 87, 98, 100-103, 106, 112, 134, 139, 144, 146, 148, 151, 154, 157, 161, 163, 166, 168, 183, 187, 189-192, 198, 203, 209, 213, 215, 221, 223-225, 241, 258, 261, 290-292, 294, 296, 300, 303, 305, 307, 310, 312, 315, 317, 319, 323, 327, 331, 342, 344, 350, 352, 372-374, 395, 445, 451
 2nd, 48, 64, 72, 79, 82, 87, 91-93, 95, 102, 106, 134, 139, 144-148, 152, 154-156, 158, 162, 183, 190-192, 199, 203, 209, 218, 220-222, 258, 264, 276-278, 280, 282-284, 288, 291, 295, 302, 304, 327,

330, 334, 338, 341, 344, 347, 350, 354, 360, 373, 439, 453
 3rd, 79, 82, 87-92, 94, 102, 105, 114, 116, 113, 122, 127, 134, 171, 173-176, 178, 183, 199, 203, 209, 216, 223, 241, 258, 260, 290, 294, 296, 300, 303, 305, 310, 312, 315, 317, 320, 322-324, 327-330, 342, 372, 454
 4th, 60, 79, 83, 105, 171, 173, 179, 182, 199, 203, 209, 226, 239, 245, 248, 251, 255, 290, 294, 299, 303, 305, 310, 312, 315, 317, 320, 322, 324, 328, 362-364, 372, 455
 5th, 78, 80, 199, 203, 209, 219, 222, 264, 317, 323-325, 327, 329, 334, 336, 341, 346, 356, 361, 372, 456
 6th, 202, 264, 333, 456
 7th, 220, 286, 333, 362-367, 369, 457
 8th, 371, 481
 26th, 46, 48, 60, 65, 69, 72, 79, 83, 95, 103, 106, 117, 119, 124, 127, 134, 148, 171-176, 183, 200, 203, 209, 216, 224, 241, 312, 330, 334, 356, 359, 364, 458
 27th, 187, 194, 203, 264-266, 268-271, 273-276, 333, 459
 28th, 79, 82, 105, 114, 123-127, 134, 171, 175, 178, 181, 183, 197, 203, 238, 246, 249, 253, 257, 262, 290, 294, 297, 301, 304, 306, 310, 320, 362-366, 368, 372, 460
 29th, 111, 202, 241, 309, 314, 316, 331, 461
 30th, 110, 194, 203, 264-276, 333, 462
 31st, 371, 482
 32nd, 66, 72, 79, 83, 171, 178-183, 195, 203, 241, 258, 260, 290, 294, 296, 300, 303, 305, 310, 312, 315, 317, 322-327, 359-361, 372, 463
 33rd, 108, 192, 200, 203, 226, 238, 245, 248, 251, 255, 290, 294, 309, 314, 316, 330, 362-367, 372, 464
 34th, 333, 482
 35th, 78, 80, 202, 226, 239, 246, 249, 252, 256, 258, 291, 362-364, 465
 36th, 187, 203, 264, 276, 278, 282-285, 296, 304, 316, 333, 466

DIVISIONS

—Combat, 43, 450

37th, 202, 222, 239, 246, 248, 252,
255, 260, 296, 369, 467

38th, 332, 483

39th, 286, 484

40th, 202, 485

41st, 48, 485

42nd, 46-48, 61, 64, 72, 79, 83,
104, 106 114, 123, 127, 131, 134,
171, 176-180, 183, 200, 203, 209,
221-224, 241, 317, 322-327, 330,
338, 342, 350, 352-354, 372, 395,
468

76th, 188, 487

77th, 72, 79, 83, 103, 182, 197, 203,
239, 246, 249, 255, 257, 261,
290, 294, 298, 301, 304, 306,
315, 320, 322, 325, 330, 334,
339, 341, 346, 350, 352-354, 362,
46978th, 108, 200, 203, 209, 219, 222,
241, 326, 330, 334, 339, 342,
346, 350, 408, 47079th, 200, 203, 239, 245, 248, 251,
255, 260, 332, 334, 356-359, 361,
372, 47180th, 109, 200, 203, 226, 239, 248,
251, 255, 290, 294, 299, 303,
305, 310, 312, 315, 334, 339, 341,
344, 348, 350, 47281st, 201, 264, 362, 364-367,
47382nd, 107, 191, 198, 200, 203, 209,
218, 241, 262 302, 304, 307, 310,
314, 322-325, 363, 474

83rd, 111, 487

84th, 287, 488

85th, 201, 489

86th, 333, 490

87th, 287, 491

88th, 286, 333, 363, 475

89th, 188, 192, 198, 200, 203, 209,
222, 241, 327, 329, 334, 339,
341, 344, 346, 350, 352, 354,
360-362, 372, 47590th, 187, 191, 198, 200, 203, 209,
218-220, 222, 226, 241, 329, 334,
336, 338, 341, 346, 354, 359-
361, 372, 47691st, 187, 200, 203, 238, 246, 249,
252, 256, 261, 296, 304, 310,
312, 314, 317, 369, 47892nd, 110, 202, 241, 362-364, 367,
369, 479

93rd, 480

DIVISIONS

BRITISH

1st, 275

6th, 272, 275

18th, 267

25th, 274

33rd, 110

34th, 109

39th, 72

46th, 269

49th, 110

75th, 267.

AUSTRALIAN

3rd, 5th, 267, 271

IRISH

16th, 109

SCOTTISH

15th, 168

FRENCH

1st, 254

2nd (Cavalry, dismounted), 209

10th (Colonial), 354, 364-366

13th, 127

14th, 61

15th (Colonial), 209, 224, 356,
360

18th, 309, 316

21st, 28, 278, 280

22nd, 282

26th, 209, 309, 316

38th, 287

39th, 90, 92, 116, 119, 124, 175,
178, 209, 216, 223

41st, 61

58th, 162

61st, 104, 277

73rd, 284

125th, 90, 116, 119

127th, 195

128th, 61, 65

152nd, 103

153rd, 146, 155, 161

164th, 61, 106

166th, 103

167th, 48, 92, 94, 119, 148, 176

170th, 127, 278

MOROCCAN

83rd, 135, 139, 146, 148, 157, 161,
164, 168, 196

Dixmude, 230

Donmartin, 225

Dormans, 89, 97, 117

Douai, 332

Doulcon, 341

Doyen, General C. A., 46, 453

Dumas, General, 28

- Duncan, General G. B., 57, 72, 103,
 182, 198, 364, 469, 474
 Dun-sur-Meuse, 341, 346, 356, 389
 Dupont, General, 28
 Dutail, General, 29

 Eclisfontaine, 249
 Ecurey, 359
 Edwards, General C. R., 46, 127, 175,
 209, 330, 459
 Eix, 365
 Elieux Forest, 62
 Ely, General Hausen E., 74, 76, 327,
 329, 336, 361, 456
 Engineers, 435
 Éperlecques, 110
 Épernay, 132
 Epieds, 172, 174
 Epinonville, 246, 249, 252
 Equipment, 45
 Erwin, General J. B., 202, 257
 Escaufort, 273
 Esnes, 236, 248
 "Essen" Trench, 278, 280
 Essey, 222, 395
 Essomes, 91
 Essomes-sur-Marne, 88
 Estrayes, 335, 354
 Etain, 360
 Etraye, 358, 360
 Etricourt, 269
 Eu, 109
 Exermont, 253, 256, 291, 300
 Exermont Ravine, 253
 Exmorieux Farm, 253
 Expeditionary Brigade, C. A. C.,
 380

 Farnsworth, General O. S., 110, 239,
 257, 369
 Fay-en-Hay, 206
 Fere-en-Tardenois, 173, 177, 179
 Fere, Forest of, 175, 177
 Field Signal Battalion, 308th, 111
 Fiske, General H. B., 36
 Fismes, 180
 Fismette, 180
 Flabas, 335, 358
 Flanders, 53, 208, 230, 428
 Fleville, 297, 301, 305, 308, 311,
 314
 Fliry, 57, 206, 212, 222
 Foch, Marshal, 29, 67, 83, 86, 100,
 114, 132, 134, 137, 185, 227,
 230, 266, 362, 365

 Foltz, General F. S., 187 478
 Fond de Ville aux Bois, 299
 Fonsomme, 268
 Foreign Legion, 135, 146
 Forest Farm, 285
 Forges, 305
 Fort du Camp des Romans, 206
 Fosse, 341
 Fossoy, 120, 124, 126
 Fouche-Trampot, 111
 Fourth Army (French), 83
 Fowke, General, 28
 Frapelle, 199
 French, General F. H., 482
 French, General Lord, 27
 Fresnes-en-Woevre, 226, 320, 362,
 365
 Fuchs, General, 209

 Gellibrand, General, 271
 G. H. Q., A. E. F., 35, 431
 General Order, No. 201, 318
 General Order No. 203, 376
 Gerardmer, 79, 202
 German Crown Prince, 236
 Germont, 346
 Gesnes, 236, 300, 302
 Gesnes brook, 253
 Gesnes Creek, 256, 291, 296
 Ghent, 232, 369
 Giberey, 360
 Gievres, 202, 407, 413, 437, 444
 Gironde, 424
 Givet, 232
 Givry, 284
 Gleaves, Admiral, 41
 Glenn, General E. F., 111, 488
 Gondrecourt, 53, 438
 Gondrecourt (Meuse), 42
 Gonzeaucourt, 230
 Gordon, General W. P., 457
 Gouraud, General, 83, 105, 128, 131,
 137, 228, 264, 276, 283, 302
 Grand-Pré, 237, 302, 307, 310, 315,
 322, 326, 30, 336
 Graves, General G., 481
 Greble, General St. J. E., 466
 Greene, General H. A., 478
 Gressaire Wood, 193
 Grimancourt, 366
 Grimpettes Wood, 179
 Grissinger, Colonel J. W., 433

 Haan, General, 66, 182, 196, 260,
 327, 361, 463
 Hagen Stellung, 236

- Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, 28, 67, 267, 276
 Hall, General H. C., 488
 Hamel, 109, 193
 Harbord, General, 35, 94, 157, 190, 453
 Harricourt, 342
 Hattonchattel, 216, 225
 Haut, Alsace, 72
 Hautecourt, 367
 Hautevesnes, 173
 Hauts de Meuse, 204
 Hay, General W. H., 311, 364, 368, 460
 Hayden, General J. L., 482
 Hazelrouk, 108
 Heudicourt, 216
 Hersey, General, 364
 Hertling, Chancellor, 131
 Hill 142, 92, 94
 Hill 180, 305
 Hill 182, 320
 Hill 184, 178
 Hill 190, 148, 176
 Hill 204, 88, 91, 95, 297
 Hill 223, 306
 Hill 230, 179
 Hill 240, 301
 Hill 244, 306
 Hill 258, 324
 Hill 262, 357
 Hill 263, 312
 Hill 268, 252
 Hill 269, 303, 308, 314
 Hill 274, 252
 Hill 299, 317, 328
 Hill 304, 236
 Hill 378, 357
 Hindenburg Line, 54, 208, 218, 220-224, 227, 230, 232, 236, 244, 266-268
 Hines, General, 169, 182, 209, 239, 320, 328, 455
 Hodges, General H. C., 484
 Hodges, General H. F., 188, 487
 Holbrook, General, 169
 Holmick, General E. A., 481
 Horne, General, 229
 Hotel Crillon, 29
 House, Colonel E. M., 51, 442
 Huppy, 108
 Hutton, Colonel P. C., 433
 Imecourt, 339
 Inor, 350, 361
 Ireland, General M. W., 432
 Irwin, General G. L., 486
 Is-sur-Tille, 413, 437, 444
 Ivoir, 246, 249, 252
 Jametz, 360
 Jaulgonne, 89, 114, 116, 119, 124, 171, 173
 Jervay, General H., 486
 Joffre, Marshal, 29, 42
 Johnson, General J. A., 483
 Johnston, General W. H., 187, 239, 369, 477
 Joinville, 196, 395
 Jones, Colonel P. L., 430
 Judson, General W. V., 483
 Juvigny, 195
 Kelton, Colonel, R. H. C., 122, 131
 Kennedy, General C. W., 201, 470, 489
 Kennon, General L. W. V., 490
 Kerensky, 53
 Kernan, General F. J., 482
 King George V, 27
 Kriemhilde Stellung, 237, 260, 284, 290, 294, 301, 311, 322, 325, 330, 336, 359
 Kuhn, General J. E., 201, 239, 257, 332, 361, 471
 "Lafayette Escadrille," 387
 "Lafayette Squadron," 387
 La-Fere, 230, 232
 La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 106
 La Forge, 302, 305
 La Forge Farm, 344
 La Guerche, 202
 La Harazée, 236, 319
 Lamarch, 223
 Lancon, 314
 Landres-St. Georges, 237, 322-324, 326, 330, 336, 338, 389
 Landreville, 339
 Laneuville, 347
 Langfitt, General W. C., 439
 Langres, 395
 Langres (Haute Marne), 37
 La Berliere, 347
 La Courtine, 108
 La Fauche, 47
 Lankhof Farm, 194
 La Pallice, 50
 La Petite Lissey, 359
 La Rochelle, 424
 La Tuilerie Farm, 326
 La Viergette, 306
 Lecatelet, 271

- Le Charmel**, 173, 175
Lechelle, 157
Le Chene Tendu, 253, 297, 302, 306
Le Chesne, 346
Legge, Captain, B. R., 169
Le Grand Carriere Farm, 336
Le Havre, 380, 400
Le Jeune, General, 190, 209, 277, 280, 283, 338, 361, 453
Le Mans, 111, 287, 333, 371
Leinhan, General, 326
Lens, 409
Les Clairs-Chenes, 358
Les Eparges, 206, 208, 224
Les Petites Armoises, 347
Lewis, General E. M., 194, 266, 462, 483
Liège, 233, 362
Liggett, General H., 47, 171, 175, 192, 209, 239, 320, 362, 486
Ligny-devant-Dun, 357
Ligny-en-Barrois, 198
Lille, 232, 332
Limey, 57, 189, 206, 209, 212
Lion-devant-Dun, 358
Lissey, 359
Liverpool, England, 27, 46, 187, 380, 411
Logan, Colonel J. A., 35
Loire, River, 41, 201, 436
London, 400
Longuyon, 364, 389
Lorraine, 55
"Lost Battalion," the, 261, 298, 301, 304, 307, 399
Louppy, 360
Lovejoy, Lieutenant, 118
Lucy-le-Bocage, 92
Ludendorf, 228
Lunêville, 61
Luxembourg, 372, 437
Lyon, General L. S., 482
Lys River, 369

Mabee, Colonel, 170
MacArthur, General D., 326, 354
Machine Gun Battalion, 1st, 158
Machine-Gun Battalion, 7th, 88-90
Machine-Gun Battalion, 9th, 90
Machine Gun Battalion, 11th, 173
Machine Gun Battalion, 101st, 175
Madeleine Farm, 252, 295, 300, 302, 310, 312
Mailly le Camp, 380
Malancourt, 236, 248, 329

Mangin, General, 134, 139, 154, 163, 195, 363
Manheulles, 226
Mann, General W. A., 47, 468
Marbach, 190, 218
Marcheville, 366
Marcq, 315
Mareuil-en-Dole, 180
Marine Brigade (4th), 46, 96
Marine Corps, 90
Marines, 84
Marne, 177
Marne, First Battle, 501
Marne River, 79, 82, 86-92, 97, 103-106, 112, 114-116, 124, 127, 132, 134, 137, 144, 148, 171, 173, 198, 200, 219, 221, 409.
Marne Salient, 82, 84, 106, 111, 181, 207
Marne, Second Battle of, 82, 125
Martin, General C. H., 490
Marvaux, 288
Marvoisin, 59
Mazingheim, 274
McAlexander, General U. G., 121, 126, 219, 477
McAndrew, General, 36
McCaw, Colonel W. D., 432, 434
McMahon, General J. E., 78, 209, 317, 325, 327
McMann, General J. E., 456, 486
McRae, General J. H., 108, 209, 326, 339, 350, 470
Meaux, 79, 88, 91, 106, 139
Medeah Farm, 278
Mehun, 444
Menohor, General C. T., 47, 104, 127, 180, 209, 317, 354, 364, 468
Merviller, 62
Messines Ridges, 53
Mesyes, 437
Metz, 206, 208, 215, 226, 232, 234, 242, 360, 362, 383, 388
Metz-Mézières, Hirson-Valenciennes R. R., 273
Metz-Sablons, 389
Meuse-Argonne, 383, 388, 395, 408-410, 433
Meuse-Argonne Battlefield, 236
Meuse River, 204, 208, 229, 234, 236, 248, 295, 302, 305, 308, 311, 315, 319, 320, 322, 328, 330, 332-336, 342, 346, 350, 353, 356, 360, 367, 408, 439
Mezieres, 231
Mezy, 119, 121, 124, 173

- Michael Steffung, 365
 Miller, General S., 489
 Milly-devant-Deen, 358
 Missy-aux-Bois, 146, 155-158, 162
 Moirey, 360
 Monash, General, 276
 Monneaux, 88, 91, 93
 Mon Plaisir Farm, 221
 Mons, 232
 Montblainville, 246, 249
 Montdidier, 70, 73, 75, 86, 98, 100, 102, 112, 114, 128, 132
 Montdidier-Noyon Defensive, 82
 Montfaucon, 201, 236, 245, 248, 252, 329
 Monthurel, 123
 Montierchaume, 413
 Mt. Kemmel, 187, 194
 Montmedy, 364
 Montmirail, 106, 117, 123
 Montoir, 407, 413, 444
 Montrehain, 271
 Montreuil-St.-Aulde, 103
 Montrieul-aux-Lions, 106, 144
 Montrefagne, 297
 Mont St. Peré, 117
 Mont St. Pére-Charteves, 89
 Mont Sec, 58, 73, 206, 212, 223
 Moranville, 366
 Morgan-Harjes Ambulance Service, 430
 Morse, General B. O., 489
 Morton General C. G., 111, 308, 314, 332, 461
 Moselle River, 69, 186, 189, 204, 206, 209, 218, 280, 333, 362, 367, 370, 372
 Mosley, General G. Van H., 36
 Mouilly, 209
 Mouzay, 360
 Muir, General C. H., 79, 105, 123, 179, 239, 311, 320, 364, 460
 Muzon, 351, 361
 Nancy, 51, 190, 204, 230, 234
 Nantes, 424
 Nantillois, 248, 252, 292, 295
 Nauroy, 269, 271
 Neilles les Blequin, 79
 Nesles Forest, 180
 Neufchateau, 42, 46, 48, 189
 Neuilly, 430
 Nevers, 436
 Nivelle, General, 60
 Nolan, General D. E., 35
 Nomeny, 190, 192
 Nonsard, 214, 216, 223, 395
 "Notre Dame des Champs," 284
 Nouart, 341
 Noyon, 70, 98, 100, 102, 112, 114, 128
 Oches, 347
 O'Neal, Captain, 356
 Ordnance Department, 406
 Ornain, Valley, 42
 Ornes, 232, 294, 309, 311, 319, 335, 346, 354, 359, 360, 362, 365, 367
 Orty, 392
 O'Ryan, General John F., 187, 194, 265, 459
 Ostend, 332
 Ourcq River, 88, 93, 171, 177, 179, 195
 Painlevé, M., 29
 Palmer, Colonel J. McA., 35
 Palmer, Lt. Col. Frederick, 131, 291
 Pannes, 223, 395
 Paris, 35, 42, 51, 78, 82, 101, 105, 111, 114, 116, 131, 139, 171, 200, 217, 400, 404, 413, 431
 Paris-Metz Railroad, 116
 Paris-Metz Road, 92
 Paris-Soissons Road, 103, 139, 158, 160
 Parker, General, 169, 452, 463, 489
 Passchendaele Ridge, 54
 Passy-sur-Marne, 124
 Pell, General, 105
 Pelletier, General, 28, 42
 Peronne, 67, 85, 271
 Pershing, General John J., 27-29, 35, 42, 50, 56, 59, 67-69, 82, 106, 114, 122, 132, 137, 147, 183, 185, 186, 192, 198, 209, 225, 228, 236, 238, 242, 320, 327, 362, 365, 376, 397, 411, 431, 435, 440, 445, 492
 Pétain, General, 28, 53
 Peuvillers, 360
 Picardy, 72, 87
 Picpus Cemetery, 29
 Planchette Wood, 179
 Pleinchamps, 297
 Ploisy, 161-163
 Plumer, General, 194, 230
 Plummer, General E. H., 475
 Plunkett, Admiral C. P., 381
 Poincaré, President, 42
 Poinson, 407

Pont-à-Mousson, 57, 187, 189, 208

Poore, General B. A., 455

Port-sur-Seille, 363

Pouilly, 201, 347, 350, 354

Prauthoy, 111, 201

Prauthoy (Haute Marne), 66

Prémont, 272

Preny, 220, 364, 367

Priez, 173

Quart de Reserve, 214

Quinn, Second Lt. Jim, 152

Railroad Engineer Regiment, 73

Railway Artillery Reserve, 380, 383

Rambervilliers, 104

Ramboucourt, 57, 212

Rawlinson, General, 264, 266, 276, 396

Ravin aux Pierres, 325

Read, General G. W., 110, 194, 462

Red Cross, 430

Reed, General H. L., 170, 266

Regiment, 1st Gas, 338, 410

REGIMENTS

ARTILLERY

2nd, 372

5th, 51, 112

6th, 7th, 51

12th, 95

15th, 95, 344

17th, 95

28th, 77

81st, 83rd, 372

ARTILLERY, C. A. C.

6th, 7th, 8th, 380

42nd, 43rd, 381

44th, 384

51st, 380, 384

52nd, 380, 381

53rd, 380-382

55th, 56th, 383

57th, 58th, 59th, 65th, 384

73rd, 74th, 75th, 381

CAVALRY

2nd, 215

ENGINEERS

1st, 158, 303, 305, 314

2nd, 162, 354, 439

4th, 173, 248

7th, 356

103rd, 105, 124, 306

108th, 109

117th, 180

REGIMENTS

ENGINEERS

308th, 111

318th, 202

319th, 372

INFANTRY

4th, 90, 119, 173, 296, 300, 321, 323

6th, 199, 323, 356

7th, 90, 94, 119, 121, 173, 296, 321, 323

8th, 372

9th, 46, 64, 91, 94-96, 145, 147, 157, 220, 278, 280, 282, 327, 338, 344, 354

11th, 323, 329, 357

16th, 41, 51, 57, 59, 146, 158, 166, 223, 296, 301, 307, 319, 353

18th, 41, 51, 57, 59, 146, 158, 166, 223, 296, 301

23rd, 46, 91, 94-96, 145, 147, 157, 163, 220, 280, 282, 327, 338

26th, 41, 51, 59, 74, 77, 100, 146, 150, 151, 161, 166-168, 223, 292, 296, 300, 303, 305, 314, 353

28th, 41, 51, 59, 74, 146, 152, 157, 161, 166, 216, 223, 296, 301, 327, 353

30th, 90, 119, 173, 321, 323

34th, 366

38th, 90, 118, 121, 126, 137, 173, 219, 321, 323

39th, 248

47th, 148, 173, 179

55th, 56th, 366

58th, 295

59th, 226, 295

60th, 61st, 323, 325, 338, 357

64th, 366

101st, 61, 175, 358

102nd, 225, 358

103rd, 104th, 148, 358

106th, 269

107th, 108th, 269, 171

109th, 105, 123, 126, 297

110th, 105, 124, 297

111th, 105, 124, 175, 249, 253, 306

112th, 175, 246, 306

115th, 309

116th, 308

117th, 119th, 120th, 269

125th, 126th, 324

127th, 181, 324, 360

128th, 324, 360

129th, 130th, 366

131st, 109, 366

REGIMENTS

INFANTRY

132d, 109
 141st, 142nd, 282, 285
 143rd, 144th, 284
 164th, 176
 165th, 64, 176, 178, 324, 326
 166th, 167th, 64, 176, 324, 326
 168th, 64, 324, 326
 306th, 341
 307th, 298, 307, 326
 308th, 261, 298
 313th, 246, 249, 255
 314th, 249
 315th, 252, 255, 357
 316th, 251, 255, 257
 317th, 251, 296, 341
 318th, 296
 319th, 315, 339
 320th, 339
 321st, 367
 322nd, 365
 323rd, 367
 324th, 365
 325th, 325
 327th, 262, 305
 328th, 305, 325
 353rd, 355th, 356th, 354
 357th, 219
 358th, 187, 360
 359th, 360th, 219
 361st, 362nd, 363rd, 364th, 252
 365th, 367th, 367
 369th, 370th, 371st, 372nd, 480
 INFANTRY, FRENCH
 17th, 282
 MARINE CORPS
 5th, 41, 46, 91-93, 145, 147, 157,
 163rd, 221, 279, 282, 338, 348,
 354, 361, 439
 6th, 46, 91-93, 147, 158, 162, 221,
 279, 282, 338
 11th, 372
 Reims, 83, 97, 114, 117, 123, 127,
 132, 180, 230, 234, 276, 284, 288
 Rembercourt, 220, 366, 388
 Remouville, 236, 338
 Requeal, 269
 Requeville, 309
 Retz Forest, 134, 140, 144, 147, 154,
 159, 168
 Reville, 359
 Reynolds, Colonel C. R., 433
 Rhine Bridgehead, 354
 Rhine River, 363, 372
 Rhodes, General C. D., 354, 468

Ribeauville, 274
 Rice, General J. H., 445
 Richthofen's Circus, 160
 Robert-Espagne, 201
 Rochefort, 424
 Rockenback, General S. D., 395
 Rogers, General H. L., 418
 Romagne, 237, 315, 317, 321-325
 Romorantin, 392
 Roncheres, 176
 Roosevelt, Colonel Theodore, Jr., 77,
 353
 Rotterdam, 400
 Rowe, Major, 122
 Rupt-de-Mad, 213, 220, 364-366

 Saar Valley, 363
 Sage, General W. H., 483
 St. Agnan, 123, 126
 St. Aignan, 47, 188, 286, 353
 St. Benoit, 223
 St. Die, 110, 201
 St. Etienne, 279, 282
 St. Florent, 286
 St. Georges, 325, 330, 336, 338
 St. Hilaire, 225
 St. Juvin, 320, 325
 St. Loubes, 436
 Ste. Marie Farm, 219
 St. Maurice sous les Côtes, 383
 St. Menenhould, 204
 St. Mihiel, 50, 192, 198, 200, 203,
 212, 215, 221, 227, 327, 333, 364,
 380, 382, 384, 388, 395, 397,
 409, 428, 433
 St. Mihiel Salient, 64, 186, 190, 204,
 241
 St. Nazaire, 41, 46, 50, 109, 111,
 412, 417, 424, 437
 St. Omer, 103
 St. Pierre, 282
 St. Pierre-Aigle, 146
 St. Pierre-de Corps, 415
 St. Pierremont, 345
 St. Pol, 108
 St. Quentin, 67, 84, 230, 266, 288,
 316
 St. Quentin Canal, 267
 St. Remy, 224
 St. Souplet, 273
 St. Sulpice, 407, 413, 444
 Sambre Canal, 274
 Samegneux, 309
 Sammer, 79, 106, 109
 Samur, 287
 Sassey, 358

- Saulx-en-Woevre, 386
- Saizerais Sector, 189, 191
- Scarpe River, 370
- Scheldt Canal, 267
- Scheldt River, 370
- School, Candidates', 37
- School of the Line, 38
- Schools after Armistice, 40
- Schools, Army, 37
- Schools, Corps, 37
- Scott, General W. S., 486
- Sedan, 208, 232, 234, 242, 336, 346, 352
- Seicheprey, 59, 72, 206, 214
- Seigneulles Brook, 364
- Selle River, 273
- Sensee River, 230
- Sept Bois, 173
- Sergy, 177, 179
- Serieux Farm, 253, 256, 260, 292
- Seringes, 178
- Seringes et Nesles, 179
- S. O. S., 38, 186, 190, 287, 392, 396, 400, 411, 412, 432, 435, 437, 444, 453
- Sharp, Ambassador, 29
- Sibert, General W. L., 41, 57, 452
- Signal Corps, 385, 396
- Sillon-Fontaine Farm, 358
- Sims, Admiral William S., 27
- Sivry, 312, 335
- Sivry-le-Buzancy, 339
- Sivry-sur-Meuse, 294, 354
- Smith, Colonel Hamilton A., 169
- Smith, General W. R., 188, 466, 483
- Suippes, 105, 131, 229, 277
- Soissons, 132, 135, 148, 152, 156, 160, 162, 168, 176, 180, 195, 291, 327, 353, 444
- Solferino Farm, 358
- Somme-Py, 277, 288
- Sommerance, 315, 317, 324
- Somme River, 108, 218, 273
- Sommerville, 51
- Somme-Suippes, 284
- Southampton, 380
- Spitaals-Bosschen, 370
- Staff, Administrative, 31
- Staff College, 37
- Staff, General, A. E. F., 30
- Staff, Technical, 31
- Stark, Colonel A. N., 433
- Stenay, 354, 360
- Stonne, 350, 352
- Strong, General F. S., 202, 485
- Sturgis, General S. D., 491
- Sty, 350
- Summerall, General C. P., 57, 144, 158, 166, 169, 192, 209, 258, 291, 312, 317, 319, 327, 353, 452
- Supreme Allied Council of War, 55
- Surmelin River, 117, 121, 123
- Swift, General E., 108, 474
- Tailly, 341
- Tank Battalion, 301st, 268, 374, 396
- Tank Battalion, 5th French, 76
- Tank Battalions, 2nd and 3rd French, 279, 283
- Tank Brigade, 1st, 395
- Tank Brigades, 3rd and 5th British, 268
- Tank Corps, 393
- Tannay, 349
- Thermonges, 341
- Thiacourt, 220, 222
- Thielt, 370
- Thinte River, 359
- Tigny, 157, 162
- Tonmerre, 201
- Torcy, 88, 92, 94, 127, 148
- Toul, 57, 65, 69, 186, 190, 200, 203, 206, 209, 286
- Toul Sector, 57, 60, 65, 69, 108, 188, 206, 208
- Tournai, 370
- Tours, 35, 50, 391, 400, 431, 435
- Traub, General P. M., 239, 257, 364, 465
- Trench Mortar Battalions, 385
- Triacourt, 285
- Triangle Farme, 92, 94
- Trieste, 53
- Tronsol Farm, 253, 292, 296
- Tronville 194
- Troyes, 380
- Trungy, 172, 174
- Tuilerie Farm, 344
- Tuttle, Colonel A. D., 418, 432
- Uniform, 44
- Upper Alsace, 287
- Valdahon, 202
- Valenciennes, 232, 273, 332, 370
- Vandieres, 219
- Varennes, 121, 246
- Vaucoulers, 46
- Vauquois, 246, 259
- Vaux, 82, 87, 91, 93, 95, 102, 124, 127, 134, 148, 184

- Vaux-Audigny, 273
 Vauxcastille, 156
 Vencheres Woods, 219
 Vendhuile, 267
 Verdun, 64, 132, 186, 194, 203, 206,
 218, 230-232, 234, 236, 294
 Verpel, 341
 Verrieres, 347
 Very, 246, 260
 Vesle River, 135, 171, 178, 182, 185,
 188, 195, 198, 387, 409
 Vierstraat Ridge, 195
 Vierzy, 147, 155, 157
 Vigneulles, 216, 224, 395
 Ville-devant-Chaumont, 359
 Villemontey, 354
 Villeneuve Farm, 357
 Villers-Cotterets, 135, 156
 Villers-devant-Dun, 341
 Villers-sous-Premy, 219
 Vilosnes-sur-Meuse, 357
 Vimy Ridge, 53
 Vincelles, 88
 Vionville, 365
 Vitry-le-François, 105
 Vive St. Eloi, 370
 Viviani, M., 29
 Volker Stellung, 236, 247, 249
 Voneq, 336
 Von Gallowitz, General, 210, 218
 Von Hutier, General, 162
 Voormezele, 195
 Vosges Mountains, 57, 61, 78, 103,
 110, 128, 135, 188, 199, 201,
 264, 410
 Wadelincourt, 353
 Wadhaus, Colonel, S. H., 418, 432
 Wassieu Brook, 295
 Watou, 110
 Watronville, 209
 Wavrille, 360
 Weigel, General, 364, 475, 487
 Wellborn, General, 395
 Whitney, General H. H., 483
 Whittlesey, Major C., 261, 298, 301,
 307
 Wilder, General W. E., 488
 Winn, General, 188, 476
 Wise, Colonel, 325
 Wittenmayer, General, 364
 Woel, 223, 395
 Woivre, 206, 225, 358
 Wood, General L., 110, 476
 Wooldridge, Captain, 119
 Wright, General W. M., 111, 188,
 209, 327, 344, 361, 365
 Wytschaete Ridge, 195
 Xamess, 220
 Xivray, 59, 206, 209
 Youcq, 350
 Ypres, 54, 194, 230, 266, 369
 Ypres Canal, 194

AUG 14 1928